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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of international joint venture activities in 
Taiwan. The primary purpose of this study is to examine control and its antecedents in 
terms of ownership, bargaining power, resources contribution, and motivation for 
forming international joint ventures. 
Primary data collected by means of a mail questionnaire is analysed along five core 
dimensions of international joint venture activities. First, the mechanism, focus, and 
extent of parent control is identified and tested in a number of sample characteristics. This 
empirical results also reveal that most joint ventures in Taiwan have higher autonomy and 
have more autonomy on the appointment of key function managers. Supporting results 
reveal that parent firms seek to focus their control over specific activities of the joint 
ventures rather than attempting to control the entire range of joint venture activities. 
Second, the results of equity shares held by the host country parents and foreign parents 
show that both parents have minority shareholding in the joint ventures. The results also 
reveal that a higher ownership by the parents in joint ventures indicates that they have a 
higher percentage of board members. Supporting evidence is found that ownership is 
significantly correlated with control. Parents can gain more control of their joint venture 
through obtaining higher equity shares in such ventures. 
Third, the relative importance of a set of bargaining power is identified and hypothesis 
tested the relationship between control and bargaining power. There is little evidence 
found that the relationship between bargaining power and control is not closely 
associated. 
Fourth, the relative importance of resource contribution by parents is identified and 
hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and resource contribution 
factors. The results are strongly supported that the relationships between resource 
contributions in terms of physical, invisible, financial, human, and organizational ability of 
parents and their control has significant and positive associations. The greater the resource 
contribution of parents to joint ventures, the greater their control in joint ventures. 
Fifth, the relative importance of a set of motives for international joint venture formation 
is identified and hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and motivation 
factors in terms of technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, competitive 
strategy consideration, resource complementarity, market expansion. The findings reveal 
a limited number of significant correlations between motivation factors and control. 
These findings reveal that there are many possible explanations for forming an 
international joint venture with respect to different theoretical perspectives. The motives 
for forming an IJV might be to acquire critical resources in order to overcome a 
transaction difficulty (transaction cost perspective and resource dependency perspective), 
or to achieve a specific strategic objective (strategic behaviour perspective), or to benefit 
from knowledge learning (organizational learning perspective), or include all these 
motives at the same time. Different motives will result in a different influence on the 
extent of control. Therefore, we suggest that the parent companies can employ various 
degrees of control over their joint ventures according to their main motives. 
The findings indicate that among the four antecedent dimensions, ownership and resource 
contributions demonstrate significant strong and positive linkages with the extent of 
control. Parent companies can increase their control in their joint venture through the 
acquisition of a higher proportion of the N's equity shares or by contributing large and/or 
significant resources to their joint venture. However, the two other antecedents, 
bargaining power and the motives for forming an IN have only tenuous relationships with 
the extent of control. Parent companies can increase directly or indirectly their influence 
and power over the joint venture. 
According to this finding, the international joint venture is an effective mode to achieve a 
parent company's objectives. We suggest that Taiwanese enterprises can create IJVs to 
achieve their strategic objectives. 
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1.1 The Research Background 
With the world economic scene growing rapidly and markets becoming globalized and 
more competitive, most enterprises face intensified competition and severe challenges. 
Because of changes in global economic circumstances, international cooperation has had 
a tendency to increase (Buckley, 1994; Teece, 1992; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; 
Hergert and Morris, 1988). International cooperation may involve several modes such as 
franchising, strategic alliance, joint venture, and licensing, etc. Comparing all of them, 
International Joint Venture (IJV) are commonly used by firms as a means of competing 
within global competitive markets (Harrigan, 1988). International Joint Venture has 
been perceived as an effective competitive strategy (Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Harrigan, 
1987) and a key entry mode into foreign markets (Child and Faulkner, 1998; Beamish, 
1985). IN has become one of the most important topics in international business. 
The attraction of IN lies in the advantages which it can offer to both multinational firms 
and local firms. For multinational firms, several advantages can be obtained, such as: 
sharing business risk and costs, attaining economies of scale, overcoming market barriers, 
acquiring raw materials at a lower cost, and so on. For local firms, the benefits include 
new competencies to improve management by transferring tacit knowledge, increasing 
local managerial flexibility, obtaining complementary contributions of technology or 
know-how, etc. Therefore, the IN has been perceived as an increasingly important 
strategic weapon for competing within a firm's core technologies, management and 
markets (Buckley and Casson, 1996; Dunning, 1988a; Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Harrigan, 1986; Beamish, 1985). 
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Due to globalization, more countries are opening up their markets. As a newly developed 
country, Taiwan faces pressures from opening its market that stem from 
internationalization. Thus, the government of Taiwan abolished the restrictive policies 
on foreign investment and implemented a set of economic plans to stimulate national and 
inward investments in 1949. The government has strongly encouraged foreign 
investments and that brings many foreign companies or multinational enterprises into 
Taiwan and encourages cooperation with Taiwanese companies. One mode for foreign 
enterprises entering Taiwan is the international joint venture which plays a vital role in 
the development of the Taiwan economy. 
Taiwanese companies have been encouraged by the government to obtain rapid access to 
capital, technology, management knowledge and export markets by adopting an IN. 
Sometimes the government would invite foreign and domestic enterprises to form an IN 
for particular products. For example, in December 1986, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs encouraged the formation of IN for 26 industrial products, including seven types 
of electrical machinery, three types of industrial materials, nine types of information and 
electronics products, three types of chemical engineering products, and four types of 
textile products. ' 
One particular example is the motor industry. Since 1953, the government has helped 
the motor industry to be independent, not to rely on government protection. The 
government achieves this by (a) imposing high tariffs, and (b) encouraging cooperation 
between major foreign companies and domestic motor companies. This allows domestic 
companies to obtain the final production design technology from the co-operators and 
also helps produce a higher self-manufactured rate. Therefore, nine of eleven motor 
manufacturing companies have used an IN in the cooperative mode; the detail is shown 
in Table I. I. Moreover, from the statistics of the Investment Commissions of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, IN is used not only in manufacturing industries, but also 




Table 1.1 The Cooperation between Taiwanese Companies and Foreign Companies in the Motor 
Tnrinetrv in Taiwan 
Taiwanese companies Nationality of foreign company Equity shareholding of fore 
Yulon Motor Co. Japan 25% 
China Motor Co. Japan 21.4% 
Ford Motors Canada 70% 
Sanfu Motors Co. France 44.4% 
San an Industxy Co. American 13.5% 
Kuozui Motors Co. Japan 47.2% 
Da-Cing Motor Co. Japan 25% 
Taiwan Isuzu Co. Japan 51% 
Chinchun German 33.3 
Prince Motor Co. Ja an, American Technical cooperation 
Goldsur Japan Technical cooperation 
source: Taiwan Motor Industries Association, 1998. 
By utilising the IN, Taiwanese companies have cooperated well with foreign partners 
and have acquired management knowledge and technological skills from partners which 
in turn has increased their competitive abilities. As a result, Taiwan has fast economic 
development and attracts many foreign companies to seek partnership with Taiwan 
companies. Taiwan has become a leading nation in global trade and provides a perfect 
model of transparent economic development for the rest of Asia. 
Most researches focus on the developed countries and developing countries; however, 
Taiwan, as a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC), plays an intermediate and vital role 
between developed and developing countries because of her successful development 
experience. Based on the study of the strategic alliance between Canada and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries of Pacific Asia, Hung (1992) stressed that the NICs are 
particularly important because they provide the gateway to other countries' markets in 
the region such as China, Japan and Indonesia. Especially, since the "reopening" policy 
of China for business in 1978, China has implemented plans for rapid economic growth 
by freeing up agriculture, loosening central control on regional government enterprises, 
opening foreign investment, and encouraging private domestic business (Barro, 2002). 
This results in a lot of foreign investments flowing into China. Unfortunately, it seems 
that major difficulties have been encountered by many IN's in the People's Republic 
4 
Chapter 1 
China (PRC) (Shenkar, 1990) and have often led to foreign parent's dissatisfaction and 
high failure rates (Dacin, Hitt, and Levitas, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Kogut, 1989; Beamish, 
1988). 
However, with the great potential of the market place, China has still attracted many 
foreign investors. Therefore, how to successfully enter China is an important issue for 
multinational enterprises. On this issue, Taiwan can play an intermediate and vital role 
between Western countries and China, because of its successful cooperation experience 
with foreign partners and its location to and similar culture with Mainland China. 
Most multinational enterprises deem Taiwan's experience as a touchstone of entering 
Asian markets, especially Mainland China. For example, the Cetelem Bank which is a 
subsidiary of the Franch BNP-Paribas group, built its first Asian branch in Taiwan in 
1998.2 Cetelem Bank occupies a leading position in the European market and has close 
cooperation with global enterprises such as Dell and Carrefour. Cetelem Bank expanded 
its overseas subsidiaries more actively since the middle period of 1990s in order to 
achieve its strategy objective which was to become the largest financial products 
company in the world. Taiwan is its first branch in Asian. The manager of BNP-Paribas 
believes that without studying Taiwan's experience, success in doing business with China 
will be very difficult to achieve. 
In addition, according to the data provided by the Japan Interchange Association, 
between 2000 and 2002,63 IJVs cooperated with Taiwan to successfully enter China's 
markets. 3 This phenomenon that foreign companies cooperate with Taiwanese 
enterprises to enter the mainland China and to seek "double win" have increased 
continuously. For example, the biggest optical lens company worldwide, the Asia- 
Optical Company is the most popular company that has Taiwanese and Japanese joint 
ventures in China. Sixteen Japanese companies including Ricoh, Nikon and Pioneer are 
all cooperating with it to establish factories in China. The mean reasons for forming an 
IJV with Taiwanese companies to access China are the advantages gained from their 
long-term cooperative relationships and Taiwan's background with China. As Taiwan 
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plays an intermediate and vital role between Western countries and China, it is 
worthwhile to understand how the international joint venture is operated in Taiwan. 
IN has its strategic value and benefits; however, it is not without its difficulties. 
Forming an IN often involves partners from different countries. The presence of two or 
more parents can make the situation difficult to manage. Different partner's nationalities, 
strategic objectives, management style, and organizational cultures can create conflicts 
between partners that result in the instability, low performance and high failure rate 
(Brannen and Salk, 2000; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Dacin, Hitt and Levitas, 1997; Parkhe, 
1993; Kogut, 1989; Beamish, 1988; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Reynolds, 1984; 
Killing, 1983). This phenomenon is not only peculiar to western countries but can also 
occur in Taiwan. When firms consider developing their markets through IJVs, they must 
evaluate the conditions and consequences to their ownership resources before making 
any investment decisions. Each partner must negotiate with other partners in order to 
decide what contributions will be made by each and what proportion of ownership will 
be allocated to each one. Thus, it is important to learn more about the fundamental 
issues with respect to international joint ventures. What factors will affect the host 
country parents to exercise control over the joint venture. What factors will affect the 
equity shares of the joint venture held by the parents? What kinds of resources will be 
contributed by the host country parents and what influence will these contributions have 
on the management of the joint venture? What motives do the host country parents have 
for forming international joint ventures; and are there any influences regarding different 
motivations? What factors will affect the bargaining power when the host country 
parents negotiate with foreign partners? All these issues are worth examining and can 
help understanding of how international joint ventures have been undertaken in Taiwan. 
Numerous studies of joint ventures have addressed the main points of motivation, control 
and performance. However, Parkhe (1993) argues that the dimensions of joint ventures 
(motives for joint venture formation, partner selection or characteristics, control/conflict, 
and stability/performance) have previously been investigated, and cannot be viewed as 
separate phenomenon, and need to be re-conceptualized into an integrative framework. 
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Therefore, this study attempts to draw the following dimensions together which are 
motivation, contribution, ownership, bargaining power and control in order to have a 
clearer picture of all the relative activities of the international joint venture. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
Taiwan must upgrade its industry structure from the demands of labour structure to the 
demands of technology and capital, at this time it faces intensified global competition. It 
needs various resources contributed by foreign firms. These resources include capital, 
raw materials, management knowledge, marketing ability, productive skills, and new 
product development, etc. The international joint venture is an effective model to 
achieve the Taiwanese company's objectives and has been adopted by many local 
enterprises. While the international joint venture is becoming a popular and effective 
investment strategy, making significant contributions to Taiwan's economy, a closer 
examination of its nature is justified. 
Thus, the objectives of this study are presented as follows. 
I. To clarify the type of control and the extent of control 
Although the international joint venture has been used universally; there are still 
problems associated with the relationship between the partners. Major problems arise in 
the negotiation, planning and management when the IN is formed by more than two 
firms which have different cultures, strategic objectives, contributions and management 
methods. This often results in a high failure rate (Dacin, Hitt and Levitas, 1997; Parkhe, 
1993; Kogut, 1989; Beamish, 1988). Therefore, control is a particularly important 
research topic in relation to the internal dynamics of the IN. Theoretically speaking, 
control offers a company an excellent opportunity to determine the most effective use of 
resources. This may improve the efficiency and profitability of the parent companies. 
Thus, it is important to learn more about the precursors of control. What factors affect 
the issue of control? What type and what extent of control does the parent company 
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have over the joint venture? What is the relationship between the extent of control and 
its antecedent factors? To answer these questions is the main objective of this study. 
H. To identify the relationship between ownership and control 
There is substantial literary research to describe the relationship between ownership and 
control; however, some research results are conflicting. Blodgett, 1991; Fagre and Wells, 
1982; Stopford and Wells, 1972 all use the ownership as a proxy for management 
control in joint ventures. From the result of their investigation in China, Child and Yan 
(1999) indicate that equity share is the major factor for the exercise of strategic control 
and also influences operational control. They suggest that the parent company should 
acquire a larger equity share, because this could increase the parent company's ability to 
influence the strategic direction of the international joint venture. 
However, in his research sample, Lecraw (1984) finds that the link between the level of 
ownership and control may not be straightforward. It depends on the type of technology 
transferred, the capabilities of the local partners, and the host government policies. 
Multinational enterprises may be able to control the operations of its subsidiary without 
majority ownership, or, conversely, may have little control over these operations despite 
majority ownership. In addition, in their case study, Yan and Gray (1994) also argue 
that equity structure is not equivalent to management control. From the controversial 
results of empirical studies, can we indicate a significantly positive correlation between 
the ownership and control in the Newly Industrialized Countries context, particularly in 
the case of Taiwan? If so, does a larger equity share provide more control? 
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III. To investigate the factor of bargaining power 
There is little research on bargaining power in terms of the IN. The literature on IJVs 
has not addressed the issue of bargaining power in detail, with a few exceptions (Combe 
and Mucchielli, 1998; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1994; Kobrin, 1987; 
Lecraw, 1984; Fagre and Wells, 1982). However, previous researchers discussed the 
topic of bargaining power using different variables and methods, and focused more on 
the precursors of bargaining power. Therefore, one of the aims of this study is the 
attempt to highlight previously unidentified factors in relation to bargaining power in the 
international joint venture context. 
IV. To explore the relationship between bargaining power, ownership and 
control 
If a parent company has more bargaining power will it have a larger equity share and 
greater control over the joint venture? Previous research suggests that the bargaining 
power of the partners is a critical variable in determining the patterns of control in joint 
ventures (Blodgett, 1991; Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Lecraw, 1984). For example, 
Lecraw (1984) finds a significant association between bargaining power and control. 
Using the perspective of bargaining power, Yan and Gray (1994) also indicate that the 
bargaining power between parents will affect the control of IN. Although previous 
researchers investigated the relationship between bargaining power and control, the 
results are difficult to compare because they have measured both variables differently. 
Therefore, one of the aims of this study is the attempt to elucidate the relationship 
between bargaining power and control. 
In his empirical study, Lecraw (1984) finds that the bargaining power of multinational 
firms and host LDCs has a strong influence on the percentage of equity ownership. He 
suggests that the greater the bargaining power possessed by the host country, the greater 
the level of local ownership gained by domestic stakeholders. Fagre and Wells (1982) 
use a bargaining power framework to explore the relationship between the multinational 
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firms' characteristics and the proportion of equity ownership. They regard equity 
ownership as an outcome of negotiation. However, prior studies investigated the 
relationship between bargaining power and ownership by using different perspectives and 
objectives. This study discusses the relationship between bargaining power and 
ownership based on the bargaining power theory. 
V. To explore the relationship between the partner's motivations and their 
contribution to the IJV 
Why should one company wish to cooperate with other foreign companies? A number 
of theories and hypotheses have been proposed to explain the reasons for the formation 
of the international joint venture. The main theories relate to resource dependence 
theory, transaction cost theory, strategic contingency theory and organizational learning 
theory. Prior studies proposed that there are many motives or factors which may 
influence the formation of international joint ventures. However, there are some 
different results which stem from partner variables, different approach aspects and 
different research samples. There are many possible explanations of the motives for the 
formation of IJVs. Do all of these theories fit the Taiwanese context? In Taiwan, can 
we explain the motives for forming an international joint venture in relation to other 
variables by identifying similar or opposing fundamental concepts? 
Firms will cooperate with other partners by forming joint ventures when they can benefit 
from other partner's knowledge or advantages (Hamel, 1991; Badaracco, 1991; Ciborra, 
1991; ' Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982). And many previous 
studies point out that one of the motivations for forming a joint venture is resource 
complementarity (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Beamish, 1985; Harrigan, 1985; Killing, 
1983; Pfeffer and Salabcik, 1978; Zald, 1970; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967; 
Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Selznick, 1948). But what kind of motives for forming the 
IN will affect the parent company's resource contribution to the joint venture has not 
been discussed precisely. 
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Therefore, one of the objectives of this study is to explore the relationship between the 
partner's motivations and their contribution to the IN. 
VI. To examine the relationship among motivations, resource contributions, 
bargaining power, ownership and control 
As Parkhe (1993) argues that most dimensions of joint ventures have previously been 
investigated, and cannot be viewed as separate phenomenon, and need to be re- 
conceptualized into an integrative framework. Therefore, this study attempts to draw 
the following dimensions together viz, motivation, contribution, ownership, bargaining 
power and control. The relationships between the above dimensions will be discussed in 
order to have a clearer picture of all the relative activities of international joint ventures. 
Once the research objectives have been demonstrated, we need to clarify the term of 
international joint venture which is described in the following section. 
1.3 Definition of International Joint Venture 
The term of international joint venture has become generally used to describe a wide 
variety of collaborative agreements between firms. There have been some difficulties in 
defining international joint ventures precisely because the concept has been viewed as 
covering numerous situations. Many empirical studies have given many definitions but 
there has been no systematic adoption of a universally accepted definition (Young et al., 
1989). Therefore, it is important to understand and define the nature of international 
joint ventures clearly before moving further into this study. 
In order to understand the meaning of the international joint venture, we first have to 
describe the meaning of joint venture. Friedman and Kalmanoff (1961) in their 
pioneering study adopt a very broad definition of joint ventures as: "any type of 
association which implies collaboration for more than a transitory period". However that 
definition is too broad, it cannot describe the characteristics of joint venture. 
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Recognising the lack of a clearer definition, Sukijasovic (1970) stresses four distinctive 
features of a joint venture, namely "a community of interests involving doing business in 
common, the sharing of profits, the sharing of business risks and losses, and longevity of 
cooperation". Tomlinson (1970) defines that a joint venture is: "the commitment for 
more than a very short duration of funds, facilities and services by two or more legally 
separate interests to an enterprise for their mutual benefit". Young and Bradford (1977) 
also define a corporate joint venture as: "An enterprise, corporation or partnership, 
formed by two or more companies, individuals, or organizations, at least one of which is 
an operating entity that wished to broaden its activities, for the purpose of conducting a 
new, profit-motivated business of permanent duration". 
Harrigan (1985) defines a joint venture as: "separate entities with two or more active 
businesses as partners". Christelow (1987) broadly defines joint ventures to: "include 
both jointly owned business enterprises and long term contracts covering supplies, 
technology exchange, production methods, licensing agreements and the like". Kogut 
(1988) suggests that: "a joint venture occurs when two or more firms pool a portion of 
their resources within a common legal organization". Beamish (1988) defines joint 
ventures as: "shared-equity undertakings between two or more parties, each of which 
holds at least five percent of the equity". Borys and Jemison (1989) define a joint 
venture as: "joint ventures result in the creation of a new organization that is formally 
independent of the parents; control over and responsibility for the venture vary greatly 
among specific cases". Lyons (1991) defines a joint venture as: "joint venture is 
cooperative forms of organization between independent parties who could otherwise 
engage in competition or have a competitive potential". Driscoll and Paliwoda (1997), in 
studying the mode of entry decision, identify the joint venture as one of the main choices 
of mode of entry to new markets. In their study, they define the joint venture as "the 
pooling of assets in common ownership and separate organizations by two or more firms 
who share joint ownership and control over the use and output of these assets (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988). " 
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Joint ventures can be divided into two classes: equity joint ventures and non-equity joint 
ventures. For the definition of equity joint venture, the OECD (1984) stresses it as "an 
equity joint venture implies the sharing of assets, risks and profits, and participation in 
the ownership (i. e. equity) of a particular enterprise or investment project by more than 
one firm or economic `group' ". Killing (1988) views it as "traditional joint ventures", 
which is created when two or more partners join forces to establish a newly incorporated 
company in which each has an equity position, thereby each expects a proportional share 
of dividend as compensation and representation on the board of directors. 
Beamish and Banks (1987) define equity joint ventures as: "shared equity undertakings 
between two or more parties". Geringer and Hebert (1989) address that joint ventures 
involve two or more legally distinct organizations, each of which actively participates in 
the decision making activities of the jointly owned entity. If at least one parent 
organization has headquarters outside the joint venture's country of operation, or if the 
venture has a significant level of operations in more than one country, then it is 
considered to be an international joint venture. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) defines 
equity-based joint venture as "an alliance that combines resources from more than one 
organization to create a new organizational entity, which is distinct from its parents". 
In contrast, non-equity joint ventures are agreements between partners to cooperate in 
some ways, but they do not involve the creation of new firms. Wright (1981) defines a 
contractual joint venture as: 
"a risk-sharing venture in which no joint enterprise with separate personality is 
formed. It is a partnership in which two or more companies (or a company and a 
government agency) share the cost of an investment, the risks and the long term 
profits. The contractual joint venture may be formed for a particular project of 
limited duration, or for a longer term cooperative effort, and the contractual 
relationship may terminate once the project is complete". (Wright, 1981) 
Some international joint ventures are formed on an equity basis and may have more than 
two parents. Habib and Burnett (1989) define an international joint venture as "the 
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national firm from the country where the joint venture located is commonly referred to as 
the host, local or domestic partner". Shenkar and Zeira (1987) elucidate international 
joint venture as: (Mead, 1994) 
" The IN is created by the investments of two or more parent firms; 
" It is a separate legal organizational entity, and belongs entirely to neither / none of its 
parents; 
" It is jointly controlled by its parents; 
" These parents are legally independent of each other; 
" The headquarters of at least one parent is located outside the country in which the IN 
operates. 
On the studying of generic differences between equity international joint ventures (EIJV), 
international acquisitions and international Greenfield investments, Newburry and Zeira 
(1997a) define the EIN as below 
"An equity international joint venture is a separate legal organizational entity 
representing the partial holdings of two or more parent firms, in which the 
headquarters of at least one is located outside the country of operation of the 
joint venture. This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms, 
each of which is economically and legally independent of the other. " (Shenkar 
and Zeira, 1987, p. 547). 
From above relative literatures, this study compiled different definitions of joint venture 
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According to the above literature and the purpose of this study, the international joint 
venture should encompass such characteristics as: 
" International joint venture is formed by two or more partners; 
" At least one of the parent's headquarters is located outside the joint venture's country 
of operation; 
. At least two parents of different nationality hold at least five percent of the equity. 
Therefore, this study refers to the international joint venture as: a newly legal 
organizational which is created by two or more partners. These parents share the control 
over the joint venture. And at least one of the parent's headquarter is located outside the 
country in which international joint venture operates. 
1.4 Organisation of the Study 
This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. Chapter One demonstrates the research 
background, objectives of the study, the definition of international joint venture, and the 
organisation of this study. 
Chapter Two begins by describing the historical development of Taiwan including the 
political background, economic policy, and political system. It also examines the trends 
of foreign investments up to date and the general characteristics of foreign investments in 
Taiwan. The chronological sequence of relevant legislation and government policy are 
described briefly. 
Chapter Three examines the theoretical foundations for the present research. The 
literature review provides a critical analysis of the control in international joint ventures. 
Literature relating to management control and theoretical and empirical literatures with 
respect to control in joint ventures is reviewed. 
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Chapter Four describes the antecedents of control in international joint ventures 
separately. Alternative theoretical rationales for international joint ventures in terms of 
resource dependence theory, transaction cost theory, strategic contingency theory, 
organizational learning theory are reviewed. The research framework and testing 
hypotheses are developed in this chapter. 
Chapter Five describes the research design and methodology employed in this study. An 
overview of the research process is examined first. The research design then is 
developed for this study. The research design is divided into ten subsections which 
include the purpose of the study, types of investigation, extent of researcher interference, 
time horizon, study setting, unit of analysis, sampling design, measurement, data 
collection and data analysis methods. Each of ten topics is examined in detail. The 
profile of the sample characteristics derived from this study is examined. 
Chapter Six analyzes the questionnaire derived from this empirical survey of Taiwanese 
international joint ventures. There are five core research dimensions in this study which 
are control, ownership, bargaining power, contribution and motivation. Each core 
research dimension is examined by its empirical results and its relationships with the 
characteristics of the sample which encompasses nationality or region, industry, size of 
the host country parents, ages of the host country parents and the joint ventures, and the 
number of board members in the joint ventures. The important results derived from each 
core research dimension of this empirical survey are examined. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the relationships between control and its antecedents which 
are motivation, contribution, bargaining power and ownership. It details the analytical 
processes and results between control and its antecedents. The hypotheses are examined 
in this chapter. 
Chapter Eight outlines the empirical results derived from this study. Further research is 




Chapter Nine examines the finding's implications for both theory and managerial 
implication. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter has indicated the background and objectives of this study; it provides a 
definition of the international joint venture and gives an outline of the chapters. Most 
research has focused on the motivation, contribution, partner selection/characteristics, 
control/conflict, and stability/ performance. However, there is little research on the 
relationship between bargaining power, ownership and control. And there are very few 
studies focusing on these issues in the Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) context. The 
primary purpose of this study is not to develop the theory relating to international joint 
ventures. It is an attempt to investigate the relationships between motivations, 
contributions, bargaining power, ownership and control associated with the international 
joint venture in Taiwan. This research is one of the few studies on international joint 
venture issues that have simultaneously addressed the perceptions of motivation, 
contribution, bargaining power, ownership and control in the NIC context. 
The following chapter provides an overview of foreign investments in Taiwan which can 
give a background to economic development before it launches into the topic of 
international joint ventures in Taiwan. 
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I Referred from China Post, Dec. 17,1986, at 7. 
2 Chinatimes, April 22,2001, at 6. 
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN 
2.1 Introduction 
r 
In Chapter 1, the background and objectives of this study have been indicated and the 
definition of International Joint Venture has been provided. This study focuses on the 
IN in the Taiwan context; therefore, this chapter is attempted to provide an overview of 
economic development of Taiwan before we launch into the topic of International Joint 
Venture. To understand the economic evolution of Taiwan, it is necessary to view the 
development of the island from at least a century-long perspective. Section 2.2 
introduces the territory, population, climate and major cities of Taiwan. Business 
environments are described in Section 2.3. Three subsections focus on the political 
background, economic situation and political system of Taiwan. Section 2.4 presents an 
overview of foreign investment in Taiwan, including the trends in foreign investment in 
recent times, geographic and industry characteristics of foreign investment. Taiwan's 
advantages are described in Section2.5. Section 2.6 draws a brief conclusion of this 
chapter. 
2.2 General Introduction of Taiwan 
The relevant backgrounds with regard to Taiwan are described in this section. The 
territory, population, climate and major cities of Taiwan are outlined briefly to provide 
some basic understanding of Taiwan. 
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2.2.1 The Territory of Taiwan 
The Industrial Development & Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic Affairs (2005) 
claims that the territory of Taiwan under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China (ROC) 
has two areas. The main area is Taiwan area, which includes the Taiwan Island, Penghu 
Islands, Green Island, Lanyu Island and the Tiaoyutai Island. The second area 
encompasses Kinmen Island and Matsu Island. In total the area of Taiwan is 36,000 
square kilometres. 
Taiwan is situated at a strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region, linking Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia and facing mainland China. The Taiwan Strait separates Taiwan 
and mainland China; it is an essential passage for major transportation routes of East 
Asia. Compared with Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore, Taiwan has the shortest 
sailing time to five major Asia-Pacific harbours. Similarly, Taiwan also has the shortest 
flying time to seven major cities in the Western Pacific. Obviously, it can be seen that 
Taiwan has a great geographical superiority. 
Taiwan Island is shaped like a leaf and stretches 386 kilometres from north to south. 
Roughly two-thirds of the island is hilly and mountainous terrain, only approximately 
one-third of the island is suitable for cultivation (Richard, 2001). 22 million people live 
in 36,000 square kilometres. Although the rugged landscape and population growth has 
imposed limitations for agriculture, Taiwan can still provide the world with other 
products and most computer components. Indeed, Taiwan as a whole has gone from 
being an agricultural base to a densely populated urban industrial society within a century 
(Richard, 2001). 
2.2.2 The Population, Climate and Major Cities of Taiwan 
According to a census conducted in December 2003, the total population was 22.689 
million. ' The population density was 626.98 people per square kilometer at that time. 
It is apparent that Taiwan is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. 
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The Tropic of Cancer passes through the centre of Taiwan, creating two distinct climatic 
zones in Taiwan. Therefore, the south of Taiwan is tropical and the north is subtropical. 
The general climate is typically hot (averaging 20 degrees Celsius), rainy and with 
seasonal typhoons. * However, Taiwan is always blessed with a good climate. 
The administrative areas of Taiwan consist of 21 cities and two special municipalities. 
These two special municipalities are Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. For Taipei City, it 
is surrounded by several sub-municipalities comprising the greater Taipei area. 
Especially, the central government of the ROC is located in Taipei City, and most 
company headquarters are also located in Taipei, making Taipei city the political and 
commercial centre of Taiwan. As for Kaohsiung City, it is an important industrial city in 
southern Taiwan. In the past, many heavy industries have located in or around 
Kaohsiung City, and oil refineries, steel mills, and shipbuilding yards are still all located 
in this area. In addition, the city also has one airport and one harbour. Shiaogang 
Airport handles both international and domestic flights, Kaohsiung harbour is the largest 
harbour in the ROC. Therefore, these two special municipalities play an important role 
in Taiwan's economic development. 
2.3 Business Environments in Taiwan 
After World War II, the success of the economic development in Taiwan was recognised 
worldwide, and its experience became a good model for other developing countries 
wishing to create similar a successful economic development. Ranis (2002) identified 
Taiwan as a role model of economic development as "neither miracle nor crisis", but 
favourable initial conditions supported with the sound governance of flexible policies. 
Ranis (2002) also summarized three conclusions as follow: (1) the success of Taiwan is a 
combination of favourable initial conditions and largely induced appropriate policy 
responses, therefore the experience is not a "miracle". (2) The favourable initial 
conditions consist of three points-a Japanese colonial heritage, the condition of 
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substantial entrepreneurial talents as well as capital to the system's total resources in 
1949, and the virtual absence of natural resources. (3) The eight elements of policy 
decisions that helped Taiwan avoid the worst of the East Asian crisis. These eight 
elements of policy decisions are shown below: 
(a) Early post-independence land reform and further cementing the foundations for 
"growth with equity" in the rural areas. 
(b) A mild and relatively brief version of the inevitable easy import substance phase. 
(c) Early attention to the increase of agricultural productivity, permitting that sector to 
support a greater increase in household saving, labour absorption and exports. 
(d) The attention paid to education, marked by flexibility in adjusting to the changing 
needs of the economy, from primary to vocational secondary to technical junior 
colleges and, to engineering and science-oriented tertiary education. More 
importantly, a policy of bringing back highly brained overseas Taiwanese who had 
migrated to the United States was established. 
(e) A decentralized rural industrialization strategy leading to a workably competitive 
industrial sector. 
(f) Modest resort to foreign capital inflows, especially with respect to short-term 
portfolio capital, while substantial foreign exchange reserves were built up. 
(g) A relatively flexible exchange rate regime, with gradual devaluations, preceding the 
crisis by several years. 
Large public sector R&D support led to large foreign exchange reserves that helped 
ward off speculative attacks on the currency. 
However, before probing into the Taiwan economic development, it is necessary to 
understand the historical background. Therefore, this section introduces the political 
background and present economic policies in Taiwan. 
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2.3.1 The Political Background of Present Economic Policies 
Traditional China (i. e. now the People's Republic of China) is a country with an 
extensive history which was ruled for centuries by a series of dynasties. According to 
China's legend, the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty, China's last dynasty, was overthrown by Dr. 
Sun Yat Sen in 1911. In the following year, the Republic of China (ROC) was founded in 
1912 and was the first democratic republic in Asia. Unfortunately, the country was then 
embroiled by civil war. After a period of civil war between Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) and Mao Zedong's Communists, the 
Communists eventually defeated the rival Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist forces. 
Afterwards, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 and continues 
to rule mainland China. On the contrary, the central government of the Republic of 
China (ROC) withdrew to Taiwan in the same year. Despite the withdrawal, led by 
Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan still calls itself the Republic of China and lays claim to the 
whole of the territory of China. However, Taiwan and mainland China are hostile to each 
other which results in political uncertainty in Taiwan. 
In the 20th century, Taiwan has experienced two cycles of regime evolution: the Japanese 
colonial regime (1895-1945) and the Nationalist emigrant regime (1945-1996). Each 
cycle of regime evolution consecutively dominated its political history for about a 
century, and also produced substantially different outcomes in terms of the development 
of political society and the construction of a collective identity (Chu and Lin, 2001). 
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War, but was returned to 
Chinese sovereignty after Japan's defeat in the Second World War in 1945. For the 
Japanese colonial period, especially, when the Europeans withdrew their Asian colonies 
during the First World War, economic expansion boosted Japanese demand for rice, 
Taiwan was to become a major supplier. In keeping with their rising economic status, 
the colonial government launched various political initiatives, such as democracy and 
self-determination. In the meantime, Taiwan had became much more accommodating to 
the Japanese in the previous two decades, and Japanese was no longer a foreign language 
to Taiwan's educated class. By the mid-1930s, Japan was on the brink of a war with 
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China, Taiwan had been transformed from a supplement to Japan's capitalist 
development into a factory for military supplies. When Japan tried to break out through 
the sea, Taiwan's role was changed into a naval military base (Chu and Lin, 2001). 
In 1936, the governor-generals outlined three polices for the colonial government: to 
"Japanize" the Taiwanese people, to build military industries and to turn Taiwan into a 
base for southward advance. To implement the assimilation policy, classical Chinese was 
totally removed from the curriculum in 1937 and all private schools for Chinese 
education were banned in 1940. Meanwhile, native society was fully politicized to 
ensure the success of the new policies, even every street corner was caught in the war 
machine. By the end of the Second World War, due to the enforced assimilation policies 
of the colonial government for more than two decades, the impact on identity formation 
varied across age and social class. Overall, at that time the Taiwanese often wandered 
between two identities: secondary Japanese or non-Japanese (Chu and Lin, 2001). 
Following Japan's defeat in 1945, Ching and the KMT retook Taiwan, and began to 
consolidate power. The Ministry of Economic Affairs reported a country profile of 
Taiwan in 2003. It provides detailed political background information. In 1945, Taiwan 
was restored to Chinese sovereignty, the Nationalist regime (lead by KMT) started from 
1945 until 1996. Discontent with the KMT triggered a crackdown starting on February 
28`h 1947, this event commemorated as the "2-28 incident" (Pang and Haggard, 1994). 
Those people, who lived on Taiwan before the KMT exodus from mainland China, call 
themselves "natives". The KMT refugees and their families, who make up about 13% of 
the population, are called mainlanders or outsiders. Despite intermarriage, the two 
communities remain largely distinct political constituencies, resulting in decades of 
mistrust and hostility between "mainlanders" and the "native" Taiwanese. 
Regarding the promotion of economic growth from 1949, the KMT initiated a 
programme of land reform and an export-oriented industrial policy and the results were 
so successful that the US stopped granting the island economic aid by 1965. Political 
freedoms were suppressed in that period, martial law was imposed in 1949 and was not 
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lifted until 1987. When the US built a relationship with mainland China in 1979, the 
KMT responded by tightening martial law restrictions. It then caused the "Kaohsiung 
incident"-a violent event in the southern city of Kaohsiung, when the authorities 
arrested many people running a democracy movement, who subsequently spent several 
years in jail. By the mid-1980s, Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek's son, who became 
president in 1978) moved towards political liberalisation. The Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) was formed in 1986. In 1987 martial law was lifted and political prisoners 
were released, opposition parties were legalised over the next two years. 
After Chiang Ching-kuo died, Lee Teng-hui was appointed president in 1988. In 1996, at 
Taiwan's first direct presidential election, Mr Lee won with 54 % of the vote. He 
supported the establishment of an independent "Republic of Taiwan", which expressed 
from DPP. Mr Lee is also subsequently embarking on a strategy of moulding a Taiwan 
national identity. In 1999 he announced that Taiwan had still not abandoned its goal of 
eventual reunification with the mainland, but that any future negotiations with China 
would be conducted on a "special state-to state" basis. 
During the next century, the people of Taiwan will continue to wrestle with competing 
claims to their political allegiance and cultural identity. The consolidation of a 
Taiwanese identity will be complicated and will be deeply influenced by the economic 
interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China, an increasing number of 
Taiwanese businessman and migrants in China, and the emergence of a Mandarin-based 
media industry across the Straits. 
2.3.2 The Economic Policy 
During the years of colonial rule, the Japanese developed Taiwan's communication and 
transport networks and fostered commerce and education. After the withdrawal from 
mainland China, the KMT devoted its efforts to building up the island with a 
comparatively well-developed economic and social infrastructure. 
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In 1950 the Korean War broke out, resulting in the East and the West confronting each 
other. Under a military and economic consideration, the USA recognised Taiwan's 
government and provided economic aid in order to build a defensive battle line with the 
East. Under pressure from the US, the government of Taiwan executed a program of 
land reform which involved rural reconstruction and established a strong foundation for 
agricultural growth. The import aid from the USA gave the government of Taiwan the 
impetus to develop the economy and international trade. 
However, because the balance of payments deficit of the USA became worse, the US re- 
evaluated their economic aid policy in 1957. In order to improve the investment climate 
and encourage exports and in response to pressure from the USA as well, an export- 
oriented industrial policy was adopted by the government of Taiwan. The USA adjusted 
its international aid policy in 1958 and finally ceased economic support to Taiwan in 
1965. After the loss of economic aid from the USA, Taiwan experienced a succession of 
setbacks in diplomatic affairs. In 1971, Taiwan signed off from the United Nations and 
broke off relationships with Japan. During that period of time, Taiwan implemented the 
export-oriented industrial policies which established the basic structure which became a 
solid foundation for economic growth. 
During the process of economic development in Taiwan, the government adopted a two- 
pronged approach. On the one hand, the government of Taiwan has sought to keep 
micro-regulation to a minimum in areas such as the labour market, thereby facilitating the 
development of a vibrant small and medium-sized enterprise sector that has focused on 
the manufacture of goods for export. On the other hand, the government has used 
intervention, regulation and bureaucratic diktat both to guide the direction of economic 
development and maintain overall economic stability in the face of the military threat 
from mainland China. 
Through the intervention, regulation and bureaucratic diktat, two important factors in 
creating the Taiwanese phenomenon were the practice of export-oriented industrial 
policy and a modernization policy, which stimulated the development drive in Taiwan. 
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The first being the importance of national defence and the creation of an industrial 
infrastructure to serve defence needs. The second was the government's encouragement 
of private enterprise and the concurrent development of export markets for products 
manufactured in Taiwan. 
In order to facilitate foreign investment, the government of Taiwan promulgated two 
cornerstones of Taiwan's legal framework for joint venture participation by foreign 
investors. There are the "Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals" (SIFN) 
promulgated in 1954, and the "Statute for Encouragement of Investment" (SEI) 
promulgated in 1960. An important objective of these statutes is to simplify the process 
of foreign investment in order to achieve specific national goals. The government policy 
strongly favours the importance of modern technology and capital intensive industry. 
While encouraging investment of all kinds, the government has extended special 
privileges to joint ventures whose production will fill domestic needs or whose 
production of export trade can be expected to earn foreign exchange. 
For example, according to article 5 of the SIFN which was amended in 19862, overseas 
investments shall be confined to those which fall in any one of the following categories: 
(1) Investments in manufacturing enterprises which make products needed domestically; 
(2) Investments in service enterprises which are needed domestically; 
(3) Investments in enterprises which have an export market; 
(4) Investments which complement important industrial, mining, or communications 
enterprises; 
(5) Investments in enterprises which are engaged in scientific and technical research and 
development ; and, 
(6) Investments in other enterprises which are conducive to the economic and social 
development of Taiwan. 
Traditionally, the government has encouraged joint ventures in light industry along with 
investment in industries specifically identified as vital to national development (such as 
mining and communications). Only joint ventures in specified industries qualify for the 
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privileges and protections of SIFN. Moreover, the joint venture statutes also encourage 
investment in industries which the government perceives as vital to national welfare 
(such as defence industries and industries requiring a high degree of technical know- 
how). 
In order to encourage foreign investment, the government will occasionally invite foreign 
and domestic enterprises to form joint ventures for particular products. For example, in 
December 1986, the Ministry of Economic Affairs encouraged the formation of joint 
ventures for 26 industrial products, including seven types of electrical machinery, three 
types of industrial materials, nine types of information and electrical textile products'. 
Over the years, the government of Taiwan has revised the positive policy on investment 
during which both the domestic and international economic environment have changed. 
For example, when the expiration of Statute of Encouragement of Investment was due at 
the end of 1990, the government of Taiwan immediately formulated the "Statute for 
Upgrading Industries" to encourage business investment. 
Basically, the economic development process and the trade policy in Taiwan can be 
divided into five main stages. These are 
1.1949-1957: After the KMT moved to Taiwan, the government intervened in political 
and economic systems using strong control. 
2.1958-1970: The USA adjusted its foreign aid policy in 1958 until Taiwan signed off 
from the United Nations in 1971. During this particular period, Taiwan 
adopted an export-oriented industrial policy. 
3.1971-1983 : The government of Taiwan adopted a free trade economic policy when 
confronted with international political and economic changes during the 
petroleum crisis period. During that period, the government also 
embarked upon a series of economic reforms in order to accelerate 
economic development. 
4.1984-1994: The government of Taiwan announced an economic and trade 
liberalization policy in economy and trade in 1984. It included two 
31 
Chapter 2 
main parts; one was the foreign free trade policy, and the other was the 
annulment of the restraint of the domestic economy including the 
liberalization of finance, property development and investment. In 
1990, the government also started to pursue membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), motivated in part by the desire to liberalise 
the domestic economy. In membership negotiations, the government 
pledged to open up Taiwan's domestic markets to foreign competition. 
5. After 1994 : The government of Taiwan set the deregulation of economy and the 
open market policy into action. Deregulation of the economy was also 
an aim of the plan launched in 1994 to turn Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operations Centre (APROC). As originally formulated, 
APROC envisaged Taiwan becoming a regional centre for multinational 
companies in six areas: manufacturing, telecommunications, air 
transport, sea transport, financial services and mass media. 
The government implements a series of economic reform policies, but the government 
does not completely abandon its interventionist approach to economic management. The 
government has played a particularly active role in the development of Taiwan's world- 
class high-technology sector. For example, government-funded research, carried out by 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), formed the genesis of Taiwan's 
semiconductor industry. ITRI has played an important part in the development of the 
island's computer industry. Also under the "Statute for Industrial Upgrading", high- 
technology firms have benefited from various kinds of official largesse, such as tariff-free 
imports and tax holidays. Under the support of economic and trade policies of the 
government, Taiwan has become one of the world's largest producers of computer- 
related products. In recent years, Taiwan has also become an increasingly important 
producer of semiconductors. 
During the past forty years, Taiwan has risen rapidly to the status of a "Newly 
Industrialized Economy. " This achievement can be traced to a number of unique social, 
political, cultural, and geographic factors which cannot easily be duplicated by other 
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developing countries. ' According to the classification of countries in the World 
Economic Outlook published by the International Monetary Fund (USAF); Taiwan was 
grouped among developing countries before 1997. As Taiwan begins to share a number 
of important characteristics with industrial countries and prove itself successful, Taiwan 
was reclassified into a group of advanced economies by IMF in 1997. 
As a result of the successful economic reforms and continuous economic development, 
Taiwan is recognized as one of the key economic countries in the Asia-Pacific Rim. 
2.3.3 Political System 
Founded in 1912, the Republic of China is the first democratic republic in Asia. The 
political system is set up according to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Five Powers and Three 
Principles of the People, which form the foundation of the ROC Constitution. 
Besides continuously promoting economic growth and upgrading the development of 
technology, the government also works to carry out democratic politics and 
constitutional reform. Following the end of martial law in 1987, Taiwan embarked upon 
a series of political reforms. The first direct election of the president and vice president 
was held in March 1996, bringing to realization the principle of sovereignty of the people. 
As a result of the election in 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took over 
the reins of power in May 2000, bringing to realization the principle of transfer of power 
between political parties and making the Republic of China in Taiwan a modem 
democratic country. 
China is a big issue, which has a significant effect on global economic development. In 
1991, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) called for the establishment of an 
independent Republic of Taiwan. This aspiration of the DDP is widely feared in Taiwan, 
because it makes the cross-strait relationship with mainland China more difficult. This 
situation became worse when Mr. Chen who represents the DPP party won the election 
in 2004 and become the president of the Republic of China (ROC). This is the second 
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time that Taiwan has non-KMT rule, resulting in an unprecedented degree of domestic 
political instability which also affects Taiwan's economic development. Taiwan has its 
historical background with mainland China, but the unstable political situation obstructs 
its economic development with mainland China. This phenomenon continues to 
adversely affect Taiwan's economy. 
2.4 An Overview of Foreign Investment in Taiwan 
The principle objective of this section is to provide a profile of foreign investment in 
Taiwan. The encouragement of foreign investment has always been a major policy of the 
government in Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan places great importance on foreign and 
overseas Chinese investment. Laws and regulations governing such investments are 
amended in a timely fashion, and every effort is made to remove investment obstacles 
and improve investment conditions. The government also provides other assistance to 
foreign nationals and overseas Chinese investing in Taiwan. Aanalysis of foreign 
investment patterns can provide an overview of foreign investment in Taiwan. It can 
reveal the trends in foreign investment, which sectors foreign investors prefer, and what 
differences exist between investor nations. Holding this overview can help to give a 
general idea of foreign investment in Taiwan, then, moving onto the specific area of 
foreign investment in Taiwan which is the International Joint Venture (IM. 
2.4.1 Trends of Foreign Investment in Taiwan over time 
The government of Taiwan has long maintained an openly welcoming attitude towards 
investment, especially in the hi-tech sector. Throughout the second half of the 20th 
century, investment patterns in Taiwan have been marked by steady progression in value- 
adding and knowledge-intensive production. As a result of heightened competition, 
mainly from China, the government has highlighted areas such as biotechnology, opto- 
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electronics and nanotechnology as development targets to attract foreign investment into 
Taiwan. 
All foreign investment ventures must be incorporated and certified by the Investment 
Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA). According to the statistics of 
the Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the total amount of 
foreign investment was US$ 52,625 million from 1951 to 2003 and the number of 
foreign investment applications from 1951 to 2003 was 13,102, as shown in Table 2.4.1. 
The trend of foreign investment is shown in Figure 2.4.1. From the data, the total 
amount of foreign investment increased steadily at the beginning of the 1980's. After 
1984, there was a rapid rise in foreign investment. The reason for this may have been the 
government's economic policy which has always been to encourage foreign investment. 
As described in section 2.3.2, the government promulgated the "Statute for Investment 
by Foreign Nationals" in 1954 to encourage foreign investments into Taiwan. The 
government took another step ahead to announce a liberalization policy in economy and 
trade in 1984 and also ended martial law in 1987. All these efforts were aimed at 
attracting foreign investment. 
The results showed that foreign investments grew quickly after 1984, especially after 
1987. However, due to the worldwide economic slowdown, this trend diminished after 
1991 and rose again in 1994, with the growth of the international economy. Since 1984, 
the trend in foreign investments has risen more steeply. However, the trend showed a 
fall in 1998 because of the financial crisis in Asia area. It dips again because of a global 
economic depression since 2001 and fell further in 2002. Well over half (51%) of the 
total sum was invested in the five years from 1997 to 2001, which was the most 
significant and rapid growth of the decade. The steeply rising trend explained by the 
government's policy which launched the deregulation of economy and opened the market 
in 1994. However foreign investment fell again because of the world economic 
slowdown. From the trend of foreign investment, we can find that the government's 
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economic policy has undergone timely amendment in order to accelerate economic 
development in tandem with the international economy. 




1952 0 0 
1953 2 2,041 
1954 5 2,092 
1955 2 4,423 
1956 2 1,009 
1957 4 48 
1958 3 1,116 
1959 2 145 
1960 8 14,338 
1961 5 5,964 
1962 26 3,543 
1963 16 10,347 
1964 13 11,890 
1965 36 35,140 
1966 52 20,904 
1967 107 38,666 
1968 123 53,445 
1969 111 81,938 
1970 71 109,165 
1971 46 125,147 
1972 52 100,190 
1973 150 193,688 
1974 83 108,736 
1975 43 70,940 
1976 45 102,032 
1977 50 95,186 
Year Case Amount S$ 1,000) 
1978 66 136,719 
1979 73 181,483 
1980 71 243,380 
1981 73 356,294 
1982 82 320,286 
1983 100 375,382 
1984 101 518,971 
1985 107 660,702 
1986 206 705,574 
1987 363 1,223,069 
1988 438 1,061,161 
1989 477 2,241,026 
1990 376 2,081,657 
1991 324 1,558,957 
1992 338 1,149,228 
1993 261 1,089,975 
1994 332 1,523,927 
1995 370 2,756,786 
1996 448 2,290,385 
1997 639 3,879,166 
1998 1059 3,554,037 
1999 1053 4,099,024 
2000 1370 7,557,355 
2001 1145 5,081,306 
2002 1117 3,226,787 
2003 1056 3,560,739 
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2.4.2 Geographic Characteristics of Foreign Investment in Taiwan 
The major national sources of foreign investment in Taiwan include the United States, 
Japan, British Possessions in Central America, Singapore, Hong Kong, Holland, and the 
United Kingdom, etc. In order to consider the statistical analysis, foreign companies 
which invested into Taiwan were grouped into six groups; there were Asian countries, 
American countries, European countries, Oceanic countries, African countries, and 
others shown in Table 2.4.2. The highest proportion of approved foreign investment 
came from American countries, which was 46% of the total investment figure. The 
second source of investment was contributed by Asian countries, which have over one- 
third of the total amount. Counted together, the investment sum contributed by 
American countries and Asian countries indicated that 84% of the total foreign 
investment total came from these two areas. The third area of foreign investment 
sources was European countries which had 14% of the total foreign investment. 











Countries Others Total 
1951-1960 1,681 23,531 ... ... 25,212 
1961-1970 90,227 227,879 52,663 233 .. .. 371,002 
1971-1980 462,802 651,184 225,264 1,944 16,307 1,357,501 
1981-1990 4,187,130 3,401,128 1,313,786 143,544 498,534 
.. 9,544,122 
1991 704,674 671,723 161,421 5,383 15,756 1,558,957 
1992 635,265 328,647 164,963 6,606 13,747 
.. 1,149,228 
1993 489,882 355,849 209,974 19,896 14,374 1,089,975 
1994 804,082 421,649 243,590 26,699 27,907 1,523,927 
1995 747,686 1,633,112 334,887 26,627 14,474 
... 2,756,786 
1996 1,013,348 1,047,430 197,016 15,502 14,144 2,945 2,290,385 
1997 1,486,894 1,278,707 399,957 656,248 51,505 5,855 3,879,166 
1998 1,070,816 2,011,696 363,156 22,319 81,757 4,293 3,554,037 
1999 1,012,492 2,497,007 460,205 66,217 63,103 
. 4,099,024 
2000 2,367,451 3,903,436 1,200,305 63,012 10,051 13,100 7,557,355 
2001 1,357,848 2,468,715 1,181,760 60,706 10,013 2,264 5,081,306 
Total 16,432,278 20,921,693 6,508,947 1,114,936 
, 
831,672 28,457 45,837,983 
Source: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
As shown in Figure 2.4.2 and Figure 2.4.3, the top three geographic regions of foreign 
investment were American Countries of which the main country is America, Asian 
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Countries of which the main country is Japan and European Countries of which the main 
countries are Britain, Germany and Holland. There are 6751 (51%) and US$ 18,503 
million (35%) of foreign investment applications from Asian Countries. American 
Countries contributed 4568 cases (34%) and US$ 24,115 million (45%) of foreign 
investment in Taiwan. 
870,091 
1,342,962 2% 42,102 






  Asian Countries   American Countries Q European Countries 
Q Oceania Countries   Africa Countries IS Others 
Figure 2.4.2 Statistics on Approved Foreign Investment by Amount and by Area 
Sources: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
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Figure 2.4.3 Statistics on Approved Foreign Investment by Cases and by Area 
Sources: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
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The largest amount of foreign investment was invested by American countries, mostly by 
the United States. This phenomenon maybe can be explained by the relationship between 
the United States and the government of the Republic of China. When the government 
of Republic of China withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan, the United States 
provided economic aid. From that time, Taiwan built a close relationship with United 
States, even though Taiwan signed off from the United Nations in 1971. Because of this 
historical background, the majority of foreign investment was invested by the United 
States. 
Asian countries were the second catogory which accounted for more than a half of 
foreign investment cases. One possibility was that the government in Taiwan had 
encouraged overseas Chinese to invest into Taiwan and overseas Chinese who had 
immigrated to nearby countries were encouraged because of location. Another 
possibility was that Taiwan was under Japan's control for a long time, the Japanese 
companies already invested in Taiwan and they wanted to continue their business with 
Taiwanese companies. On the other side, Japanese companies control the key 
components of manufacturing and the Taiwanese companies have to cooperate with 
them in order to obtain these components or key technology. Therefore, the historical 
background can maybe explain that Asian countries and American countries had over 
82% of the cases and the amount involved in foreign investment in Taiwan. European 
countries are the third category of foreign investment applications both on the amount 
and the corporate cases. As a result of the great distance, those European countries had 
less investment and a smaller amount in Taiwan. 
As above, a similar analysis shows the main regions of foreign investment are American 
countries and Asian countries. As shown in Figure 2.4.4, from 1952 until 1995, the 
Asian countries were the leading countries based on the amount of inbound foreign 
investment in Taiwan compared with other regions. However from 1995 onwards, 
American countries became prime investors. But when calculated on the number of 
40 
Chapter 2 
cases, Asian countries are still the main area of inbound foreign investment applications, 
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2.4.3 Industry Characteristics of Foreign Investment in Taiwan 
Foreign investors in Taiwan are mainly involved in the Electronic & Electrical 
Appliances industry. As shown in Figure 2.4.6, the top five industries that attracted the 
most inbound foreign investment are the Electronic & Electrical Appliances industry 
(25%), the Banking & Insurance industry (16%), the Services industry (11%), the 











  Electronic & Electric Applicances   Banking & Insurance Q Service 
Q Chemicals   Whole Sale & Retail   Trade 
  Basic metals & Metal products Q Machinery Equipment   Food & Beverage Processing 
  Total Others 
Figure 2.4.6 Statistics on Approved Foreign Investment by Amount and by Industry 
Source: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
On the other hand, Figure 2.4.7 shows the top five industries in terms of the numbers of 
invested cases are the Services industry (16%), the Trade industry (14%), the Electronic 
& Electrical Appliances industry (15%), the Wholesale & Retail industry (19%), and the 
Banking & Insurance industry (15%). This means that the service sectors have more 
investment numerically but a smaller investment sum than the industrial sectors. 
Q 11'1 1C1 
44 
4,008,504 4.225,491 S. 974,82S 







  Electronic & Electric Applicances   Banking & Insurance Q Service 
Q Chemicals   Whole Sale & Retail   Trade 
  Basic metals & Metal products Q Machinery Equipment   Food & Beverage Processing 
  Total Others 
Figure 2.4.7 Statistics on Approved Foreign Investment by Cases and by Industry 
Sources: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
In addition, the government report shows that the percentage of GDP constituted by the 
agricultural, industrial and service sectors stood at 27.25%, 26.57% and 45.98% 
respectively in 1961; but the percentages changed to 2.1%, 32.4% and 65.5% in 20004. 
According to government reports, prior to 1990, most foreign investment in Taiwan was 
in manufacturing. After that year, Taiwan opened up the service industry and brought 
about a structural change in foreign investment coming into the island. The proportion 
of foreign investment flowing into manufacturing steadily declined, while that flowing 
into services increased rapidly; from 1991 to 2003, the amount of approved foreign 
investment in services exceeded that in manufacturing. The foreign investment in the 
service sector was increasing and becoming more important. 
To consider the Industry and the Area together shown in Table 2.4.3, the data represents 
that the different country Area is involved more in different industries. Firstly, for Asian 
countries the most important industry is the Electronic & Electrical Appliances industry, 
followed by Wholesale & Retail industry and then Banking & Insurance industry. In the 
case of the American countries, the major industry is the Service industry, followed by 






European countries, these are the three most important industries in which they are 
heavily involved - the Banking & Insurance industry, then the Food & Beverage 
Processing industry and the Wholesale & Retail industry. 
Table 2.4.3 Statistics on Annrnved Fnreivn Tnvestment by Industry and by Area Unit: USS1.000 








Countries Others Total 
Agriculture & Forestry 8,222 16,514 1,415 ... 26,151 
Fishery & Animal 
Husbandry 11,177 11,450 ... 22,627 
Mining 44,669 2,322 2,097 2,349 .. 51,437 
Food & Beverage 
Processing 438,165 419,966 245,525 448 187,311 ... 1,291,415 
Textile 173,984 158,678 31,718 5,744 7,643 377,767 
Garment & Footwear 104,765 53,136 4,103 2,443 .. .. 164,447 
Leather & Fur Products 9,819 168,682 4,254 2,592 ... 185,347 
Lumber & Bamboo 
Products 
68,179 16,962 8,255 93,396 
Paper Products & 
printing 
33,648 63,509 5,069 44,137 ... 146,363 
Chemicals 1,056,194 1,819,258 1,066,383 62,690 214,640 6,326 4,225,491 
Rubber products 291,210 99,722 56,764 682 .. 448,378 
Plastic Products 54,218 79,415 53,428 25,133 89 44 212,327 
Non-Metallic Minerals 318,812 169,517 89,734 1,923 725 ... 580,711 
Basic metals & Metal 
products 
985,681 543,327 128,845 675,558 25,272 ... 2,358,683 
Machinery Equipment 1,028,058 663,369 157,920 8,067 53,638 .. 1,911,052 
Electronic & Electrical 
Appliances 4,636,387 
6,811,043 1467 265 63,086 2,564 4,506 12,984851 ' 
Transport Equipment 637,271 184,972 64,533 .. 21,920 ... 908,696 
Precision Instruments 211,307 278,650 42,745 1,841 ... 10,651 545,194 
Construction 267,967 299,236 94,073 3,396 
... 664,672 
Wholesale & Retail 1,394,346 1,738,139 799,853 46,045 28,356 1,765 4,008,504 
Trade 1,298,817 857,931 324,522 111,166 2,777 3,995 2,599,208 
Restaurant 63,885 87,879 18,626 ... ... 170,390 
Transportation 125,872 563,087 74,564 464 154,284 .. 918,271 
Storage 5,898 10,175 6,302 7,686 2,274 .. 32,335 
Banking & Insurance 1,680,478 4,865,557 1,876,761 116,159 13,459 5,911 8,558,325 
Service 2,377,003 2,419,848 863,109 150,825 155,139 8,904 5,974,828 




10,528 ... 3,164,643 
Total 18,502,928 124,114 , 582 
1 7,752,844 1,342,962 870,091 42,102 52,625,509 
Sources: Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC 
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From the above profile analysis of foreign investment in Taiwan, we can form a general 
idea that American countries are the main region in terms of investment amount and 
focus more on the Service industry and Electronic & Electrical Appliances industry. 
Because of location, Asian countries were the earliest investors and have the most cases 
in the region of foreign investment, and they contribute more in manufacturing, especially 
in the Electronic & Electrical Appliances industry. European countries entered Taiwan 
very late and focus more on the Service industry. It might be because of the effects of 
culture distance or psychic distance and physical distance, and their ability to specialize in 
the field of service. 
2.5 Taiwan's Advantages 
Taiwan not only has great geographic superiority, it also has a good investment 
environment that is amenable to foreign enterprises. The Industrial Development and 
Investment Center (IDIC) has a publication to introduce the investment environment of 
Taiwan to foreign investors. 4 According to the 2002 global competitiveness ranking 
published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), among the 80 countries covered, 
Taiwan ranked third in the world, behind only the U. S. and Finland, and first in Asia. In 
2003-2004, Taiwan ranked fifth out of 102 economies maintaining its high rank. In its 
report for April 2003, Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) of Switzerland 
ranked Taiwan investment environment fourth in the world and second in Asia. In the 
assessment published in April 2003 by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
(PERC) of Hong Kong, Taiwan's business environment is given fourth place in the Asian 
region. In the category of Innovation Potential, Taiwan ranked fourth in the world in the 
number of U. S. patents granted. The assessments compiled by these institutions, all of 
which enjoy a high degree of public trust, make it clear that Taiwan has a low risk 
investment environment and is suitable for investment. These evaluations once again 
identify Taiwan as one of the most favourable environments for investment in Asia. 
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As mentioned above, because of the superiority of Taiwan's geography and investment 
environment, Taiwan lends itself to foreign investment. In the eyes of foreign investors, 
Taiwan's greatest advantages are its close proximity to the mainland Chinese market, its 
excellent geographic location, convenient sea and air transportation, a complete network 
of peripheral industries, high efficiency, abundant manpower, highly efficient shipment 
and logistical services, a complete infrastructure, and strong support capabilities. 
After more than 50 years of economic development, Taiwan has built up a highly 
liberalized economic system with highly advantageous conditions, shown as the 
following. 5 
1. Solid industrial infrastructure, strong vertical integration capability in IT and 
electronics industries. 
Over the past 20 years, Taiwan's development has focused on information technology 
(IT) as the economy's driving force, and has become an integral link in the global high 
technology industry supply chain. 
In 2003, products for which Taiwan was the world's largest supplier included following,: 
(1) eighteen products ranked as the world number one, such as Notebook PCs, cable 
modems, LCD monitors, IC packaging etc. (2) Six products ranked as the world number 
two, such as IC design, digital steel cameras, polyester filament, purified terephthalic 
acid etc. (3) Four products ranked as the world number three, such as DRAM, flat panel 
displays, nylon fibre, and screws and nuts. 
2. Strong industrial research and development capability 
Taiwan has placed an ever-increasing emphasis on improving R&D capabilities. National 
expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP rose from 1.66 % in 1990 to 2.30 % in 
2002. Also Taiwan was granted 5,431 US patents, the fourth largest quantity in the 
world after the US, Japan and Germany. 
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3. A corporate sector with a strong spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation, and 
experience in international competition. 
4. A leading position in Asia in venture capital 
Venture capital can flexibly integrate technology, personnel, market opportunities and 
capital investment in new technology industries. In 2003, Taiwan's venture capital 
industry had become the largest in Asia7. By the end of 2003, Taiwan had 209 venture 
capital firms, and had raised a total of NT$158.346 billion in venture capital. The 
investment projects mainly focused on the semiconductor, IT, telecoms, electronics and 
fibre optics industries. 
5. Complete information and communications infrastructure. 
Taiwan began privatization of the industry in 1998 in order to response to a general 
worldwide trend toward telecoms privatization, and to provide the public with a greater 
choice of telecoms providers. The telecoms industry had enjoyed rapid growth since 
1998. By the end of 2003, there were 590.8 telephone line subscribers per 1,000 people, 
and 1,109.9 mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 people. According to statistics from the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Taiwan's mobile phone saturation at 
1,109.9 per 1,000 is now the highest in the world for the second year, which is far higher 
than the US (at 488.1 mobile phones per 1,000 people), Japan (636.6 per 1,000 people) 
and South Korea (679.5 per 1,000 people) (year 2000 figures)8. 
With increasing computer ownership, Internet accounts in 2003 reached 7.84 million 
users, reflecting an average growth of 36.2% per year over the last five years. ADSL 
broadband subscribers also have a huge increase over the 1999 figure and reached 3.01 
million in 2003. These figures illustrate the huge achievements Taiwan has made in 
establishing telecommunications, information technology and Internet infrastructure. 




In March 2004, legislation was passed to designate Kaohsiung Port and Keelung Port as 
free trade zones. This measure will speed up customs procedures; increase the flow of 
goods and lower business operating costs. 
7. High extent of industrial computerization and digitization, appreciable trend 
toward knowledge and technology industries. 
8. Large numbers of enterprises with experience in international and mainland 
Chinese markets, making it certain that these enterprises will play a key role in 
the future process of integration in the Asian region. 
With a high level of management capabilities, Taiwanese companies have established 
mutually-beneficial collaborative relationships with many leading European and 
American multinational corporations, thus becoming a vital link in the global supply 
chain. For example, major foreign companies operating in Taiwan include DuPont, 
Corning, Applied Materials, Texas Instruments, Toshiba, NEC, Philips, General 
Instrument, Mitsubishi, Samsung, and Siemens. 
The government continues to approve related plans and regulations in order to make 
Taiwan become the ideal location for transactional corporations to undertake regional or 
global logistics management. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter attempts to provide a profile of foreign investment in Taiwan from 1951 to 
2003. It might help in understanding the background of Taiwan's economic 
development before looking at specific sections of international joint ventures. 
Despite the fact that Taiwan has a complicated historical relationship with mainland 
China which makes for an unstable political situation that obstructs Taiwan's economic 
development. However, Taiwan still develops its economy and has risen rapidly to the 
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status of a "Newly Industrialized Country". Many assessments compiled by world 
famous institutions, make it clear that Taiwan has a low risk investment environment and 
is suitable for investment. They once again identify Taiwan as one of the most 
favourable environment for investment in Asia. 
The encouragement of foreign investment has always been a major policy of the 
government of Taiwan. The government of Taiwan has long maintained an openly 
welcoming attitude towards investment and provides assistance to foreign nationals and 
overseas Chinese to encourage foreign investment into Taiwan. For example, in 2004, 
the government has highlighted areas such as biotechnology, opto-electronics and 
nanotechnology as development targets to attract foreign investment into Taiwan. 
The main regions of foreign investment are American countries and Asian countries, 
especially the United States and Japan. The majority amount of foreign investment is 
most invested by the United States. The top five industries in which foreign investors are 
mainly involved are the Service industry, the Electronic & Electrical Appliances industry, 
the Banking & Insurance industry, the Wholesale & Retail industry, and the Chemical 
industry. 
From the viewpoint of foreign investors, Taiwan's greatest advantages are its close 
proximity to the mainland Chinese market, its excellent geographical location, convenient 
sea and air transportation, a complete network of peripheral industries, high efficiency, 
abundant manpower, highly efficient shipment and logistical services, a complete 
infrastructure, and strong support capabilities. 
This chapter provides a basic introduction to the backgrounds of Taiwan and an 
overview of foreign investment before we move on to international joint ventures. The 
theories related to the international joint venture are discussed in the following chapter. 
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1 Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, R. O. C. [On-line] Available-http: //www. dgbas. gov. tw 
2r Statute for Investment by Foreign National Amended time and articles 
Revision Article Content 
time 
1959 Article 5 The investment is limited to invest the following industries: 
1. Investments in manufacturing enterprises which make products needed domestically, 
2. Investments in enterprises which have an export market; 
3. lnvestments in enterprises which complement important industrial, mining, or 
communications; 
4. Investments in other enterprises which are conducive to the economic and social 
development 
1979 Article 5 The investment is limited to invest the following industries: 
1. Investments in manufacturing enterprises which make products needed domestically, 
2-Investments in enterprises which have an export market; 
3. Investments in enterprises which complement important industrial, mining, or 
communications; 
4-Investments in enterprises which are engaged in scientific and technical research 
and development ; 
5-Investments in other enterprises which are conducive to the economic and social 
development of Taiwan. 
1986 Article 5 The scope of investment is the following industries: 
I-Investments in manufacturing enterprises which make products needed domestically, 
2. Investments in service enterprises which are needed domestically; 
3. Investments in enterprises which have an export market; 
4. lnvestments in enterprises which complement important industrial, mining, or 
communications; 
5. Investments in enterprises which are engaged in scientific and technical research 
and development ; 
6. Investments in other enterprises which are conducive to the economic and social 
development of Taiwan. 
1989 Article 5 The investor is prohibited from investing in the following industries: 
1. Those which may negatively affect public order 
2. Those which may negatively affect good customs and practices 
3. Those which are high pollution 
4. Those which monopolize by law or are prohibited by the law. 
The investor, who applies to invest in the following industries, shall obtain an 
approval thereof or a consent thereto from the competent authority in charge of the 
industry in question. 
1. The public service industries 
2. The financial and insurance enterprises 
3. The journalist and publish enterprises 
4. Those which are prohibited by the law 
The industries prohibited under Paragraph 1 above or restricted under Paragraph 2 
above shall be prescribed by the Executive Yuan. 
1997 Article 7 The investor is prohibited from investing in the following industries: 
I. Those which may negatively affect national security, public order, good customs and 
practices, or national health; and 
2. Those which are prohibited by the law. 
The investor, who applies to invest in an industry in which investment is restricted by 
law or by an order given under the applicable law, shall obtain an approval thereof or 
a consent thereto from the competent authority in charge of the industry in question. 
The industries prohibited under Paragraph I above or restricted under Paragraph 2 
above shall be prescribed and reviewed on a regular basis by the Executive Yuan. 
Sources: Industrial Development & Investment Center, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 
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3 China Post, December 17,1986, at 7. 
The Industrial Development &Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic affairs, ROC 
[On-line] Available-http: //www. idic. gov. tw/htm/einto-l. htm 
The Industrial Development &Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic affairs, ROC 
[On-line] Available-http: //www. idic. gov. tw/content/doc/ROC_edoc_2. doc 
6 The Industrial Development &Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic affairs, ROC 
[On-line] Available-http: //www. idic. gov. tw/content/doc/ROC_edoc_2. doc 
Products ranked as the world number one 
World Number 1 World Number 2 World Number 3 
1. Notebook PCs 1. IC Design 1. DRAM 
2. Wireless LAN 2. Digital Still Cameras 2. Flat Panel Displays 
3. xDSL Modems 3. Polyester Filament 3. Nylon Fiber 
4. Cable Modems 4. Polyster Staple Fiber 4. Screws and Nuts 
5. Foundry 5. Purified Terephthalic Acid 
6. IC Packaging 6. Polyurethanes Synthetic Leather 
7. SOHO Routers 
8. LCD Monitors 
9: Optical Disk Drives 
10. Motherboards 
11. Recordable Optical Disks 
12. Network Interface Cards 
13. Hubs 
14. ABS Copolymers 
15. Glass Fiber 
16. Bicycles 
17. Ethernet Switches 
Power Chaires 
7 The Industrial Development &Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic affairs, ROC 
[On-line] Available-http: //www. idic. gov. tw/content/doc/ROC-edoc_2. doc 
The Industrial Development &Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic affairs, ROC 
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ANTECEDENTS AND RATIONALES OF 
CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
JOINT VENTURES 
3.1 Introduction 
After the introduce about Taiwan's history and the development of foreign investment 
and Taiwan's advantages, in this chapter, we move on to the topic of antecedents and 
rationales of control in IJVs. Although this study is primarily concerned with the issue of 
control in international joint ventures and its antecedent factors in particular, it is 
necessary to have a basic discussion concerning management control. There are two 
reasons. First, management control is a core concept in management it is necessary to 
refer to theoretical and empirical studies. Second, a variety of theoretical approaches in 
management show management literature can offer useful theories of management 
control and we can use relative theoretical studies to illustrate aspects of control in 
international joint ventures. This chapter is organized into five sections. General 
theories of management control are presented in section 3.2. Then the relevant theories 
and empirical studies of control in international joint venture are reviewed in section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 briefly discusses control and its antecedent factors and a research framework 
for this study is proposed. Finally, we summarise the empirical studies and provide a 
brief conclusion in the final section 3.5. 
3.2 General Theories of Management Control 
As there is a vast amount of research which is relevant to management control, this 
research will only concentrate on the definition of control and the types of control which 
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are relevant to this study. First, the relevant studies regarding the definition of control 
are reviewed then different types of control are examined. 
3.2.1 The Definition of Control 
The issue of control has long been a topic of interest in organization theory (Eisenhardt, 
1985) and has been broadly discussed in the literatures of both organization theory and 
international management. Management control is referred to as a procedure that an 
entity employs to affect its subsidiary or members behavior in order to achieve 
organizational objectives (Yan and Gray, 1994; Flamholtz, Das and Tsui, 1985; Arrow, 
1974). Anthony (1965) defines management control as "the process by which managers 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives". Lowe (1971) describes the control 
broader as "a system of organizational information seeking and gathering, accountability 
and feedback, designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes in its substantive 
environment and that the work behavior of its employees is measured by reference to a 
set of operational sub-goals so that the discrepancy between the two can be reconciled 
and corrected". Machin (1983) defines control as "... the process by which managers 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives". Child (1984) defined management 
control as "a process whereby management and other groups are able to initiate and 
regulate the conduct of activities so that their results accord with the goals and 
expectations held by those groups". Simons (1987) defined control as the formalised 
routines and procedures that use information to maintain or alter patterns in 
organizational activity. 
After reviewing the existing literature, Geringer and Hebert(1989) demonstrate that 
control is a process in which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and 
output of another entity, through the use of power and authority (Etzioni, 1965) and a 
wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms (Jaworski, 1988 ; Baliga 
and Jaega, 1984). 
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With regard to international joint ventures, Hebert and Beamish (1994) define the control 
of IN as "the process by which the behaviour and output of the venture are influenced 
by an IN partner. " Yan and Gray (1994) also describe management control as the 
process by which an organization influences its sub-units and members to behave in ways 
that lead to the attainment of organizational objectives. The extent of influence exercised 
by each partner over the following three dimensions of control: strategic, operational and 
structural (Flamholtz, Das, and Tsui, 1985; Ouchi, 1977; Arrow, 1974). Driscoll and 
Paliwoda (1997), in investigating the different dimensions of the mode of entry decision 
and the determinants which bear on mode choice, identify control as one of the key 
underlying dimensions of the choice of mode of entry. In their study, they define the 
term "control" as "the extent to which a firm desires authority over both operational and 
strategic decision-making responsibilities in the host market. " 
The definitions of control have been described in a wide variety of research fields. 
Numerous empirical studies have given many definitions. We compile these definitions 
as shown in Table 3.2.1. 
Tnh1e 121 The Definition of Control 
Authors Year Term Definition 
Management the process by which managers assure that resources are Anthony 1965 
control obtained and used effectively and efficiently 
in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives 
A system of organizational information seeking and gathering, 
accountability and feedback designed to ensure that the 
Lowe 1971 Control enterprise adapts to changes in its substantive environment 
and that the work behavior of its employees is measured by 
reference to a set of operational sub-goal's 
The process by which managers assure that resources are 
Machin 1983 Control obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives 
A process whereby management and other groups are able to 
Child 1984 Management 
initiate and regulate the conduct of activities so that their 
control results accord with the goals and expectations held by those 
groups 
Simons 1987 Control The formalised routines and procedures that use information to 
maintain or alter patterns in organizational activity 
The process by which one entity influences, to varying 
Geringer degrees, the behaviour and output of another entity through 
and 1989 Control the use of power and authority (Etzione, 1965) and a wide 
Hebert range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms 
ali a& Jae a 1984 
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Tnh1P Il 1 The. Tlpfinitinn of f nntrnl (rnntinnel 
Authors Year Term Definition 
Hebert The process by which behaviour and output of the venture are 
and 1994 Control influenced by an IN partner 
Beamish 
The process by which an organization influences its subunits Yan and 1994 Management and members to behave in ways that lead to the attainment of Gray y Control organizational objectives 
Driscoll The extent to which a firm desires authority both over 
and 1997 Control operational and strategic decision-making responsibilities in 
Paliwoda the host market. 
Source: this study compiled from relative articles 
In multinational companies, the concept of control has been given different terms, for 
example, it has been named as control, organization control, control system, strategic 
control, communication control or control mechanism. Researchers have used the term 
of control differently; however, they have the same perception of the intention of control 
that the objective of control is to reduce the varied behaviour of an organization's 
subsidiary or employee in order to achieve focused organizational objectives. 
Therefore, in this study the term of "control" or "management control" only focuses on 
the definition in relation to international joint ventures and is used interchangeably. In 
this study, the term of control is referred to as "a process that parents of international 
joint venture utilise to affect its venture's behaviour in order to ensure that the venture 
conforms to its organizational objectives (Ding, 1997; Schaan, 1983). 
3.2.2 The Type of Control 
Due to the large number of studies on the issues of management control, this review will 
therefore mainly highlight the representative studies of different types of control in 
relation to international joint ventures. 
Ouchi (1977) classified control into "behavior control" and "output control", shown as 
Table 3.2.2. Behavior control is where the supervisor is personally observing and 
checking the behavior of subordinates. In contrast, output control is involved with the 
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extent to which data on sales, returns, exchanges, and so on is used to monitor 
operations. 
Tah1e" Z79 (`nnfrnl Time nnA itc AntprPrlrnt Cnnditinnc 
Knowledge of Transformation processes 
Perfect Imperfect 






Low Behavior control Ritual 
Source: Ouchi, W. G. (1977). The relationship between organizational structure and organizational 
control, Administrative Science Quarterly, 22: 95-113. 
Integrating organizational theory and transaction cost theory; Ouchi (1979) describes 
three fundamentally different mechanisms which organizations can employ to effect 
organizational control in order to achieve organizational objectives. These three 
mechanisms are referred to as the market mechanism, the bureaucratic mechanism and 
the clan mechanism (an informal social mechanism). 
. Market mechanism: deals with the control problem through their ability to precisely 
measure and reward individual contributions. 
. Bureaucratic mechanism: depends on a mixture of close evaluation and a socialized 
acceptance of common objectives. It involves close personal surveillance and 
direction of subordinates by superiors. The information necessary for task completion 
is contained in rules which concern processes to be completed or by specifying the 
standards of output or quality. 
. Clan mechanism: relies on a deep level of common agreement between members on 
what constitutes proper behavior, and it requires a high level of commitment on the 
part of each individual to those socially prescribed behaviors. 
On the basis of the management and accounting reviews, Jaworski (1988) identifies two 
broad classes of control: formal controls and informal controls. He identifies formal 
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controls as the written, management-initiated mechanisms that influence the individual or 
group behaviour, which was classified into three types: the input, the process, and the 
output controls. In contrast, informal controls are unwritten, worker-based mechanisms 
that influence the individual or group behaviour, also classified into three categories: self- 
control, social control, and cultural controls. Extending Jaworski's (1988) results, 
Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan (1993) identify four combinations of controls: (1) 
a traditional bureaucratic management control system whose primary emphasis is on 
formal controls, (2) a clan system control whose primary emphasis is on informal 
controls, (3) a low control system whose low formal control is combined with low 
informal control, and (4) a high control system whose high formal control is combined 
with high informal control. 
Parker and Lewis (1995) summarized the classical model of control using the following 
concepts (Parker, 1986a, 1986b). 
. Authority-based control: This is centralized control exercised through formal lines of 
authority and positions of responsibility at each point in the organizational hierarchy. 
. Disciplinary control: This approach involves restriction, prohibition, direction and 
transactions for non-compliance. Budgetary control has been often employed as a 
part of disciplinary control. 
" Coordinative control: This targets the coordination of various key organizational 
functions through the exercising of the supervisors' authority and self-adjustment 
between subordinates. Mechanisms include specification of objectives, tasks, lines of 
authority, spans of control, costing, budgeting and transfer pricing. 
" Controls: This sees effective control being achieved via the employment of `control' 
such as rules of behavior, workplace procedure, technical standards and budget 
targets. 
" Exception control: This involves the detection of significant variances from planned 
targets and the correction of such variances. Variances in actual operating results 




Emmanuel et al. (1990) classifies control into a number of major types: 
" Behavior (or action) control: Actual behaviors are monitored and compared with 
specified desirable behaviors. Although suitable for programmed or routine tasks, 
generally such controls have limited applicability to managerial work. 
" Output (or result) control: Actual results are monitored against those that are desired. 
Where available, such controls are often preferred for much managerial work, as 
evidenced by the widespread use of profit centers. 
" Input controls: comparison of resources used in task performance against pre-set 
budgets. 
" Personnel controls: desirable behavior is encouraged by the selection, recruitment and 
training of appropriate people to help ensure that they conduct themselves in 
predictable and desirable ways. 
" More general social controls: appropriate behavior patterns are encouraged by the 
development of a cultural ethos which controls individual behavior by means of the 
establishment of appropriate norms and values, which are monitored on a general and 
random basis. 
Anthony (1988) describes one management control system as three coexisting control 
systems, which include management control, task control and strategic planning. 
Anthony and Govindarajan (1998) also explore the relationship between the operation of 
management control systems and the actors' power resources in multinational companies. 
Based on the organizational theory literature in multinational companies, they distinguish 
three types of control namely; "personal control", "bureaucratic control" and "social" or 
"cultural" control. 
" Personal control: relies on direct close personal supervision of lower levels by higher 
(Child, 1984). 
" Bureaucratic control: relies on the deployment of social control mechanisms to make 
employees operate effectively. It is based on formalized procedures and systems such 
as budgeting, investment appraisal, or formal human resource management policies. 
Child (1984) emphasizes the budgetary and standard cost-variance accounting 
controls within a bureaucratic mechanism. 
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" Social or Cultural control: depends on developing a manager's identification with and 
commitment to the values and objectives of the corporation. 
According to the object of control, Groot and Merchant (2000) classify control 
mechanisms as actions, results, or personnel/cultural shown as Table 3.2.3. 
Table 3.2.3 Tvne of Control Mechanisms Classified by the Ohiect of Control 
Action Controls Results Controls Personnel/Cultural Controls 
Require adherence to specific Set performance targets and Select partner(s) who can be 
actions defined in legal monitor performance reports. trusted (e. g., reliable history, 
contracts. Ask for explanations and give shared management 
advice where appropriate. philosophy). 
Require adherence to pre- Set performance targets and Place qualified, loyal personnel 
specified policies and monitor performance reports. in key operating positions. 
procedures (with checking by Intervene when necessary. 
auditors and penalties for non- 
adherence). 
Review and approve certain Set performance targets and Require specified training. 
planned decisions (e. g., promise and provide rewards for 
proposed investments). good performance. 
Source: Groot, T. L. C. M. & merchant, K. A., (2000). Control of International Joint Ventures, 
Accounting Organizations and Society, 25(6): 579-607. 
Yan and Gray (1994,2001) state that parent firms can exercise control in three ways (1) 
strategic control by the IN's board of directors, (2) operational control by the joint 
venture's top management; and (3) structural control by imposing the procedures and 
routines of the parent companies in the IJV. 
Stewart (2002) examines management control systems that are used by a US physicians 
group. Reviewing the existing literature, he describes an effective set of formal controls 
that includes three major mechanisms: operational plans, performance measurement 
systems and feedback mechanisms. 
. Operational plans: include the company's annual master budget and the related 
supporting work plans and are the standard for operating performance. 
. Performance measurement systems: report the financial results and operating data of 
the work activities on a periodic basis. 
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. Feedback mechanisms: report the variances that generated from the comparison of 
actual and planned performance within the organization periodically through various 
interim reports. 
In summary, this review of the existing literature suggests that various mechanisms or 
types of management control developed by scholars are well documented. We compile 
the relative literatures of control mechanism in Table 3.2.4. 
Table 3.2.4 The Relative Literatures of Control Mechanism 
Authors Year Control mechanisms 
Ouchi 1977 Behavior control Output control 
Market mechanism 








Anthony 1988 Task control 




Behavior (action) control 
Output (result) control 










Govindarajan 1998 Bureaucratic control Social or culture control 
Action controls 
Groot and Merchant 2000 Results controls 
Personnel/culture controls 
1994 Strategic control Yan and Gray , Operational control 2001 Structure control 
Operational control 
Stewart 2002 Performance measurement systems 
Feedback mechanisms 
Source: this study compiled from relevant articles 
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Based on the above literature review, this study uses the decision-making and the 
appointment of high-level management to discuss the control of international joint 
venture in Taiwan. 
3.3 Theoretical and Empirical Studies Relating to Control 
of International Joint Ventures 
An international joint venture agreement legally creates aN through a contract and 
identifies the major rights and obligations of the partners. However, the legal agreement 
in an IN cannot ensure that the partner's objectives will be observed precisely. 
Therefore, the joint venture's partners typically rely on various control mechanisms to 
ensure their objectives are achieved. Control is a crucial organizational process and also 
a complex and multidimensional concept. Control is desirable to improve a firm's 
competitive position and maximize the returns on its assets and skills (Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992). It plays an important role in the successful management and 
performance of international joint ventures. For example, Killing (1983) found that if 
one partner has dominant control, the IN will be operated more successful and have 
higher performance. Geringer and Hebert (1989) also suggest that the exercise of 
control by a parent company over some or all of an international joint venture's activities 
helps to protect it from the risk of prematurely exposing its technological or other 
proprietary assets to the other partner. 
Some researchers deem control as the authority over decision-making responsibilities 
(Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997; Hill et al., 1990; Young et al., 1989; Klein, 1989; 
Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Philips, 1982). Driscoll and Paliwodä (1997), in 
investigating the different dimensions of the mode of entry decision and the determinants 
which bear on mode choice, define the term "control" as "the extent to which a firm 
desires authority both over operational and strategic decision-making responsibilities in 
the host market. " They elucidate control as having some benefits for the partners. First, 
control can be used to safeguard supplies of essential inputs to the production process, 
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coordinate activities, ensure the quality of end products, and influence the logistical and 
marketing activities for the production for the target market. Second, control can enable 
firms to make more precise decisions in response to the demands of the market, and in 
turn to increase the satisfaction of the customers. Third, control enables the firm to 
anticipate and respond to the strategies of competitors. 
Prior research has also found that many international joint ventures fail. Kogut (1988) 
found that 32% of one sample of joint ventures failed within the first 10 years. In a 
sample of over 5000 subsidiaries of 180 large US multinationals, Gomes-Casseres (1987) 
found that 31% of joint ventures were unstable. Some authors have suggested that 
control problems are one of the primary causes of international joint venture failures 
(Dacin, Hitt and Levitas, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Kogut, 1989; Beamish, 1988). However, 
only a relatively small proportion of international joint venture research has focused on 
control issues. For example, Geringer and Hebert (1989) wrote 
"The issue of control has received only fragmented and unsystematic attention 
in joint venture literature and managers have received minimal guidance about 
when and how to use(the various control options), as well as about the 
potential trade-offs between alternative control options". (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1989, p237, p250) 
Glaister(1995) argues that the relevant literature on joint ventures basically focuses on 
two parts: emphasizing on general issues in the management of joint ventures where the 
problems are often running them(Ohmae, 1989; Datta, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 
1988; Koot, 1988; Otterbeck, 1981; Peterson and Shimade, 1978; ) and providing 
guidelines as to how joint ventures should be managed (Lorange, 1988; Schaan, 1988; 
Devlin and Bleackley, 1988; Lorange and Probst, 1987; Killing, 1982; Holton, 1981). 
After reviewing previous literature, Geringer and Hebert (1989) identify three 
dimensions of joint venture control: the mechanism of control, the extent of control and a 
focus of control. 
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(1) Mechanism of control 
The mechanism of control refers to the methods by which control is exercised. Initial 
researches show that firms frequently rely on majority ownership or on voting rights to 
achieve effective management control of an IN's activities (Stopford and Wells, 1972; 
Friedman and Beguin, 1971; Tomlinson, 1970). Behrman (1970) and Friedman and 
Beguin (1971) suggest that control is not a strict and automatic consequence of 
ownership. It is a variety of mechanisms which are available to firms in exercising 
effective control such as the right of veto, representation in management bodies and 
special agreements related to either technology or management. Parent firms might also 
be able to depend on their technical superiority and managerial skills as a means of 
guaranteeing participation in the management of operations. Methods of exercising 
managerial control can also be found in the appointment of a joint venture's general 
manager and key functional managers, and the employment of different ownership 
structure arrangements (Rafii, 1978; Gullander, 1976; ). 
Doz and Prahalad (1981,1984) demonstrate a series of administrative mechanisms which 
can be used by the MNCs to gain control over subsidiary operations and to influence 
their strategies over time. They identify three kinds of mechanisms which help to acquire 
the control: (1) data management mechanisms which structure and provide data that are 
relative to the global performance of the company, (2) managers' management 
mechanisms which shift the expectations of managers to meeting, and (3) conflict 
resolution mechanisms which resolve the conflicts triggered by the necessary tradeoffs 
among national subsidiaries. 
Cullen and Johnson (1995) in a study of Japanese companies, use three mechanisms of 
control and the extent of control of decision-making to evaluate the commitment to IJVs 
of both Japanese and local partners. They indicate that mechanisms of control include 
equity share, voting control and strategic placement of key personnel in an IJV. 
Therefore, they represent the mechanisms of control as: the proportion of ownership by 
each partner, the proportion of IN managers assigned by each partner and the 
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proportion of IN directors from each partner. Yan and Child (2004) argue that parent 
firms can use the appointment of key management in an IN to protect their strategic 
resources or to safeguard the delegation of their technology and management and also to 
increase their power by creating dependency on the parent firms. They also illustrate 
that the occupancy of key IN management positions are important factors in IN control. 
Schaan (1983) classifies several control mechanisms in joint ventures as follows: 
representation on the board of directors, formal agreements, the appointment of key 
personnel, participation in the joint venture's planning process and reporting 
relationships. He makes a significant contribution to the understanding of joint venture 
control by identifying control mechanisms into positive and negative types. Positive 
controls are mechanisms which parent companies use to promote certain joint venture 
behaviours. In contrast, negative control mechanisms tend to be imposed by parent 
companies to stop or to prevent the joint venture from implementing certain activities or 
decisions. He found that positive control was most exercised through informal 
mechanisms. 
Child (1984) identifies four mechanisms of control including personal supervision, 
formalization, targeting systems, and cultural control. Based on a 67 samples of 
international joint ventures in China, Child and Yan (1999) distinguish strategic control 
and operational control. They describe strategic control as "control over the means and 
methods on which the whole conduct of an organization depends (Child, 1984)" 
including the deployment of capital, the determination of strategic priorities and the 
making of senior appointments. Operational control is "control over the production 
process within an organization, in the sense of determining how the employees of an 
organization perform their work (Child, 1984)". Operational control focuses on 
production related activities such as purchasing, sales and distribution, and quality. Their 
results showed that equity share is the major driver for the exercise of strategic control 
and also influences operational control through its effects on the appointment of board 
members and appointments to key executive positions. Also, non-capital resources have 
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a direct effect on operational control in addition to an indirect effect through 
appointments to key executive positions. 
Previous studies of alliances have examined control mechanisms within the framework of 
cultural controls, behavioural actions controls, and outcome results controls (Groot and 
Merchant, 2000; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Chalos and O'Connor (2004) have studied 
the effects of determinants on the usage of various types of control mechanisms in US- 
Chinese joint ventures. They used various control mechanisms which included: (1) 
cultural controls which include expatriate staffing and socialisation practices encourage 
the alignment of partner values and interests; (2) behavioural controls which include 
delegated decision-making responsibilities and parent company communications control 
and monitor managers; and (3) output controls which include management performance 
incentives to motivate managers to meet strategic goals and objectives. 
According to prior research results (Kumar and Seth, 1998; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; 
Schaan, 1983), Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang (2001) suggest that partners can use 
several mechanisms to exert effective control over the activities of joint ventures. 
" Active participation in the joint venture's board of directors. Exercising control 
depends on the capacity of certain administrators to influence the points of view of 
other board members. 
" Holding directorship positions. Partners who keep total control on certain key 
functions can prevent misappropriation and can ensure the resources transferred from 
parent to joint venture are utilized effectively. 
" Training and socialization of managers and other employees of the joint venture. 
" Special technology transfer agreements or supply of specific component parts between 
the partners of the joint ventures. 
" Close contacts between the managers of both partners, by installing committees and 




The extent of control is the degree to which a parent company exercises control over the 
joint venture at strategic and operational levels (Killing, 1983; Tomlinson, 1970). Lyles 
and Reger (1993) suggest that the extent of control can be expressed in terms of the 
degree to which joint venture managers enjoy autonomy from the parent companies. 
Using a sample of 153 EIJVs located in China, Newburry, Zeira and Yeheskel (2003) 
found that a JV's autonomy and effectiveness had strong relationships. Their results 
revealed that joint ventures with higher autonomy have increased effectiveness. Their 
results imply that the extent of control affects the JV's performance, and more freedom 
will result in greater effectiveness of the joint venture. 
In his study of 37 joint ventures in developed countries, Killing (1983) defines control in 
terms of the decision-making role of joint venture management. He identifies nine types 
of decisions: pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, manufacturing 
process, quality control replacement of managers, sales targets, cost budgeting and 
capital expenditures. Killing investigates whether each decision was made by the JV 
general manager alone, by the local parent alone, by the foreign parent alone, by the N 
general manager with input from the local parent, or from the foreign parent, or from 
both parents. He identifies three types of control, namely, dominant parent, shared and 
independently controlled. 
(a) Dominant parent control: Killing (1983) states that dominant parent ventures are 
managed much like wholly-owned subsidiaries. The dominant parent makes all 
operating and strategic decisions and all functional managers will come from or be 
selected by the dominant parent. 
(b) Shared management control: The use of shared control is the notion of split control. 
Both parents manage and play an active role in the management of joint ventures. 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) provide empirical support for this view. Dunning and 
Cantwell (1984) suggest that it is possible to obtain the benefits of each partner's 
expertise by dividing or splitting decision-making. 
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(c) Independent control: A joint venture is relatively free of the interference from either 
parent. Such ventures receive little direction from either parent and the venture's 
management team is highly autonomous. 
From his research, Killing (1983) argues that dominant joint ventures were easier to 
manage than shared joint ventures, because one parent was willing to play a passive role. 
Beamish (1984) applies Killing's scale analysis in an examination of joint ventures in 
developing countries. However, his results do not support Killing' findings. The main 
reasons associated with the extent of control are: (a) the percentage of equity committed 
by the partners; (b) the joint venture general manager's autonomy which tends to be 
controlled and influenced by how much the joint venture fits into the parent company's 
organizational structure; and (c) the balance of technology, management expertise and 
distribution network contributed by the partners. 
(3) Focus 
The focus of control describes the areas of the joint venture's operation in which control 
is exercised. It suggests that partners tend to seek control over specific activities rather 
than over the whole joint venture. Schaan (1983) explicitly defines control as "the 
process through which a parent company ensures that the way a joint venture is managed 
conforms to its own interest". He finds that partners may choose to exercise control 
over a relatively wide or narrow scope of the IN's activities. Geringer's (1986) 
research of 90 joint ventures in developed countries, provides confirmation that selective 
control can be used when a parent exercises control over a joint venture. According to 
the literature, Geringer and Hebert (1989) note that effective control should emphasize 
selective control over those dimensions that a parent perceives as critical, rather than 
attempting to control the entire range of the joint venture's activities. In investigating 
the control and performance of INs in China, Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw (2001) clarify 
control into two constructs, namely, specific control and overall control. They claim that 
overall control is designed to monitor the entire range of an IN's activities, whereas 
specific control emphasizes the selective areas which are strategically important for 
achieving a partner's objectives. From their empirical investigation, they found that 
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foreign partners achieve more overall and specific controls in joint ventures while 
Chinese parents have more specific control in joint ventures in order to acquire 
knowledge and skills from foreign partners. 
Control involves various partners and each partner of an international joint venture has 
their own objectives; therefore, how to exercise control over its joint venture plays an 
important role in successful cooperation. However, little relevant literature on 
international joint ventures has been directed at the questions related to what constitutes 
control and what factors will affect the degree of control and also what is the relationship 
with the factors. 
This study to intends to add to the knowledge of international joint ventures by focusing 
on the nature of control exercised by Taiwanese parent firms over the joint ventures and 
the relationship between control and its antecedent factors, in terms of the parent's 
contributions, ownership, bargaining power and motivation. 
3.4 The Antecedents of Control in International Joint 
Ventures 
As noted previously, other researchers demonstrate that control is an important function 
of an international joint venture and it can be affected by various factors such as parent's 
contributions, ownership, bargaining power and motives. In this section, the links 
between control and its antecedents are briefly explained and will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
Substantial studies have investigated the relationship between ownership and control of 
IJVs (Child and Yan, 1999; Pan, 1997; Lin, 1995; Meier, Perez and Woetzel, 1995; 
Blodgett, 1991; Harrign, 1986; Killing, 1983; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Youseff, 1975; 
Stopford and Wells, 1972) and most of these research results indicate that ownership is 
the main method for the IN's parents to gain control over their joint ventures. Although 
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some studies have inconsistent results, the main argument of researchers suggests that 
equity ownership is not the only factor explaining the variations in control. Some other 
factors will complement minority equity shares and in turn affect control (Lecraw, 1984). 
Based on most research results, the relationship between control and ownership is 
proven by most researchers (Child and Yan, 1999; Pan, 1997; Lin, 1995; Meier, Perez 
and Woetzel, 1995; Blodgett, 1991; Harrign, 1986; Killing, 1983; Fagre and Wells, 1982; 
Youseff, 1975; Stopford and Wells, 1972). This also shows that there is a positive 
relationship between the parent ownership and their extent of control in joint ventures. 
Previous research also suggests that the bargaining power of partners is a critical variable 
in determining patterns of control in joint ventures (Yan and Gray, 1994; Blodgett, 1991; 
Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Lecraw, 1984; ). Cooperating partners have increased 
power to influence the outcome of a negotiation process (Brouthers and Bamossy, 1997; 
Schelling, 1956; ), and in turn can affect control and the proportion of equity shares 
(Lecraw, 1984). Bargaining power stems from important advantages or assets such as 
technology, export potential ability or marketing capability which are important 
resources for each partner (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1994; Grosse and 
Behrman, 1992; Blodgett, 1991; Eiteman, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Harrigan and 
Newman, 1990; Fisher and Ury, 1987; Kobrin, 1987; Fagre and Wells, 1982). Some 
research results show that bargaining power will affect control of IJVs (Yan and Gray, 
1994; Lecraw, 1984; ). Based on prior studies, this study measures the relationship 
between bargaining power, control and ownership. 
According to a resource-dependency perspective, the extent of control is affected by the 
resource contributions which are required for the international joint venture to succeed 
(Chalos and O'Connor, 2004; Child and Yan, 1999; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Lin, 1995; 
Killing, 1983). For example, Child and Yan's (1999) empirical investigations show 
parents contributing the necessary resources to a joint venture which will gain more 
control over the IN subject. Various researchers find that different resource 
contributions by each partner will result in a different scope of control by each partner in 
exercising control to protect their assets and investments (Yan and Child, 2004; Chalos 
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and O'Connor, 2004; Yan and Ku, 1997; Lin, 1995). Some researchers also found that 
resource contributions to a joint venture may affect the proportion of parent's equity 
shares (Pan, 1996; Lin, 1995; Blodgett, 1991; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Fagre and Wells, 
1982). The resources contributed by each parent provide a different source of power 
and a different scope of influence on control and ownership. Thus, this study intends to 
explain the relationships between resource contribution, control and ownership. 
The motives for forming an IN has investigated by many researchers (Glaister, 2004; 
Yan and Luo, 2001; Pan and Tse, 1996; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1992; Hung, 1992; Hennart, 1991; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 
1988; Harrigan, 1985,1988; Beamish, 1985; Mariti and Smiley, 1983). However, there 
are very few studies examining the relationship between motives and control 
simultaneously. Lin (1995) reported that different motives for joint venture formation 
have different extents of control and found that the partner who has learning motivation 
would have greater control in order to specifically acquire knowledge from foreign 
partners. Chalos and O'Connor (2004) describe the difference in partner perceptions of 
control mechanisms as determined largely by their respective motives. They found that 
knowledge dependency and asset specific transaction costs to be the determinants of 
varying degrees of control for each partner. When the partners have different objectives, 
normally they will exercise various modes of behaviour to achieve their objectives. One 
mode is exercising control over their ventures. Therefore, this study proposes that the 
motives for forming an IN will affect its control, and will measure their relationship. 
As an attempt to integrate the concepts of control, ownership, bargaining power, 
resource contribution, and motivation of forming IJVs, this study proposes a research 
framework to represent the main linkages which are drawn from the literature. The 
research framework of this study is shown in Figure 3.4.1. 
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Motivation Contribution Bargaining 
power 
Ownership 1 0-1 Control 
Figure 3.4.1 The Research Framework 
In the framework, it is postulated that there are significant relationships between control 
and its antecedent factors, namely, motivation, contribution, bargaining power and 
ownership. Ownership is also a function of motivation, contribution and bargaining 
power. More details of relationships between permutations of the dimensions will be 
elucidated in Chapter 4. 
3.5 Summary 
This study mainly focused on the control of international joint ventures, and considered 
what antecedent variables will affect control. This chapter reviews the relevant literature 
with respect to the general theories of management control and the definition and types 
of control. In this study, the term "control" refers to "a process used by parents of 
international joint venture to affect the venture's behaviour in order to ensure that the 
venture conforms to its organizational objectives (Schaan, 1983; Ding, 1997). " 
The reviews of the prior literature provide examples of various types of management 
control. Most types of management control are grouped into one of three classes, i. e. 
action controls, results controls, and personnel/cultural controls (Groot and Merchant, 
2000). Yan and Gray (1994,2001) state that parent firms can exercise control in three 
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ways: strategic control, operational control; and structural control. This study adopts 
Yan and Gray's results: utilizing strategic control and operational control to discuss the 
control of international joint venture in Taiwan. 
Due to the large number of studies on the issues of international joint ventures and this 
study only concentrate on the control of IN; therefore, the relevant literatures on the 
control of IN have been reviewed only and the antecedents of control associated with 
motives, parent's resource contributions, bargaining power, and ownership have been 
described briefly. In order to represent the relationship between control and its 
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THE ANTECEDENTS OF CONTROL IN 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has reviewed briefly on the definitions of control and its antecedent factors in 
international joint ventures. In this chapter, we focus on the factors which affect the 
control of international joint ventures. Therefore, the following sections demonstrate the 
relevant literature associated with the antecedents of control in the context of the IN in 
Taiwan. This chapter is organized into five sections. In each subsection, relevant 
literature is reviewed first and then hypotheses, in relation to the control of IN, are 
proposed. Section 4.2 describes the ownership and discusses the determinants of equity 
ownership and its relationship with control. Section 4.3 explains the bargaining power 
and its relationship with control and ownership. Section 4.4 describes the contribution 
which is derived from parents and the type of resources contributed by parents. The 
effect of this contribution is discussed and the relationship among control, ownership, 
and bargaining power is expressed. Section 4.5 first examines alternative theoretical 
rationales for international joint venture and then moves onto the empirical literature 
relating to the motives for the formation of an IN. The relationship between the 
motivation for formation of an IN, control and other factors are discussed. Finally, a 
research framework of this study is proposed. In the next section, we start to describe 
the antecedents of control. 
4.2 Ownership of International Joint Ventures 
Funding is the basic resource for building a business. The issue of ownership is central 
to any theory of multinational enterprises and an important issue in international business 
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studies (Pan, 1996,2002; Pan and Li, 2000; Hennart, 1991; Blodgett, 1991; Contractor, 
1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1989,1990; ). For the international joint venture, the amount of 
investment in the venture represents the equity ownership in the ventures held by the 
partners. The equity ownership of a joint venture will affect the number of N board of 
directors, which board members serve as a communication and information-processing 
channel between the parent, and the joint venture (Leksell and Lindgren, 1982) and so 
affect the important decisions of joint ventures. Therefore, equity ownership has a very 
important meaning for the parent of joint ventures. Under Taiwan's company law, the 
corporate control of a joint venture can be exercised through the voting rights of the 
shareholders, and the inherent powers of the board chairman. The amount and type of 
shares held determine voting rights in the company. Usually, one share has one vote; 
thus, the most effective method of gaining control is to gain shares. 
4.2.1 The Determinants of Equity Ownership 
In the pioneering work of Vernon (1971), Stopford and Wells (1972), and Franko 
(1971), four factors were seen as major determinants of the level of equity ownership of 
multinationals in their subsidiaries; (a) the desired ownership level of the multinational, (b) 
the bargaining power of the multinational, (c) the desired level of local equity 
participation of the host country, and (d) the bargaining power of the host government 
(including the bargaining power of locally-owned firms in the host country). Lecraw 
(1984) stated that the desired ownership structure of a multinational firm for its 
subsidiaries in LDCs is a function of its firm-specific advantages, internalization 
advantages, and host country advantages. He stresses that when the complexity of the 
managerial technology increases, the multinational increases its desire for a higher degree 
of equity ownership and control. Conversely, host governments may push for increased 
local equity participation in order to increase the management expertise of their 
entrepreneurs and managers. 
Yan (1997) indicates that the ownership rights have three dimensions. The first is 
ownership rights associated with the range of resources valued as equity investments 
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committed by the owning companies. The second is the structure of a contract for the 
range of resources provided by the partners in terms which usually depend on the local 
legal system, social customs and the technical attributes of the assets involved. The third 
is the configuration of a range of resources provided on a non-contractual basis and 
which represent the level of commitment of the owning companies to their joint ventures. 
Yan and Gray (1994b, 1996) regard equity as the provision of a "capital resource" to a 
joint venture by its partner companies, typically finance and sometimes land and buildings. 
They distinguish and categorize the resources as "capital resource" and "non-capital 
resource", the latter includes technology, management expertise, local knowledge, raw 
material procurement channels, product distribution and marketing channels, and global 
services support. On the study of the impact of country of origin on equity ownership, 
Yan (2002) finds that the equity ownership tends to be higher when the parent firms' 
country of origin has a strong currency, low cost of borrowing, strong export capability 
and political stability. 
In general terms, the choice of ownership structure for a subsidiary depends on MNE's 
strategy and on the costs of different ways to implement this. Gomes-Casseres (1989) 
argues that various studies on the ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries suggest 
that the costs and benefits of different ownership structures depend on three types of 
factors. These factors are motivation for cooperation, transaction costs of cooperating 
through contractual means and the organization costs of equity joint ventures. These 
three types of factors are reflected implicitly in some empirical studies (Buckley and 
Casson, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1985; Stopford and Wells, 1972; 
Tomlinson, 1970; Friedmann and Kalmanoff, 1961). Using the transaction cost 
perspective, Gomes-Casseres (1989) indicate that the ownership preferences of MNEs 
are driven by a combination of three factors. These are (a) the relevant capabilities of the 
MNEs and host country firms; (b) the transaction cost of transferring each partner's 
capability to a cooperative venture; and (c) costs due to shirking by partners and 
conflicts between partners do not outweigh the benefits of joint ownership. 
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An examination of the literature suggests that the subsidiary ownership decision could be 
a very complex function of numerous factors spanning host country characteristics, 
industry characteristics, product characteristics and firm characteristics (Root, 1994; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Robinson, 1978). Erramilli (1996) explores the notion 
that a multinational's nationality influences its foreign subsidiary ownership decisions. 
From their research sample, Stopford and Wells (1972) find that U. S. multinationals have 
a predominant preference for wholly owned subsidiaries. Weinstein (1977) finds that 
62% of the subsidiaries are either fully or majority owned in his sample of American 
multinational advertising agencies. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) explore that 
American multinationals have an intrinsic tendency to prefer wholly owned subsidiaries, 
after testing a transaction cost model to explain the MNE's degree of control over 
foreign subsidiaries. After analyzing the joint venture ownership in developed and 
developing countries, Beamish (1985) finds that the foreign firms have equal-equity 
ownership in developed countries and contrastingly have majority or minority equity 
ownership in developing countries, see Table 4.2.1. 
Tnhie 421 Joint Venture Ownershin in Develoned and fPvP1nnino rnntripc 
Countries Frequency of equal- 
_equity 
(50-50) ventures 
Frequency of majority or 
minority equity ventures 
Developed Mergers &Acquisitions 43 57 
countries (153) 
samples Killing (40) 50 50 
Geringer (86) 70 30 
Developing Mergers &Acquisitions 20 so 
countries (47) 
samples Beamish(66) 10 90 
Reynolds (51) 20 80 
Source: Beamish, P. W. (1988), Multinational Joint Ventures in Developing Countries, 
New York: Routledge, p. 16. 
Fagre and Wells (1982) and Lecraw (1984) explain that the wide variation in the 
ownership of foreign affiliates mainly lies in industry or firm-specific independent 
variables, as well as in country-specific variables (Kobrin, 1987). In his sample, Kobrin 
(1987) explores how host government-imposed limits and performance requirements 
induce a greater use of minority and 50-50 affiliate, , 
particularly in the developing 
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countries. And larger market size increases the propensity to use 50-50 and minority 
affiliates, particularly in industrialized countries. Al-Saadon and Das (1996) develop a 
model to explain that the ownership shares are determined as the outcome of Nash 
bargaining between a multinational firm and a host country firm. They deem that the 
pattern of ownership distribution between the foreign parents and the host parent firms 
may be influenced by the tax/subsidy policy of the host country's government. Using the 
Nash bargaining model, they conclude that the equity share of the foreign parents is 
negatively related to the fixed cost of the JVs and positively related to the size of the 
market that the JV serves. 
Using neural networks analysis in a Sino-foreign joint venture, Hu, Zhang and Chen 
(2004) found that equity ownership is basically a form of control that the foreign parent 
exercises over its overseas operations. Their results also revealed that the time 
commitment in terms of the duration of the joint venture and the regional growth rate 
could be the most significant factors for equity. They explained that the longer duration 
of the joint venture may create more economic uncertainty or risks; therefore, the 
partners would consider having greater ownership to compensate for these risks. 
4.2.2 The Relationship between Ownership and Control 
There is substantial research literature to describe the relationship between ownership 
and control; however, some research results are conflicting. Some research indicates 
that equity share is a predictor of the overall control held by IN partners, and of their 
control over strategic decisions in particular (Child, 2002; Child et al., 1997; Yan and 
Gray, 1996; Lecraw, 1984; Killing, 1983; Youseff, 1975). Equity ownership is regarded 
as the most direct means of gaining and exercising control over the IN (Killing, 1983; 
Pan, 1997). Some researchers regard ownership as a proxy of control. For example, 
Stopford and Wells (1972), Fagre and Wells (1982), Blodgett (1991) all use ownership 
as a proxy for management control in joint ventures. Some studies found that the ability 
of one parent to influence the strategic decisions in INs is associated with the equity 
share (Yan and Gray, 1996) and results often recommended that the foreign partners 
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should hold 67% or more of the equity of an IN ( Meier, Perez and Woetzel, 1995). 
From the result of their investigation in China, Child and Yan (1999) indicate that equity 
share is the major lever for the exercise of strategic control and also influences 
operational control. They suggest that the company should acquire a larger equity share, 
because this can increase the parent's ability to influence the strategic direction of an 
international joint venture. 
However, other researchers have inconsistent results. Mjoen and Tallman (1997) find no 
link between equity and strategic controls or between equity and operational controls. In 
his research sample, Lecraw (1984) finds that the link between the level of ownership 
and control may not be straightforward. It depends on the type of technology 
transferred, the capabilities of the local partners, and host government policies. 
Multinational enterprises may be able to control the operations of its subsidiary without 
majority ownership, or, conversely, may have little control over these operations despite 
majority ownership. In addition, Yan and Gray (1994) also argue that equity structure is 
not equivalent to management control, in their case study. Some researchers argue that 
partner equity is not the only independent variable explaining variation in the uses of 
behavioural control mechanisms (Chalos and O'Connor, 2004; Child and Faukkner, 
1998). Chalos and O'Connor (2004) find that equity ownership seems to be more 
descriptive of actual N control mechanisms rather than to be a determinant of specific 
management controls. 
Harrigan (1986) demonstrates that multinational companies intend to obtain a greater 
control over joint ventures by committing to majority equity shares. In her study in the 
Taiwan context, Lin (1995) finds the level of ownership and control has a positive 
relationship. Greater ownership represents greater control over the ventures. From the 
Chinese viewpoint, the ownership of the venture means the power of control. On the 
basis of the alternative arguments, this study posits that ownership and control have a 
positive relationship. Therefore, the following hypotheses are represented. 
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H 1: There is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of ownership 
and the extent of control. 
H 1.1: The higher the proportion of equity ownership held by host country parents 
the stronger their control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture. 
H 1_2: The higher the proportion of equity ownership held by host country parents 
the stronger their control of the appointment of high-level managers in a 
joint venture. 
4.3 Bargaining Power of International Joint Ventures 
Prior studies have demonstrated that bargaining power can be used to affect the outcome 
of the negotiation process (Mamossy 1997; Lax and Sebinius 1986; Schelling, 1956; ) and 
can be derived from some resource contributions (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Grosse 
and Behrman, 1992; Eiteman, 1990; Kobrin, 1987; Fisher and Ury, 1987; Fagre and 
Wells, 1982). Previous researchers also suggest that the bargaining power of partners is 
a critical variable in determining patterns of control in joint ventures (Blodgett, 1991; 
Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Lecraw, 1984). Therefore, this section stresses the 
sources of bargaining power first, and then discusses its relationship between control and 
ownership. 
4.3.1 The Sources of Bargaining Power 
The concept of bargaining power is related to a bargainer's ability to favourably change 
the "bargaining set" (Lax and Sebinius, 1986), to obtain accommodations from the other 
party (Dwyer and Walker, 1981), and to influence the outcome of a negotiation 
(Schelling, 1956). In their study, Brouthers and Bamossy (1997) state that bargaining 
power exists when foreign and local parties possess power over each other that can be 
used to affect the outcome of the negotiation process. They describe bargaining power 
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as coming from three domains: (1) the bargaining resources of each party; (2) the 
importance of the agreement to each party; and (3) the degree of similarity of interests of 
each party (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Grosse and Behrman, 1992; Eiteman, 1990; 
Fisher and Ury, 1987; Kobrin, 1987; Fagre and Wells, 1982). They also find that the 
host government can cause changes in the levels of bargaining power of the participants 
due to the dependency of the IN on the government (Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; 
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Lecraw, 1984). 
The issue of the determinants of bargaining power has been presented by some studies. 
For example, Fagre and Wells (1982) find that the bargaining power of multinational 
firms is an increasing function of five elements which are the multinational's 
technological level, the product differentiation, the access provided to export markets, 
the invested sum, and the diversity of the firm's production line. Robinson (1969) 
stresses that partner contributions are important to the process of joint venture 
management because the contributions and expected benefits of the participating firms 
are continually adjusted to align with shifts in relative power between the partners. 
In his study, Lecraw (1984) stresses that firm-specific advantages which include the 
proprietary product or technology, access to relatively inexpensive capital, access to 
export markets, and management expertise may give the multinational bargaining power 
over the host country and competing firms. He indicates that possession of a proprietary 
product of technology may increase a multinational's bargaining power over the host 
country, particularly if other multinationals or local investors cannot supply technology 
of the same type or level of advancement. Similarly, Kobrin (1987) indicates that the 
sources of MNE bargaining power can be derived from firm-specific advantages or 
assets. He has used several variables to represent the sources of MNE bargaining power, 
such as technology, parent size, subsidiary size, employment, and export potential. In 
their study of expectations and results of contractual joint ventures by US and UK 
MNCs, Paliwoda and Liebrenz (1984) indicate that the most powerful position for the 
MNCs was when firms hold a near monopolistic technology which could yield beneficial 
leverage at the beginning of negotiations. They summarize the elements which are useful 
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to the MNCs in maintaining control as, cutting-edge technologies, additional services 
such as marketing expertise or sales opening, a corporate trademark, or being the sole 
proprietor of certain technology. 
Using bargaining power theory and transaction costs theory, Gomes-Casseres (1990) 
state that the investment size increases the MNE's bargaining power and the 
attractiveness of the territory strengthens the host country's bargaining power. He also 
suggests that the bargaining process is affected by several factors, such as R&D intensity, 
marketing intensity, and intra-system sales and that the outcome of ownership 
negotiations seems to be affected by the market attractiveness of the subsidiary. 
Focusing on their domestic joint venture research, Harrigan and Newman (1990) state 
that the bargaining power of potential joint venture partners is determined primarily by 
what each partner brings to the venture. Blodgett (1991) identifies five resources that 
can give a firm bargaining power in a joint venture. These five elements are government 
persuasion, technology, knowledge of the local environment and/or marketing expertise, 
control of intra-system transfers, and financial capital. 
With regard to the bargaining power of host parents, this mainly derives from their 
control of the environment in which the joint venture will operate. Lecraw (1984) states 
that bargaining power of the host country increased with the increasing attractiveness of 
its local market and the degree to which it controlled market access through tariffs, and 
the possession of scarce resources. He argues that the greater the country-specific 
advantages of the host country, the greater its bargaining power and the higher the level 
of local ownership it may gain for local investors. Kobrin (1987) demonstrates that the 
major bargaining power resources of the host country are the number of residents, and 
its size of Gross Domestic Product, its rate of growth, its per capita income, and its 
technological and managerial capacity. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) state that knowledge 
of the local environment is not only a key resource of local partners, but is also a key 
source of bargaining power. 
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Yan and Gray (1994) develop an integrative model of international joint ventures that 
encompass two context-based and seven resource-based components of bargaining 
power. The context-based components of bargaining power are stakes and availability of 
alternatives. A stake is a bargainer's level of dependence on a negotiation relationship 
and on its outcomes. The potential partner who has more alternatives is more powerful 
because it can threaten to walk away and exercise its best alternative to negotiate an 
agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1987). The components of resources-based bargaining 
power constitute the resources and capabilities committed by the partners to a joint 
venture. The more critical resources contributed to an organization by its partner, the 
greater power that partner has. Luo (2002) indicates that the market power of foreign 
firms in home or international markets can elevate the foreign firm's bargaining power 
stemming from the dependence of their local partners (Yan and Gray, 1994; Pfeffer and 
Salancil, 1978). From the above relevant empirical studies, the major determinants of 
bargaining power are summarized in Table 4.3.1. 
Tahle AI1 Mainr Determinants of Rarwainino Pnw r 
Author Year Sources of bargaining power 
Fagre and Wells 1982 . Technological level 
. Product differentiation 
. Access to export markets 
. Invested amount 
. Diversity of firm's production line 
Lecraw 1984 . Proprietary product or technology 
. Access to relatively inexpensive capital 
. Access to export markets 
. Management expertise 
Kobrin 1987 . Technology 
. Parent size 
. Subsidiary size 
. Employment 
. Export potential 
Gomes-Casseres 1990 . Investment size 
. Attractiveness of the territory 
. R&D intensity 
Harrigan and Newman 1990 . The source of each partner brings to the venture 
Blodgett 1991 . Government suasion 
. Technology 
. Knowledge of the local environment and/or marketing expertise 
. Control of intra-system transfers 
. Financial capital critical resources 
Yan and Gray 1994 . Context-based: stakes and availability of alternatives 
Resources-based: 
Inkpen and Beamish 1997 . local environment knowledge 
Source: this study compiled from relevant articles. 
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In general, according to the pioneering work of researchers, bargaining power can be 
classified into three categories: (1) resource-based: bargaining power, which can stem 
from the contribution of critical resources, such as technology, marketing expertise, 
access to financial markets, control of internetwork; (2) capability-based: when investing 
firms have the ability to affect outcomes or to get things done; (3) equity-based: when 
investing companies are characterized as having a strong preference for major ownership 
in their overseas subsidiaries, and in most cases their perceived relatively strong 
bargaining positions allow them to realize those ownership options. 
4.3.2 The Relationship between Bargaining Power, Control and 
Ownership 
Adopting the negotiations perspective to explain the distribution of control between the 
partners in a joint venture, previous researchers suggest that the bargaining power of 
partners is a critical variable in determining patterns of control in joint ventures (Blodgett, 
1991; Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Lecraw, 1984). For example, using the perspective 
of bargaining power to discuss the control of IN, Yan and Gray (1994) indicate that the 
bargaining power between parents will affect the control of IN including the proportion 
of board membership, the nomination of general managers, structural control and 
perceived overall control. 
Moreover, Lecraw (1984) finds a significant association between bargaining power and 
control. He finds bargaining power that was influenced by technical leadership, 
advertising intensity and export capability of the multinational partner had a significant 
contribution to control. On the basis of the alternative literature, this study posits that 
there is a relationship between bargaining power and control. Therefore, the hypothesis 
is represented as follows. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the extent of control 
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Fagre and Wells (1982) use a bargaining power framework to explore the relationship 
between the multinational firms' characteristics and the percentage equity ownership 
position. They regard equity ownership as an outcome of negotiation, and a 
representation of relative power between participating interests. Also, it is influenced by 
the number of multinational competitors active in the industry. 
In his empirical study, Lecraw (1984) finds that the bargaining power of multinational 
firms and host LDCs have a strong influence on the percentage equity ownership. He 
deems that the greater the country-specific advantages of the host country, the greater its 
bargaining power and the higher the level of local ownership it may gain for local 
investors. By following the bargaining approach, Lee (2004) assumes that the equity 
share of an IN firm is negotiated between the MNC and the local government. Lee 
indicates that the multinational corporations will hold an equity share of IN that is larger 
than its relative bargaining power, because the MNC has a cost advantage and superior 
technology over its local partner. 
Based on alternative literature, this study posits that there is a relationship between 
bargaining power and ownership. Therefore, the hypothesis is represented as follow. 
H 3: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the proportion of 
ownership. 
4.4 Contributions of the Joint Venture Parents 
A contribution is defined as any resource input from the foreign parent and host parent 
companies to the joint venture. Establishing an organization needs many kinds of 
resources such as capital, human resource, technology and know-how, etc.; and each of 
these resources has an important position in different situations. Kogut (1988) defines-a 
joint venture as: "a joint venture occurs when two or more firms pool a portion of their 
resources within a common legal organization". For a joint venture, the needed 
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resources are derived from different parent entities. For example, capital must firstly be 
contributed from each parent when they decide to cooporate under different motives. 
Many previous research points out that one of the motivations for forming a joint 
venture is resources dependence (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Harrigan, 1985; Beamish, 
1985; Killing, 1983; Pfeffer and Salabcik, 1978; Zald, 1970; Aiken and Hage, 1968; 
Thompson, 1967; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Selznick, 1948). In his sample of sixty- 
six joint ventures in less developed countries, Beamish's (1985) results showed that the 
reasons for creating a joint venture are skills acquisition and assets or attributes needed. 
Next, we will discuss what type of resources the parent contributes to joint ventures. 
4.4.1 The Type of Resources Contributed by Parents 
There is a wide range of resources that each parent might contribute to a joint venture 
and each type of resource potentially provides a different source of power and different 
scope of influence. Several categorisations of resource levels have been mentioned in the 
relevant literature. Grant (1991) identifies six categories of company resources: financial, 
physical, human, technological, reputation, and organisational. Barney (1991) groups 
the resources into three categories: physical, capital and human capital resources. 
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) identify resources into three categories: physical, 
invisible and financial. 
Yan and Gray (1994) state that primary resources contributed by foreign partners 
generally involve technology, management expertise, and global support. For local 
partners, the main resource contribution is expertise in areas such as local sourcing, 
domestic distribution and personal management. Sharp and Barz (1997) indicate that the 
foreign parents typically provide two types of support to their joint ventures: (1) 
technical support which including process and product technology, and (2) managerial 




Referring to a survey of a hundred US MNEs, UNCTC (1987) ranked the order of the 
importance of local partner's contributions as shown in Table 4.4.1. 
Tahle 441 Rank Orderine of Local Partners' Contributions to the Joint Venture 
Rank Contribution 
1 Knowledge of the political situation, economy and customs of the country 
2 General management 
3 Access to markets for goods produced in the country 
4 Marketing personnel and expertise 
5 Local capital 
6 Contacts and relationships with governments of host countries 
7 Plants, facilities and land of local partners 
8 Capability of recruiting local labor and dealing with labor unions 
9 Access to local materials 
10 Access to local financial institutions 
Source: UNCTC (1987), Arrangements between Joint Venture Partners in Developing countnes, 
UNCTC, New York, p18. 
UNCTC (1987) argues that the complementary contribution of resources by the partners 
provides a firm basis for a viable joint venture between firms from a developed and a 
developing country. The major contributions of the MNE are its manufacturing 
technology, product know-how, patents, business expertise, technical training and 
management development. The local partner's main contributions include capital, 
management, knowledge of the local environment and country, contacts with host 
governments, financial institutions, local suppliers and labour unions and local marketing 
capabilities. 
For local partners, Inkpen and Beamish (1997) also indicates that contributions revolve 
around an understanding of the local market, cultural, and environmental conditions. In 
the study of the effect of foreign partner contributions on IN performance, Luo (2002) 
classifies the foreign partner attributes into three categories, namely strategic 
(technological capability, market power, and marketing expertise), organizational 
(managerial skills, international expertise and corporate reputation), and financial (cost 
control, capital allocation, and asset management). Luo (2002) argues that strategic 
attributes can improve a local partner's operational skills and competitive resources 
(Geringer, 1991), technological and production capabilities (Dyer, 1997), and market 
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power and competitive position (Hamel, 1991). Organizational attributes contributed by 
a foreign partner may improve the local partner's managerial efficiency, organizational 
legitimacy and corporate reputation. His research findings revealed that Chinese firms 
look for strategic or organizational attributes but not financial competency when they 
cooperate with foreign firms and suggested that Chinese firms are expansion-driven, 
rather than focused on maximizing returns or minimizing costs. 
From the above relevant literatures, this study compiles the relevant results with regard 
to resource contribution of international joint ventures as shown in Table 4.4.2. 
Tah1P ddl Main P& nnrcr f nntrihntM by PartnPrc 
Company resources Author 


























Knowledge of the 
local environment 
Source: this study compiled from relevant articles 
With reference to the prior works of other researchers, this study chooses more common 
variables based on the variables in Table 4.4.2 above. Resource contributions can be 
classified into five categories: (1) Physical resources; (2) Invisible resources; (3) 
Financial resources; (4) Human resources; and (5) Organizational resources. This study 
will use these five resource categories to measure the resource contributions supplied by 
host country parents and foreign parents. 
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4.4.2 The Relationship between Contribution, Control, Ownership 
and Bargaining Power 
Resource-dependence theory suggests that the extent of the stakeholders control 
depends on their ability to provide the resources needed for the international joint 
venture to succeed. Child and Yan (1999) suggest that the foreign-investing enterprise 
should provide key non-capital resources which can significantly increase the ability of a 
partner to influence the quality of the joint venture management process through an 
active managerial presence. From their empirical investigation, the results show that the 
resource dependence perspective has considerable theoretical power for predicting and 
explaining the control of international joint ventures when parents from developed and 
developing countries are involved. In such cases, it means the parent contributing the 
necessary resources will gain more control over the international joint venture entity. 
Killing (1983) reported that the partners' respective contributions shaped the control 
structure of the joint venture. Lin (1995) found the contribution supplied by each 
partners not only affects the ownership but also the control. She also found that different 
contributions inputted by each partner resulted in a different scope of control by each 
partner. For example, one partner predominates in the marketing strategy; the other 
partner makes the manufacturing decisions. Mjoen and Tallman (1997) suggest that 
parents who supply the most critical resources and have greater expertise can have 
higher control over joint ventures. Chalos and O'Connor (2004) assert that the partner 
with greater specific assets in the venture is naturally more likely to exercise control over 
these assets. They found that specific asset investments which include employee 
development, supplier relationships, regulatory agency relationships, availability of 
alternative partners and local investment in land, buildings and special purpose machinery 
had significant effects on the control mechanisms from the perspective of the Chinese 
partners. Child, Yan and Ku (1997) also suggest that Chinese partners may focus on 
specific controls to protect their investments in the ventures. Yan and Child (2004) 
claimed that the ability of one party to provide better resources than its partners and/or 
control resources will give that party power over the IN. 
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There is a wide range of resources that each parent might contribute to an international 
joint venture and each type of resource potentially provides a different source of power 
and different scope of influence. Thus, this study posits that there has a relationship 
between contribution and control. The hypotheses are represented as follows: 
H 4: There is a significant relationship between resource contributions of host country 
parents and the extent of control they exercise in a joint venture 
H 4.1a: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture 
H 41b: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture 
H 42,: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture 
H 4_2b: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture 
H 43i: Host country parents with higher financial resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture 
H 4-3b: Host country parents with higher financial resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture 
H44.: Host country parents with higher human resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture 
H a. ab: Host country parents with a higher human resource contribution to the 
venture will have a stronger control of the appointment of high-level 
managers in a joint ventures. 
H4-5.: Host country parents with a higher organizational resource contribution to 
the venture will have a stronger control of operational decision-making 
activity in a joint venture. 
H 4-5b: Host country parents with a higher organizational resource contribution to 
the venture will have stronger control of the appointment of high-level 
managers in a joint venture. 
Blodgett (1991) indicates that the type of expertise that a company contributes to a joint 
venture may affect the amount of equity it holds. The results of her study revealed that 
ownership patterns vary with the combination of resources contributed to a venture. Pan 
(1996) indicates that the foreign partner who is capable of contributing more to the initial 
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capital sum acquires' stronger bargaining power for a higher equity share (Gomes- 
Casseres, 1990; Harrigan, 1985; Fagre and Wells, 1982). Lin (1995) demonstrates that 
the level of contribution supplied by each stakeholder will affect their proportion of 
ownership in the joint venture. Therefore, the proposed research hypothesis can be 
phrased as follows. 
H5: There is a significant relationship between the resource contribution of host country 
parents and their proportion of ownership in a joint venture 
H s_l: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have a 
higher proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5_2: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have a 
higher proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5.3: Host country parents with a higher financial resource contribution to the 
venture will have a higher proportion of N equity shares in a joint venture 
H s. 4: Host country parents with a higher human resource contribution to the 
venture will have a higher proportion of N equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5-4: Host country parents with higher organizational resource contribution will 
have a higher proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
Gomes-Casseres (1987b) states that participants gain power from their commitment of 
various resources, such as technology, marketing expertise, control of intra-network 
sales, access to financial markets, and geographical or industrial experience. Robinson 
(1969) stresses that partner contributions are important in the process of joint venture 
management because the contributions and expected benefits of the participating firms 
are continually adjusted to align with shifts in relative power between the partners. 
Blodgett (1991) suggests that a contributed resource is likely to result in greater 
bargaining power if the partner cannot easily appropriate it. She identifies five resource 
contributions that give a firm bargaining power in a joint venture as, government suasion, 
technology, knowledge of the local environment and/or marketing expertise, control of 
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intrasystem transfers, and financial capital. Lecraw (1984) indicates that possession of a 
proprietary product or technology may increase the bargaining position of a multinational 
over the host country. Kobrin (1987) indicates that the sources of MNE bargaining 
power can be derived from the firm-specific advantages or assets. Harrigan and 
Newman (1990) assert that the bargaining power of potential joint venture partners is 
determined primarily by what each partner brings to the venture. 
Based on the alternative literature, this study posits that there is a relationship between 
contribution and bargaining power. Therefore, the hypothesis is represented as follows: 
H 6: There is a significant relationship between resource contributions of host country 
parents and bargaining power 
4.5 The Motives for Forming International Joint Ventures 
The motives for engaging in international joint ventures are quite varied (Glaister, 2004; 
Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Why does one company 
want to cooperate with other firms? Several theoretical explanations of this particular 
form of inter-company cooperation have been proposed to explain why international joint 
ventures are formed. The principal theoretical perspectives regarding the motives or 
reasons for forming international joint venture relate to (a) resource dependence theory 
(Glaister, 2004; Harrigan, 1985; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), (b) transaction cost theory 
(Glaister, 2004; Hennart, 1988,1991; Buckley and Casson, 1988), (c) strategic 
contingency theory (Teece, 1992; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1985,1988), 
(d) organizational learning theory (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Mody, 1993). In this 
section, a number of alternative theories for the motives for joint venture formation are 
described first, and then the relevant empirical studies relating to the motives of 
international joint ventures are reviewed. Finally, hypotheses in relation to the motives 
for the formation of international joint ventures are presented. 
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4.5.1 Alternative Theoretical Rationales for International Joint 
Ventures 
This section first reviews the alternative theoretical rationales for international joint 
venture formation. There are a number of theoretical perspectives on IN formation 
which are (a) resource dependence theory, (b) transaction cost theory, (c) strategic 
contingency theory, (d) organizational learning theory. Each theory will be described in 
the following sections. 
4.5.1.1 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence analysis concentrates on resource scarcity. It illustrates that 
organizations must assume some strategies when they face an uncertain environment in 
order to obtain resources that are required for survival but constrained by external 
organizations. Some international joint ventures are motivated by the belief that the 
parent of an international joint venture can better obtain the target resources through 
cooperation. This implies that the combined resources of the two companies can 
increase the organization's competition. 
A number of authors (Pfeffer and Salabcik, 1978; Zald, 1970; Thompson, 1967; Blau, 
1964; Emerson, 1962; Selznick, 1948) have provided an integrated context of the 
resource dependence framework. Aiken and Hage (1968) indicate that cooperation 
between organizations results from resource dependence which creates a dependent 
relationship within organizations. Pfeffer and Salabcik (1978) identify the command of 
critical resources as the basis for exercising power within and between organizations. 
Harrigan (1985) suggests joint ventures can be resource-aggregating and resource- 
sharing mechanisms, which allow investing companies to concentrate resources in those 
areas where they possess the greatest respective strengths. Studying the choice of 
foreign market entry mode, Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) find that the smaller and 
less experienced multinational firms prefer entry into foreign markets through a joint 
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venture because they need to complement their resource needs with the host county 
firms. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) stated that dependence can be a source of power for 
controlling key resources because each firm can increase or withhold resources that are 
attractive to its partner (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). 
Utilising resource based theory, Glaister (2004) stresses that there are three mechanisms 
for acquiring resources and capabilities: (1) buying resources or hiring people with the 
required knowledge from other organisations, (2) internally creating them, and (3) 
through combinations of complementary resources and/or capabilities. However, 
Glaister (2004) mentions that internal development or acquisition methods are sometimes 
costly and problematic. Therefore, he suggests that an alliance is an attractive means 
which can provide access to certain capabilities, specific assets or systems. Madhok and 
Tallman (1998) also point out that there are three considerations in play when an alliance 
is formed. First, the firm does not have the resources and capabilities which can improve 
its competency and cannot develop them internally in an acceptable time or cost 
perameter. Second, markets cannot transmit organisational learning of embedded 
knowledge effectively. Third, acquiring and fully integrating another firm is not feasible. 
Therefore, if firms cannot create capabilities or posses the resources on their own, they 
can acquire the resources and capabilities through an alliance. Using data on US 
investment banking firms, Chung, Singh and Lee (2000) found that resource 
complementarity has a significant influence on the formation of alliances. They argue 
that the complementarity of capabilities implies the possibility of synergy when the 
partner's resources are pooled together, which thus enhances the likelihood of alliance 
formation. 
From the perspective of a resource based rationale, the recognition of acquiring the 
resources and capabilities provides a strategic motive for N formation. The 
collaboration provides the firm with access to complementary capabilities which are 




4.5.1.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory is concerned with the cost-effectiveness of organizing 
international economic activities. The origins of transaction cost economics are 
associated with the early writings of Coase (1937). Its framework has been most fully 
developed by Williamson (1975,1985). Casson (1982) states that markets and 
hierarchies are alternative modes of governance that offers the transaction as the basic 
unit of analysis. Williamson (1975) argues that firms choose how to manage their 
transactions according to the criteria of minimizing the sum of production and 
transaction costs. Production costs may differ between firms due to the scale of 
operations, learning, and proprietary knowledge. Transaction costs refer to the expenses 
incurred in searching out new suppliers or customers, for writing, negotiating and 
enforcing contracts and for administering a transaction. Williamson (1985) employed the 
transaction cost framework to explain that a firm may choose to exercise more or less 
control over its investment. 
Transaction cost theory is seen as a means to decide whether a joint venture is the best 
option according to the sum of production costs and transaction costs (Pan and Tse, 
2000). According to Williamson's perspective, some theorists developed the 
internalization theory to explain the strategic contents of the wholly owned subsidiary, 
the joint venture and licensing. Transaction costs will affect the choice of entry mode 
into a foreign market (Belderbos, 2003; Yu and Tang, 1992; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; 
Hennart, 1988). Teece (1986) finds that firms adopt a joint venture as a cooperation 
mode when the transaction costs are less than the internal costs of a wholly owned 
subsidiary and a joint venture is the best option when a firm possesses high specific 
resources (Hennart, 1991; Kogut, 1988). 
Transaction cost theory provides sound reasons for the formation of a joint venture; 
however, it sometimes incurs costs in another situation when pursuing the minimum 
transaction costs. Additionally, the measure of transaction costs has limitations in terms 
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of its ability to explain transaction cost theory. Kogut (1988) summarizes the argument 
on transaction costs and joint ventures as follows: 
"The critical dimension of a joint venture is its resolution of high levels of 
uncertainty over the behaviour of the contracting parties when the assets of 
both parties are specialized to the transaction and the hazards of joint 
cooperation are outweighed by the higher production or acquisition costs of 
100 percent ownership". (Kogut, 1988, p 321) 
4.5.1.3 Strategic Behaviour Theory 
Strategic behaviour theory emphasises how strategic behaviour influences the 
competitive positioning of a firm. On studying the motivation of foreign direct 
investment, some researchers have suggested that the strategic motives for firms entering 
new international markets mainly relate to acquisition of resources or advantages that 
could improve their competitive position in the global marketplace (Randoy and Dibrell, 
2002; Chandprapalert, 2000; Chen and Chen, 1998; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1992; Beamish and Banks, 1987). On the study of the IJV, researchers also 
find that firms using a joint venture strategy improve their competitive positioning in the 
market and maximizing profits (Contractor and Lorange, 1988) or increase the value of 
firms' assets (Kogut, 1988). Vernon (1983) views the joint venture as a form of 
defensive investment by which a firm hedges against strategic uncertainty, especially in 
industries of moderate concentration where collusion is difficult to achieve. Vickers 
(1985) considers joint ventures as a way to deter the entry of competitors through pre- 
emptive patenting, and shows that for small innovations, a joint venture is an effective 
mechanism to deter market-entry investment of competitors. For large innovations, it is 
in the interest of each firm to pursue its own research if the expected pay-off justifies the 
costs. Kogut (1988) indicates that the purpose of forming joint ventures is to prevent 
the entry of rivals or to enervate the competitive position of its rivals. 
With regard to transaction cost and strategic behaviour perspectives, Kogut (1988) 
deems that these two perspectives are complementary rather than substitutive. He 
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explores that the differences between these theories are the motivation for cooperative 
and the standard for partner selection. Transaction cost theory predicts that matching 
between partners should reflect minimizing costs; in contrast, strategic behaviour theory 
predicts that joint venture partners will be chosen to improve the competitive positioning 
of the parties, whether through collusion or through depriving competitors of potentially 
valuable allies. 
4.5.1.4 Organizational Learning Theory 
Organizational learning theory views joint venture as a mode by which firms learn (or 
seek) to retain their capabilities. Several studies on IJVs show that the role of 
organizational learning is an important determinant for the formation of strategic 
alliances (Glaister, Husan and Buckley, 1998,2003; Shenkar and Li, 1999; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Hamel, 1991; Badaracco, 1991; Ciborra 1991;. 
Kogut, 1988). Numerous studies have suggested that firms may enhance their 
competitive position through acquiring tacit experiential knowledge, new skills and 
capabilities from partner firms. Polanyi (1967) argues that joint ventures allow "tacit 
knowledge" to be transferred. The characteristics of tacit knowledge should be 
simultaneously valuable, difficult to imitate and limited in prevalence among the 
competitors (Barney, 1991). Robson, Leonidou and Katsileas (2002) identify knowledge 
as being useful to parent firms in three ways: (1) it can strengthen the strategic, 
operational, and tactical aspects of their businesses; (2) it can enhance experience in the 
design, implementation, and management of IJV business; and (3) it can be embedded in 
specific processes and outputs of the IJV and benefit the venture itself. Joint ventures 
are the most effective mode for transferring and integrating tacit knowledge since many 
employees from both parent companies are working together and are communicating 
frequently and directly and are able to share experience (Mowery et al., 1996; Hedlund, 
1994; Parkhe, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988). 
Kogut (1988) states that other forms of transfer, for example, licensing, are ruled out, 
not because of market failure or high transaction costs, but because the knowledge being 
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transferred is organizationally embedded. He argues that a joint venture is encouraged 
under two conditions: one or both firms desire to acquire the other's organizational 
know-how, or one firm wishes to maintain an organizational capability while benefiting 
from another firm's current knowledge or cost advantage. 
Hamel (1991) argues that collaboration may provide an opportunity for one partner to 
internalize the skills of the other and thus improve its position both within and without 
the alliance. Nelson and Winter (1982) explore whether a firm may decide on a joint 
venture in order to retain its capability of organizing specific activities while benefiting 
from the superior production techniques of a partner. Therefore, a firm may choose a 
joint venture in preference to a less costly option, in order to exploit these capabilities at 
a later stage. 
Harrigan (1984) argues that firms will cooperate in forming joint ventures only if the 
needs of each partner are great enough and if they can add resources which are 
complementary to the other's attributes. Luo (2002) indicates that Chinese firms 
perceive foreign partner competence in strategic and organizational attributes as 
significantly critical to achieving their goals of IN formation. Chinese firms are more 
focused on market expansion and knowledge acquisition considerations rather them 
transaction cost concerns. By contrast, foreign companies often aim at market 
penetration in China. Swierczek and Dhakal (2004) define learning as the utilization of 
knowledge by joint ventures as demonstrated by the improved performance of joint 
venture in accomplishing its objectives. They assert that learning involves interaction 
among parent firms and a joint venture when an entity is built to achieve the parent firm's 
objectives and/or interests (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). 
In conclusion, transaction costs, strategic behaviour, resource dependence and 
organization learning provide distinct explanations of joint venture behaviour. 
Transaction costs and strategic behaviour theory are economic analysis perspectives; in 
contrast, resource dependence and organizational learning theory are resource-based 
aspects. Transaction costs theory views joint ventures as efficient solutions to the hazard 
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of economic transactions. Strategic behaviour theory places joint ventures in the context 
of competitive rivalry and collusive agreement to enhance market power. Resource 
dependence theory sees joint ventures as stemming from resource dependence, which 
creates a dependent relationship within organizations. Organization learning theory 
views joint ventures as a vehicle by which organizational knowledge is exchanged and 
imitated. 
4.5.2 The Empirical Studies Relating to Motives for International 
Joint Venture Formation 
The empirical finding of strategy motives in a variety of studies supports the theories of 
the formation of international joint ventures (Glaister, 2004; Yan and Luo, 2001; Pan and 
Tse, 1996; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992; Hung, 1992; 
Hannart, 1991; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1985,1988; 
Beamish, 1985; Mariti and Smiley, 1983). Mariti and Smiley (1983) identify a number of 
core strategic motives for joint venture formation. These are risk sharing, product 
rationalization, transfer of complementary technology and conformance to host 
government policy. Some researchers perceive risk sharing as a fundamental motive for 
cooperative alliances (Pan and Tse, 1996; Brouthers and Wilkinson, 1995; Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1992; Harrigan, 1988). Pan and Tse (1996) classify the risk into two types: 
the contextual risks which mainly relate to the external macro-environment of the host 
country, and transactional risks which are associated with the internal nature of the 
cooperative partnership. They find that when the risks of the host country increase, 
foreign companies are more likely to cooperate with other partners in order to reduce the 
investment risk. 
In his sample of thirty-four joint ventures in developed countries (DCs), Killing (1983) 
divides the reasons for creating a joint venture into three groups: (a) government suasion 
or legislation; (b)one partner's needs for another partner's skills; and (c) one partner's 
needs for the another partner's attributes or assets. Beamish (1985) compares his own 
findings, based on a sample of sixty-six joint ventures in less developed countries (LDCs), 
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with those of Killing and identifies different motivations between developed and less 
developed countries. Table 4.5.1 shows that government suasion/legislation is a 
significantly more important influence on joint venture formation in less developed 
countries than developed countries. 
Table 4.5.1 Relationshins of Stage of Develonment to Ventnre_Creatinn Rntinnalec 
Rationale Developed country °/a e Less developed coun 
government suasion /legislation 17 57 
Skills needed 64 38 
Assets or attributes needed 19 5 
a based on sample of 34 Joint ventures by Killing 
b Based on sample of 66 joint ventures by Beamish 
Source: Derived from Beamish, P. W. (1985) "The Characteristics of Joint Ventures in Developed and 
Developing Countries", Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall, 20(3), p. 14. 
Janger (1980) obtains a similar result in LDCs, noting that nearly half of the companies 
forming joint ventures stemmed from government requirement. Gullander (1976) adds 
that the political reason maybe why foreign companies in LDCs form joint ventures. 
Tomlinson (1970), in his sample of joint venture in India and Pakistan, also stresses that 
the main reason for using a joint venture structure is either explicit or implicit 
government pressures. In some cases government policies have given more lucrative 
incentives to encourage local firms in cooperating with foreign companies to acquire 
foreign technology (Contractor, 1989). In his study on the characteristics of joint 
ventures in China, Beamish (1993) found that joint ventures in China are frequently 
created due to government pressure. Similarly, in studying the strategic alliance of 
Chinese and Hungarian companies, Child and Markoczy (1993) and Child, Markoczy 
and Cheung (1994) found that strategic alliances between the host country and foreign 
partners have been encouraged by both governments. From these empirical studies, we 
can find one of the motivations for forming an IN is government encouragement. 
From the perspective of small business, Barrett (1992) suggests that the formation of an 
IN can bring small firms some benefits which he groups into three categories. First, by 
sharing the development of an export program with an IN partner, small company 
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owners can enhance growth prospects. Second, an international partner in an IN can 
bring to the enterprise a range of cultural skills and knowledge required for trading in 
international markets, enhancing competitiveness. Third, small firms can overcome 
financial constraints when a number of government-assisted financing programs are 
available to form the export ventures. 
Franko (1972), Robock and Simmonds (1983), and Killing (1983) all observe a similar 
pattern in joint ventures. They demonstrate that joint ventures are formed as a result of 
uncertainty concerning a new market; apparent learning about the market and need for a 
partner. 
Daniels et al. (1985) indicate that investing companies engage in foreign direct 
investment for two main reasons. These are generally concerned with either expanding 
their markets by exporting abroad, or acquiring foreign resources. Berlew (1984) 
suggests that a small firm can choose a joint venture to establish itself overseas because 
the mode of joint venture brings advantages to a small firm, including (1) sharing in the 
venture's income and growth, (2) enjoying preferred treatment in developing countries, 
(3) having better accesss to the market, (4) keeping its capital contribution low by 
supplying technical expertise, (5) experiencing less drain on its managerial resources, and 
(6) creating equity value for the parent. Porter and Fuller (1986) identify four strategic 
benefits of joint venture formation which are reducing risks, economies of scale or 
learning, access to knowledge or ability, and shaping competition. They stress that joint 
ventures are seen as an attractive mechanism for hedging risk because neither partner 
bears the full risk and cost of the alliance activity. 
Harrigan (1985) classifies the various uses of joint ventures into three broad categories 
shown as Table 4.5.2. There are: (a) internal uses associated mainly with cost reduction 
and the sharing of resources; (b) competitive uses aimed at improving the firms' strategic 
positions through forcing their industries' structures to evolve in a favourable manner, 
pre-empting competitors such as developing defensive strategies in mature industries; 
104 
Chapter 4 
and (c) strategic uses aimed at implementing changes in the firms' strategic postures 
through access to new technology or diversification. 
Table 4.5.2 Motivations for Joint Venture Formatinn 
Internal uses 1. Cost and risk sharing (uncertainty reduction) 
2. Obtain resources where there is no market 
3. Obtain financing to supplement firm's debt capacity 
4. Share outputs of large minimum efficient scale plants 
" avoid wasteful duplication of facilities 
" utilize by products, processes 
" shared brands, distribution channel, wide product lines, etc. 
5. Intelligence: obtain window on new technologies and customers 
" superior information exchange 
" technological personnel interactions 
6. Innovative managerial practices 
" superior management systems 
" improved communications among strategic business units (SBUs) 
7. Retain entrepreneurial employees 
Competitive uses 1. Influence industry structure's evolution 
" pioneer development of new industries 
" reduce competitive volatility 
" rationalize mature industries 
2. Pre-empt competitors (first mover advantages) 
" gain rapid access to better customers 
" capacity expansion or vertical integration 
" acquisition of advantageous terms, resources 
" coalition with best partners 
3. Defensive response to blurring industry boundaries and globalization 
" ease political tensions (overcome trade barriers) 
" gain access to global networks 
4. Creation of more effective competitors 
" hybrids possessing parents' strengths 
" fewer, more efficient firms 
" buffer dissimilar partners 
Strategic uses 1. Creation and exploitation of synergy 
2. Technology (or other skills) transfer 
3. Diversification 
" toehold entry into new markets, products, or skills 
" rationalization (or divestiture) of investment 
" leverage-related parents' skills for new uses 
Source: Harrigan, K. R. (1985), Strategies for Joint Ventures, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., 
Lexington, Mass., p28. 
Hung (1992) studied 110 strategic business alliances between Canadian and Pacific Asia 
companies and identified 22 "motives and fundamental objectives", which are shown in 
Table 4.5.3. Based on Hung's study, Groot and Merchant (2000) refined Hung's studies 
to four main categories of objectives: (1) reducing costs, (2) obtaining market access, (3) 
obtaining access to technological developments or expertise, or (4) reducing risks. 
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Table 4.5.3 The Main Categones of objectives 
1. Gain access to local market 
2. Become "global" more quickly 
3. Share the business risk 
4. Overcome trade barriers 
5. Develop cultural familiarity 
6. Minimize capital investment 
7. Stabilize earnings 
8. Share regional markets 
9. Reduce cost of product development 
10. Make use of foreign labour 
11. Generate new ideas to stimulate internal 
innovation 
of strategic Alliances 
12. Increase contribution to the company's fixed 
investments 
13. Gain political protection 
14. Reduce/share cost of research 
15. Reduce competition 
16. Satisfy personal ambition 
17. Acquire foreign technology 
18. Gain knowledge on how other companies 
manage 
19. Circumvent investment restrictions 
20. Integrate the company's operations 
21. Make use of under-utilized equipment 
22 Secure material supplies 
Source: Groot, T. L. C. M. & Merchant, K. A., (2000), Control of International Joint Ventures, 
Accounting Organizations and Society, 25(6): 579-607 
Joint ventures are also deemed as an attractive mechanism for the sharing of risks. 
Contractor and Lorange (1988b) identify the ways in which a joint venture can reduce a 
partner's risk. These include: (a) spreading the risk of a large project over more than 
one firm; (b) enabling product diversification and the faster establishment of a presence 
in the market, which in turn allows a more rapid payback on investment; (c) cost sub- 
addivity, i. e. the cost of the partnership is less than the cost of investment undertaken by 
each firm alone. A joint venture can lower the total investment cost of a particular 
project or the assets at risk, by combining expertise and slack facilities in the parent firms. 
Kogut (1988a) stresses the use of international joint ventures stems from theories on 
how strategic behaviour influences the competitive positioning of the firm. From the 
strategic behaviour perspective, he argues that joint ventures are a mode of organization 
that maximizes profits through improving a firm's competitive position. 
Datta (1988) argues that there are a number of economic reasons why firms are 
increasingly required to accept and work with joint ventures. The motives for a 
multinational to enter into a joint venture agreement are: (a) to enter new and potentially 
profitable markets; (b) to share heightened economic risks in new business ventures; (c) 
to satisfy nationalistic demands and reduce the risks of expropriation; and (d) to pool 
organizational know-how and gain various synergistic benefits. 
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A study by the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (1988) identifies the 
range of potential objectives of foreign companies that enter into joint ventures with 
local partners to be: (a) to reduce the capital cost (and risk) of setting up a new capacity; 
(b) to penetrate a specific geographic market; (c) to acquire managerial know-how about 
local market conditions; (d) to enter a new field of business; (e) to achieve the vertical 
integration of existing products; (f) to acquire a manufacturing base or raw material 
sources; (g) to expand existing product lines; (h) to learn about newly developing market 
needs; (i) to acquire a means of distribution; (j) to improve the effectiveness of existing 
marketing; (k) to avoid cyclical or seasonal instability and (1) to take advantage of lower 
input costs. 
Hagedoorn (1993) identifies the motives for strategic technology partnering as increased 
complexity and the intersectional nature of emerging technologies, technological 
synergies, access to scientific knowledge, complementary technologies, reduction and 
minimizing of uncertainty in R&D, capturing a partner's tacit knowledge and technology 
transfer. In studying the case of Chrysler and the Beijing jeep corporation, Aiello (1991) 
found that the Chinese partner's main strategy for entering into corporation with the 
West was to absorb as much technology and management skills as possible; in contrast, 
the foreign partner's main motive was to get access to the Chinese market. 
Beamish et al. (1994) summarized four basic purposes that lead companies to the 
creation of joint ventures. These are: (a) to strengthen the firms' existing business; (b) to 
take the firm's existing products into new markets; (c) to obtain new products that can 
be sold in the firm's existing markets; (d) to diversify into a new business. Beamish and 
Inkpen (1995) find that a primary motive for forming an IN is the need for access to 
specific local knowledge. This knowledge contribution of local partners has strategic 
value to the foreign partners, as they continue to depend on local partners for specialized 
local knowledge. 
Mead (1994) demonstrates that forming an international joint venture (IJV) may give 
both partners opportunities to: (a) create greater market power by combining resources; 
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(b) reduce risk by sharing costs of investment and production (c) cooperate and avoid 
competition, which might incur greater costs than those incurred by forming the IN and 
(d) cooperate with a potentially dangerous competitor. 
Pennings (1981) indicates three types of motivation when organizations process the 
exchange: (a) efficiency driven-sharing cost and risk; (b) competitive driven- 
improving the competitive position; (c) resource driven-controlling scarce resources, 
enlarging present resources and finding complement resources. 
Lin (1995) classifies the motivation for forming international joint ventures into three 
categories, as follows; (a) efficiency driven- based on transaction cost theory including 
sharing cost and risk, obtaining capital, overcoming legislation, acquiring economic scale 
of production or sale, etc.; (b) competitive driven---based on resource dependence 
theory and strategic behaviour theory including entering foreign or domestic markets, 
maintaining the partner's relationship, stabilizing supply of resource materials and 
components, shortening the time from the product design to market entry and increasing 
market share; (c) learning driven-based on organization learning theory including 
acquiring technology, management knowledge, marketing knowledge and educating 
employees in research and development. 
Based on the relevant literature, Glaister and Buckley (1996) identify the most important 
motives relating to the strategic motivation for alliance formation which are (1) risk 
sharing, (2) product rationalization and economies of scale, (3) transfer of 
complementary technology / exchange of patents, (4) shaping competition, (5) 
conforming to host government policy, (6) facilitating international expansion, (7) 
vertical linkages, and (8) consolidation of market position. They also provide 16 
strategic motives for alliance formation by UK firms with partners in Western Europe, 
the United States and Japan and group them into 5 categories which are configured as 
technology development, market power, market development, resource specialization 
and large project completion. The details of these motivations are shown in Table 4.5.4. 
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Tnh1P ASA Ctrateair Mntivatinnc fnr Tnternatinnal Alliance Fnrmatinn 
Technology . Share R&D costs 
development . Exchange of complementary technology 
. Exchange of patents/ territories 
Market power " Compete against common competitor 
. Maintain market position 
. Produce at lowest cost location 
. Reduce competition 
Market " Facilitates international expansion 
development " Faster entry to market 
. Gain presence in new market 
. Conform to foreign government policy 
Resource " Concentrate on higher margin business 
specialization " Economies of scale 
. Faster payback on investment 
Large project . Spread risk of large project 
completion " Product diversification 
Source: Glaister, K. W. and Buckley, P. J. (1996). Strategic motives for international alliance formation, 
Journal of Management Studies, 33(3), pp301-332. 
In the study of UK international joint ventures, Glaister, Husan and Buckley (1998) 
group the purposes underlying IN formation into three classifications, namely, non- 
marketing- related, marketing-related and service provision. Their results revealed that 
most IJVs were formed in order to carry out a service activity (Glaister and Buckley, 
1994). 
Yan and Luo (2001) indicate that the primary reasons for N formation for Chinese 
partners are the acquisition of the US partner's knowledge which includes the technical, 
production, marketing and operational knowledge. Tidd and Izumimto (2002) claimed 
that a firm was likely to have multiple motives for an alliance. The reasons for 
collaboration include the reduction of cost and risk of technological or market 
development, to reduce time to market, and the exploitation of economies of scale. 
From the perspective of newly-industrializing country firms, Chen and Chen (2003) 
argue that the motive for the creation of strategic alliances with advanced-country firms 
is to gain market access and new technologies. Beamish and Berdrow (2003) also found 
that sharing risks and gaining market access are key motivations for IN activity, but 
their results revealed that the accessing knowledge and learning new skills are secondary 
motives to market positioning and sharing risks. 
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Glaister (2004) examines the rationale for the formation of international equity joint 
ventures from the perspectives of the transactions cost and resource based theories, and 
his findings indicate that both aspects of the transactions cost and resource based views 
influence the decision to form a joint venture. He agues that the transactions cost and 
resource based perspectives on N formation should be regarded as complementary 
views rather than substitute views (Tidd and Izumimoto, 2002). 
From the relevant literature above, the major motivations for joint venture are identified 
as: cost sharing, risk reduction, economics of scale, resource implementation, market 
entry, shaping competition, legislation, organization learning, etc. Table 4.5.5 
summarizes the core strategic motives for joint venture formation. 
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DAnielsdA 1985 # # 









UNECE 1988 * * * * # 
Bemishetal 19% 
Lin 1995 * # # * # # # 
Source: this study compiled from relevant articles 
According to above research of the motivation for the formation of joint ventures, there 
are some different results. These differences may stem from: 
(a) Different partner aspects: multinational firms and local firms in general have different 
objects. To the former, a joint venture may present a way into new markets, reduce 
risk and provide economies of scale. To the latter, a joint venture may be the way to 
acquire capital, to obtain technology skills, to learn management and marketing 
knowledge. Additionally, developed countries and less developed countries will have 
different objectives. 
(b) Different approach aspects: using different approaches will result in different results, 
for example, transaction cost theory emphases minimizing the transaction costs. In 
contrast, strategic behaviour theory concentrates on maximizing profits. 
(c) Differences in research sample: some research investigates the manufacturing 
industry only which provides different results. 
In sum, there are many possible explanations of the motivation for forming international 
joint ventures. Many of these explanations; however, are variants of four theoretical 
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perspectives, namely, transaction costs, strategic behaviour, resource dependence, and 
organizational learning. From the literature review and the theories on international joint 
ventures, this study implies that different motivations encompass different meanings for 
the investors (the parents). Therefore, this study also attempts to identify the variables 
which measure the motivation for creating international joint ventures in a Taiwan 
context and discusses the relationship among motivation and other constructs. 
4.5.3 The Relationship between Motivation, Control, Ownership and 
Contribution 
Copious literature exists on the investigation of joint ventures solely in terms of an 
examination of either motivation or control (Mariti and Smiley, 1983; Beamish, 1985; 
Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1985,1988; Hennart, 1991; 
Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992; Hung, 1992; Pan and Tse, 1996; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; 
Yan and Luo, 2001; Glaister, 2004). Very few studies have examined the relationship 
between motivations and control simultaneously. Chalos and O'Connor (2004) describe 
partner differences in their perceptions of control mechanisms as determined largely by 
their respective motives. They found knowledge dependency and asset specific 
transaction costs to be the determinants of controls to varying degrees for each partner. 
Based on the study of US- Chinese joint ventures, they found that US partners have 
higher controls when they consider protecting their knowledge and have lesser control 
mechanisms to protect their specific asset investments. In contrast to the US partner, 
they found that Chinese partners increase their controls when their specific asset 
investments increase and have less controls when they are knowledge dependent on the 
foreign partners. 
Lin (1995) reported that a different motivation for joint venture formation has a different 
extent of control. In her study, she found that the partner who has the learning 
motivation would have higher control in order to learn specific knowledge from a partner. 
Based on relevant research's results, this study posits that that there is relationship 
between motivation and control. The hypothesis is presented as follows: 
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H 7: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and their control over a joint venture 
The parents of a joint venture usually have different backgrounds and different business 
operating strategies which affects the choice of ownership structure (Harrigan, 1985 ; 
Killing, 1983). Gomes-Casseres (1989) address the motivation for cooperation as the 
result of a different ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries. Lin (1995) also reported 
that different motivation for creating a joint venture will affect the proportion of 
ownership in such venture. She found that learning driven motivation has a higher 
proportion of ownership than competitive driven and efficiency driven motivation has a 
lower proportion of ownership. Thus, this study posits that there is a relationship 
between motivation and ownership. The hypothesis is represented as follows: 
H s: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country parents 
forming joint ventures and their ownership in a joint venture 
Establishing an organization needs many kinds of resources such as capital, human 
resources, technology and know-how, etc.; and these resources have important positions 
in different situations. Kogut (1988) defines a joint venture thus: "a joint venture occurs 
when two or more firms pool a portion of their resources within a common legal 
organization". For a joint venture, the needed resources are derived from different 
parent entities. For example, the capital must be firstly contributed from each parent 
when they decide to corporate under different motives. Therefore, firms will cooperate 
in forming joint ventures when they can benefit from another partner's knowledge or 
advantages (Hamel, 1991; Badaracco, 1991; Ciborra, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 
1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
113 
Chapter 4 
Much existing research points out that one of the motivations for forming a joint venture 
is resource dependence (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Beamish, 1985; Harrigan, 1985; 
Killing, 1983; Pfeffer and Salabcik, 1978; Zald, 1970; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Thompson, 
1967; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Selznick, 1948). In his sample of sixty-six joint 
ventures in less developed countries, Beamish's (1985) results showed that the reasons 
for creating a joint venture are skills needed and assets or attributes needed. On the basis 
of the relevant literature's results, this study posits that there is a significant relationship 
between motivation for forming international joint ventures and resource contribution 
supplied by host country parents. The hypothesis is represented as follows: 
H 9: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and their resource contribution to a joint 
venture 
As already noted previous research demonstrates that control is an important function in 
an international joint venture and it can be affected by its antecedent factors which are 
parent's contributions, ownership, bargaining power and motivations. Based on the 
previous discussion, this study proposes a research framework that links the control and 



















In this framework, it is postulated that there is a significant relationship between control 
and its antecedent factors which are motivation, contribution, bargaining power and 
ownership. Ownership is also a function of motivation, contribution and bargaining 
power. The relationship between the motivation and contribution and bargaining power 
will be measured. Nine hypotheses are proposed to test their relationship between every 
two dimensions. These hypotheses are summary in Table 4.5.6. 
Table 4.5.6 Summary of the Research Hvnntheces 
Research Hypotheses 
Constructs 
H1: There is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion 
of ownership and the extent of control 
H 1.1: The higher proportion of equity ownership held by host 
Ownership country parents the stronger their control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 1.2: The higher proportion of equity ownership held by host 
country parents the stronger their control of the appointment 
of high-level managers in a joint venture 
H2: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the 
i i B extent of control arga n ng H3: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the 
proportion of ownership 
H4: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of 
host country parents and the extent of control they exercise in a 
joint venture 
H 4.1,: Host country parents with higher physical resource 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 
41b: Host country parents with higher physical resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the appointment 
of high-level managers in a joint venture 
H 42a: Host country parents with higher invisible resource 
Contribution contribution will have stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 42b: Host country parents with higher invisible resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the appointment 
of high-level managers in a joint venture 
H 43k: Host country parents with higher finance resource 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 4.3b: Host country parents with higher finance resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the appointment 
of high-level managers in a joint venture 
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Table 4.5.6 Summary of the Research Hvnotheses (continued) 
H 44,: Host country parents with higher human resource 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H mob: Host country parents with higher human resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint venture 
H 45,: Host country parents with higher organization resource 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 45b: Host country parents with higher organization resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint venture 
H5: There is a significant relationship between the resource 
contribution of host country parents and their proportion of 
ownership in a joint venture 
Contribution H s-1: Host country parents with higher physical resource 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity shares 
in a joint venture 
H 5.2: Host country parents with higher invisible resource 
contribution to the venture will have a higher proportion of 
equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5.3: Host country parents with higher financial resource 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity shares 
in a joint venture 
H 5.4: Host country parents with higher human resource 
contribution to the venture will have a higher proportion of 
equity shares in a joint venture 
H s. s: Host country parents with higher organizational resource 
contribution to the venture will have a higher proportion of 
equity shares in a joint venture 
H 6: There is a significant relationship between the resource 
contribution of host country parents and bargaining power 
H 7: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host 
country parents forming international joint ventures and their 
control over a joint venture 
H g: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host 
Motivation country parents forming international joint ventures and their 
ownership in a joint venture 
H 9: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host 
country parents forming international joint ventures and their 




This research mainly focuses on the issue of control in international joint ventures, and 
considers what antecedent variables affect control. Drawing on previous literature, this 
chapter reviews the relevant literature on international joint ventures and centres on the 
antecedents of control associated with motivation, parent's contribution, bargaining 
power, and ownership. The research framework is proposed after the literature reviews 
and hypotheses are developed to test the relationship between control and its antecedents 
which are motivation, parent's contribution, bargaining power, and ownership. 
Hypotheses HI. 1 and 111.2 are built to test the relationship between ownership and the 
control on operational decision-making activities and the appointment of high-level 
managers in joint ventures. 
Hypotheses 1 12 H3 are constructed to understand the relationship between the firm's 
bargaining power, control on operational decision-making activities, the appointment of 
high-level managers in joint ventures, and to test the relationship between the firm's 
bargaining power and ownership. 
Hypotheses H4. Hs and ü6 are posited to examine the relationship between the 
contribution supplied by host country parents and control, ownership and bargaining 
power. 
Hypotheses 117, Ha and ßi9 are proposed to understand the relationship between the 
motivation for forming international joint ventures and control, ownership and 
contribution. 
In the next chapter, an empirical investigative methodology is designed. The relevant 
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According to the research objectives indicated in Chapter 1, this study is designed to 
examine the issue of control in international joint ventures, and to test the relationship 
between control and its antecedents which discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). To 
achieve the goal of the study, a appropriate research design can lead to a success of the 
study. Therefore, the main objectives of this chapter are to discuss the research design 
employed in this study. It is organised into six sections. Section 5.2, an overview of the 
research process is examined first. In section 5.3, the research design is divided into ten 
subsections which included the purpose of the study, types of investigation, extent of 
researcher interference, time horizon, study setting, unit of analysis, sampling design, 
measurement, data collection and data analysis methods. Each of ten topics is examined 
in detail. Section 5.4 give a brief summary of the research design of this study. Section 
5.5 examines the profile of the sample characteristics derived from this study. Finally 
Section 5.6 draws a brief conclusion. 
5.2 An Overview of Research Process 
What is business research? Sekaran (2003) defines the business research as "an organized, 
systematic, data-based, critical, objective, scientific inquiry or investigation into a specific 
problem, undertaken with the purpose of finding answers or solutions to it". It can be 
described as a systematic and organized effort to investigate a specific problem or 
opportunity encountered in the work setting that needs a solution (Cavana, Delahaye and 
Sekaran, 2001). In essence, business research involves a series of scientific activities 
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designed and executed carefully. Thus, scientific research focuses on solving problems 
and pursues a step-by-step logical, organized, and rigorous method to identify the 
problems, gather data, analyze them, and draw valid conclusions there from (Sekaran, 
2003). 
In the research process, Hussey (1997) identifies six fundamental stages which are 
common to all scientifically based investigations. These research stages encompass: 
identify research topic, define research problem, determine how to conduct research, 
collect research data, analyze and interpret research data and write thesis which shown in 
Figure 5.2.1. 
Identify research topic 
Define research problem 
Determine how to conduct research 
Collect research data 
Analyze and interpret research data 
Write dissertation / thesis 
Figure 5.2.1 Stages in the Research Process 




Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) identify seven main stages: problem definition, 
hypothesis, research design, measurement, data collection, and data analysis. They 
provide an overview of what is involved in the research process and depict key research 
activities and their interrelationships. Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001) state that 
business research involves 11 steps. These are the catalyst for research, preliminary 
information gathering and literature survey, problem definition, framework development, 
research objectives, research design, data collection, data analysis, interpretation of 
findings, report preparation and presentation and management action. 
Kumar (2000) develops a general model of research process which includes eight main 
steps. There are: Step 1: to formulate a research problem, Step 2: to conceptualize a 
research design, Step 3: to construction an instrument for data collection, Step 4: to 
selecting a sample, Step 5: to write a research proposal, Step 6: to collection data, Step 7: 
to processing data, and Step 8: to writing a research report. 
Similarly, Sekaran (2003) outlines the research process for basic and applied research in 
a systematic way which includes (1) the identification of the broad problem area; (2) 
preliminary information gathering, especially through unstructured and structured 
interviews and literature survey; (3) problem definition; (4) evolving a theoretical 
framework; (5) deriving testable hypotheses; (6) scientific research design; (7) data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation; (8) deduction the results; (9) report writing; (10) 
report presentation; (11) managerial decision making. These 11 phases are shown in 
Figure 5.2.2 (see next page). 
The research process of this study follows the method Sekaran (2003) outlines. In the 
previous chapters, the research problems are identified, a research framework is evolved 
and testable hypotheses are derived. Following Sekaran's research process, the next 
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5.3 Research Design 
Research design is the "science (and art) of planning procedures for conducting studies 
so as to get the most valid findings" (Vogt, 1993). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
(2000) define the research design as "the `blueprint' that enables the investigator to come 
up with solutions to these problems and guides him or her in the various stages of the 
research" (p. 89). Babbie (2002) indicates that the research design involves a set of 
decisions regarding what topic is to be studied among what population with what 
research methods for what purpose. In other words, research design involves a detailed 
plan which can guide the research methods to be employed. To provide a general 
introduction of research design, Sekaran (2003) outlines it in a systematic way shown in 
Figure 5.3.1(see next page). 
As shown in Figure 5.3.1, the various issues involved in the research design include the 
key decisions. These are 
" Purpose of the study: studies may be either exploratory in nature or descriptive, or 
may be conducted to test hypotheses. 
" Type of investigation: what types of investigation employed in the study. 
" Extent of researcher interference: how the researcher manipulates and controls the 
study. 
" Study setting: where the study will be conducted. 
" Time horizon: the temporal aspects of the study. 
" Unit of analysis: the level at which the data will be analyzed. 
" Sampling design: the types of sample to be used. 
" Quantification and measures: how to measure the related variables. 
" Data-collection method: how the data will be collected. 
" Data analysis: how the concepts and variables will be analyzed. 
The research design of this study adopted Sekaran's model and each issue involved in the 
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5.3.1 The Purposes of the Study 
In the field of social science, there are many reasons for research. For conducting 
empirical research, Kidder et al. (1986) classify the purpose of research into discovery, 
demonstration, refutation, and replication. According to the research purpose, Hussey 
(1997) classifies research into four types of research which are exploratory research, 
descriptive research, analytical research and predictive research. Churchill (1999) 
divides the research types into exploratory, descriptive, and causal (or explanatory) 
research. According to the nature of the study, Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001) 
classify the research into exploration study, description study, hypothesis-testing study 
and case study. In general, the most common and useful purposes of social research 
include exploration, description, and explanation. Often research studies combine more 
than one purpose (Babbie, 2002). Each type of research is examined below in order to 
understanding their characteristics. 
Exploratory study is undertaken when a research problem or issue is novel or when no 
information can be referred from earlier studies. This approach typically occurs when a 
researcher examines a new interest or when the subject of study itself is relatively new 
(Babbie, 2002). The aim of this type of study is to look for patterns, ideas, or 
hypotheses, rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis (Hussey, 1997; Churchill, 
1999). Babbie (2002) describes exploratory studies as the attempt to develop an initial, 
rough understanding of some phenomenon, which is done mostly for three purposes: (1) 
to satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) to test the 
feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, and (3) to develop the methods to be 
employed in any subsequent study. Typical techniques used in exploratory research 
include case studies, observation and historical analysis. Such techniques are highly 
flexible, unstructured and qualitative. As such, exploratory study is particularly helpful 
to better comprehend the nature of the problem when initial ideas and insights into a 
research issue are required and it can give guidance on what type of future research 
should be conducted. 
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Descriptive study is used to identify and obtain information on the characteristics of a 
particular problem or issue, to describe the characteristics of certain groups, to estimate 
the proportion of people in a specified population who behave in a certain way, or to 
make a specific prediction (Churchill, 1999; Hussey, 1997). Basically, descriptive study 
is undertaken to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the pertinent issues. Babbie 
(2002) states that descriptive study is the precise measurement and reporting of the 
characteristics of some population or phenomenon under study. Therefore, the goal of a 
descriptive study is to offer a profile or to describe relevant aspects of the phenomenon 
of interest to the researcher from different perspectives. Quantitative and statistical 
techniques are usually used to collect the data, for example, surveys, field studies and 
content analysis, and also to summarize the information. 
Explanatory study or hypotheses testing (cf. Sekaran, 2003) is used to understand 
phenomena by discovering and measuring causal relations among variables, to discover 
and report the relationships among different aspects of the phenomenon (Babbie, 2002). 
In other words, explanatory study is concerned with establishing cause-and-effect 
relationships in an attempt to explain the variance in the dependent variable or to predict 
organizational outcomes. Hypothesis testing can offer an enhanced understanding of the 
relationships the exit among variables and also can establish the cause and effect 
relationships (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001), and it can better explain the causal 
links between the characteristics. 
The process of identifying and selecting the most appropriate research design for this 
study is driven by the nature of the research objectives. The purpose of this study is to 
explain the relationships between motivation, contribution, ownership, bargaining power 
and control in international joint venture issue. Therefore, an explanatory /hypothesis 
testing methodology was employed in this study. The next section turns to the different 
types of investigation. 
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5.3.2 Types of Investigation: Causal Versus Correlational 
When deciding on the type of investigation, the researcher can consider whether a causal 
or a correlation study is needed. A correlation relationship indicates that at least two 
concepts or variables move simultaneously and a causal relationship indicates that one 
concept or variable causes a movement in another concept or variable (Cavana, Delahaye 
and Sekaran, 2001). In other words, when the researcher is intending to delineate the 
important variables that are associated with the problem, then it is a correlational study. 
In contrast, when the researcher wants to know how one variable causes or determines 
the values of other variables, then the study is called a causal study. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that it is not just one or more variables that cause a problen}. 
At most times there are multiple factors that influence one another and the problem. 
Therefore, the researcher might identify the critical factors first which are associated with 
the problem, rather than establish a causal relationship. The cause and effect 
relationships can be established through certain types of correlation or regression 
analyses, such as cross-lagged correlations and path analysis (Sekaran, 2003). 
The aim of this study is intended firstly to delineate the important variables which are 
associated with control. Once the variables associated with control are identified, then a 
causal relationship will be tested between those variables and control. Therefore, the 
correlation and causal study will be used in this study. 
5.3.3 Extent of Researcher Interference 
Sekaran (2003) indicates that there could be varying degrees of interference by the 
researcher in the manipulation and control of variables in the research study, either in the 
natural setting or in an artificial research setting. Exploratory and descriptive studies are 
conducted in the natural environment of the organization, the researcher usually 
interfering minimally with the normal flow of work. In addition, most correlation designs 
are carried out in natural settings with a normal flow of events; therefore, the extent of 
researcher interference can be reduced to the minimum. 
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This study is conducted in Taiwan by administering postal questionnaires to the 
companies who engage in international joint ventures. Thus, the research interference is 
minimised. 
5.3.4 Study Setting 
Business research can be conducted in the natural environment which is called a non- 
contrived setting or in an artificial environment which is called a contrived setting. 
According to Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran's (2001) description, exploratory, 
descriptive studies are invariably conducted in non-contrived settings, whereas rigorous 
causal studies are undertaken in contrived lab settings. The above authors also examine 
the difference between a field study, a field experiment and a lab experiment. 
Description, exploratory, descriptive and some correlation studies undertaken in 
organizations are called "field studies" where research is conducted in non-contrived 
settings with minimal researcher interference. Research studies conducted to establish 
cause and effect relationships using the same natural environment where employees 
normally function are called "field experiments" which are conducted in a non-contrived 
setting but with researcher interference to a moderate extent. Experiment studies done 
to establish cause and effect relationships would create an artificial, contrived 
environment in which all the extraneous factors are strictly controlled. These studies are 
referred to as "lab experiments" which are conducted in a contrived setting with 
excessive researcher interference. 
In this study, the survey of the sample of host country parents is undertaken by 
employing mailed questionnaires. Hence, it is a field study in a non-contrived setting 
with minimal researcher interference. 
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5.3.5 Time Horizon 
In social science research, two studies with regard to time are usually used, namely 
cross-sectional studies and longitudinal studies. Hussey (1997) defines cross-sectional 
studies as a positivistic methodology designed to obtain information on variables in 
different contexts, but at the same time. Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001) also 
suggest that cross-sectional studies can be carried out in which the data is gathered just 
once over a period of days, weeks, or months. Babbie (2002) stresses that a cross- 
sectional study is based on observations made at one time and involves observations of a 
sample, or of a population or phenomenon that are made at one point in time. 
On the other hand, a longitudinal study involves the study of variables or a group of 
subjects over a long period of time. The aim of longitudinal studies is to research the 
problem deeply by investigating the same situation or people several times over a period 
of time in which the problem runs its course. Longitudinal is often the best way to study 
changes over time (Babbie, 2002). Well-planned longitudinal studies could help to 
identify cause and effect relationships and take account of social processes instead of 
concentrating only on individuals and offer some good insights. However, longitudinal 
studies are very time-consuming and expensive to conduct compared with cross- 
sectional studies. Most of the field studies conducted is cross-sectional in nature because 
of the time, effort and costs involved in collecting data over several time periods. The 
researcher determines the appropriate decisions based on the problem definition, the 
research objectives and the time and cost considerations. 
Due to the purpose of this research and the limited time and resources, this study is a 




5.3.6 Units of Analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to the level of aggregation of the data collected during the 
subsequent stage of data analysis (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001). Hussey (1997) 
defines the term of unit of analysis as: "the kind of case to which the variables or 
phenomena under study and the research problem refer, and about which data is 
collected and analyzed. " Neuman (2000) demonstrates that the unit of analysis refers to 
the type of unit a researcher uses when measuring. Common units of analysis in social 
science research are the individual, the group, the organization, and nations (Wu and Lin, 
2000; Bailey, 1993). The research objective will determines the unit of analysis which 
can be shifted from individuals to groups, organizations and nations. The unit of analysis 
has to be clearly identified because the data collection methods, sample size and the 
variables may sometimes be determined or guided by it. In addition, sampling plan 
decisions will also be governed by the unit of analysis. Therefore, the unit of analysis 
should be given serious consideration in the research design. 
In this study, the unit of analysis is Taiwanese parent companies who engage in 
international joint ventures and where the secondary organization (the joint venture) 
locates in Taiwan. 
5.3.7 Sampling Design 
The survey is only useful and powerful in finding answers when the data is collected from 
the right people, events, or objects which can provide the correct answers. Therefore, 
selecting the right individuals, objects, or events for the study is very important. The 
process of selection is known as "sampling" and it is a fundamental element of a study. 
The relative terms of a sample have to be examined first. A population refers to a body 
of people or to any other items under consideration for research purposes (Hussey, 1997) 
or refers to the entire group of people, events, or things of interest that the research 
wishes to investigate' (Sekaran, 2003). McDaniel and Gates (2001) define the term 
population or population of interest as the total group of people from whom we need to 
130 
Chapter 5 
obtain information. They also make a definition of the census and the sample. The term 
census refers to whose situations where data are obtained from or about every member 
of the population (McDaniel and Gates, 2001). A sample is a subset of the population. 
Information is obtained from or about a subset of the population to make estimates about 
various characteristics of the total population. It comprises some members selected from 
the population. 
McDaniel and Gates (2001) stress that the process of developing a sampling plan can be 
separated into seven steps which are (1) defining population of interest, (2) choosing the 
data collection method, (3) choosing the sampling frame, (4) selecting the sampling 
method, (5) determining the sample size, (6) developing and specifying the operational 
plan for selecting sample elements and (7) execute the operational sampling plan. The 
sampling frame (or population frame) is a listing of all the elements in the population 
from which all the sampling units are drawn (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001). 
Sampling is the process of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the population 
(Sekaran, 2003). It is important to ensure that the sample is not biased and is 
representative of the population from which it is drawn. 
There are various methods which can be used to select a sample. Basically, there are 
two types of sampling designs: probability and non-probability sampling. The often used 
and useful probability sampling is simple random, systematic, stratified, and clustered 
sampling. Non-probability sampling can be divided into the broad categories of 
convenience sampling and purposive sampling which includes judgment sampling, snow 
ball sampling and quota sampling. 
In this study, the data is collected from the entire qualified organizations because the 
sample is not very large relative to the international joint venture in Taiwan. Although 
there are the constraints of time, cost, and other human resources, this study still tries to 
overcome difficulties in order to produce more reliable results. In order to identify the 
population frame, some procedures are conducted which are described below. 
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The international joint venture in the sample varies in terms of pattern of cooperation. 
The research first designates a population of interest. According to the definition of the 
international joint venture, the main criteria used in the selection of an international joint 
venture are: 
" International joint venture is formed by two or more partners; 
" At least one of the parent's headquarters is located outside the joint venture's country 
of operation; 
" At least two parents of different nationality hold at least five percent of the equity 
shares; 
In Taiwan, a list of qualifying international joint ventures is not available. It is very 
difficult to collect identifying data on international joint ventures directly from any source. 
The researcher tried to create a database by getting a list of the firm's names that 
cooperate with foreign partners to establish a joint venture in Taiwan. There are two 
main sources that are used to identify the samples: (a) the 1999/2000 edition of the 
Directory of Business Groups in Taiwan, and (b) the 1999 edition of the Directory of 
Foreign Investment in Taiwan, published by the Investment Commission of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. For the directory of business groups, Taiwanese partners of 
international joint ventures are identified by using the criteria above. A business group 
usually invests in different areas or industries; therefore, the company will be eliminated 
when firms have duplicate investment. Finally, 66 of the parent companies whom engage 
in international joint ventures were identified. 
More difficulties were encountered when identifying the potential respondents from the 
second source--the Directory of Foreign Investment in Taiwan. According to 
government regulations, all foreign investors must register and obtain an agreement 
when they plan to invest in Taiwan. The Investment Commission of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs publishes the list of foreign investment each year. The researcher 
wrote a letter to request the database of that directory, but was rejected the first time. 
Then a formal letter was written from the department of Business Administration of 
National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences that is the researcher's home institute, 
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but the request was still rejected. Finally, a personal approach to senior government 
officials was used in order to request the database. 
The database has been acquired. However, the list not only includes joint venture 
enterprises but also individual companies and contains all types of organization. A two- 
stage process was launched to ascertain whether or not a joint venture had been formed. 
At the first stage, the companies were eliminated when they did not meet the criteria that 
the shareholders hold less than five percent or over eighty percent. As a result, 2466 
firms were selected from about 6300 organizations. All the firms were checked on the 
Internet that connected to the database of the Department of Commerce of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs (MEA). 
Several problems were encountered during the process. That was because the Directory 
of Foreign Investment is never amended by the government department. The 
government only records the application of foreign investment, but never fellows up the 
result of these application cases. Therefore, there are some problems when we used the 
government data base. Firstly, some firms cancelled their application and some firms 
were dissolved. Secondly, in some cases, some of the companies were merged with 
other companies. Thirdly, some firms changed their addresses. Fourthly, some firms 
have the same address because of the same parent. Finally, some of the sample did not 
exist. After checking the detail of 2466 firms, a total of 1459 companies were finally 
verified. 
The second stage was conducted to ascertain if these selected companies were joint 
ventures or not. A mailed questionnaire with pre-addressed/pre-paid envelopes was sent 
to a total of 1459 companies. A copy of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix II A. 
354 completed questionnaires were received from respondents. 
At stage 1, a large quantity of manpower and a substantial amount of the time was 
involved in checking the data. Stage 2, this phase involved printing, labelling, paper- 
clipping, inserting into the envelopes and sealing. This required a great deal of time, cost 
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and effort. The reason for all this effort is to collect as large a sample as possible in 
order to conduct a statistically significant analysis and to identify the correct sample with 
as much relevant data as possible which is crucial to the success of this research. 
All the respondent questionnaires were checked against the Directory of Business 
Groups in order to eliminate the respondent with the same parent companies. Finally, a 
list of 227 firms were identified. Figure 5.3.2 shows the procedure of the sample 
identification. 
The Directory of Business 
Groups in Taiwan 
Using criteria to identify ventures' 
companies 
" International joint venture is 
formed by two or more partners; 
" at least one of parent's 
headquarters is located outside 
the joint venture's country of 
operation; 
" at least two different 
nationality's parents hold at 
least five percent of the equity 
Obtain 66 firms 
The Directory of Foreign 
Investment in Taiwan 
1. Eliminate the firm which 
has an equity share less than 
five percent or greater than 
eighty percent. 2466 Stage 1 
companies were selected 
from 6300 firms. 
2. Check the 2466 firms on 
Internet and 1459 
companies have been 
Obtain 1459 fines 
Questionnaires with prepared 
Stage 2 
envelops were sent to a total of 
1459 companies. 354 responses 
of joint venture with Taiwanese 
partners were received. 
. Eliminate the same parent 
company. 
.A list of 227 samples has 
been identified. 
Obtain 227 samples 
Figure 5.3.2 The Procedure of Sample Identification 
Obtain 354 cases 
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In this section, we examine the sampling design decisions which are important aspects of 
research design. The population frame is used in this study in order to obtain more 
reliable results. Some procedures are used to identify the list of sample and cases for this 
study and a final list of sample frame is obtained. In the next section, we will discuss 
how the variables can be measured. 
5.3.8 Measurement of Variables 
Measurement of the variables is an integral part of research and is a fundamental aspect 
of quantitative research. Unless the variables can be measured precisely, the research 
hypotheses cannot be tested correctly to find the right answers to the research issues. 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) define the measurement as the assignment of 
numerals to variables, properties, or events according to a prescribed set of rules, of 
which a rule is to specify the procedure a researcher uses, to assign numerals or numbers 
to objects or events. 
There are at least two types of variables: one can be objective and measured precisely 
such as blood pressure and body temperature; the other is more intangible and cannot be 
measured directly such as attitudes and perceptions. One technique is to reduce the 
unobservable concepts to observable behaviour or characteristics. This technique is 
called an operational definition. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) define an 
operational definition as: a set of procedures a researcher can follow in order to establish 
the existence of the phenomenon described by a concept (p. 29). When a phenomenon 
cannot be observed directly, the researcher needs to use the operational definition to 
reduce the concepts so that a phenomenon can be measured in a tangible way. In general, 
operational definitions specify how variables relevant to a concept will be measured 
(Babbie, 2002). 
Once the concepts are defined operationally, then the measurement scales have to be 
developed to measure them. Scale classifications employ the characteristics of the real 
135 
Chapter 5 
numbers system. The most accepted and basic types of measurement scale are namely 
the nominal, ordinal, interval and ration scale (Emory and Cooper, 1991). A researcher 
must choose from four types of measures that capture increasing amounts of information. 
The most appropriate level depends on the purpose of the measurement. As we move 
from the nominal scale to the ratio scale, we can obtain greater precision in quantifying 
the data and greater flexibility in using more powerful statistical tests. 
According above description, this study includes theoretical concepts which are 
motivation, contribution, bargaining power, ownership and control. Therefore, the 
operational definition of each variable or construct is described first and then the 
measurement is developed. 
5.3.8.1 Control 
On the basis of the literature reviewed in chapter 3, the operational definition of control 
refers to the process that one entity affects the behaviour and output of another 
organization through the use of power and authority in order to reach its objects (Yan 
and Gray, 1994; Das and Tsui, 1985; Ohchi, 1977; Arrow, 1974). Reviewing relevant 
literatures, Geringer and Hebert (1989) identify three dimensions of joint venture control 
that are the mechanism of control, the extent and the focus. These classifications of 
control are the most frequently mentioned and used in the studies of international joint 
ventures. Moreover, this study adopts these three dimensions to measure the concept of 
control. 
5.3.8.1.1 The Mechanism and Focus of Control 
Several empirical studies have attempted to directly or indirectly use Killing's (1983) 
framework in explaining the control of INV with regard to the mechanism, the extent and 
the focus of control (Geringer, 1986; Beamish, 1984). Killing (1983) defines control in 
terms of the decision-making role of joint venture management on 37 joint ventures in 
developed countries and identifies nine types of decisions. The decision-making role of 
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the joint venture management and the appointment of high-level management are used to 
measure the focus and mechanisms of control over joint ventures. 
The mechanism of control refers to the methods by which control is exercised over the 
joint venture. On the basis of the literature reviewed in chapter 3.3, the methods of 
exercising managerial control can be achieved through the appointment of the joint 
venture's general manager and key functional managers (Child and Yan, 1999; Child, 
1984; Schaan, 1983, Killing, 1983; Gullander, 1976; Rafli, 1978). Therefore, the 
appointment of high-level managers such as general manager, vice general manager, 
production managers, marketing managers, financial managers, human resource 
managers, R&D managers and the head of engineering were ascertained by use of 
questionnaire in order to measure the mechanism of control over the joint venture. 
The focus of control refers to the areas of the joint venture's operation in which control 
is exercised. Several researchers have found that effective control should emphasize 
selective control over the joint venture's activities (Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang, 2001; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer, 1986; Dunning and Cantwell, 1984; Schaan, 1983). 
The variables which Killing (1983) used to measure the focus of control are used in this 
study. These are pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, manufacturing 
process, quality control, sales targets, cost budgeting and capital expenditure. The focus 
of control is measured by the decision-making processes as made by whom in above 9 
areas. 
The measure scale of mechanism and focus of control are measured by these decision- 
making activities and appointment of high-level management as made by whom. These 
are 
1. Taiwanese parent alone 
2. Foreign parent alone 
3. Joint venture alone 
4. Taiwanese parent and joint venture 
5. Foreign parent and joint venture 
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6. Taiwanese parent and foreign parent 
7. Both parents and joint venture 
This study uses the appointment of high-level managers as the mechanism of control and 
nine types of decisions are used to measure the focus of control. After identifying the 
variables for measuring the mechanism and focus of the control; next, we turn to 
examine the variables for the extent of control. 
5.3.8.1.2 The Extent of Control 
The extent of control refers to the degree to which a parent company exercises control 
over the joint venture at strategic and operational levels (Lyles and Reger, 1993; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Dunning and Cantwell, 1984; Beamish, 1984; Killing, 1983; 
Tomlinson, 1970). On his empirical study of 37 joint ventures in developed countries, 
Killing(1983) identifies three types of control, namely, dominant parent, shared and 
independent control according to the decision-making role of joint venture management 
by using nine types of decisions(pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, 
manufacturing process, quality control, replacement of managers, sales targets, cost 
budgeting and capital expenditures) with each decision made by whom(the general 
manager alone, by the local parent alone, by the foreign parent alone, by the JV general 
manager with input from the local parent , or 
from the foreign parent , or 
from both 
parents). 
Using Killing's results and considering the weight of the involvement by parents and joint 
venture, Wu (1994) identifies four kinds of control in his study, namely, dominant host 
parent, dominant foreign parent, shared management and independent control. 
In his empirical study in Taiwan, Chang (1996) points out that Killing deems the 
importance of each decision as equal, but he argues that the control is not a dichotomous 
context; it is a continuant idea. Therefore he revises the method of clarification of 
control used by Killing. He clarifies four kinds of control in his study, namely, dominant 
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host parent, dominant foreign parent, shared management and independent control 
according to the degree that each activity will be effected by host parent and foreign 
parent and the weight of importance of each activity. Wu (1994), Chang (1996) and 
Chen (1999), in investigating the relationship between control, conflict management and 
satisfaction of IN in Taiwan, they also clarify four kinds of control as dominant host 
parent, dominant foreign parent, shared management and independent control. 
Based on the relevant literature, this study integrates Wu's (1994) and Chang's (1996) 
classification in which control can be divided into four types, described as follows. 
1. Independent control: A joint venture has high freedom from both parents and has 
extensive decision making autonomy 
2. Dominant Taiwanese parent control: A joint venture is controlled by the dominant 
host partner who makes all the venture's decisions and plays an active role in 
decisions. Foreign partners effectively delegate authority to host partners 
3. Dominant foreign parent control: A foreign partner plays a strong role in decision 
making and with high authorization from host partners 
4. Shared management control: Both parents play an active role in the management of 
the joint venture. 
This study also adopts Wu's (1994) method to measure the extent of control. 
The score of Taiwanese parent =E Slj + WE S4j +1/2Z S5j +1/3E S7j 
The score of foreign parent =E S2j + 1/2E S4j +1/2E S6j +1/3E S7j 
The score of joint venture =E S3j + 1/2E S5j + 1/2E S6j + 1/3E S7j 
Si to S7 represent the possible of decision maker. 
j means the items of important decisions, j=1,2,....., 9 
When 
Max 0{ score of joint venture, score of Taiwanese parent, score of foreign parent } 
= the score of Taiwanese parent 
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Or © score of Taiwanese parent equal score of joint venture 
4 Then the type of control is Dominant Taiwanese parent control 
When 
Max 0{ score of joint venture, score of Taiwanese parent, score of foreign parent } 
= the score of Foreign parent 
Or 0 score of foreign parent equal score of joint venture 
4 Then the type of control is Dominant Foreign parent control 
When 
Max 0{ score of joint venture, score of Taiwanese parent, score of foreign parent } 
= the score of joint venture 
4 Then the type of control is Independent control 
When 
Max 0{ score of joint venture, score of Taiwanese parent, score of foreign parent } 
= the score of Taiwanese parent equal score of foreign parent 
4 Then the type of control is Share management control 
Based on above discussion, Table 5.3.1 below summarises the operational definition of 
control and measurement of variables. 
Table 5.3.1 Onerational Definition and Meamirement of Cnntrnl 
Control Operational Key relevant Measure Items Measurement Definition researchers 
control is exercised Killing (1983) Measuring the 
in which high-level Beamish(1984) appointment of 8 
Mechanism of managers are Child(1984) fuActions 
control appointed Schann (1988) managers made 
Nominal 
Geringer (1986) by whom 
Child and Yan (1999) 
control is exercised Killing (1983) Measuring 8 
in which area of Schaan (1983) decision-making 
Focus of control joint venture's Dunning and made by whom Nominal 
operation Cantwell (1984) 
Geringer 1986 
the degree of Killing (1983) the score of 
Extent of control control over a JV is Wu (1994) control 
Interval 





Control is the main part of this study. According to the literature, it can be measured by 
the mechanism, the extent and focus of control. Using the above formula, it can be 
classified into four types namely; dominant Taiwanese parent control, dominant foreign 
parent control, shared management control, and independent control. In the following 
section we describe how ownership can affect the extent of control. 
5.3.8.2 Ownership 
In formal terms, ownership is the legal possession of assets. Therefore, the term 
ownership is measured by the percentage of equity. 
Beamish (1985) finds that the foreign firms have equal-equity ownership in developed 
countries and contrastingly have majority or minority equity ownership in developing 
countries. Kobrin (1987) explores how host government-imposed limits and 
performance requirements induce a greater use of minority and 50-50 affiliate, 
particularly in the developing countries. Blodgett (1991) finds that most joint ventures 
are 50-50 joint ventures in his study of the form of equity. 
The proportion of equity means the ownership of the joint venture held by a single parent. 
According to the classification of prior studies, this research classifies the equity 
shareholding into three groups: more than 50 level, 50-50 level and less than 50 level. 
1. More than 50 level: Firms who hold more than 50 percent proportion of the equity of 
joint venture. 
2.50-50 level: Firms who hold equal percentage proportion of the equity of joint 
venture. 




Based on above discussion, Table 5.3.2 below summarises the operational definition and 
measurement of ownership. 
Tahle 5.3.2 Operational Definition and Measurement of Chvnershin 
Dimension Operational Definition Key relevant 
researchers 
Measure Items Measurement 
" The share of equity held 
The share of equity 
by the host country Measured as Ownership held by the parents a percentage " The share of equity held 
by the foreign parents 
Ownership was ascertained by asking respondents to indicate the percentage of equity 
shares they hold in the joint ventures. Then, the percentage of equity shares is classified 
into three groups according above criteria. The percentage of equity shares and the type 
of ownership are used in future analysis. 
5.3.8.3 Bargaining power 
Bargaining power is defined as a bargaining ability possessed by foreign and local parties 
that can be used to change the `bargaining set', to obtain accommodations from the other 
party, and to affect the outcome of a negotiation (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Brouthers 
and Bamossy, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1994; Blodgeet, 1991; Lax and Sebinius, 1986; 
Dwyer, Orville and Walker, 1981). 
Fagre and Wells (1982) indicate that the bargaining power of multinational firms can be 
increased through five elements which are the multinational technological level, the 
product differentiation, the access provided to export markets, the investment amount, 
and the diversity of the firm's production line. Lecraw (1984) states that a firm will have 
bargaining power over the host country that stems from a proprietary product or 
technology, access to relatively inexpensive capital, access to export markets, and 
management expertise. Kobrin (1987) indicates that the MNE can derive bargaining 
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power from the firm-specific advantages or assets such as technology, parent size, 
subsidiary size, employment, and export potential. 
Gomes-Casseres (1990) find that investment size and attractiveness of the territory affect 
bargaining power. He also suggests that the bargaining process is affected by several 
factors, such as the intensity of R&D, marketing intensity, and intrasystem sales. 
Blodgett (1991) identifies five resource contributions that give a firm bargaining power 
in the joint venture. The five elements are government lobbying, technology, knowledge 
of the local environment and/or marketing expertise, control of intrasystem transfers, and 
financial capital. Yan and Gray (1994) classify the bargaining power into context-based 
and resource-based components. 
Basing on the review of relevant literature, this study referring to Fagre and Wells (1982), 
Yan and Gray (1994) and the results of the relevant literature, measures the bargaining 
power by the following variables: technological ability, innovative ability, investment 
amount, access to financial resources, level of equity share, management experience, 
knowledge of the local markets, access to export markets, access to sales distribution 
channels, the influence of the host government. Table 5.3.3 summarises the operational 
definition and measurement of bargaining power. 
Table 5.33 C perational Definition and Meacnrement of Rnraninino Pnwer 
Dimension Operational Definition 
Key relevant 
researchers 
Measure Items Measurement 
" Technological ability 
" Innovative ability 
" Investment amount 
" Access to financial 
The power that can Faltre and Wells (1982) 
resources 
" Level of equity share 
Bargaining be used to affect the Lecraw (1984) Kobrin (198' " Management e fence 5-points 
Power outcome of the Gomcs-Casseres (1990) " Knowledge of the local scale 
negotiations Yan and Gray (1994) markets 
" Access to export markets 
" Access to sales distribution 
channel 




These items affecting the bargaining power are measured on a scale of 1-5, with 5= 
`extremely strong', 4= `strong', 3= `average', 2= `weak', 1= `very weak'. 
The respondents express their perceptions on each item using above scales. 
5.3.8.4 Contribution 
The contribution is defined as any resource input from the foreign parent' firms and host 
parent companies to the joint venture. Several categories of resource levels have been 
mentioned in the relevant literature. Grant (1991) identifies six categories of company 
resources: financial, physical, human, technological, reputation, and organisational. 
Barney (1991) groups the resources into three categories: physical, capital resources and 
human capital resources. Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) identify the resource into 
three categories which are physical, invisible and financial. 
According to prior research, this study compiles the relevant results with regard to the 
IN parent's resources contribution (see Chapter 3.4.3) and classifies the resources 
contributed from parents into five groups, namely, physical, invisible, financial, human 
resource, and organisational ability. 
1. Physical resources: including two measured items: key components and raw 
material, and land, machinery and equipment 
2. Invisible resources: including three items: brands or patent, know-how, and 
knowledge of management 
3. Financial resources: including two measured items: financial resources and access 
to external capital 
4. Human resources: including two measured items: high-level expertises and 
expertise of employees 
5. Organisational resources: including seven measured items: marketing and operation 
ability, technology or R&D resources, access to public relations with local 
government, and access to environmental knowledge 
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Based on the review of the relevant literature, Table 5.3.4 summarises the operational 
definition and measurement of resource contribution. 






Measure Items Measurement 
Grant (1991) 14 items including the 5 The any resources Barney(1991), categories below: 
Resource 
input from the 
foreign parent firms 
Chatterjee and 
" Physical resources 
" Invisible resources 5-point 
Contribution 
and host country 
Wernerfelt(1991) " Financial resources scale 
parent firms 
Yan and Gray " Human resources 
"Organisational resources (1994) 
This study measures the resource contribution by the types of resources which are input 
to the joint venture from each parent. A five point scale is used to measure the 14 
contribution items on the scale, with 5= `extremely high', 4= `high', 3= `average', 2= 
`low', 1= `very low' ,0 means no contribution from each parent. 
Respondents were asked to assess the extent of resources that have been contributed into 
the joint venture and also asked to evaluate from their perceptions, what degree of 
resources have been contributed by foreign parents. 
5.3.8.5 Motivation 
The motivation of a joint venture indicates the main reason for companies to cooperate 
with other firms to establish a new firm in order to reach some goals. A variety of 
strategic objectives have been suggested to explain a firm's motives for forming an 
international joint venture. From previous literature reviews (see chapter 3 and chapter 
4), some empirical studies report the strategic motivations for forming an international 
joint venture. The principal theories relating to IN formation are (1) resource 
dependence theory (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; 
Harrigan, 1985; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Pfeffer and Salabcik, 1978), (2) transaction 
cost theory (Yu and Tang, 1992; Hennart, 1988,1991; Kogut, 1988; Teece, 1986; 
Williamson, 1975,1985; Casson, 1982), (3) strategic behaviour theory (Contractor and 
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Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Vernon , 1983), 
(4) organizational learning theory (Hamel, 
1991; Badaracco , 1991; 
Ciborra, 1991; Kogut, 1988). 
Glaister and Buckley (1996) argue that the motivation for alliance formation cannot be 
straightforwardly mapped to the theoretical approaches directly, but can relate individual 
theoretical perspectives to motives indirectly. Based on the relevant literature, Glaister 
and Buckley (1996) identify the most important motives relating to the strategic 
motivation for alliance formation as, (1) risk sharing, (2) product rationalization and 
economies of scale, (3) the transfer of complementary technology / exchange of patents, 
(4) shaping of competition, (5) conforming to host government policy, (6) to facilitate 
international expansion, (7) vertical linkages, and (8) to consolidate market position. 
They also provide 16 strategic motives for alliance formation by UK firms with partners 
in Western Europe, the United States and Japan and group them into 5 categories which 
are configured as technology development, market power, market development, resource 
specialization and large project completion. 
Based on prior empirical studies relating to motives for forming an IJV, this study 
compiles the relevant results (see Chapter 3.4.4) and classifies these motives into four 
groups according to their theoretical roots. 
1. Resource dependence 
"Sharing a large sum of fixed costs 
"Spreading the financial risk 
"Reducing the risk caused by environmental uncertainty 
. Sharing the risk of the business cycle 
"Acquiring low cost materials and components 
*Acquiring sufficient capital 
"Sharing partner's resource 
2. Transaction cost explanations 




*Acquiring partner's manufacturing technology 
"Acquiring partner's brands or patents 
"Acquiring partner's manufacturing equipment and technology 
. Acquiring the economies of scale of production and sale 
3. Strategic positioning 
. Expanding the market and entering new markets 
"Extending the range of products and services 
. Reducing competition 
*Maintaining or improving the competitive position 
Shortening the time from the product development to market entry 
"Conforming to host government policy 
*Facilitating diversified development 
4. Organisational learning 
"Learning international business knowledge 
. Learning marketing knowledge 
. Improving new product design ability from partner 
*Learning management knowledge 
"Learning partner's human resource management 
"Improving ability on developing new technology 
Basing on the review of relevant literature, Table 5.3.5 summarises the operational 
definition and measurement of motivation of forming IN. 
Tah1e 53 5 Orieratinnnl nefinitinn antiMe"acnrpment nfMntivatinn nfPnrmino TTl1 
Dimension Operational Definition 
Key relevant 
researchers 
Measure Items Measurement 
Harrigan (1985) 26 items including the 4 
The motives of UNECE (1988) categories below 
companies to Lin (1995) 
" Resource dependence 
" Transaction cost 
Motivation cooperate with other Glaister & Buckley explanations 
5-point 
firms to establish a (1996) " Strategic positioning scale 




This study uses a scale of 1=5 to measure the 26 motivating factors with 5= `extremely 
important', 4= `important', 3= `somewhat important', 2= `not important, and 1= `not 
at all important'. The questions score responses at interval level of measurement to 
correspond to multivariate statistical approaches in data analysis. 
In order to provide an overall view of the measurements used in this study, Table 5.3.6 
summary the variables with reference sources, if any. 
Once the measurement of variables is decided, the next step is identifying the sample 
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5.3.9 Data Collection 
There are two main sources of data: original data and secondary. Original data is known 
as primary data, which is data collected at source. Secondary data is data which already 
- exists, such as books, documents and films. Details are given below. 
5.3.9.1 Secondary Data Collection 
Secondary data are one of the cheapest and easiest means of access to information and 
can be obtained from various sources (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). This can be obtained 
from company's internal records, such as cost information, customer feedback, sales 
results, and external sources, such as data published by government, periodicals, books, 
standardized sources of marketing data, and the Internet. Based on different researchers' 
classifications for secondary data, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) group the 
secondary data into three main subgroups: documentary data (ie, books, newspapers, 
reports), survey-based data (ie, government censuses and government surveys), and 
those compiled from multiple sources (ie, industry statistics and reports). The amount of 
secondary data available is overwhelming and researchers have to locate and utilize the 
data that are relevant to their research. 
This study has used the secondary data such as the government censuses and government 
surveys data, which provide the main data set for this study. These government surveys 
data also can be compared with the findings of this study in the later chapter. 
5.3.9.2 Primary Data Collection 
There are three main data collection methods for primary data which are interviewing, 
administering questionnaires, and observing people. Observation is a method for 
collecting data associated with either a structured or non-structured methodology and 
can take place in a laboratory setting or in a natural setting. There are two ways in 
which observation can be conducted: non-participant and participant observation 
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(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The purpose of non- 
participant observation is to observe and record what people do in terms of their actions 
and their behaviour without the researcher being involved. On the other hand, 
participant observation is a method of collecting data where the researcher is fully 
involved with the participants and the phenomena being researched. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) indicate that interviews are associated with both positivist 
and phenomenological methodologies. For the positivistic approach of interviews, the 
structured questions are prepared beforehand. By contrast, a phenomenological 
approach suggests unstructured questions. Interviews can be conducted either face to 
face or by telephone or online. Based on the level of formality and structure, Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2003) categorise the interviews into three types: structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews. Structured 
interviews use questionnaires based on a predetermined and standardised set of questions. 
By comparison, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews are more 
informal and non-standardised. Different types of interviews are useful for different 
research purposes. Structured interviews can be used in survey research and 
unstructured interviews are often used in qualitative research. The unstructured 
interviews were used in this study. Two companies which are the Talee-Isetan 
department store and COSTCO Warehouse Corporation (see Appendix I-A and 
Appendix I-B) were interviewed by the researcher to gather detailed information with 
regard to the management of international joint ventures and to obtain feedback from the 
company's perspective on the questionnaire. 
Survey questionnaires are the most common method of collecting data and are a most 
useful method when large numbers of people are to be reached in different geographical 
regions and have the advantage of obtaining data more efficiently in terms of researcher 
time, energy, and cost (Sekaran, 2003). Survey questionnaires can be conducted either 
personally, or mailed to the respondents, or electronically distributed. The data obtained 
by observation are rich but this is expensive and time consuming. All of them have 
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advantages and disadvantages; the researcher has to choose the one which is the most 
profitable to their study. 
A primary data collecting technique involves the gathering of data from a sample by 
questioning people and recording their responses. It is an efficient and economic method 
and can expand geographical coverage at a fraction of the cost and time required by 
other methods (Cooper and Emory, 1995). 
As stated above, there is no "best" form of survey. Each method has a range of 
advantages and disadvantages. By considering the research objectives and the nature of 
this study, the postal questionnaire was strongly suited to collect primary data. First, this 
study has to identify the samples from very large numbers of cases which cover a wide 
geographical area and did not have correct records of company's information. 
Compared with personal interviews and telephone interviews, the postal questionnaire 
has a relatively low cost and best met the research objectives. As Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) stress that the questionnaire survey is cheaper and less time-consuming than 
conducting interviews and very large samples can be taken. Second, the nature of the 
data to be collected required reflection on the part of respondents. Respondents needed 
enough time to think about their replies and work through the questions. Especially, 
when the respondent is an inaccessible person, a mail questionnaire should be chosen 
because it allows respondents to complete questions at a later date. Third, a mail 
questionnaire can allow respondents to collect facts that they may not recall immediately 
or accurately. Therefore, the mail questionnaire was chosen to collect primary data from 
host country parents. 
5.3.9.3 Questionnaire Design 
Before designing the questionnaire, two personal interviews were conducted in order to 
capture the enterprise's viewpoints on how the international joint venture was formed. 
Two international joint ventures were selected, COSTCO and Talee-Isetan. These two 
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cases provide the researcher some useful information about how joint ventures are 
formed and how they manage their joint ventures. The detailed information is described 
in appendix I-A and appendix I-B. Then the researcher starts to design the questions for 
this study. The questions within the questionnaire are suggested, in part, by reference to 
earlier and similar research, by consulting with experienced academic researchers and by 
my own knowledge of Taiwan's economic environment. For this study two 
questionnaires were compiled. The first questionnaire is designed to identify the joint 
venture samples in order to capture the host parent's information. The second 
questionnaire is the main questionnaire and consisted of two parts. The first part is a 
page of information for the respondent. This information indicates the purpose of this 
study and the meaning of international joint venture by giving an example. The 
information also requests the respondent to provide information relating to an 
international joint venture with which they are most familiar. 
The second part of questionnaire is divided into six sections: motivation, contribution, 
bargaining power, decision making, manager's appointment, and company's background. 
The first section comprises 26 questions designed to provide responses with regard to 
the most important factor for the formation of international joint venture. 
The second section contains 16 items related to the contributions from each parent to the 
joint venture. The contributions of the Taiwanese parent and its foreign partner are 
requested from the Taiwanese partner's viewpoint. The third section measures 11 
variables which affect the bargaining power. The fourth and fifth sections deal with the 
strategic decisions and responsibility for the appointment of managers. And the final 
section consists of a number of questions designed to capture the company's background. 
All the questions are structured as appendix II-B and II-B. 
5.3.9.4 Questionnaire Pre-Testing 
Pre-testing (or Pilot testing) is usually considered in the trial investigations of specific 
research problems that will be treated more intensively at a later date. It is also 
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conducted to make sure that the questionnaire works and yields the data required. 
Emory and Cooper (1991) indicate that the pilot tests are conducted to detect 
weaknesses in the study's design, instrumentation, and procedures. They suggest that 
the size of the pilot group may range from 25 to 100 subjects depending on the method 
to be tested. They also give a warning that in very small populations the pilot testing has 
the risk of exhausting the supply of respondents. Thus, this study chose 20 companies as 
a pilot testing sample in order not to deplete the supply of respondents and also used two 
interview cases to detect any weakness for the purpose of refining of measuring 
instruments. 
A random number table was used to select 20 Taiwanese's parent companies as the pilot 
survey sample. The questionnaires were posted to these companies. After ten days, 20 
companies were followed up by telephone to confirm that the questionnaire has been 
received by the right department and person. But only two companies completed the 
questionnaire as requested. Two firms stated that their headquarters moved to a new 
location recently and the questionnaire had to be sent to the new office. Three firms said 
that they didn't receive the questionnaire and the researcher had to use Fax to send the 
questionnaire again. However, the questionnaire was still not received. Three 
companies stated that they receive many questionnaires every week and only choose a 
few simple questionnaires to answer. Some of the firms said that they did not answer 
questionnaires. Some of firms said that if the address and addressee are not correct, the 
questionnaire may simply be destroyed. In the pre-testing of 20 firms, 8 responses were 
received. 
This pre-testing provides some valuable experiences. For example, the original version 
of questionnaire proved to be too long. Also, if most of the respondents hold a high 
position in the company they do not have the time or patience to complete the 
questionnaire. It is better to restructure the questionnaire in a simpler fashion and reduce 
the number of pages. As all researchers know, if there are many pages in a questionnaire, 
the risk of non-response will increase. On the other hand, if there is not enough 
information included in the questionnaire, the research cannot be employed successfully. 
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It has to balanced on both sides. Four to six pages in a questionnaire is an appropriate 
size to obtain the data required. 
Another useful experience from pre-testing was to make a phone call to identify the 
correct department and named person before the questionnaire was sent out. This 
ensures the questionnaire is going to right respondent and will not be destroyed during 
the document exchange. It is also easy and helpful for the follow-up stage. This pre- 
testing provides many helpful experiences which serve in the final version of the 
questionnaire which was modified on the basis of comments received during the pre- 
testing phase. 
5.3.9.5 Respondent Selection 
The study requires respondents with specialised knowledge of all joint venture activities, 
from motives for the formation of international joint ventures, contributing resources to 
N's companies, bargaining power of each parent, control and ownership over the N. 
Those requirements identify respondents as managers of at least middle to senior 
positions in Taiwanese partner firms. To ensure good quality responses and to enhance 
the response rate, telephone contact was made with each Taiwanese partner in order to 
identify the name and position of the most appropriate senior manager in the organisation 
with intimate knowledge of the N. 
5.3.9.6 Survey Implementation 
Since the potential samples have been identified, telephone contact was made to confirm 
the appropriate respondent and correct address. The questionnaires were sent out to a 
total of 227 companies in October 2001. The researcher used the facilities provided by 
the National Kaohsiung University of Applied Science. Each questionnaire is mailed by 
using the envelope with University's title. It made the questionnaires look more formal 
in order to increase the response rate. Also each questionnaire includes a pre-paid/pre- 
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addressed envelope and a cover letter which highlights the nature of the research and 
requested support from the respondent. A first round of 82 questionnaires was collected. 
Follow-up calls were made to firms that had not returned a completed questionnaire. By 
the end of December 2001, a second round of 32 completed questionnaires had reached 
the University. As a result, a total number of 114 completed questionnaires were 
collected. The total of 114 eligible respondents represents a 50.22% (114/227) response 
rate. 
5.3.10 Data Analysis Methods 
After the questionnaires were collected, the next step was to code the data and key into a 
computer program. Data analysis of the questionnaire was carried out using the SPSS 
statistical package. The general procedures employed included descriptive statistics, 
analysis of variance, correlation analysis, factor analysis and regression analysis. 
5.3.10.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Descriptive analysis refers to the transformation of the raw data into a form that will 
make for easy comprehension and interpretation (Zikmund, 1997). Descriptive statistics 
are used to express the most fundamental characteristics of location, spread, and shape 
of the variables and factors. Its purpose consists of understanding the contents and 
construction of samples, in order to utilize inference statistical analysis in the next stage. 
Descriptive statistics are provided by frequencies, measures of central tendency, and 
dispersion. The most common form of summarizing data is the average, frequency 
distributions, and percentage distributions ((Zikmund, 1997). 
Frequencies simply refer to a numerical value which represents the total number of 
observations for a variable under study (Hussey, 1997). The frequencies may be 
summarised by calculating the average and/or the percentage frequencies and the 
information can also be presented in the form of a histogram or a bar chart. In business 
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research, frequencies are generally obtained for the nominal variables such as gender and 
educational level and ordinal variables such as attitudes or opinions. 
Measures of central tendencies and dispersions enable individuals to get an idea of the 
basic characteristics of the data and are a convenient way of describing a large frequency 
distribution by means of a single value (Sekaran, 2003; Hussey, 1997). There are three 
measures of central tendencies: the mean, the median and the mode. The mean is the 
arithmetical average of a frequency distribution. The median is the mid-value in a 
frequency distribution which has been arranged in size order. The mode is the most 
frequently occurring value in a frequency distribution (Hussey, 1997). 
A simple measure of central tendencies can not give us any idea of the profile of the data 
distribution; thus, the measure of dispersion can help us to describe the spread of values 
in a data distribution. The three measurements of dispersion are the range, the variance, 
and the standard deviation. The range refers to difference between the upper extreme 
(highest) values and the lower extreme (lowest) value in a set of observations. The 
variance is the term used to describe the mean of the deviations squared. Standard 
deviation is a very commonly used measure of dispersion, and is simply the square root 
of the variance. 
In summary, descriptive statistics enable the researcher to summarize and organize data 
in an effective and meaningful way. The mean, median and mode can be useful measures 
of central tendencies, and the range and standard deviation are useful measures of 
dispersion. However, most of the time we would be interested to know the relationships 
or differences between two variables. We will need to know the inferential statistics 
which are described in the next section. 
5.3.10.2 Inferential Statistical Analysis 
Inferential statistics allow researchers to determine whether an expected pattern 
designated by the theory and hypotheses is actually found in the observations. When we 
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are interested to know: (1) the relationship between two variables; (2) differences in a 
variable among different subgroups; and (3) how several independent variables might 
explain the variance in a dependent variable, we need to employ inferential statistics to 
answer these questions (Sakaran, 2003). Cross-tabulation, Chi-square test, t-test, and 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), correlations, regression analysis and factor analysis are 
the most popular statistical tools for inferential statistics. 
Cross-tabulation is a technique for comparing two classification variables, such as gender, 
age, and profession, etc. The purpose of categorization and cross-tabulation is to allow 
the inspection of differences among groups and to make comparisons ((Zikmund, 1997). 
It also can be constructed for statistical testing, referred to as contingency tables, and the 
test determines if the classification variables are independent. 
The chi-square test is probably the most widely used nonparametric test of significance. 
It can be used to test the significance of nominal data or higher scales and can also help 
us to see whether or not two nominal variables are related. The chi-square test is useful 
not only in cases of one-sample analysis but also two-independent samples or k 
independent samples. But when using this technique, we have to be careful of three 
situations: (1) when the degree of freedom equals 1, each expected frequency in each cell 
should be at least 5 in size; (2) if the degree of freedom is greater than 1, but more than 
20 percent of the expected frequencies are smaller than 5, then the Chi-square test should 
not be used; (3) when any expected frequency is less than 1, the Chi-square test should 
not be used. 
Agresti (1996) indicated that the chi-squared approximation can be poor when the tables 
contain very small fitted values or about 20% of the cells have fitted values below 5. 
Agresti and Finlay (1997) mentioned that the chi-squared was frequently misused. A 
common misuse was to apply it when the expected frequencies are too small. In other 
words, when situation (2) happens but there has to be a significant value, the Chi-square 
test should not be used and the G2 test can be used to solve the limit of Chi-square test. 
The G2 statistic is obtained by the formula: 
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.. G2 = 2En, log 
n° 
uij 
u#: the expected value of ny assuming independence. 
A 
u;; : estimated expected frequencies. 
The t-test takes into consideration the means and standard deviations of the two groups 
on the variable and tests whether or not there is a significant mean difference in a 
dependent variable between two groups (Sekaran, 2003). 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is a technique for testing the null hypothesis that the 
means of several populations are equal. It breaks down the total variation among scores 
into between-groups and within-groups variance. The F ratio, the test statistic, 
determines if the differences are sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis. Analysis 
of Variance can be extended from One-way Analysis of Variance to two-way and n-way 
Analysis of Variance. 
5.3.10.3 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is the statistical method to measure the direction and strength of the 
linear relationship between two quantitative variables. A Pearson correlation coefficient 
(y) is a technique which can measure the direction, the strength and significance of 
association between two variables. But the coefficient does not distinguish between 
independent and dependent variables (Emory and Cooper, 1991). The correlation 7 is 
always a number between -1 and 1. Positive y indicates positive association between the 
variables, and negative y indicates negative association (Hair et al., 1998). 
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When '=1 represents a perfect positive linear association 
y=0 represents no linear association 
y= -1 represents a perfect negative linear association 
Direction represents that large values on one variable are associated with large values on 
the other (and small values with small values), in other words, as one variable increases, 
the other also increases (Emory and Cooper, 1991). The values in between can be 
graded as 
IiI>0.7, it indicates strong degree of linear relationship. 
0.3; 5 1y1S0.7, it indicates middle degree of linear relationship. 
yI<0.3, it indicates low degree of linear relationship. 
Correlation coefficients should be interpreted with care, since a correlation between two 
variables does not prove there is a causal link between them. 
5.3.10.4 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis refers to a diverse number of techniques used to discern the underlying 
dimensions or regularity in phenomena (Zikmund, 1997). There are two purposes in 
factor analysis: data reduction and substantive interpretation. The first purpose is used 
principally to summarize the important information in a set of observed variables by a 
fewer number of factors. This technique is usually referred to as "data reduction. " The 
second purpose is to discover the underlying constructs that explain the observed 
variance. This multivariate statistical technique is particularly suited to this study 
because it analyses the interrelationships among a large number of variables and then 
explains the relationships within the data. Four steps have to be addressed prior to the 
implementation of factor analysis. 
The first step for running a factor analysis is to determine and extract the factors which 
will be used to describe the data set. The method this study used was Principle 
Components Analysis (PCA). The principal component technique is the most frequent 
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approach to construct a new set of principal components. Successive components 
explain progressively smaller portions of the total sample variance, and are all 
uncorrelated with each other. 
The second step is to determine the number of factors necessary to account for the 
variation in the data. A number of rules have been advanced for deciding how many 
factors to retain for a factor analytic solution. The most popular is the latent root 
criterion. The latent roots criterion holds that the amount of variation explained by each 
factor must be greater than 1. Therefore, factors with an Eigenvalue more than 1 are 
selected. 
The third step is selected a rotation procedure which is used to clarify the factors. There 
are two different types of rotation which can be employed, Orthogonal and Oblique. 
Orthogonal rotation refers to the procedure where the factors are uncorrelated to one 
another and preserves the right angles that exist among the factors axes. Oblique 
rotations allows for some correlation between the factors, which means that the factors 
themselves can be correlated. The orthogonal extraction method was carried out in this 
study. SPSS provides a number of alternative algorithms for orthogonal rötation. The 
most popular orthogonal rotation scheme is the Varimax method which attempts to 
minimise the number of variables which have a high loading on a factor and can enhance 
the interpretability of factors. 
The final step was to assign a name or label to a factor that accurately reflects the 
greatest extent possible. In order to name the factors appropriately, the criteria of the 
significance of any factor loading has to be decided. The significance of any loading can 
be judged using statistical criteria. Statistical criteria mean that the loading is considered 
statistically significant at some specified alpha level, typically 0.05. For the samples of 
less than 100, the lowest factor loading to be considered as significant would have to be 
greater than 0.3 (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). 
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In addition, item-to-total is used to measure the correlation coefficient of each variable 
for each factor. This evaluation would be in terms of the variable's overall contribution 
to the factor. If the variable is of minor importance to the factor or less than 0.4, it 
should be eliminated. Then the Cronbach a coefficient was used to test the internal 
consistency of each factor. 
5.3.10.5 General Linear Regression 
Regression analysis refers to the techniques used to derive an equation that relates the 
dependent variable to one or more independent variables. It is a powerful analytical tool 
designed to explore all types of dependence relationships and is viewed as the foundation 
for business forecasting models (Hair et al., 1998). There are two kind of regression 
analysis, one is called simple regression analysis, and another one is multiple regression 
analysis. The classification between these two is according to the number of independent 
variables. Simple regression analysis is the analyzing method where there is only one 
independent variable in the regression formula. Multiple regression analysis is used to 
analyze the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent 
variables in the regression formula. The objective of multiple regression analysis is to 
predict the changes in the dependent variable in response to changes in several 
independent variables. 
The basic formulation of multiple regressions is shown as the below: 
Y, =a+ßß, X1 +ß2X2 +....... +ßnx" +s, 
Where Y, : is the dependent variable 
Xi : is indepentent variables i =1,..., n 
ß : is the regression coefficien tin 
c: is the error associated with the i th observation 
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There are two methods to estimate a and ß, one is called ordinary least squares method 
(OLSE); and the other one is called maximum likelihood method. The coefficient of 
determination is the number which serves as an evaluation to determine the fineness of 
the regression model. It is used to measure the overall closeness of the relationship, and 
the defining capability from the regression model. The coefficient of determination is 
denoted by R2 
. 
The value of R2 ranges from 0 and 1. When the value of R2 is closer to 1, it means a 
high degree of variation from the total variation is attributed to the regression model. 
Hair et al. (1998) described a simplified procedure to demonstrate the analysis of multiple 
regression which was represented in Figure 5.3.3. There are six steps in the analysis 
procedure. These are 
Step 1: Select the independent variables to examine: the correlation matrix can be used 
to identify which independent variables are most closely correlated with the 
dependent variable. The independent variable with the highest correlation with 
the dependent variable will be the first choice into the regression equation. 
Step 2: Explain the statistically significance of variation: R2 is used to indicate the 
percentage of total variation of the dependent variable (Y) explained by 
independent variable (X). 
Step 3: Consider other available independent variables: when other potential independent 
variables remain available to add to the equation. 
Step 4: Select a new variable to be added to a predictive equation: partial correlations 
and t valued can be used to assess the potential contribution of other independent 
variables to improve the prediction of the dependent variable. The criterion of 
selecting variables is that the independent variable has the highest partial 
correlation with the dependent variable. 
Step 5: Assess whether the variance explained by all variables is significant or not: the t 
value of variables in the equation which measures the significance of the partial 
correlation of the variable to determine whether a variable should be dropped 
from the equation once a variable had been added. 
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Step 6: Drop non-significant independent variables: when the partial correlation of 
independent variables is very small and has no statistical significance, drop these 
non-significant independent variables. 
Sequence of Analysis 
1 Select predictor variable to examine criterion: 
highest correlation with dependent variable 
No prediction 









Select a new variable to be added to 
predictive equation. 
Criterion: highest partial correlation 
with dependent variable Examine appropriateness 
5 Is variance explained by all variables 
now significant? 
Criterion: partial F tests for each 
variable in equation 
No 
6II Drop non-significant 
Figure 5.3.3 Simplified Stepwise Regression Procedure Used by HATCO 
Source: Hair, et al. (1998), Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings, New York: Macmillan, p63. 
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The above procedure of analysis can provide very useful guidelines when employing 
multiple regression analysis. This study adopted this procedure throughout the 
regression analysis. 
When exercising multivariate regression analysis, the researcher must be aware the 
impact of multi-collinearity which a term used to describe a situation where an 
independent variable is related to one or more of the other independent variables in the 
equation. Two measures are available for testing the impact of collinearity: (1) 
calculating the tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) values, and (2)using the 
condition indices and decomposing the regression coefficient variance ( Hair et al, 1998, 
p. 74). The tolerance value is 1 minus the proportion of the variable's variance. As the 
tolerance value grows smaller, the independent variables become more highly collinear 
with the other variables. VIF is an indicator of the effect that other independent 
variables have on the variance of a regression coefficient. Large VIF values indicate a 
high degree of collinearity among the independent. There are a number of ways can be 
used to deal with the multicollinearity. These methods include (Hair et al, 1998): 
" Collect more data. This is one of the best methods to reduce multicollinearity. But it 
is not practical or possible for a researcher to employ because the limits of cost, time 
and available samples. 
" Omit one or more highly correlated independent variables and seek others to help the 
prediction. 
" Use the simple correlations between each independent and the dependent variable to 
understand the independent-dependent variable relationship. 
" Use the model with the highly correlated independent variables for prediction only. 
" Use more sophisticated methods of analysis or regression on principle components to 
obtain a model that more clearly reflects the simple effects of the independent variables. 
5.3.10.6 Reliability and Validity 
Any test or questionnaire could be looked upon as the result of a measure from random 
sampling, whether the result is reliable or not. It is important to ensure the instrument 
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can measure the variable accurately. A well-designed instrument will ensure more 
accurate results, which in turn will enhance the scientific quality of the research. Hence, 
we need to be reasonably sure that the instruments we use in our research do indeed 
measure the variables and measure them accurately (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 
2001). In social science research, the reliability and validity are most commonly used to 
assess the "good" of the measures developed. Sekaran (2003) states that validity and 
reliability of the measure certifies the scientific rigor and can be applied to the research 
study. She provides a Figure 5.3.4 (see next page) to describe the various forms of 
validity and reliability. There four methods can be used to measure the reliability which 
are test-retest reliability, parallel-form reliability, inter-item consistency reliability (or 
Cronbach's alpha), and split-half reliability. The types of validity tests include the 
content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. The next subsection 


















e d :. ' U 
r. "a 
" 
Cl. Ü v t C"" U 
.ý 
U am 
, E ß 
N 
, äö 

























The reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which the measure is without bias and 
hence offers a consistent measurement across time and across the various items in the 
instrument (Cavana, Delahaye, and Sekaran, 2001). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
(2000) define the reliability as "the extent to which a measuring instrument contains 
variable errors, that is, errors that appear inconsistently between observations either 
during any one measurement procedure or each time a given variable is measured by the 
same instrument. " Sekaran (2003) also states thet the reliability of a measure indicates 
the extent to which it is without bias (error free) and hence ensures consistent 
measurement across time and across the various items in the instrument. Wu and Lin 
(2000) define reliability as the extent of a measure without any errors; it also means the 
degree of stability and consistency of a measure. 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) define reliability as a measuring tool which 
includes the extent of variable errors. The possible resources of measurement errors are: 
1. The errors resulting from respondent: This kind of errors results from respondent. For 
example, because of different race and social level some respondents are unwilling to 
express true recognition or attitude. 
2. The errors resulting from different circumstances: The resources of this kind of error 
are extensive; any matter which could affect the measure result can cause errors. For 
example, if there is another person beside person A when he is doing the 
questionnaire, this circumstance may adversely affect person A's responses. 
3. The errors resulting from measurers: For example, the interviewer's explanation about 
the questionnaire may affect the interviewee's understanding. 
4. The errors resulting from measuring instruments: A faulty measuring instrument can 
result in a measurement error. Or an error results from using the inappropriate 
measuring instrument to examine specific item. 
Reliability could be explained by two implications, one is stability, and another one is 
internal consistency. The stability refers to whether we could get the same result by 
repeating the same measuring instruments on one particular object or not. And the 
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internal consistency refers to the degree of agreement between measurements that 
measure the same theoretical concept. There are two common methods of estimating 
stability reliability which are: 
1. Test-retest method: Test-retest method is the method to let the same group of 
respondents to be tested twice on the same measure, and find the coefficient from the 
two tests. This coefficient is also called test-retest reliability. 
2. Parallel-form method: The same group of respondents has to be tested twice with two 
similar but different instruments. The correlation coefficient of these two instruments 
is called coefficient of forms. 
Internal consistency can be measured by using: 
1. Split-half method : Split-half method is the method to split the questionnaire into 
halves, and compare the questions in each part. It estimates reliability by measuring 
each of two or more parts of a measuring instrument on a separate scale (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). If these two halves of an instrument correlate well, it 
indicates that the instrument has high reliability. 
2. Inter-item method: This is a test of the consistency of respondents' answers to all the 
items in a measure. The most popular test of inter-item consistency reliability is the 
Cronbach's coefficient alpha. Cronbach (1951) brings up the famous coefficient alpha 
which overcomes some defects of the split-half method. 
The formula of Cronbach alpha is shown below: 
_k 
ST _S; 
a=I SZ J 
a: the estimated reliability 
K: total questions in a measure 
S2 : is the total variation in a measure 
S2 is the variation in each question 
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The Cronbach alpha reliability is quite commonly used in business research (Cronbach, 
1955). The main reason is that either the test-retest method, the split-half method, or the 
equivalent-forms method has low practicality in testing in a real situation. Therefore, the 
Cronbach alpha is a useful method to investigate reliability. This study will use the 
Cronbach alpha to measure the reliability. 
5.3.10.6.2 Validity 
Validity indicates the extent to which an instrument can measures what it is supposed to 
measure. In other words, validity indicates whether the measurement is effective or not, 
according to the purpose, content and scope of the research. Several types of validity 
test are used to test the goodness of measures. 
1. Content validity: Content validity is the extent to which a test measures an intended 
content area or is a function of how well the dimensions and elements of a concept 
have been delineated. There are at least three ways to achieve content validity -from 
literature, from qualitative research and from the judgement of a panel of experts. 
Face validity is usually tested by giving the questionnaire to a respondent to measure 
their reaction to the items. However, most researchers do not treat it as a valid 
component of content validity (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001). Because there 
are no precise, replicable procedures for evaluating the content validity of face validity 
and it is extremely difficult to repeat the evaluation procedure precisely and it entirely 
relies on subjective judgements (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). 
2. Criterion-related validity: Criterion-related validity is the ability of a test or other 
measure to produce results in keeping with those of the same criterion observed within 
the same time frame. Criterion validity can be either concurrent validity or predictive 
validity (Sekaran, 2003; Neuman, 2000). Concurrent validity refers to the criterion 
that exists at the same time as the measure, whereas predictive validity indicates the 




3. Construct validity: Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) indicate that construct 
validity is established by relating the measuring instrument to a general theoretical 
framework within which the researcher conducts their studies in order to determine 
whether the instrument is logically and empirically tied to the concepts and theoretical 
assumptions they are employing. Construct validity is used to measure how well the 
results obtained from the use of the measure fit the theories around which the test is 
designed (Sekaran, 2003). Two specific forms of construct validity are convergent and 
discriminant validity. Convergent validity is established when the scores obtained by 
two different instruments measuring the same concept are highly correlated. 
Discriminant validity is established when two variables are predicted to be uncorrelated, 
and the scores obtained by measuring them are indeed empirically found to be so 
(Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001). 
Some of the methods in which the above forms of validity can be established are through: 
1. Correlational analysis: which can be used in the case of establishing concurrent and 
predictive validity or convergent and discriminant validity. 
2. Factor analysis: a multivariate technique would confirm the dimensions of the concept 
that have been operationally defined, as well as indicate which of the items are most 
appropriate for each dimension. In factor analysis, we need to calculate the factor 
structure matrix (not pattern matrix) in the questionnaire; then ascertain whether the 
construct validity good or bad could be determined from the score of factor loading. 
In the same construct, if the score of factor loading is ascending, (usually, the 
particular item is maintained if its score is more than 0.5, otherwise the item is deleted 
and the factor analysis is rank again), it means a higher level of convergent validity 
3. Multi-traits multi-methods: The application of multi-traits multi-methods is to test the 
same group of samples (or interviewees) twice with the same hetero-traits measuring 
implements in a different method. Sekaran (2003) indicates that the multitrait, 
multimethod matrix of correlations derived from measuring concepts by different 
forms and different methods, additionally establishes the robustness of the measure. 
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In summary, the goodness of measures can be obtained through different kinds of validity 
and reliability. The researcher needs to use well-validated and reliable measures to 
ensure the results of the measures. After discussing the relative methods in terms of 
validity and reliability, next we examine the reliability and validity of the questionnaire 
derived from this empirical survey. 
5.3.10.6.3 Reliability and Validity of this Questionnaire 
The aims of this subsection is to analyze the reliability and validity of questionnaire 
derived from this empirical survey. This study includes motivation, contribution, 
bargaining power, ownership and control constructs. Most constructs are measured by 
multi-questions except ownership. 
All of the concepts in this research and the hypotheses for the theory construction are 
mainly referred from previous research, and partly from practical observation; therefore, 
it meets the requirements of content validity. In addition, this study uses factor analysis 
to affirm the measuring validity of motivation and bargaining power. As mentioned 
above, factor analysis would confirm the dimensions of the concept that have been 
operationally defined, as well as indicate which of the items are most appropriate for 
each dimension. In this study, the construct validity of motivation and bargaining power 
are measured by using factor analysis. The results are shown in Table 5.3.7. 
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Table 5.3.7 The Summary of Construct Validity of Motivation and Bargaining Power 
Concepts Factors Variables 
Factor 
loading 














Motivation F3 M1 0.887 3.32 12.76 82.56 M4 0.884 
M3 0.829 
M8 0.902 
M7 F4 0.845 3.12 12.00 9 M 0.752 
M10 0.726 
M21 0.856 
F5 M19 0.797 2.85 10.95 
M18 0.762 
M5 0.804 
F6 M6 0.794 2.25 8.64 
M11 0.786 
Fl B1 -0.928 
B2 -0.922 3.89 38.91 B9 0.927 F2 B6 0.891 
Bargaining Power B4 0.880 80.41 F3 B5 0.868 2.67 26.68 
B 10 0.824 
B7 0.917 
F4 B3 0.905 1.48 14.82 
B8 0.644 
After employing factor analysis, the factors of motivation and bargaining power are 
obtained and the analysis process of these two concepts is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. The results of factor analysis for motivation obtained six factors and for 
bargaining power have four factors. Most factors loading of each variable is over 0.7. 
Both concepts have a total cumulated percentage of variance of over 80 percent. These 




As described in the above section, the reliability of empirical measurement can be 
obtained by four methods: the test-retest method, parallel-form method, inter-item 
consistency method (or Cronbach's alpha), and split-half method (Sekaran, 2003). This 
study uses the SPSS to analyze the data and the reliability of the concepts in this study is 
calculated through their Cronbach efficient alpha. The results of the reliability of 
motivations, contributions and bargaining power are shown in Table 5.3.8. 
Table 5.3.8 Summaries of Reliability of Research Constructs 
Constructs Factors Cronbach a 
Technological Acquiring(6 items) 0.9802 
Knowledge Learning (5 items) 0.9005 
Motivation Risk Sharing (4 items) 0.9117 Competitive Strategy (3 items) 0.8641 
Resource Complementarity (4 items) 0.8222 
Market Expanding (3 items) 0.8380 
Physical Resources (2 items) 0.9112 
Invisible Resources (3 items) 0.8987 
Contribution Financial Resources (2 items) 0.9034 
Human Resources (2 items) 0.9383 
Organization Resources (5 items) 0.8443 
Technological Capability (2 items) 0.9689 
Bargaining Power Management Capability (2 items) 0.8894 Financial Capability (3 items) 0.8564 
Marketing Capability (3 items) 0.7045 
As shown in Table 5.3.4, the results indicate that the Cronbach's alpha of all the factors 
is over 0.8 except the marketing capability of bargaining power which for Cronbach's 
alpha is 0.7045. Sekaran (2003) suggests that reliabilities of less than 0.6 are considered 
to be poor, those in the 0.7 range are acceptable, and those over 0.8 are good. 
Therefore, the internal consistency reliability of the measures used in this study can be 
considered to be good. 
In summary, the research design can enable the researcher to obtain the data they desired. 
Research deign involves a detailed plan and includes many key decisions such as the 
purpose of the study, type of investigation, extent of researcher interference, studying 
setting, time horizon, unit of analysis, sampling design, measurement and measures, data 
collection method, an data analysis. Each of key decisions with respect to the research 
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design is described in detail in this section and it can guide the research to be employed. 
In the next section we start to analysis the data which was derived from this empirical 
survey. 
5.4 Summary of Research Design of this Study 
In this chapter we begin with the description of research process which is used to guide 
the study from its concept through the final analysis, recommendation, and ultimate 
action (Kumar, Aaker and Day, 2002). A research process can provides a systematic, 
planned approach to the research project. This study adopted a Sekaran's (2003) step- 
by-step process to ensure that all aspects of this study are consistent with re research 
purpose and objectives. Sekaran (2003) outlines the research process includes 11 steps 
which are: (1) the identification of the broad problem area; (2) preliminary information 
gathering, especially through unstructured and structured interviews and literature survey; 
(3) problem definition; (4) evolving a theoretical framework; (5) deriving testable 
hypotheses; (6) scientific research design; (7) data collection, analysis, and interpretation; 
(8) deduction the results; (9) report writing; (10) report presentation; (11) managerial 
decision making. Following Sekaran's research process, the research problems are 
identified (see Chapter 1), a research framework is evolved and testable hypotheses are 
derived (see Chapter 4). 
For the research design step, it is very important step because a poor research design will 
lead to a failure of the study. A research design is the detailed blueprint to guide the 
research study towards its objectives. The research design of this study adopted 
Sekaran's model and each issue involved in the research design is described in the 
following. 
" Purpose of this study: There are three basic types research, namely exploratory, 
descriptive and causal (hypothesis testing). The purpose of this study is to explain the 
relationships between motivation, contribution, ownership, bargaining power and 
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control in international joint venture issue. Therefore, an explanatory /hypothesis 
testing methodology was employed in this study. 
" Type of investigation: Because the aim of this study is first to delineate the important 
variables which are associated with control. If the variables are associated with 
control, then a causal relationship will be tested between the variables and control. 
Therefore, the correlation and causal study will be used in this study. 
" Extent of researcher interference: This study is conducted in Taiwan by administering 
questionnaires to the companies, thus, the research interference was kept to the 
minimum. 
" Study setting: In this study, the survey of the sample of host country parents is 
undertaken by employing postal questionnaires. Hence, it is a field study in a non- 
contrived setting with minimal researcher interference. 
" Time horizon: Due to the purpose of this study and the limited time and resources, 
this study is cross-sectional study and it is conducted to gather data using 
questionnaires in a single-time frame. 
" Unit of analysis: In this study, the unit of analysis is Taiwanese parent companies who 
engage in the international joint ventures with the child (the joint venture) located in 
Taiwan. 
" Sampling design: Basically, there are two types of sampling designs: probability and 
non-probability sampling. In this study, the data is collected from the entire 
population because the sample is not very large relative to international joint ventures 
in. Taiwan. Two main sources were used to identify the samples: (a) the 1999/2000 
edition of the Directory of Business Groups in Taiwan, and (b) the 1999 edition of the 
Directory of Foreign Investment in Taiwan. A list of 227 firms have identified in this 
study. 
" Quantification and measures: This study includes theoretical concepts of motivation, 
contribution, bargaining power, ownership and control. Therefore, the operational 
definition of each variable or construct is described first and then the measurements 
are developed (see Chapter 5.3.8). 
" Data-collection method: There are three main primary data collection methods which 
are interviewing, administering questionnaires, and observing people. By considering 
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the research objectives and the nature of each survey method, the mail questionnaire 
was chosen to collect primary data from host country parents. In addition, two 
company interviews which are COSTCO company and Talee-Isetan company were 
conducted to capture the enterprise's viewpoints on how the IN was form. 
" Data analysis: The general procedures employed included descriptive statistics which 
include mean, median, mode, standard deviation and inferential statistics. Statistics 
methods used in this study include cross-tabulation, Chi-square test, t-test, and 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), correlations, regression analysis and factor analysis, 
etc. 
Following the research design, the next section starts to analyze the data which was 
collected from this study. 
5.5 Data Analysis: the Profile of Sample Characteristics 
After data was collected from the population, the next step is analysis. Sekaran (2003) 
indicates that there are three objectives in data analysis, namely, getting a feel for the 
data, testing the goodness of data, and testing the hypotheses. Getting a feel for the data 
is a necessary first step in all data analysis. Therefore, this section begins to analyse 
characteristics of the sample derived from this empirical survey. The unit of analysis in 
this study is a firm. Thus, the firm's profiles are the industry in which they are involved, 
the size as measured by capital, sales volume and the number of employees, the ages of 
parents and the joint ventures and the number of board members. Each is described in 
following sections. 
5.5.1 Industry Characteristics 
The industries in which the host country parents are involved are quite varied, thus it is 
necessary to categorize industries into main industry sectors. This study classifies the 
179 
Chapter 5 
industry into 19 sectors which are Electronic, Plastics, Trade/General Merchandise, 
Machinery Equipment, Electrical Equipment/Cable, Banking & Insurance, Textile, 
Automobiles, Chemicals, Food, Steel, Construction, Transportation, Mining, 
Glass/Ceramic, Paper Product & Printing, Rubber Products, Tourism and Others. The 
number of host country parents of international joint ventures formed across industries is 
ranked in the descending order of frequency and is shown in Table 5.5.1. 
Tah1e 551 Descrintive Statistics of Industry of Resnnndents Involved 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Electronic 15 13.20 
Plastics 12 10.50 
Trade/General Merchandise 11 9.60 
Machinery Equipment 9 7.90 
Electrical Equipment/Cable 9 7.90 
Banking & Insurance 9 7.90 
Textile 8 7.00 
Automobiles 7 6.10 
Chemicals 6 5.30 
Food 5 4.40 
Steel 5 4.40 
Others 5 4.40 
Construction 4 3.50 
Transportation 4 3.50 
Mining 1 0.90 
Glass/Ceramic 1 0.90 
Paper Product & Printing 1 0.90 
Rubber Products 1 0.90 
Tourism 1 0.90 
Total 114 100.00 
As shown in Table 5.5.1, the Electronics industry has the greatest proportion of 
international joint ventures with 15 cases which is 13.2 % of the sample. Second is the 
Plastics industry with 12 cases, 10.5% of the sample Third is the Trade/General 
merchandise industry with 11 cases, 9.6% of the sample. Machinery Equipment, 
Electrical Equipment/Cable, Banking & Insurance have 27 cases together, each 7.9% of 
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the sample. The other industries with over 4 cases are Textile, Automobiles, Chemicals, 
Food, Steel, Construction, Transportation and others. 
From the government report, the major recipients of foreign investment between 1952 
and 2003 are Electronic and Electrical Products (24.67%), Banking and Insurance 
(16.26%) Services (11.35%), Chemical Products (8.03%), and Wholesaling and 
Retailing (7.62%) (Described detailed in Chapter 2). 
Compared with the results of the government's report and the survey of this study, the 
major industries receiving foreign investment are almost the same, shown in Table 5.5.2. 
But the reader should bear in mind that the result of the government report is derived 
from all the foreign investment and the result of this study is derived from a part of 
foreign investment and only focuses on cases of international joint venture. 
Table 5.5.2 Major Industries of Foreign Investment: Compared with the Government Report and the 
Results of this Study 
The major industries of international joint 
ventures derived from this study 
The major industries of foreign investment 
derived from government report 
Electronic Electronic and Electrical Products 
Plastics Banking and Insurance 
Trade/General Merchandise Services 
Banking & Insurance Chemical Products 





However some industries such as Mining, Glass/Ceramic, Paper Product & Printing, 
Rubber Products, Tourism industry only have one case, it might be because the industry 
sector in this study is rather scattered. Therefore, to consider the analysis method of 
statistics, the industry sector is aggregated into two groups: manufacturing and service 
group. As shown in Table 5.5.3, a 75 % of the total international joint ventures involved 
manufacturing enterprises and accounts for 25% by service companies. 
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Tnhh 5S1 fr ccrintive Statistics of Resnnndents by Industry Groun 
Industry Group Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing Group 85 74.60 
Service Group 29 25.50 
Total 114 100.00 
From the above description, these results indicate that most international joint ventures in 
Taiwan occurred in the manufacturing group. This probably reflects that the economic 
development under the Government's guidance in Taiwan was more focused on the 
manufacturing industry since 1960. So, prior to 1990 most foreign investment in Taiwan 
is in manufacturing. Nevertheless, the government of Taiwan implemented an open 
policy on the service industry after 1990 which resulted in a structural change in foreign 
investment. The ratio of foreign investment in manufacturing industries steadily declines, 
while the ratio of foreign investment in the service industries increases rapidly in recent 
years. 
5.5.2 Nationality Characteristics 
With which nationality of foreign partners do Taiwanese companies cooperate to form an 
international joint venture? In Table 5.5.4, the result shows that the major nationality of 
foreign partners is Japan, which accounts for 59.6% of total cases or over a half of total 
foreign partners. American partners present 19.3% of the sample, followed by Singapore 
which has 5.3% of the sample. 
Again, there are several cells with fewer than five percent, thus the nationality data is 
divided into five regions which are Japan, American, European countries, Asian countries 
and others. As shown in Table 5.5.5, Japan and other Asian countries together account 
for 67.5 % of total cases. The next is American which has 22 cases, 19.3 % of the 
sample. The third is European Countries which has 12 cases, 10.5% of the sample. 
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Table 5.5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Nationality of Foreign Partners 
Nationality Frequency Percent 
Japan 68 59.60 
American 22 19.30 
Singapore 6 5.30 
Holland 5 4.40 
United Kingdom 4 3.50 
France 3 2.60 
Hong Kong 3 2.60 
Others 3 2.60 
Total 114 100.00 
Table 5.5.5 Deccrintive Statistics of Recnnnlentc by Natinnnlity and Area 
Nationality Frequency Percent 
Japan 68 59.60 
American 22 19.30 
European countries 12 10.50 
Asian countries 9 7.90 
Others 3 2.60 
Total 114 100.00 
These results indicate that most international joint venture events in Taiwan are heavily 
involved with Asian countries. There are probably three main reasons. Firstly, because 
of the location, historical background and culture, Japan and other Asian countries have 
a higher percentage of foreign investments. Some of the leaders or chief executive 
officers have close relationship with the leader or managers of Japan's enterprises 
because they were educated in the Japanese education system in Taiwan or had studied 
in Japan in an earlier period. That experience helps the cooperation later on. 
Secondly, the cultural distance between Japan and Taiwan is low and both parent 
companies have built trust in their prior cooperation which in turn influences the 
opportunities for future investments. As Gill and Butler (2003) found, for the Japanese 
the main driver for joint venture stability is trust. They and some other researchers have 
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found that trust and personal relations are the key factors which influence future 
cooperation (Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay, 1996). Some other studies have also found that 
joint ventures with Japanese companies tend to last longer than ones between US or 
British partners. The above empirical study's results can provide an explanation of why 
Japanese enterprises have the highest proportion of foreign investments in Taiwan. 
Thirdly, most Taiwanese companies obtained technology or import machinery or 
components from Japan in an earlier period, they are used to Japanese products or are 
limited by Japanese's specifications of special key products; thus, they have to continue 
to cooperate with Japanese enterprises. 
Although Japanese enterprises have the highest proportion of foreign investment in 
Taiwan, other countries have increased their investments in recent ten years. For 
example, American partners represent the second highest proportion of foreign 
investment. As discussed in Chapter 2.4, American countries are the main and fastest 
growth area in terms of the amount of inbound foreign investment in Taiwan since 1998. 
5.5.3 Size of the Host Country Parents 
The host country parents represented in the sample varied in size, as measured by capital, 
sales volume and the number of employees. Based on the company's capital, the scale of 
host country parents is classified into four groups shown as Table 5.5.6. The greatest 
numbers of host country parents which hold capital from five hundred million NT dollars 
to five thousand million NT dollars represent 37.7 % of the sample. The second group 
of companies which holds capital of more than ten billions NT dollars constitutes 32.5% 
of the sample. The third group of companies holds capital of less than five hundred 
million NT dollars equals 15.8% of the sample. 
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Table 5.5.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Capital of Host Country Parents Hold 
Unit: NT$ million 
Capital 
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum Category Frequency Percent 
less than 500 million 18 15.8 
501 - 5,000 million 43 37.7 
16405.0 38962.1 10 330000 5,001 - 10,000 million 16 14.0 
more than 10,000 million 37 32.5 
Total 114 100 
According to the revised definition of small and medium enterprises promulgated by 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2000, the enterprise in the manufacturing industry with 
paid-in capital of less than NT$80 million or has regular employees numbering less than 
200 will be referred to as a small and medium enterprise(SME). The enterprise in the 
services industry which has sales volume less than NT$100 million in last year or less 
than 50 regular employees is defined as an SME. This means the company in the 
manufacturing industry which has more than 200 regular employees or a company in the 
service industry with more than 50 regular employees is classified as a big enterprise. 
Therefore, the results indicate that most of the international joint ventures occur within 
large companies in Taiwan. 
Based on the company's sales volume, the host country parents are also classified into 
four groups shown as Table 5.5.7. The largest group of host country parents which hold 
sales volumes of more than ten billions NT dollars represents 40.4% of the sample. The 
second group which achieves sales volumes from five hundred million NT dollars to five 
thousand million NT dollars presents 32.5 % of the sample. The smallest group which 
has sales volumes of less than five hundred million NT dollars amounts to 13.2% of the 
sample. Companies whose sales volumes are over five thousand million NT dollars 
represent in total 54.4%, or more than half the sample. These results also indicate that 




Table 5.5.7 Descriptive Statistics of Sales Volume of Host Country Parents 
Unit: NT$ million 
Business Volume 
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum Category Frequency Percent 
less than 500 million 15 13.2 
501 - 5,000 million 37 32.5 
23278.4 63468.5 16 485202 5,001 - 10,000 million 16 14.0 
more than 10,000 million 46 40.4 
Total 114 100 
The results of calculating the size of host country parents by the number of employees is 
shown in Table 5.5.8. The largest group of employees of more than one thousand 
people represents 41.2%, or two-fifths of the sample. The second group is 21.1% of the 
sample, with five hundreds to one thousand employees. The smallest group is 18.4% of 
the sample, with employees numbering less than two hundreds. Counted together 
companies with employees of more than five hundreds represent 62.3% of the sample. 
These results also indicate that most host country parents are big companies. 
T. d. le QG4 Tlacrr; n4i. ns Cro*; ct; rc of the Ah. mhpr of PmAl , %c of Anct Cnnntrv Parents 
Number o f employees 
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum Category Frequency Percent 
less than 200 21 18.4 
201-500 22 19.3 
2266.9 4624.1 20 31421 501-1000 24 21.1 
more than 1000 47 41.2 
Total 114 100 
With regard to capital, sales volume and the number of employees, these results show 
that most host country parents involved in international joint ventures are very successful 
companies which have a high reputation in Taiwan and that would be the reason why 
foreign companies choose them as partners. In addition, some studies have indicated 
that a firm's size may act as a proxy measure for the quantity of resources available 
(Glauster abd Buckley, 1997; Hill, Heang and Chan, 1990; Caves and Mehra, 1986). In 
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studying the characteristics of IJVs in Japan, Burton and Saelens (1982) found that 
larger firms tend to establish their first affiliates comparatively earlier than smaller 
companies. This implies that large Japanese firms had earlier access to sparsely available 
technology. Foreign partners may like to cooperate with firms who have different 
resources available to complement their own resources. In general, large firms have 
more ability to provide resources. This might explain the results of this study in that 
most Taiwanese parents are large companies. 
5.5.4 Ages of the Host Country Parents and the Joint Ventures 
Do the companies engaged in an international joint venture have long-standing history? 
From the empirical result shown in Table 5.5.9, the average age of host country parents 
is 32.9 years. Over half (60.5%) of the total number of host country parents have been 
established for more than 30 years. Only 5.3% of host country parents are less than 10 
years old. It is clear that the host country parents tend to be companies that have more 
business experience. 
Table 5.5.9 Descrintive Statistics of Ages of Host Crnmtrv Parents 
Ages of Host country parents 
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum Category Frequency Percent 
1-5 years 2 1.8 
6-10 years 4 3.5 
32 9 13 2 3 74 11-20 years 15 13.2 . . 21-30 years 24 21.1 
more than 30 years 69 60.5 
Total 114 100 
As described in Chapter 2.2, the government has strongly encouraged Taiwanese 
enterprises to cooperate with foreign investors and since 1954 has promulgated relative 
legal statutes to encourage foreign investment. These results indicate that most host 
country parents operate their company successfully and they have more resources and 
abilities to attract foreign investors to cooperate in an IN. This infers that the older the 
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company the more experiences and abilities it has, and in turn more opportunities to 
cooperate with foreign investors. 
Next we turn to look at the ages of the joint ventures. As shown in Table 5.5.10, the 
average age of a joint venture is 14.2 years. The greatest group is 35.1% of the sample, 
with ages of 11 to 20 years. The second group and third group have nearly equal 
percentage of the ages, 22.8% for the age from 6 to 10 years and 21.1% for the age from 
1 to 5 years. Over half (56.1%) of the total number of ventures were established for 
more than 10 years. Especially, 14 cases of ventures, 12.28% of the sample, were 
formed for more than 30 years. 
Tnh1e 55 10 Decerintive Stnticticc of Aaec of the Mint Ventnrec 
Ages of the Joint Venture 
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum Category Frequency Percent 
1-5 years 24 21.1 
6-10 years 26 22.8 
2 14 10 5 1 49 11-20 years 40 
35.1 
. . 21-30 years 10 8.8 
more than 30 years 14 12.3 
Total 114 100 
The ages of joint ventures represent the number of years that host country parents have 
cooperated with foreign parents. The older the joint venture, the longer their 
cooperation. From the literature, we know that international joint ventures are formed 
by more than two companies which have different cultures, objectives, and management 
styles, etc.; and this will cause a high failure rate (Dacin, Hitt and Levitas, 1997; Parkhe, 
1993; Kogut, 1989; Beamish, 1988). It is difficult to maintain the relationship when 
there is conflict between the partners. The age of joint ventures, imply that host country 
parents have very good relationships with foreign parents and these good relationships 
will affect opportunities for future cooperation with foreign companies. This result 
might explain a phenomenon that was found in this study during the sample identification, 
that one parent is involved in many international joint ventures. For example; the Uni- 
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President company participates in 18 international joint ventures. These results reveal 
that good relationships between the partners will affect cooperation in the future. 
5.5.5 Number of Board Members 
Prior researches have found that the number of board members in joint ventures will be 
affected by the equity share of joint ventures held by parents. The board directors serve 
as a communication and information processing channel between the parents and the 
child (or joint ventures). It is also the way that parents exert their control over the 
ventures. The number of board members represented by parents is shown in Table 
5.5.11, the mean score of the number of board members that the host country parents 
represent in the joint venture is 4.2 and 3.9 for foreign parents respectively. When 
counted by the percentages shown in Table 5.5.12, host country parents have 57% and 
foreign parents have 43%. The host country parents have a higher percentage of board 
members in joint ventures than foreign parents. The paired samples test shows that there 
is a significant difference in the percentage of board members in joint ventures between 
the host country parents and foreign parents. 
Tnh! 5511 Nnmher of RnnrA Memherc in Mint VPntnrPC RPnrecentM by Parents 
Parents No. Mean Std. Minimum Maximum 
Host country parents 114 5.2 2.2 0 13 
Forei parents 114 3.9 1.9 0 9 
TAM 55-12 Percentage of Board Members in Inint Ventures Renresented by Parents 





Percentage of Taiwanese parent represented in 
JV's board members 
0.57 0.18 
4033 4 113 0 0000 
Percentage of Foreign parent represented in . . 
N's board members 
0.43 0.18 
*p<0.05 
The findings reveal that host country parents have more seats on the board of directors 
of joint ventures. As discussed in Chapter 3, prior research results suggest that partners 
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can use participation in the joint venture's board of directors to exert effective control 
over the activities of the joint venture (Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang, 2001; Kumar and 
Seth, 1998; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Schaan, 1983). Therefore, this study infers that 
host country parents might have more control over the joint venture than foreign parents 
if they have to vote when different objectives and conflicts occurred among the parents. 
The relationship between the number of board members and control will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
In the majority of the sample, 70% of the total sample as shown in Table 5.5.13, most of 
the joint venture's general manager is Taiwanese. Researchers suggest that holding the 
key executive positions can ensure the parent's objectives be achieved (Jaussaud, 
Schaaper and Zhang, 2001; Child and Yan, 1999; Schaan, 1983). This result also implies 
that the host country parents might have greater control than its partners by having more 
general managers. 
Table 5.5.13 Descrintive Statistics of Nationality of 7V's General Manager 
Nationality of JV's general manager Frequency Percent 
Taiwanese 80 70.18 
Foreigner 34 29.82 
Total 114 100.00 
All the characteristics of the sample derived from this empirical survey are summarized in 
Table 5.5.14. 
Table 5.5.14 Descrintive Statistics of the Samnle rharacterisficc 
Variables Frequency Percent 
I d t G 
Manufacturing Group 85 74.6 
n us roup ry Service Group 29 25.9 
Japan 68 59.60 
American 22 19.30 
Nationality/ 
Region European countries 12 10.50 
Asian countries 9 7.90 
Others 3 2.60 
Capital less than 500 million 18 15.8 
501 - 5,000 million 43 37.7 
50,001 - 10,000 million 16 14.0 
190 
Chapter 5 
I Imore than 10,000 million 37 32.5 
Tah1e 55 14 Deccrintive Staticticc of the Samnle Characteristics (cnntinnedl 
Variables Frequency Percent 
less than 500 million 15 13.2 
l l 
501 - 5,000 million 37 32.5 
ume Sa es vo 50,001 - 10,000 million 16 14.0 
more than 10,000 million 46 40.4 
less than 200 21 18.4 
201-500 22 19.3 
Number of employees 501-1000 24 21.1 
more than 1000 47 41.2 
1-5 years 2 1.8 
6-10 years 4 3.5 
Ages of Host country parents 11-20 years 15 13.2 
21-30 years 24 21.1 
more than 30 years 69 60.5 
1-5 years 24 21.1 
6-10 years 26 22.8 
Ages of the joint ventures 11-20 years 40 35.1 
21-30 years 10 8.8 
more than 30 years 14 12.3 
Percentage of board Host country parents 0.57 
members in joint ventures Foreign parents 0.43 
Nationality of JV's general Taiwanese 80 70.18 
manager Foreigner 34 29.82 
In Table 5.5.14, a frequency distribution is obtained for all the sample's data or 
classification variables. The greatest number of parents of international joint ventures is 
present in the manufacturing group and most of the foreign partners come from Japan. 
According to the size of host country parents as measured by capital, sales volume, and 
the number of employees, it was found that most belong to big companies. About 60% 
of host country parents have been in business for over 30 years and only 5% of host 
country parents have run the business for less than 10 years. About 66% of international 
joint ventures have been established for over 10 years. Host country parents hold about 
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57% of board members in joint ventures and about 70% of the joint venture's general 
manager is Taiwanese. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter examines the methods associated with the empirical approach employed for 
this study. An overview of research processes which is described as a systematic and 
organized effort to investigate a, specific problem or issues (Cavana, Delahaye and 
Sekaran, 2001) has been demonstrated briefly first. 
Then the research design which specifies the procedures for collecting and analyzing the 
data has been explained properly. Research design involves a systematic plan which can 
guide the research to be employed. Sekaran (2003) outlines the research design into 
various critical topics which include the purpose of the study , types of 
investigation, 
extent of researcher interference, time horizon, study setting, unit of analysis, sampling 
design, measurement and measures, data collection method and data analysis. The 
research design of this study adopts Sekaran's model and each issue involved in the 
research design is described in the relevant sections. 
There are three basic types research, namely exploratory, descriptive and causal 
(hypothesis testing). The process of identifying and selecting the most appropriate 
research design for this study is driven by the nature of the research objectives. 
According to the purpose of this study which is to explain the relationships between 
motivation, contribution, ownership, bargaining power and control in international joint 
ventures, a descriptive study and hypotheses testing are employed in this study. 
The type of investigation of this study includes correlation and causal study. Because the 
aim of this study is first to delineate the important variables which are associated with 
control. If the variables are associated with control, then a causal relationship will be 
tested between the variables and control. Therefore, the correlation and causal study will 
be used in this study. 
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Sekaran (2003) indicates that the extent of interference by the researcher is depended on 
what kind of study is undertaken. This study is conducted in Taiwan by administering 
questionnaires to the companies, thus, the research interference was kept to the minimum. 
Business research can be conducted in non-contrived settings or contrived settings. 
Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran's (2001) describe the difference among a field study, a 
field experiment and a lab experiment which is based on the study undertaken in a 
particular environment. In this study, the survey of the sample of host country parents is 
undertaken by employing postal questionnaires. Hence, it is a field study in a non- 
contrived setting with minimal researcher interference. 
With regard to time, there are usually two kinds of study, ie. cross-sectional studies and 
longitudinal studies. The aim of longitudinal studies is to research the problem deeply by 
investigating the same situation or people several times over a period of time in which 
the problem runs its course. A cross-section study is a study that collects data just once 
over a period of days or weeks. Due to limited time and resources, this study is cross- 
sectional study and it is conducted to gather data using questionnaires in a single-time 
frame. 
The unit of analysis refers to the level of aggregation of the data collected during the 
subsequent data analysis stage (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001). The research 
objectives will determines the unit of analysis which can be shifted from individuals to 
groups, organizations and nations. In this study, the unit of analysis is Taiwanese parent 
companies who engage in the international joint ventures with the child (the joint venture) 
located in Taiwan. 
Basically, there are two types of sampling designs: probability and non-probability 
sampling. The often used and useful probability sampling is simple random, systematic, 
stratified, and cluster sampling. Non-probability sampling can be divided into the broad 
categories of convenience sampling and purposive sampling which includes judgment 
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sampling, snow ball sampling and quota sampling. In this study, the data is collected 
from the entire population because the sample is not very large relative to international 
joint ventures in Taiwan. In order to identify the population frame for this study, some 
procedures were conducted. A list of Taiwanese international joint venture enterprises 
was obtained by using two main sources: (a) the 1999/2000 edition of the Directory of 
Business Group in Taiwan, and (b) the 1999 edition of the Directory of Foreign 
Investing in Taiwan. A two-stage process was launched to identify the sample and a 
total of 227 cases were identified as the sample frame for this study. 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) define the measurement as the assignment of 
numerals to variables, properties, or events according to a prescribed set of rules where a 
rule is used to specify the procedure a researcher uses to assign numerals or numbers to 
objects or events. When a phenomenon cannot be observed directly, the researcher 
needs to use the operational definition to reduce the concepts so that a phenomenon can 
be measured in a tangible way. This study includes theoretical concepts of motivation, 
contribution, bargaining power, ownership and control. Therefore, the operational 
definition of each variable or construct is described first and then the measurements are 
developed. 
There are three main data collection methods which are interviewing, administering 
questionnaires, and observing people. All of them have advantages and disadvantages; 
the researcher has to choose the one which is the most appropriate for their study. 
Questionnaires are the most common method of collecting data and are a most useful 
method which can be administered either personally, mailed to the respondents, or 
electronically distributed (Sekaran, 2003). By considering the research objectives and 
the nature of each survey method, the mail questionnaire was chosen to collect primary 
data from host country parents. Questionnaire pre-testing was conducted to make sure 
that the questionnaire worked and yielded the data required for this study. After the pre- 
testing, a total of 227 questionnaires were sent out and 114 valid responses were 
received, representing a 50.22% effective response rate. 
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Data analysis of the questionnaire was carried out using the SPSS statistical package. 
The general procedures employed included descriptive statistics which include mean, 
median, mode, standard deviation and inferential statistics which include cross-tabulation, 
Chi-square test, t-test, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), correlations, regression 
analysis and factor analysis, etc. 
The goodness of measures can be obtained through the different kinds of validity and 
reliability. This study includes motivation, contribution, bargaining power, ownership 
and control constructs. Most constructs are measured by multi-questions except 
ownership. Thus the analysis of reliability and validity of motivation, contribution, and 
bargaining power are launched and the results were considered to be good. 
After data was collected from the sample, the next step was to analyze them. The unit of 
analysis in this study is a firm. Thus, the characteristics of companies are analyzed in 
order to get a feel for the data. The company's profiles include the industry in which 
they are involved, the size as measured by capital, sales volume and the number of 
employees, the ages of the parents and the ventures and finally the number of board 
members. The results reveal that the greatest number of parents of international joint 
ventures is involved in the manufacturing group and most of its foreign partners are from 
Japan. The size of host country parents measured by the capital, sales volume, and the 
number of employees indicates that most are big companies. Most host country parents 
have run the business for over 30 years and most of international joint ventures have 
existed for over 10 years. Host country parents hold about 57% of board members in 
joint ventures and in about 70% of the joint ventures, the general manager is Taiwanese. 
This study includes five main dimensions; (a) control, (b) ownership, (c) bargaining 
power, (d) contribution, and (e) motivation. Each dimension will be examined first and 
the relationship between these dimensions and the sample characteristics will be tested in 













DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF CORE 
RESEARCH DIMENSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
According the research framework proposed in Chapter 4, there are five core research 
dimensions in this study which are control, ownership, bargaining power, contribution 
and motivation. Following the research design steps indicated in Chapter 5, the data was 
collected from this empirical survey of Taiwanese international joint ventures. The 
purpose of this chapter is to begin the analysis of the data and also to describe the 
general descriptive results. Each core research dimension is examined in its empirical 
results and its relationship with the characteristics of the sample. Three sections are 
organized in this chapter. Section 6.2 describes the descriptive analysis of each core 
research dimension. The characteristics of the sample encompass nationality or region, 
industry, size of the host country parents, ages of the host country parents and the joint 
ventures, and the number of board members in the joint ventures. Section 6.3 
demonstrates the important results derived from each core research dimension of this 
empirical survey and provides a brief conclusion. 
6.2 Descriptive Analysis of Core Research Dimensions 
This study consists of five core dimensions viz, control, ownership, bargaining power, 
contribution and motivation. As described in chapter 5.3.10, descriptive statistics are 
used to express the most fundamental characteristics of variables before doing inferential 
statistics. Sekaran (2003) also indicates that one of objectives of data analysis is getting 
a feel for the data which can help the researcher have a basic understanding of the data 
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derived from an empirical survey. Therefore, this section starts to analysis each core 
research dimension and their relationship with the characteristics of the sample. 
6.2.1 The Control of International Joint Ventures 
Control is a crucial core dimension in this study. The perspective of this section is to 
present the empirical results of the nature of control exercised by Taiwanese parent 
companies over the joint ventures. From relevant literature, three constructs have been 
identified to describe the control of international joint venture (Geringer and Hebert, 
1989). They are the mechanism of control, the extent of control and the focus of control. 
Thus, the first subsection starts to present the joint venture activities over which the host 
country parents exert control. The second subsection describes what kinds of 
mechanisms are employed by parents over the activities of the joint ventures. The third 
subsection examines the extent to which the host country parents have control compared 
with foreign parents, and to classify the type of control. The final subsection elucidates 
the relationship between the control and characteristics of the sample. 
6.2.1.1 Focus of Control 
From the review of the prior literature, the parents can seek control over the whole range 
of a joint venture's activities or instead concentrate on controlling specific activities of a 
joint venture. Killing (1983)identifies nine decisions in terms of product design, pricing 
policy, production scheduling, manufacturing process, quality control, replacement of 
managers, sales targets, cost budgeting and capital expenditures. He uses six categories 
to investigate whether each decision is made by the general manager alone, by the local 
parent alone, by the foreign parent alone, by the N general manager with input from the 
local parent, by the JV general manager with input from the foreign parent, or by the N 
general manager with input from both parents. 
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This study adopts Killing's scale by asking host country parents to assess decisions, but a 
question about the replacement of managers is not included. Eight categories are utilised 
including Killing's six categories plus another two categories which are decisions made 
by both parents and not applicable in any case. 
The results are shown in Table 6.2.1.1. Most of the decisions relating to production 
scheduling, manufacturing processes, quality standards, and cost budgeting are taken by 
the joint ventures alone, especially they have nearly 50% of the decision-making on 
production scheduling; however, on the other side, they have the lowest percentage on 
the decision of capital expenditures, only 0.88% of the sample. 29.82% of foreign 
parents in the sample took the decision regarding product design and actively exercise 
control on the product design decision. This might be because most of the foreign 
parents regard product design as their area of expertise and competitive advantage. 
Tol. ln A911 Tlnricinn_Týifelrinn of PV'c (lnpritino Artih, tinc Mar1r+}Kv Whnm 
Your Foreign JV alone Your Co. Your Foreign Your Co. Not 
company Partner & foreign company Partner & foreign applicable 
alone alone partner & JV & JV partner & 
iv 
NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % 
1. Product design 12 10.53 34 29.82 15 13.16 30 26.32 11 9.65 11 9.65 1 0.88 0 0.00 
2. Pricing policy 14 12.281 8 7.02 25 21.93 22 19.30 26 22.81 15 13.16 4 3.51 0 0.00 
3. Production 
2 1.75 2 1.75 53 46.49 0 0.00 12 10.53 11 9.65 0 0.00 34 29.82 
scheduling 
Manufacturing 
3 2.63 2 1.75 36 31.58 2 1.75 16 14.04 19 16.67 2 1.75 34 29.82 
process 
5. Quality 
10 8.77 24 21.05 39 34.21 12 10.53 15 13.16 13 11.40 1 0.88 0 0.00 
standards 
Cost budgeting 8 7.02 1 0.88 40 35.09 7 6.14 35 30.70 18 15.79 5 4.39 0 0.00 
Sales targets 12 10.53 0 0.00 6 5.26 25 21.93 26 22.81 14 12.28 31 27.19 0 0.00 
8. Capital 14 12.28 0 0.00 1 0.88 39 34.21 6 5.26 3 2.63 51 44.74 0 0.00 
expenditures 
However, these results reveal that both parents exercise their control more on the sales 
targets and capital expenditure decisions. This may be because these two decisions 
largely involve the financial investment and performance of joint ventures. It may be 
presumed that parents focussing their control on particular activities of the joint venture 
partly reflect the parent's concerns and their competencies. For example, when foreign 
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parents took more responsibility on a product design decision, it could mean that they 
are more concerned about the issue and have more competence on product design. 
Next, we calculate the frequencies of operational decision-making activities made by host 
country parents, foreign parents or joint ventures. The results are shown in Table 6.2.1.2 
reveal that host country parents have an extremely high percentage on capital 
expenditure decisions and foreign parents also attach the most importance to this. On 
the other hand, joint ventures have extremely high percentage on decision-making, on 
production scheduling and manufacturing processes. This might be because these two 
activities are highly related to the joint venture's environment and have to fit the joint 
venture's daily operating strategies. 
Tnh1P A212 17ecicinn_Mnkino of IV'c (lnerntinv Artivitipc Mar h by Whnm 
Host count parents Foreign parents Joint venture 
No % No % No % 
1. Product design 54 47.37 76 66.67 38 33.33 
2. Pricing policy 66 57.89 49 42.98 70 61.40 
3. Production scheduling 14 12.28 13 11.40 76 66.67 
. Manufacturin processes 23 20.18 25 21.93 
73 64.04 
5. li standards 38 33.33 50 43.86 68 59.65 
6. Cost budgeting 55 48.25 31 27.19 98 85.96 
7. Sales targets 94 82.46 70 61.40 77 67.54 
. 
8. Cap ital expenditure, 110 96.49 93 81.58 61 53.51 
The descriptive results indicate the decision-making on N's operating activities influence 
a broad set of controls. But there are some differences among host country parents, 
foreign parents and the joint ventures. The host country parents perceive decision- 
making responsibility in terms of capital expenditure and sales targets activities, whereas 
foreign parents take more responsibility for production design decisions. Other decisions 
regarding production scheduling, manufacturing processes, cost budgets, pricing policy, 
and quality standards are taken by varying combinations of parents and joint ventures, 
but most of these decisions are taken primarily by joint ventures. 
Consistent with the evidence of control in relevant studies, these findings are confirmed 
Schaan (1983), Geringer (1986), Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Glaister's (1994) 
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suggest that parents tend to seek control over particular activities rather than over the 
whole range of a joint venture's activities. From the above analysis, one can conclude 
that the joint venture's parents concentrate on controlling specific activities instead of 
controlling all the activities of the joint ventures. 
6.2.1.2 Mechanism of Control 
Child and Yan's (1999) research results suggest that parents could exercise effective 
control through the appointment of board members and key executive positions. 
Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang (2001) also suggest that partners could use several 
mechanisms to exert effective control over the activities of joint ventures, for example, 
active participation in the joint venture's board of directors or by holding key function 
directorship positions. Killing (1983) uses the responsibility for the appointment of high- 
level management to measure the mechanisms of control over joint ventures. This study 
adopts Killing's scale by asking host country parents to assess the responsibility for the 
appointment of high-level managers. 
The results are shown in Table 6.2.1.3. In this study, about one-third of host country 
parents appointed the general manager by themselves, and just over 30% of foreign 
parents were responsible for the general manager appointments. But on the other hand, 
more than one-third of the general managers were appointed by both parents. None of 
the general managers were appointed by the joint ventures. 
These findings are very reasonable, when the parents make the agreement to form a new 
company, they have taken into consideration who is going to take all the responsibility 
for the joint ventures and how to make sure the joint venture could achieve the parent's 
objectives. Basically, the general manager is the main decision maker in the joint venture 
company, and he also acts as the communication bridge to the parent companies. Thus, 
the general manager is always appointed by the host country parents or foreign parents 
or even both partners. 
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These findings concur with Child and Yan (1999) and Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang 
(2001), who suggest that the parents use the appointment of the joint venture's board of 
directors to control the venture. On the basis of the above discussion, one concludes 
that the parents exercise effective control through the appointment of key executive 
members of the joint ventures. 
Tnh1P r, I1 '1 Annnintment of Niuh-T. evel Management of Joint Ventures Made by Whom 
Your Foreign JV Your Co. Your Foreign Your Co. Not 
company Partner alone & company. Partner & applicabl 
alone alone foreign & JV & JV foreign e 
partner. partner 
&JV 
NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % 
1. General manager 39 34.21 35 30.70 0 0.00 40 35.09 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. Vice general 48 42.11 3 2.63 29 25.44 29 25.44 1 0.88 2 1.75 1 0.88 1 0.88 
manager 
3. Production g 7.02 7 6.14 30 26.32 6 5.26 17 14.91 12 10.53 0 0.00 34 29.82 
manager 
4. Marketing 10 8.77 4 3.51 69 60.53 7 6.14 15 13.16 9 7.89 0 0.00 0 0.00 
manager 
5. Financial 37 32.46 4 3.51 33 28.95 16 14.04 19 16.67 4 3.51 1 0.88 0 0.00 
manager 
6. Personnel 
10 8.77 3 2.63 70 61.40 6 5.26 17 14.91 8 7.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 
manager 
7. R&D manager 6 5.26 20 17.54 20 17.54 11 9.65 10 8.77 11 9.65 0 0.00 36 31.58 
8. Head engineer 2 1.75 6 5.26 45 39.47 0 0.00 9 7.89 5 4.39 0 0.00 47 41.23 
However, Table 6.2.1.3, shows that most of the vice general managers were appointed 
by the host country parents, i. e. 42 % of the sample. Either the parents or the joint 
venture are responsible for the vice general manager appointment with the same 
percentage, at 25.44%. The foreign parents have the lowest percentage regarding the 
appointment of the vice general manager. These results indicate that the appointment of 
the vice general manager is not always so important to the foreign parents if the general 
managers originate from the foreign parents. Another possible reason might be the 
control mechanism must be finely balanced between the host country parents and the 
foreign partners and they had agreements that the general managers were appointed by 
foreign partners and the vice general managers originated from host country parents. 
Normally, the vice general managers have to take more responsibility on local markets or 
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operational issues, therefore the vice general managers have to be more familiar with 
local markets or dealing with daily operations. Thus, the vice general managers were 
better appointed by host country parents who are familiar with local environments. 
According to the above discussion, host country parents were positively and strongly 
associated with the appointment of vice general managers. In addition, vice general 
managers were more focused on the operational matters of the joint ventures. 
Accordingly, the joint ventures also took more responsible for the vice general manager 
appointment. 
Table 6.2.1.4 Appointment of High Level Management of Joint Ventures Made by Parents and Joint 
Ventures 
Taiwanese parent Forei Parent Joint Venture 
No % No % No % 
1. General manager 79 69.30% 75 65.79% 0 0.00% 
2. Vice general manager 79 69.91% 35 30.97% 33 29.20% 
3. Production manager 31 38.75% 25 31.25% 59 73.75% 
Marketing manager 32 28.07% 20 17.54% 93 81.58% 
5. Financial manager 73 64.04% 25 21.93% 57 50.00% 
. Personnel manager 33 28.95% 17 14.91% 95 83.33% 
R&D manager 27 34.62% 42 53.85% 41 52.56% 
8. Head engineer 11 16.42% 11 16.42% 59 88.06% 
Table 6.2.1.4, considers the key function directors but except the general and vice 
general managers, it shows that the host country parents command stronger control over 
the appointment of financial directors. This result is consistent with the findings in Table 
6.2.1.2, where it reveals that Taiwan headquarters also have stronger power over the 
capital expenditure decisions. Both findings shown in Table 6.2.1.4 and Table 6.2.1.2 
indicate that the host country parents had high intervention in capital expenditure 
decisions and the appointment of financial directors in their invested company. One 
possible reason that could explain this phenomenon is that fiscal affairs are an important 
issue for the host country parents to estimate the performances of their subsidiaries and 




In the appointment of R&D managers, we also find that the foreign parents have stronger 
control on this issue; additionally, they also have stronger control in the decision-making 
regarding product design which is explained in the above section. One possible reason is 
that foreign parents have better professional skills and superiority in competition of 
production design and research. Therefore, they master a stronger control in R&D. 
On the other aspect, the joint ventures have more power in production, marketing, and 
the appointment of personnel managers and head engineers. This means that the joint 
venture has more autonomy in these areas. One possible reason is that these positions 
involve daily operating actions, and it is more appropriate to let the subsidiary companies 
deal with this matter, because they require someone who has more practical experience 
in the operational activities of the company. These results concur with the result of Van 
Den Bulcke (1986) who finds that the subsidiary has more autonomy on the matter of 
production and personnel management, but has less autonomy on financial issues 
From the above analysis, one can conclude that most parents appoint personnel to the 
general manager and vice general manager positions. The purpose of this is to ensure 
that the policies of the joint venture are followed up and are well practiced by the 
subsidiary company. From this empirical survey, it is clear that host country parents 
command stronger control over the appointment of general managers, vice general 
managers, and financial managers. 
However, the foreign parents are the most active in the appointment of R&D managers 
and general managers. The joint venture companies have more autonomy on the 
appointment in terms of production, marketing, personnel managers and head engineers. 
Schaan (1983) argues that parents might choose to exercise control over a relatively 
broader or narrower scope of the joint venture's activities. Geringer and Hebert (1989) 
note that effective control should emphasize selective control over some important 
dimensions rather than attempting to control the entire range of joint venture's activities. 
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Again, these findings have supported the results suggested by Schaan (1983), Geringer 
(1986), Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Glaister's (1994) that the joint venture's 
partners tend to seek control over particular activities of the joint ventures rather than 
over the whole range of the joint venture's activities. 
6.2.1.3 Extent of Control 
Killing (1983) defines control in terms of the decision-making role of joint venture 
management and identifies three types of control, namely, dominant parent, share and 
independent control. Wu (1994) and Chang (1996) revise the method of clarification of 
control used by Killing and clarify four kinds of control in their studies, namely, 
dominant host parent, dominant foreign parent, shared management and independent 
control. This study adopts Wu (1994) and Chang's (1996) classification to represent the 
extent of control. 
According to following equations and the identification method described in chapter 
5.3.8.1.2, the type of control is classified into the following four categories, dominant 
Taiwanese parent, dominant foreign parent, shared management and independent control. 
The score of Taiwanese parent =E S1j+ 1/2E S4J +1/2E S5j +1/3Z Sij 
The score of foreign parent =E S2j + 1/2E S4j +1/2E S6j +1/3E Sr 
The score of joint venture =E S3J+ 1/2E S5J + 1/2E S66 + 1/3E S7J 
S1 to S7 represent the possibilities of decision maker. 
j stands for the items of important decisions, j=1,2,....., 9 
The results shown in Table 6.2.1.5 compare the percentage of decision-making activities 
among host country parents, foreign parents and joint ventures. The results show that 
"Independent control" has the highest percentage, at 42.12%; the next is "Dominant 
Taiwanese parent control" at 30.7% of the sample. "Dominant foreign parent control" 
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accounts for 24.6% of the sample. "Shared management control" has the lowest 
percentage which is only 3.5%. 
Tnh1e 6715 Tvne of Cnntrnl Identified by T)ecicinn_Malcino of the Mint Ventrpe 
Decision-making Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Dominant Taiwanese parent control 35 30.7 30.7 
Dominant Foreign parent control 28 24.6 55.3 
Independent control 47 41.2 96.5 
Share management control 4 3.5 100 
Total 114 100 100 
On the other hand, as shown in Table 6.2.1.6, comparing the appointment of high-level 
managers among host country parents, foreign parents and joint venture, we also find 
that "Independent control "has the highest percentage at 49.1% of the sample. The 
second is "Dominant Taiwanese parent control" with 28.9%. "Dominant foreign parent 
control" represents 20.2% of the sample. The lowest is "Shared management control", 
which is only 1.8%. 
Table 6.2.1.6 Type of Control Identified by the Appointment of High-Level Managers of the Joint 
Venture-, 
Appointment of high-level manager Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Dominant Taiwanese parent control 33 28.9 28.9 
Dominant Foreign parent control 23 20.2 49.1 
Independent control 56 49.1 98.2 
Share management control 2 1.8 100 
Total 114 100 100 
These results regarding the types of control identified by the appointment of high-level 
managers are very similar to the results identified by decision-making in the joint 
venture's activities. But the factors of "Dominant Taiwanese parent control" and 
"Dominant Foreign parent control" have a slightly lower percentage when based on the 




Because the number of "Shared management control" has fewer than five observations, it 
could not be tested by inferential statistical analysis. To overcome this analysis problem, 
the data is reclassified into three types of control according to who has the power to 
appoint the general manager. If the joint venture's general manager is appointed by the 
host country parents, in this case it is re-classified to "Dominant Taiwanese parent 
control". Using the same criteria, if the type of control in decision-making and the 
appointment of the high-level manager of the joint venture is re-categorized, the results 
are shown in Table 6.2.1.7. 
T.. l. ln A111 Tvrt of rnntrnl nApr Do-Anccifit' tine 
Type of Control 
Decision-making of 
operating activities 
Appointment of high-level 
managers 
Frequency Percent Freuen Percent 
Dominant Taiwanese parent control 37 32.5 34 29.8 
Dominant Foreign parent control 30 26.3 24 21.1 
Independent control 47 41.2 56 49.1 
Total 114 100 114 100 
From the empirical results shown in Table 6.2.1.7, "Independent control' has the highest 
score on both decision-making of operating activities and the appointment of high-level 
managers with 41.2% and 49.1% respectively. "Dominant Taiwanese parent control' 
has about 30% of the sample and "Dominant foreign parent control" has just over 25 
percent of the sample on decision-making of operating activities and around 20% on 
high-level manager's appointment. 
Previous empirical studies indicate that the parents work as "partners" with their joint 
ventures and seek to control particular activities which they perceive to be critical issues. 
These results are not consistent with some prior studies and some other studies have 
different conclusions on this issue (Glaister, 1994; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer, 
1986; Schaan, 1983). The results are puzzling. There are some possible explanations. 
One possible explanation might be that the different research context resulted in a 
different management culture in toward their subsidiaries. 
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Another possible explanation might be assigned to the measurement of control. As 
argued by Chang (1996), Killing (1983) deems the importance of each decision is equal, 
but Chang argues that control is not a dichotomous context, it is a continuant idea. 
Parents seek to control particular activities which they perceive as critical dimensions. 
Therefore, each decision or activity should be weighted by its importance. This study 
uses a different method to measure the extent of control by modifying Killing's method 
and considering the weighting of each activity in which the parents and the joint venture 
are involved at the same time. 
In addition, another possible reason might explain the different results. The joint venture 
is an independent organization, it has its own objectives and management structures even 
though the parents are involved in some important decisions. The joint venture still has 
to be responsible for all the results of its activities. As most joint ventures have been 
viable for more than 10 years, this might encourage the parents to have trust and credit 
them to have more autonomy. On the basis of the above analysis, one could conclude 
that in most international joint ventures in Taiwan, the joint venture has high autonomy 
to manage the company. 
6.2.1.4 The Analysis of Variance between Control and Sample Characteristics 
The main goals of this subsection are to analyze the variance between the type of control 
and the sample characteristic derived from this survey. The sample characteristics 
include nationality or region, industry, size and the age of host country parents, and the 
number of board members represented in the joint ventures. Tests are approached using 
appropriate statistical techniques. 
6.2.1.4.1 Nationality /Regions 
Logically, different nationalities of foreign parents are expected to exert different types 
of control in their respective joint ventures. Child et al. (1994b) found in their study of 
IJV'S in China, Hungary, America, Germany, and Japan that foreign parents of different 
nationalities tend to exercise control over different activities of joint vestures. For 
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example, they found that Chinese managers focus more on the production targets of joint 
ventures. From a study of UK joint ventures with partners from Western Europe, USA 
and Japan, Glaister (1995) finds that American parent companies tend to have tighter 
control than European or Japanese companies. Osland (1994), in studying the US-China 
joint venture's performance, also found that the nationality of foreign partners will affect 
the extent of control in joint ventures. Thus, it is assumed that the nationality of foreign 
parents will affect the types of control they exercise over their joint ventures (Glaister, 
1995; Osland, 1994; Child et al, 1994b) 
The results of this survey are shown in Table 6.2.1.8, based on the type of control 
identified by decision-making. We find that when the foreign parents are from Singapore, 
the host country parents have tighter control over the joint ventures. The foreign parents 
from Hong Kong and Holland have less control over the joint ventures. French foreign 
parents have tighter control over their joint ventures. When the foreign partners are 
from the United Kingdom, it shows that either "Dominant foreign parent control" or 
"Independent control" is adopted by the foreign parents. 
When the foreign partners are from Japan and America which represent most of the cases 
in the sample, there is not a big difference among these three types of control but 
"Independent control" has a slightly higher preponderance than another two types of 
control. For example, in the case of Japan which represents the largest proportion of this 
sample the results show that when the foreign partner is Japanese, the type of control 
leans more to "Independent control" and followed by "Dominant Taiwanese parent 
control' and less toward "Dominant Foreign parent control. " 
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Tah1P Al 1R Crncs_tahnlatinn of the Tvne of Control identified by Decisinn_Makino and Natinnality 
Type of Control Identified by Decisi -making 






Japan 22(32.35%) 19(27.94%) 27(39.71%) 68 
America 8(36.36%) 5(22.731/o) 9(40.911/o) 22 
United Kingdom 0(0.00. /. ) 2(50.001/o) 2(50.00%) 4 
Hong Kon 1(33.33%) 0(0.000/0) 2(66.67%) 3 
Singapore 5(83.33%) 0(0.00%) 1(16.67%) 6 
Holland 1(20.00%) l(20.00%) 3(60.00%) 5 
Others 0(0.00%) 1(33.33%) 2(66.67%) 3 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(2 6.32% 47(41.23%) 114 
The results are very fragmentary. It might be because some foreign parents only 
represent few of the examples in this survey, excepting Japan and American. Therefore, 
from these findings it is not possible make a clear conclusion on the relationship between 
the type of control and the foreign parent's nationality. 
Since some of the cells have less than 5 samples, some tests could not be performed. 
This study regroups the countries into three regions according to geographical features 
and the new result is shown in Table 6.2.1.9. The results are very similar to Table 
6.2.1.8. 
Table 6.2.1.9 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and Regions 
T nrntinn of FnrPion Partin-rc 
Type of Control i dentified by Decision-making 







Asian countries 28(3 6.36% 19(24.68%) 30(38.96%) 77 
American countries 8 36.36% 5(22.731/o) 9(40.911/o) 22 
European countries 1(6.67%) 6(401/o) 8(53.33%) 15 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.321/o) 47(41.23%) 114 
Chi-Square= 5.4230 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.2466 
After regrouping, the Chi-Square test could be performed and the null hypothesis (Ho) 
and alternative hypotheses (Hl) is presented as follows. 




Hl: The origin of its foreign parents and the type of control identified by decision-making 
is associated 
The value of statistic is 5.423 and the significance is great than 0.05, so the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected. One could conclude that there is no significant difference 
between the country of origin of foreign parents and the type of control identified in 
relation to decision-making. 
Same analytical processes are utilised to test the relationship between the type of control 
in relation to the appointment of high-level managers for the joint ventures and the 
nationalities of foreign parents. From Table 6.2.1.10, the results are very similar to the 
results which are described with respect to the type of control identified by decision- 
making of international joint ventures. But apart from these results, France has the 
highest control over its joint ventures in terms of the appointment of high-level managers. 
The two main sources of countries of foreign investment in Taiwan, Japan and America 
still have a higher proportion on "Independent control", followed by "Dominate 
Taiwanese parent control" and have least on "Dominate foreign parent control'. United 
Kingdom is split equally on "Dominate foreign parent control" and "Independent 
control. " 
Table 6.2.1.10 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
and Natinnality of Fnreivn Partners 
Type of Control identifi ed by High-level Ma ger Appointment 






Japan 21 (30.88%) 15(22.06%) 32(47.06%) 68 
American 7(31.82%) 4(18.181/o) 11(50.00%) 22 
United Kingdom 0(0.000/. ) 2(50.00%) 2(50.00%) 4 
France 0 0.00% 3(100.00%) 0(0.00%) 3 
Hong Kong 1(33.33%) 0(0.00%) 2(66.671/o) 3 
Singapore 4(6.67%) 0(0.00%) 2(33.33%) 6 
Holland 1(20.00%) 0(0.00%) 4(80.00%) 5 
Others 0(0.000/0) 0(0.000/. ) 3 100.00% 3 
Total 34(29.821/o) 24(21.05%) 56(49.121/o) 114 
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Because some of cells have less than five examples, countries have again been regrouped 
into three regions. After regrouping the sample the results shown in Table 6.2.1.11 are 
very similar to the table above. The main source regions of foreign investors, Asian 
countries and American countries have a higher proportion on "Independent control" 
followed by "Dominant Taiwanese parent control". In contrast, European countries 
have the highest proportion of "Independent control" comparing with Asian countries 
and American countries, followed by "Dominant Foreign parent control'. The reason 
might be the distance as described before. Therefore, parents from European countries 
let their joint ventures have more autonomy or they exercise "Dominant foreign parent 
control" over their joint ventures. 
After regrouping the sample, the Chi-Square test was performed. The value of 
statistic is 4.8315 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, one could conclude 
that the type of control identified by appointment of high-level managers to international 
joint ventures and regional location of foreign parents is independent. 
Table 6.2.1.11 Cross tabulation of Type of Control Identified by High-level Manager Appointment and 
Regions Location of Foreign Partners 
Type of Control identified by High-level Ma ager Appointment 







Asian countries 26(33.771/o) 15(19.48%) 36(46.75%) 77 
American countries 7 31.82% 4(18.18%) 11(50.00%) 22 
European countries 1(6.67%) 5(33.33%) 9(60.00%) 15 
Total 34 29.82% 24(21.050/"0) 56(49.121/o) 114 
Chi-Scare= 4.8315 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.3050 
From the Chi-Square test, it is therefore concluded that nationalities or regional location 
of foreign parents is not associated with the type of control, or the control which is 
identified by decision-making of operating activities and the appointment of high-level 
managers of international joint ventures. 
These results are not consistent with Child and Glaister's results that the nationalities of 
foreign parents have different preferences on the joint venture's control. However, from 
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this empirical investigation, we find when the foreign parents come from Asian and 
American countries, the joint ventures have higher autonomy. One possible explanation 
is the foreign parents from Asia and America have long term cooperative experiences and 
a close relationship with the host country parents, thus they have replicated their 
management procedures in Taiwanese companies. Therefore, they have the trust and the 
confidence to let the joint ventures have more autonomy. In fact, in Taiwan, most 
company's management skills are learned and replicated from American and Japanese 
companies. Thus, in the Taiwan context, the nationalities of foreign partners do not 
affect the type of control exercised over the joint ventures. 
6.2.1.4.2 Industry 
The relationship between the industry that host country parents involved and the type of 
control identified by decision-making and high-level manager appointment are tested. 
The same analytical processes as described above are employed for all the following 
subsections. In order to launch the Chi-square test for the industry variable, it is 
classified into two industry groups, namely manufacturing and service. The result from 
the Chi-square test relating to the industry group of host country parents, and the type of 
control identified by decision-making is represented in Table 6.2.1.12. 
Both of the industry groups of the host country parents have the greatest number of 
"Independent control", however, the service group has slightly higher percentage than 
manufacturing group. The value of y is 1.3216 and the significance is great than 0.05; 
therefore, it is concluded that the industry groups of the host country parents is not 
associated with the type of control identified by decision-making. 
Table 6.2.1.12 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and the Industry 
Groups of the Host Country Parents Involved 
of Control identified by Decision-making 
- 
Type 







Manufacturing group 30(35.291/o) 22(25.881/o) 33(38.82%) 85 
Service group 7(24.141/o) 8(27.59%) 14(48.28%) 29 
Total 37(32.461/o) 30(26.32%) 47(41.23%) 114 
Chi-Scare=1.3216 D. F. =2 Significance= 0.5164 
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With regard to the type of control identified by the appointment of high-level managers 
and the industry group of host country parents, the output from a Chi-square test is 
depicted in Table 6.2.1.13. The results also show that both industry groups of host 
country parents have the greatest number of "Independent control". Also, host country 
parents from the service industry have the highest percentage on the "Independent 
control". The value of x2 is 4.19 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the industry groups of the Taiwanese parents is not associated with the 
type of control identified by a high-level manager appointment. 
Table 6.2.1.13 Cross- tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-level Manager Appointment 
and the Industry Groups of the Host Country Parents Involved 
Type of Control identified by High4evcl Manager Appointment 







Manufacturing group 28(32.94%) 20(23.53%) 37(43.53%) 85 
Service group 6(20.69%) 4(13.79%) 19(65.52%) 29 
Total 34(29.82%) 24(21.051/o) 56(49.12%) 114 
Chi-Square=4.1900 D. F. =2 Significance= 0.12 31 
On the basic analysis of the Chi-Square test, one could conclude that the industry group 
of the host country parents is not associated with the type of control identified by 
decision-making of operating activities or the appointment of high-level managers of 
international joint ventures. However, host country parents in the service industry have a 
higher percentage on the "Independent control" than those in the manufacturing group. 
6.2.1.4.3 Size of the Host Country Parents 
In this subsection, werconduct an analysis on whether the size of the host country parents 
would affect the type of control over the joint venture. The size of the host country 
parents encompasses the three variables of capital, sales volume and the number of 
employees. The relationship between the type of control and these variables is explained 
in detail. Firstly, we conduct an analysis of the relationship between the Taiwanese 
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parent's capital and the type of control related to decision-making. The output from the 
Chi-square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.14. 
Table 6.2.1.14 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and the Capital 
of Host Country Parents 
Type of Control identified by Decision-making Capin 







less than 500 million 6(33.33%) 3 16.67% 9(50.00%) 18 
501- 5,000 million 10(23.26%) 11(25.580/o) 22(51.16%) 43 
5,001 - 10,000 million 5(31.25%) 6 37.501/6 5(31.25%) 16 
more than 10,000 million 16(43.24%) 10(27.031/6) 11(29.730/o) 37 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.32%) 47(41.230/o) 114 
Chi-Scare=6.8110 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.3387 
As to the results in Table 6.2.1.14, the value of j is 6.811 and the significance is greater 
than 0.05; therefore, it is concluded that the Taiwanese parent's capital was not 
associated with the type of control identified by decision-making. 
But even though the result is not significant, there is a trend showing that host country 
parents who invest higher capital appear to exercise the "Dominant Taiwanese parent 
control" more than others. On the other hand, the companies who provide less capital 
tend to let their joint ventures have more autonomy. Where the host country parents 
input higher capital this normally signifies that they have more resources and abilities to 
manage the business by themselves. When they form international joint ventures with 
foreign partners, they have their special strategic motivations. Therefore, this study 
infers that at the time when they are exercising higher control over the joint venture, this 
means that they are ensuring that their strategic objectives are observed and achieved. 
Next, we conduct an analysis between the Taiwanese parent's capital and the type of 
control identified by the appointment of high-level managers. The output from Chi- 
square test is presented in Table 6.2.1.15. 
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Table 6.2.1.15 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
ýn. i the (`antat of Hnct rniintrv Parente 
Type of Control identified by High-level Manage r Appointment Capital 








less than 500 million 7 38.89% 4(22.221/o) 7(38.89%) 18 
501 - 5,000 million 8(18.60%) 8(18.60%) 27(62.79%) 43 
5,001 - 10,000 million 5(31.25%) 5(31.25%) 6(37.50%) 16 
more than 10,000 million 14(37.840/o) 7(18.92%) 16(43.24%) 37 
Total 34(29.82%) 24(21.05%) 56(49.121/o) 114 
Chi-Square--6.8422 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.3357 
The value of is 6.8422 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the Taiwanese parent's capital is not associated with the type of control 
in relation to the appointment of high-level managers. 
Although the result is not significant and very similar to the result of analysis conducted 
on the decision-making of operating activities, there reveals part of a different trend. 
Table 6.2.1.15 shows that at the time when Taiwanese parent's capital increase, the type 
of "Independent control' is exercised more, but there is an exception when the 
companies who are in the NT$ 501-5,000 million capital group have the highest 
percentage on "Independent control". 
Secondly, we conducted an analysis between the Taiwanese parent's sales volume and 
the type of control identified in relation to decision-making. The output from the Chi- 
square test is presented in Table 6.2.1.16. 
Table 6.2.1.16 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and the Sales 
Volume of Host Country Parents 
Type of Control on Decision-Makin Sales Volume 







less than 500 million 4(26.67%) 4(26.67%) 7(46.671/o) 15 
501 - 5,000 million 5(13.51%) 10(27.03%) 22(59.461/o) 37 
5,001 - 10,000 million 8(50.00%) 4(25.00%) 4(25.001/o) 16 
more than 10,000 million 20(43.48%) 12(26.09%) 14(30.43%) 46 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.32(/1o) 47(41.23%) 114 
Chi-Square=12.9163 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.0444* 
3 cells (250/16) have expected count less than 5. 
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From the analysis of Table 6.2.1.16, we find that the host country parents who achieved 
more than 5,001 million NT dollars of sales volume appeared to exercise greater 
"Dominant Taiwanese parent control" than others. The companies whose sales volume 
is less than 5,000 million NT dollars tend to adopt a greater degree of "Independent 
control". 
The value of is 12.9163 and the significance is slightly less than 0.05. However, there 
are 25% of the cells whose expected count is less than 5. Therefore, the G-Square Test 
is used instead of the Chi-Square Test detailed in chapter 5.3.10.2. The G2 statistic is 
obtained by the formula and will be used in the relevant sections. 
n. G2 = 2En, log ' 
u" 
u! : the expected value of ny assuming independence. 
A 
u,;: estimated expected frequencies. 
As shown in Table 6.2.1.17, the value of G2 statistic is 13.6402 and the significance is 
less than 0.05. Therefore, it is concluded that the Taiwanese parent's sales volumes are 
associated with the type of control in relation to decision-making. The host country 
parents with higher sales volumes tend to have higher control over the joint venture. In 
other words, the host country parents who have lower sales volume have more 
"Independent control". One possible reason might be the same as described in the 
discussion relating to the capital provided by the host country parents. Host country 
parents might have their special objectives for forming international joint ventures and 




Table 6.2.1.17 G-Squared Test of the Type of Control of Host Country Parents Identified by Decision- 
MakinQ and Sales Volumes of Host Country Parents 
Sales Volume Type of 
Control on Decision-Making 
Dominant Dominant Foreign Independent 
Unit: NT$ Taiwanese control parent control 
_parent 
control 
Count 4 4 7 
less than NT$500 million Expected Count 4.87 3.95 6.18 
Count 5 10 22 
NT$501 - 5,000 million Expected Count 12.01 9.74 15.25 
Count 8 4 4 
NT$5,001 - 10,000 million Expected Count 5.19 4.21 6.60 
Count 20 12 14 
more than NT$ 10,000 million Expected Count 14.93 12.11 18.96 
G-Square=13.6402 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.0339* 
Regarding the type of control identified by the appointment of high level managers and 
the sales volume of the host country parents, the output from Chi-square test and G- 
square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.18. 
Table 6.2.1.18 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
nn A thr Colpc Vnlnma of T-inct (`nnntrv Pirnntc 
Type of Control identified by Hi h-level mans er Appointment Sales volume 







less than 500 million 6(40.00%) 5(33.331/6) 4(26.67%) 15 
501 - 5,000 million 3(8.11%) 8(21.62%) 26(70.270/o) 37 
5,001 - 10000 million 8(50.00%) 3(18.75%) 5(31.25%) 16 
more than 10,000 million 17(36.960/o) 8 17.39% 21(45.65% 46 
Total 34(29.821/o) 2421 . 05% 
56(49.12%) 114 
Chi-Square=16.8147 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.0100* 
4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. 
G-S uare=16.6645 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.0048* 
The value of G2 is 16.6645 and the significance is less than 0.05; therefore, we might 
conclude that the Taiwanese parent's sales volumes are associated with the type of 
control identified by a high-level manager appointment. 
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Thirdly, we conducted an analysis of the number of employees of the host country 
parents and the type of control identified in relation to Decision-making. The output 
from the Chi-square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.19. 
Table 6.2.1.19 Cross-tabulation of Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and Taiwanese 
Pnrenf'c Rmnlnver Nnmherc 
Type of Control identified by Decision- ing 
Number of employee Dominant Taiwanese 






less than 200 4(19.05%) 4(19.05%) 13(61.90%) 21 
201 - 500 4(18.18%) 7(31.82%) 11(50.00-1. ) 22 
501-1000 8(33.33%) 8(33.33%) 8(33.33%) 24 
more than 1000 21(44.68%) 11(23.40%) 15(31.91%) 47 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.32%) 47(41.23%) 114 
C hi-Square=0.9293 D. F. =6 Si ificance= 0.1277 
The value of y is 0.9293 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the number of employees in the Taiwanese parent company is not 
associated with the type of control identified in relation to decision-making. Although 
the result is not significant, Table 6.2.1.18 shows that most host country parents exercise 
"Independent control" over their joint ventures. 
With regard to the type of control identified by the appointment of high-level managers 
and the number of employees in the Taiwanese parent company, the output from the Chi- 
square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.20. 
Table 6.2.1.20 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
and Taiwanese Parent'c Fmnlnvpr Nnmherc 
of Control identified b High-level Manager Appointment 







less than 200 4(19,05%) 4(19.05%) 13(61.901/o) 21 
201 - 500 5(22.73%) 4(18.18% 13(59.09%) 22 
501-1000 8(33.33%) 6(25.00%) 10(41.67%) 24 
more than 1000 17(36.17%) 10(21.28%) 20(42.55%) 47 
Total 34(29.82%) 24(21.05%) 56(49.12%) 114 
C hi-Square-4.0560 D. F. -6 Significance= 0.6691 
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The value of x2 is 4.056 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the number of employees in the Taiwanese parent company is not 
associated with the type of control identified by high-level manager appointment. Again, 
the result is not significant; however, it shows that all the host country parents exercised 
"Independent control" over their joint venture. Also, there is a trend apparent when the 
number of employees in the Taiwanese parent company increased a smaller proportion of 
"Independent control" is exercised. 
In sum, from the above analysis on the relationship between the capital, sales volume, the 
number of employees and the type of control identified in relation to decision-making 
and the appointment of high-level managers, most of the results are not significant except 
for the sales volume. Therefore, according to the above analysis, one can conclude that 
the size of the host parent company did not affect the type of control they exercised over 
their joint ventures. The results of this survey show that when the host country parents 
are bigger, the less "Independent control' they employ and more "Dominant Taiwanese 
parent control' they possess. 
6.2.1.4.4 Ages of the Host Country Parents and Joint Ventures 
This subsection conducted an analysis of whether the age of the host country parents 
affects the type of control they exercise over the joint ventures and whether the age of a 
joint venture affects its parent's control. First, we conducted an analysis between the 
Taiwanese parent's ages and the type of control identified in relation to decision-making. 
The output from the Chi-square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.21. 
Table 6.2.1.21 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by Decision-Making and Ages of 
Host Country Parents 
Age of the host country 
parents 
Type of Control identified by Decision- makin 
Dominant Taiwanese Dominant Foreign Independent 
parent control parent control control 
Total 
1-5 years 1(50.00-1. ) 00.00%) 1(50.00%) 2 
6-10 years 1(25.00%) 2(50.00%) 1(25.001/o) 4 
11-20 years 4(26.67%) 2(13.331/o) 9(60.00%) 15 
21-30 years 5(20.83%) 9(37.50%) 10(41.67%) 24 
more than 30 years 26(37.68%) 17(24.640/o) 26(37.68%) 69 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.32%) 47(41.23%) 114 
Chi-Scare=7.333 D. F. =8 Significance-- 0.5011 
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As the results of Table 6.2.1.21 show, the value of is 7.333 and the significance is 
greater than 0.05; therefore, it is concluded that the age of Taiwanese parents ages is not 
associated with the type of control identified by decision-making. However, the results 
show that there is a trend that host country parents who have a longer history appear to 
have less "Independent control" than others. The companies who are younger tend to let 
their joint ventures have more autonomy. 
Next, we analyzed the relationship between the age of the Taiwanese parents and the 
type of control identified relative to the appointment of high-level managers. The output 
from the Chi-square test is represented in Table 6.2.1.22. 
Table 6.2.1.22 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
and Ages of Host Country Parents 
Ages of the host country 
parents 
Type of Control identified by High-Level mans erappointment 
Dominant Taiwanese Dominant Foreign Independent 
parent control parent control control 
Total 
1-5 years 1(50.00'1,. ) 1(50.00-1. ) 0(0.00%) 2 
6-10 years l(25.00%) 2(50.00%) 1 25.00% 4 
11-20 years 2(13.33%) 1(6.671/o) 12(80.00'/o) 15 
21-30 years 6(25.00%) 6(25.00%) 12(50.00%) 24 
more than 30 years 24(34.781/o) 14(20.29%) 31(44.931/o) 69 
Total 34(29.821/o) 24(21.05%) 56(49.121/o) 114 
Chi-S uare=11.106 D. F. =8 Significance= 0.1958 
The value of is 11.106 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the Taiwanese parent's age is not associated with the type of control 
identified by high-level manager's appointment. However the results show that when the 
Taiwanese parent's age increases, "Independent control" is exercised more, except for 
the companies that are younger than 5 years. 
Then, we conducted the analysis of the relationship between the age of joint ventures and 
the type of control identified in relation to decision-making. The output from Chi-square 
test is represented in Table 6.2.1.23. 
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The value of f is 4.113 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the joint venture's ages was not associated with the type of control 
identified by decision-making. However, the results reveal that when the age of joint 
ventures increases, more "Independent control" is exercised by its parents. 
Table 6.2.1.23 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control identified by Decision-Making and Ages of the 
Tnint Venthrec 
Type of Control identified by Decision making 







1-5 years 7(29.17%) 7(29.17%) 10(41.67%) 24 
6-10 years 9(34.621/o) 7(26.9 2% 1008.46%) 26 
11-20 years 14(35.00%) 11(27.50%) 15(37.50%) 40 
21-30 years 4(40.00'/o) 3(30.001/o) 3(30.00%) 10 
more than 30 years 3(21.43%) 2(14.29%) 9(64.291/o) 14 
Total 37(32.461/o) 30(26.32%) 47(41.23%) 114 
Chi-Square=4.113 D. F. =8 Significance= 0.8 468 
With regard to the type of control identified by the appointment of high-level managers 
and the age of joint ventures, the output from the Chi-square test is represented in Table 
6.2.1.24. 
Table 6.2.1.24 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Control Identified by High-Level Manager Appointment 
nnri A oec of the mint VPntnrec 
Type of Control identifie d by High-level Manag r Appointment 







1-5 years 5(20.83%) 5(20.831/o) 14(58.33%) 24 
6-10 years 7(26.92%) 7(26.92%) 12(46.151/o) 26 
11-20 years 13(32.50%) 7(17.50%) 20(50.00%) 40 
21-30 years 4(40.00%) 3 30.00% 3(30.00%) 10 
more than 30 years 5 35.71% 2(14.291/o) 7(50.00%) 14 
Total 34(29.82%) 24(21.05%) 56(49.12%) 114 
Chi-Scare=3.3946 D. F. =8 Significance= 0.8665 
The value of x2 is 3.3946 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, it is 
concluded that the joint ventures' age were not associated with the type of control 
identified by high-level manager appointment. However, the results show all the joint 
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ventures have relatively high autonomy, except for the companies who are in the 21-30 
years group. 
6.2.1.5 The Number of Board Members 
This subsection examines the relationship between the control of host country parents in 
relation to decision-making, the appointment of high-level managers and the number of 
board members in joint ventures. The number of board members percentage was 
recalculated based on the number of the Taiwanese parent's, or foreign parent's board 
members divided by the total number of board members. The percentage of Taiwanese 
parent's and foreign parent's seats on the board is equal to one. In order to launch the 
suitable statistical methods, the percentage of board members were classified into the 
following three groups: less than 50%, equal 50%, and more than 50%. The Chi square 
test was launched and the results are shown in Table 6.2.1.25 and Table 6.2.1.26. 
Table 6.2.1.25 Cross-tabulation of Control Type of Host Country Parents Identified by Decision- 
Makina and the Percentage of Rnnrd Memherc in mint Ventures 









less than 50% 7(25.93%) 16(59.26%) 4 14.81% 27 
equal 50% 8(30.77%) 10(38.46%) 8(30.77%) 26 
more than 50% 22(36.07%) 4(6.56%) 35(57.38%) 61 
Total 37(32.46%) 30(26.32%) 47(41.231/o) 114 
Chi-Square= 31.381 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0000* 
0 cells . 0% have expected count less than 5. 
In Table 6.2.1.25, the value of x2 is 31.381 and the significance is less than 0.05. These 
results indicate that the Taiwanese parent's control has a significant relationship to the 
percentage of board members in joint ventures. When the percentage is less than 50%, 
this group has the highest proportion of "Dominant Foreign parent control". When 
percentage is equal to 50%, these groups have a slightly higher proportion of "Dominant 
Foreign parent control, " while the "Dominant Taiwanese parent control" and 
"Independent control" have the same proportion. If the percentage is more than 50%, 
then "Independent control" has the highest proportion. These results reveal that the 
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higher the percentage of board members that host country parents have, the more they 
exercise "Independent control" over the joint venture. 
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Table 6.2.1.26 Cross-tabulation of Control Type of Host Country Parents Identified by High-level 
Manager Anointment and the Percentage of Rnard Memherc in Tnint VPntrPc 









less than 50% 5(18.52%) 11(40.740/o) 11(40.74%) 27 
equal 50% 6(23.08%) 8(30.77%) 12(46.15%) 26 
more than 50% 23(37.70%) 5(8.20%) 33(54.10%) 61 
Total 34(29.82%) 24(21.05%) 56(49.12%) 114 
Chi-Square= 14.491 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0059# 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. 
In Table 6.2.1.26, the value of x2 is 14.491 and the significance is less than 0.05. These 
results indicate that the Taiwanese parent's control type as identified by a high-level 
manager appointment has a significant relationship with the percentage of board 
members in joint ventures. No matter how high the percentage of board members of the 
host country parents, most allow "Independent control" over the joint venture. 
From Table 6.2.2.25 and Table 6.2.2.26, we find that there is a significant relationship 
between Taiwanese parent control types and the percentage of board members in their 
joint ventures. The higher the percentage of board members that host country parents 
have, the more "Independent control" they exercise over joint ventures. The 
phenomenon could be explained by host country parents letting joint ventures have more 
autonomy but at the same time, they use their representatives among the joint venture's 
board members to control the joint venture. 
A summary of analysis results between the Taiwanese parent's control and the sample 
characteristics is provided in Table 6.2.2.27. 
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Table 6.2.2.27 Summary of the Relationship between the Taiwanese Parent's Control and Sample 
Characteristics 
Host count parents 
Sample Characteristics Type of control identified by 
Type of control identified 
decision-making 
by high-level manager 
appointment 
Regions of foreign partners 
Asian countries No association No association American countries 
European countries 
Industry groups 
Manufacturing group No association No association 
Service group 
Size 
Sales Volume GZ=13.6402 p=0.0339* GZ=18.6645 p=0.0048* 
Capital No association No association 
Number of employees No association No association 
Age 
Host country parents No association No association 
Joint ventures No association No association 
Number (percentage) of board x2=14.491 x2=31.381 
members P=0.0059* P=0.0000* 
As a whole, the results of this empirical survey have indicated that there are associations 
between the Taiwanese parent's control, the sales volumes of host country parents, and 
the percentage of parent's board members in joint ventures. Although, there are no 
associations between the Taiwanese parent's control and the host country parent's 
industry category, the region of the foreign partners, the capital or the number of 
employees of the host country parents and the ages of the host country parents and the 
joint ventures. 
From the above analysis, the relationship between the sample characteristics and the type 
of control in relation to decision-making and the appointment of high-level managers, in 
summation, most of the results are not significant, except the sales volume of host 
country parents and the percentage of board members. 
These results reveal that the Taiwanese parent's sales volumes are associated with the 
type of control identified by decision-making and a high-level manager appointment. 
Higher sales volume the host country parents have, higher "Dominant Taiwanese parent 
control' they exercise over the joint venture. The result indicates that the host country 
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parents tend to have stronger control over the joint ventures. In other words, the host 
country parents who have smaller sales volumes, have greater "Independent control". 
The results also reveal that there is a significant relationship between Taiwanese parent 
control types and the percentage of their board members in their joint ventures. The 
higher the percentage of board members, the more "Independent control" host country 
parents exercise in joint ventures. 
These results could partly explain why some important sample characteristics have an 
important influence on the control types employed by host country parents over joint 
ventures. Next, we conducted an analysis of ownership and its relation with sample 
characteristics. 
6.2.2 Empirical Results of Ownership 
The extent of host country parent's and foreign parent's equity in joint ventures is 
examined first in this subsection, and a test is employed to measure the different extent of 
both parents' equity shares in joint ventures. The relationship between the Taiwanese 
parent's equity share and the sample characteristics are tested. The results of the 
relevant statistical tests are described in the relevant subsections. 
6.2.2.1 Empirical Results 
Beamish (1985) classifies three categories of ownership of multinational joint venture in 
developing countries. This study applies his classification of ownership and categorises 
the equity shareholding into three groups, namely, majority equity (more than 50), equal 
equity (50-50) and minority equity (less than 50). The degree of Taiwanese parent's 
equity shareholding in international joint ventures is shown in Table 6.2.2.1. 
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Tah1P All1 PairPi_Samnles T Test of Fnuity Shareholding of Parents 
Equity Shareholding Cases Mean Std Dev t df 2-Tail Sig. 
Host country parents 114 41.15 16.72 2 135 113 0 035* 
Foreign parents 114 46.64 16.02 
- . . 
* a=0.01 
The mean equity shareholding of host country parents is 41.15% and the mean equity 
shareholding of foreign parent is 46.64%. The computed value of t test shows that the 
mean equity shareholding is significantly different between the host country parents and 
foreign parents (p< 0.05), but both parents have minority shareholdings in the ventures. 
Next, equity shareholding is classified into three groups: majority equity (greater than 
50), equal equity (50-50) and minority equity (less than 50). The results of Table 6.2.2.2, 
show that either host country parents or foreign parents have less than 50 %of equity 
shareholding in joint ventures, about a half of the sample. Both only have one quarter of 
the sample with more than 50 % equity shareholding in joint ventures. The proportion of 
50-50 equity shareholding in joint ventures is the lowest percentage for both parents. 
TehlP4 777 n^ce-rirti.. p Ctatictirc nfPnnity CharPhnlAino nfPnrentc 
Host country parents Foreign parents Equity Shareholding 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
less than 50 67 58.80 57 50.00 
50=50 18 15.80 22 19.30 
more than 50 29 25.40 35 30.70 
Total 114 100.00 114 100.00 
These results are similar to the results of the survey which was conducted by the 
Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the equity structure of 
all the overseas and foreign investments in Taiwan. This government report indicates 
that most equity structures of overseas Chinese and foreign investors are joint ventures 
and most of them hold less than 50% equity shareholding in joint ventures. The results 
of this empirical survey are consistent with the results of the government report. Thus, 
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we conclude that most parents have minority shareholdings (less than 50%) in the joint 
ventures, but the host country parents have slightly less equity shareholding than the 
foreign parents. 
6.2.2.2 The Analysis of Variance between Equity Share and Sample 
Characteristics 
The main goals of this subsection are to analyze the variance between equity share of 
host country parents and the sample characteristics. The characteristics include regions, 
industry, size, age of host country parents and the number of individuals on the boards in 
the joint ventures. Appropriate statistical techniques are employed to test their 
relationship. 
6.2.2.2.1 Regions 
As described in chapter 5.5.4.2, the three major nationalities of foreign partners are 
Japanese, American and Singaporean. Asian countries were the major regional sources 
of foreign investment in Taiwan. When host country parents cooperated with these 
foreign partners, does ownership create a significant difference among different 
nationalities? An analysis was conducted to answer the question. The ANOVA test was 
employed and the results are shown in Table 6.2.2.3. 
Table 6.2.2.3 ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and the 
Source Reainns of Fnreian PnrPntc 
i Re 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
g ons 
No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
Asian countries 77 42.4681 16.5901 
American countries 22 39.7859 16.7050 
European countries 15 36.3707 17.5455 
0.9236 0.4001 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
From the results shown in Table 6.2.2.3, we find that host country parents who 
cooperate with Asian partners have a higher equity shareholding in joint ventures than 
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partners from other region's countries. No matter which foreign partner the host 
country parents cooperates with, the average equity shareholding in joint ventures is less 
than 50%. From the output of the ANOVA computation, the significance is greater than 
0.05; therefore, it is concluded that the origin of the foreign partner's and equity 
shareholding held by host country parents, is independent. In other words, the 
nationalities or origins of foreign parents do not affect the equity shareholding of host 
country parents. 
The same analytical procedures were undertaken to measure the relationship between 
foreign parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures and the origins of foreign parents. 
The results are shown in Table 6.2.2.4. 
Table 6.2.2.4 ANOVA test of Foreign Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and Source 
Re'innc of Fnreivn Parentc 
Foreign parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
Regions 
No Mean Std. Deviation 
F Sig. 
Asian countries 77 46.4335 16.7152 
American countries 22 46.1464 12.3488 1057 0 8998 0 
European countries 15 48.4000 17.9157 . . 
Total 114 46.6368 16.0158 
As shown in Table 6.2.2.4, the results indicate that the significance is greater than 0.05; 
therefore, there isn't any relationship between the foreign parent's equity shareholding in 
joint ventures and the origins of foreign parents. From the Table 6.2.2.4, for those 
foreign parents from European countries, the average of the foreign parent's equity 
shareholding in joint ventures is higher than for other countries. One possible 
explanation for these results is that European countries are far from Taiwan and parents 
from European countries have entered the Taiwan market late, so they might have higher 




The above analysis is based on the parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures and the 
results reveal that there is no significant difference between the parent's equity 
shareholding and nationalities or origins of foreign partners. 
The next analysis is based on the ownership type of the host country parents in joint 
ventures. The results are shown in Table 6.2.2.5, the value of statistic is 10.5909 and 
the significance is less than 0.05; therefore, it was concluded that the origins of foreign 
partners is associated with the ownership type of host country parents. 
Table 6.2.2.5 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and Regions of 
Foreign Partners 
i R Type of ownership of Host coup parents T l ons eg Minori equity Equal equity Majority equity 
ota 
Asian countries 44(57.14%) 8(10.391/o) 25(32.471/o) 77 
American countries 12(54.55%) 7(31.82%) 3(13.64%) 22 
European countries 11(73.33%) 3(20.00%) l(6.67%) 15 
Total 67(58.771/o) 18(15.791/o) 29(25.441/o) 114 
Chi-Square= 10.5909 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0316* 
3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. 
G-S uare= 10.9156 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0275* 
From Table 6.2.2.5, we could find that no matter which regions its foreign partners come 
from, the occurrence of the minority equity type of host country parent has the highest 
percentage. However, when the foreign partners are from the European region, the host 
country parents have a higher proportion of minority equity type than other two types. 
For the foreign partners from the American region, the host country parents have around 
32% on equal equity type. When foreign partners are from Asian countries, the host 
country parents have the highest proportion of minority equity and follow by the majority 
equity. 
The Chi-Square Test was employed and the results shown in Table 6.2.2.6. The value of 
f statistic is 10.7728 and the significance is less than 0.05. However, there are 33.3% of 




Table 6.2.2.6 G-Squared Test of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and Regions of 
Fnreiun Partners 
Minority equity Equal equity Majority equity Total 
Asian Count 44 8 25 77 
countries Expected Count 45.25 12.16 19.59 77 
American Count 12 7 3 22 
countries Expected Count 12.93 3.47 5.60 22 
European Count 11 3 1 15 
countries Expected Count 8.82 2.37 3.82 15 
G-Square= 10.9156 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0275* 
As shown in Table 6.2.2.6, the value of the G2 statistic is 10.7728 and the significance is 
less than 0.05. Thus, it was concluded that the source regions of foreign parents are 
associated with the ownership type of Taiwan parents. In other words, Taiwanese 
parent's ownership type is different when their foreign partners are from different regions. 
Next, the same analytical process was launched to measure the relationship between the 
source regions of foreign parents and the type of ownership of foreign parents. The 
results are shown in Table 6.2.2.7. 
Table 6.2.2.7 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Foreign Parents and Regions of Foreign 
Partners 




42(54.55%) 9(11.69%) 26(33.77%) 77 
American countries 11(50.00-1. ) 7(31.82 % 4(18.18 % 22 
European countries 4(26.67%) % 6(40.00'o) 5(33.3 15 
Total 57 50.00% 22 19.30% 35 30.70% 114 
Chi-Square= 10.7728 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0292* 
3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. 
In Table 6.2.2.7, the results show that foreign parents who came from European 
countries had the highest proportion of the equal equity type. On the other hand, foreign 
parents coming from Asian countries have a higher proportion of the minority equity 
type and follow by the majority equity type. Furthermore, foreign parents from 
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American countries had the highest proportion of the minority equity type and followed 
by equal equity type. 
As described above, there are 33.3% of cells that have an expected count of less than 5; 
therefore, the G-Square Test was employed. The result of the G-Square Test is shown 
in Table 6.2.2.8. 
Table 6.2.2.8 G-Squared Test of the Type of Ownership of Foreign Parents and Regions of Foreign 
Pnrtnrrc 
less than 50 50=50 more than 50 Total 
Asian Count 42 9 26 77 
countries Expected Count 38.50 14.86 23.64 77 
American Count 11 7 4 22 
countries Expected Count 11.00 4.25 6.75 22 
European Count 4 6 5 15 
countries Expected Count 7.50 2.89 4.61 15 
G-Square= 10.5797 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0317* 
As shown in Table 6.2.2.8, the value of the G2 statistic is 10.5797 and the significance is 
less than 0.05. Thus, we concluded that the source regions of foreign parents are 
associated with the type of ownership of foreign parents. In other words, foreign 
parent's ownership types are different when foreign partners are from different regions. 
6.2.2.2.2 Industry 
This subsection analyzes the relationship between the Taiwanese parent's equity 
shareholding in joint ventures and industry groups in which host country parents are 
involved. This study reclassifies industries into manufacturing and service groups. The 
results are shown in Table 6.2.2.9. 
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Table 6.2.2.9 ANOVA test of the Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and 
Industry Grouns 
I d 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
n ustry groups No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
Manufacturing group 85 40.5161 17.5672 
Service group 29 43.0007 14.0768 0.4750 0.4921 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
From the results shown in Table 6.2.2.9, we found that the average Taiwanese parent's 
equity shareholding in joint ventures is less than 50%, no matter in which industry group 
they are involved. The output of the ANOVA computation, shows that the significance 
is greater than 0.05; therefore, one could conclude that the Taiwanese parent's equity 
shareholding and their industry group are independent. 
Next, the relationship between the industry groups and the type of ownership of host 
country parents was tested. The type of ownership was classified into majority equity, 
equal equity, and minority equity. The results are shown in Table 6.2.2.10. 
Table 6.2.2.10 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and Industry 
r1rnnns 
Industry groups 
Type of ownership of Host country parents identified by 
equity shareholding in Joint ventures Total 
Minority equity Equal equity Maori equity 
Manufacturing group 51 60.00% 15(17.651/o) 19(22.35%) 85 
Service group 16(55.17%) 3(10.34%) 10 34.48% 29 
Total 67(58.770/o) 18(15.79%) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Square= 2.0666 D. F. =2 Significance= 0.3558 
The value of the f statistic is 2.0666 and the significance is greater than 0.05; therefore, 
it was concluded that the type of ownership of the host country parents is not associated 
with their industry group. 
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From the above analysis, we conclude that the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in 
joint ventures and their industry group is not associated. Also the most common type of 
ownership stake employed by the host country parents is minority equity. 
6.2.2.2.3 Size of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted the relationship analysis between the size of host country 
parents and their equity shareholding in joint ventures. The size of host country parents 
is analyzed using capital, sales volume and the number of employees. The ANOVA test 
was launched to test the relationship between the size of host country parents and their 
equity shareholding in joint ventures. The results are shown in Table 6.2.2.11, Table 
6.2.2.12 and Table 6.2.2.13. 
Table 6.2.2.11 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Canital 
Capin Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
Unit: NT$ No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
less than 500 million 18 39.2956 14.4072 
501- 5,000 million 43 37.1830 18.3604 
5,001 - 10,000 million 16 47.3238 13.7004 2.0148 0.1160 
more than 10,000 million 37 43.9870 16.2071 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
Table 6.2.2.12 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Sales Volume 
Sales Volume Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
Unit: NT$ No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
less than 500 million 15 36.5813 15.0160 
501 - 5,000 million 37 33.6786 17.5997 
5,001 - 10,000 million 16 51.6638 10.4633 6.6057 0.0004* 
more than 10,000 million 46 44.9878 15.5137 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
Table 6.2.2.13 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Number of Emnlovees 
l N f b 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding 
um er o emp oyees No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
less than 200 21 37.5010 15.7854 2.4126 0.0706 
201- 500 22 37.4791 18.9683 
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501-1000 24 38.0413 16.8600 
more than 1000 47 46.0817 15.1632 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
The results of the ANOVA computation shown in Table 6.2.2.11, Table 6.2.2.12 and 
Table 6.2.2.13, show only the sales volume and the Taiwanese parent's equity 
shareholding has a strong relationship, the significance is less than 0.05. The host 
country parents whose sales volume is between NT$5,001 - 10,000 million, have the 
highest equity shareholding in their joint ventures. In other words, they have the 
majority equity type of ownership. Host country parents in other sales volume groups 
had the minority ownership type. 
These results reveal that the capital and the number of employees are not associated with 
the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint ventures. However, when we 
analyzed the average of equity shareholding, we found that there was a trend. The 
bigger the capital, sales volume and the greater the number of employees in the host 
country parent company, the higher the equity shareholding they hold in joint ventures. 
Next, we examined the relationship between the ownership type of host country parents 
and their capital, sales volume, and number of employees. The results are shown in 
Table 6.2.2.14, Table 6.2.2.15, and Table 6.2.2.16. 
The output of X2 tests from the three tables above, shows that the significance of each is 
greater than 0.05. The results reveal that the capital, sales volume and the number of 
employees are not associated with the ownership types of Taiwanese parent. From these 
three tables, we only found a rough phenomenon that the smaller host country parents 
have more minority equity types, and the larger host country parents have more minority 
equity types and majority types. 
Table 6.2.2.14 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Canital 
Capital Type of ownership of Host country ents T l Unit: NT$ Mnori equity Equal equity Maor ui ota 
less than 500 million 11(61.110/o) 2(11.11 % 5(27.78%) 18 
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501 - 5,000 million 30(69.77%) 7(16.28%) 6(13.950/o) 43 
5,001 - 10,000 million 7(43.75%) 4(25.000/o) 5(31.251/o) 16 
more than 10,000 million 19(51.35%) 5 13.51% 13(35.14%) 37 
Total 11 61.11% 2(l 1.11% 5(27.78%) 18 
Chi-Scare= 6.9478 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.3257 
Table 6.2.2.15 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Snlec Volumes 
Sales Volumes Type of ownership of Host coup parents T l 
Unit: NT$ Minori equity Equal equity Majority equity 
ota 
less than 500 million 10(66.67%) _ 2(13.33%) 3(20.00%) 15 
501 - 5,000 million 27(72.97%) 5(13.51%) 5(13.51%) 37 
5,001 - 10000 million 6(37.501/o) 3(18.751/o) 7(43.750/. ) 16 
more than 10,000 million 24(52.17%) 8(17.391/o) 14 30.43% 46 
Total 67(58.77%) 18(15.79%) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Scare= 8.1467 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.2276 
Table 6.2.2.16 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Niimh r of Pmnlnvp c 
Type of ownership of Host coon parents l T t Number of employees Minority equity Equal equity Maori equity 
o a 
less than 200 15(71.43%) 2(9.52%) 4(19.05%) 21 
201 - 500 13(59.09%) 4(18.18%) 5(22.73%) 22 
501-1000 18(75%) 2(8.331/o) 4(16.67%) 24 
more than 1000 21(44.68%) 10(21.28%) 16(34.04%) 47 
Total 67(58.771/o) 18(15.79%) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Scare= 8.0736 D. F. =6 Significance= 0.2328 
From the above analysis, one concludes that the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding 
in the joint venture and their sales volumes is associated. The higher the sales volume of 
host country parents, the higher equity shareholding in joint ventures they hold. 
Additionally, host country parents with bigger capital and a larger number of employees 
also have higher equity shareholding in their joint ventures. However, there is no 
association between the equity types of host country parents and the capital, sales 
volumes, and the number of their employees. 
6.2.2.2.4 Ages of the Host Country Parents and Joint Ventures 
This subsection conducted the analysis of whether the age of host country parents and 
their joint ventures has a relationship to the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in 
their joint ventures or not. Firstly, the relationship between age of host country parents 
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and their equity shareholding in joint ventures was tested. The results of the ANOVA 
test are shown in Table 6.2.2.17, and the significant is greater than 0.05. Thus, one 
concludes that the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in joint venture and their ages 
was not associated. 
Table 6.2.2.17 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding in Joint Ventures and its 
Ages 
Taiwanese paren t's equity shareholding in joint ventures 
Age of host country parents No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
1-5 years 2 52.5000 3.5355 
6-10 years 4 45.3750 12.3381 
11-20 years 15 37.8707 18.9209 5202 0 0 7211 
21-30 years 24 39.4867 19.0770 . . 
more than 30 years 69 41.8645 15.8862 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
Next, the relationship between the age of joint ventures and their Taiwanese parent's 
equity shareholding was tested. The results of the ANOVA test are shown in Table 
6.2.2.18, and the significant is also greater than 0.05. Thus, one concludes that the 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in the joint venture and the age of their joint 
ventures was not associated. 
Table 6.2.2.18 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding and its Joint Venture's 
A 4PQ 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding Ages of Joint Ventures 
No Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
1-5 years 24 44.2179 14.4605 
6-10 years 26 36.3623 19.5436 
11-20 years 40 43.4151 17.2774 2425 1 2972 0 
21-30 years 10 43.5580 9.1810 . . 
more than 30 years 14 36.5743 16.3330 
Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
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However, when we analyze the mean of equity shareholding, the ages of host country 
parents and their joint ventures, we found that there was a trend. The younger the 
companies, the higher the equity shares that host country parents held in joint ventures. 
Especially, in the 1-5 years group, host country parents and joint ventures had the 
highest mean of equity shares. 
Next, the analysis defined the type of ownership of host country parents in joint ventures 
and the relationship with the ages of host country parents and joint ventures. The results 
are shown in Table 6.2.2.19 and Table 6.2.2.20. 
Table 6.2.2.19 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and Ages of Host 
Cniintru DQrnnre 
Ages of host country Type of ownership of Host coun t parents Total 
parents Minori equity Equal equity Majority equity 
1-5 years 0 0.00% 1(50.00'Y. ) 1(50.00'Y. ) 2 
6-10 years 2(50.001/o) 1(25%) 1 25% 4 
11-20 years 9(601/o) l(6.67%) 5(33.33%) 15 
21-30 years 16(66.67%) 4(16.671/o) 4 16.671/6) 24 
more than 30 years 40(5 . 97% 
11 15.94% 18(26.09%) 69 
Total 67(5 8.77% 18(15.790/o) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Scare= 5.5739 D. F. =8 Significance= 0.6948 
Table 6.2.2.20 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and Ages of Joint 
Type of ownership of Host coup parents Total Ages of Joint Ventures Minority equity Equal equity Majority equity 
1-5 years 11(45.83%) 6(25.001/o) 7(29.17%) 24 
6-10 years 16(61.54%) 5(19.231/o) 5(19.23'o 26 
11-20 years 22(55.00%) 5(12.50%) 13(32.50%) 40 
21-30 years 6(60.00%) 1(10.000/0) 3 30.00% 10 
more than 30 years 12(85.71%) l(7.14%) 1 7.14% 14 
Total 67(58.77%) 18(15.781/o) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Square= 8.4128 D. F. =8 Significance= 0.3942 
As shown in Table 6.2.2.19, the value of the j statistic is 5.5739 and the significance is 
greater than 0.05; therefore, it was concluded that the ages of host country parents was 
not associated with their type of ownership in a joint venture. From Table 6.2.2.20, the 
results also reveal that there is no association between the age of joint ventures and the 
Taiwanese parent's equity type. 
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From the above analysis, one concludes that the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding 
in a joint venture, their ages and the joint venture's ages are independent. However, the 
younger parents would have a higher equity shareholding in their joint ventures. 
6.2.2.2.5 The Number of Board Members 
This subsection is focused on the relationship between ownership of host country parents 
and the number of board members in joint ventures. The number of board members was 
recalculated as a percentage based on the number of board members of the Taiwanese 
parent's or foreign parent divided by the total number of board members. The 
percentage of Taiwanese parent's and foreign parent's board is equal to one. In order to 
launch the suitable statistical methods, the percentage of board members was classified 
into three groups, which are less than 50%, equal to 50%, and more than 50%. The 
ANOVA test was launched and the results are shown in Table 6.2.2.21 and Table 
6.2.2.22. 
Table 6.2.2.21 The ANOVA Test of Equity Shareholding of Host Country Parents and the Percentage 
of Rnird Memherc in Tnint Ventnrec 
Percentage of Taiwanese 
parent's board members 
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
less than 50 27 37.0867 14.4706 
Equal 50 26 36.5146 16.7199 
4940 3 0340* 0 
more than 50 61 44.9208 16.9803 . . 
1 Total 114 41.1482 16.7239 
Table 6.2.2.22 The ANOVA Test of Equity Shareholding of Foreign Parents and the Percentage of 
Board Members in Joint Ventures 
Percentage of foreign parent's 
board members 
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig. 
less than 50 60 37.349 12.6854 
Equal 50 26 52.8846 11.1511 
* 
more than 50 28 60.7378 13.0869 
37.8812 0.0000 
Total 114 46.6368 16.0158 
240 
Chapter 6 
From Table 6.2.2.21 and Table 6.2.2.22, the results showed that there were significant 
differences between the percentage of board member and the ownership of both parents. 
The parents who had a higher percentage of board members in joint ventures had higher 
equity shares. However, foreign parents have a stronger statistically significant 
difference than host country parents. Basically, the representation of board members and 
the equity shares could represent the rights on important decisions relating to joint 
ventures. The higher percentage of board members could imply higher ownership. We 
infer that foreign parents are not located in Taiwan; therefore, they could participate 
actively on the N's board to ensure their objectives are achieved and to protect their 
rights. 
Next, the associations between the percentage of Taiwanese parent's board members in 
joint ventures and the type of ownership of host country parents was tested. The results 
are shown in Table 6.2.2.23. 
Table 6.2.2.23 Cross tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Host Country Parents and the Percentage 
of Bnard Members in mint Ventures 
fb Type of ownership of host coun parents l T t Percentage o oard members Minority equity Equal equity Majority 
o a 
less than 50% 22(81.48%) 3(11.11%) 2(7.41%) 27 
equal 50% 14(53.85%) 10(38.46%) 2(7.69%) 26 
more than 50% 31(50.82%) 5(8.2%) 25(40.98%) 61 
Total 67(58.770/o) 18(15.79%) 29(25.44%) 114 
Chi-Square= 26.663 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0000* 
2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. 
G-S uare= 26.1785 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0000* 
The value of G2 is 26.1785 and the significance is less than 0.05. These results indicated 
that the type of the Taiwanese parent's ownership has a significant relationship with the 
percentage of board members in joint ventures. When the percentage is more than 50% 
group, most host country parents have a majority equity ownership. In other words, the 
higher the percentage of board members that host country parents have, the greater their 
majority equity ownership. 
241 
Chapter 6 
The relationship between the percentage of foreign parent's board members in joint 
ventures and the type of ownership they have was tested. The results are shown in Table 
6.2.2.24. The value of X2 is 758817 and the significance is less than 0.05. These results 
indicated that the type of foreign parent's ownership has significant relation with the 
percentage of board members in joint ventures. In the group with more than 50%, most 
foreign parents have a majority equity ownership. In the group less than 50%, most 
foreign parents have a minority equity ownership. These results reveal that the greater 
the percentage of board members that foreign parents have, the more majority equity 
type they have. 
Table 6.2.2.24 Cross-tabulation of the Type of Ownership of Foreign Parents and the Percentage of 
Board Members in Joint Ventures 
Percentage of board Type of ership of foreign parents T t l 
members Minori equity Equal equity Majority 
a o 
less than 50% 49(81.67%) 5(8.33%) 6(10.001/o) 60 
equal 50% 5(19.23%) 14(53.85'Y. ) 7(26.921/o) 26 
more than 50% 3(10.71%) 3(10.71%) 2278.57% 28 
Total 57(50.00%) 22(19.301/o) 35(30.70'/o) 114 
Chi-Square= 75.8817 D. F. =4 Significance= 0.0000* 
2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. 
From Table 6.2.2.21 to Table 6.2.2.24, we found that there was a significant relationship 
between the Taiwanese parent's ownership, and foreign parent's ownership and the 
percentage of board members in their joint ventures. The higher percentages of board 
members from host country parents and foreign parents, the higher the equity 
shareholding they hold in joint ventures; and the more majority equity type they have. 
The parents who have more ownership would normally have more power in terms of 
board member's representation. Leksell and Lindgren (1982) indicated that the equity 
ownership of the joint ventures would affect the number of joint venture's board 
directors. The results of this study echo Leksell and Lindgren's (1982) results. We 
conclude that the higher the ownership that parents hold in joint ventures, the higher the 
percentage of board members they hold. 
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A summary of the analysis of the results between the Taiwanese parent's ownership and 
the sample characteristics, is provided in Table 6.2.2.25. To view it as a whole, the 
results of this empirical survey indicated that there are associations between the 
Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding, the sales volumes of the host country parents, 
and the percentage of the parent's board members in the joint ventures. There are no 
associations between the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding, industry of the host 
country parents, the origin of foreign partners, capital and the number of employees of 
host country parents, and the ages of host country parents and joint ventures. 
Table 6.2.2.25 Summary the Relationship between the Taiwanese Parent's Equity Shareholding and 
Tvne of Chvnerchin and Samnle Characteristics 
Host coun parents Sample Characteristics 
Equity shares Type of ownership 
Regions of foreign partners 
Asian countries G2=10.9156 
American countries 
No association p=0.0275* 
European countries 
Industry groups 
Manufacturing group No association No association 
Service group 
Sizes 
Sales volume F=6.6057 p=0.0004* No association 
Capital No association No association 
Number of employees No association No association 
Age 
Host country parents No association No association 
Joint ventures No association No association 
Number (percentage) of board F=3.3490 G =26.1785 
members P=0.034* P=0.0000* 
From Table 6.2.2.5, the Taiwanese parent's ownership type is different when their 
foreign partners come from different regions. When the foreign partners are from the 
European region, the host country parents had a higher proportion of the minority equity 
type than the other two types. For the foreign partners from the American region, the 
host country parents have a preponderance of an equal equity type. When foreign 
partners come from Asian countries, the host country parents have the highest 
proportion of minority equity. 
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The results also reveal that the Taiwanese parent's equity shareholding in the joint 
venture and their sales volumes is associated. The higher the sales volume of the host 
country parents, the higher their equity shareholding in joint ventures. 
There is a significant relationship between the Taiwanese parent, the foreign parent's 
ownership, and the percentage of board members in their joint ventures. The higher the 
percentage of board members from the host country parents and foreign parents, the 
higher the equity shareholding they hold in joint ventures and the more majority equity 
type. These results are consistent with Pedersen and Thomsen's (1997) in their study of 
corporate ownership patterns, which they found that industry and company size influence 
ownership structures. 
These results partly explain why some important sample characteristics had an important 
influence on the percentage equity share of host country parents in joint ventures. 
Next, we conducted on analysis on bargaining power and its relation with sample 
characteristics in the following section. 
6.2.3 Empirical Results of Bargaining Power 
In this section, the variables which affect bargaining power are analyzed first. Then, the 
relationship between bargaining power and sample characteristics is tested. The relative 
importance of bargaining power is discussed first in the following subsection. 
6.2.3.1 The Relative Importance of Bargaining Power 
This section aims to analyze which variable assumed the greatest importance for partners 
in obtaining bargaining power when they decided to cooperate and build a joint venture. 




From the results shown in Table 6.2.3.1, the most important variable is the level of 
equity shares with a mean value of 4.38. When two, or more than two companies want 
to cooperate and establish another new subsidiary, equity share is a fundamental and 
critical resource. This indicates that ownership is a very important variable for partners. 
In addition, the equity shares in joint ventures also affected the number of the N board 
of directors who represented their parents, and in turn affected the important decisions of 
joint ventures. Basically, through the acquisition of equity shares, the company could 
obtain control over the joint venture in order to ensure that its organizational goal can be 
reached. 
Therefore, equity ownership has a very important meaning for a joint venture's parents. 
The amount of equity shares affect the bargaining power of partners; thus, the most 
effective method of gaining bargaining power is to gain more equity shares. 
Table 6.2.3.1 The Rank Order of BarEainine Power 
Variables Mean Std Dev. Rank 
10. The level of equity shares 4.38 0.62 1 
4. Access to export markets 4.25 0.58 2 
9. Knowledge of the local markets 3.71 0.95 3 
1. Technological ability 3.57 1.53 4 
5. Access to financial resources 3.51 0.60 5 
6. Management experience 3.28 0.94 6 
2. Innovative ability 3.08 1.36 7 
7. Access to sale distribution channel 3.02 0.92 8 
3. Investment amount 2.73 0.88 9 
8. The influence of host government' 1.87 0.67 10 
The following two important variables are "access to export markets" and "the 
knowledge of the local markets". Their mean scores are 4.25 and 3.71 respectively. The 
results indicate that the market is a fairly important variable for bargaining power. With 
a mean score of 1.87, the least important variable is "the influence of host government". 
The results indicate that the influence of the host government does not have a significant 
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effect on the company's bargaining power. Taiwan is a democratic county and the 
government encourages enterprises to cooperate with foreign companies by offering 
some assistance. It is not like other developing countries where the government 
oversees cooperative activities and has a strong effect on bargaining power. Therefore, 
in the Taiwan context, the government has the least influence on bargaining power. 
The mean values of "technological ability" and "innovative ability" are 3.57 and 3.08 
respectively. They ranged between "fairly important" and "important". These results 
indicate that technology is an important variable for a company to obtain more 
bargaining power and implies that technology could enhance the control available to the 
partners. These results echo those found in previous studies. 
6.2.3.2 Factor Analysis of Bargaining Power 
After the primary ranking of bargaining power, this subsection examines the factor 
analysis of bargaining power. Factor analysis is used to identify the structure 
underpinning bargaining power for international joint ventures. This analysis summarizes 
important information contained in these 10 variables into a smaller set of new factors, 
with a minimum loss of information. Principal components analysis is used to extract a 
new set of core data. The rotated principal components analysis for bargaining power is 
shown in Table 6.2.3.2. 
Table (2 32 The Fioenvilne after Rntatinn fnr Rarvainine Pnwer 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variable Cumulated % 
1 3.8911 38.9114 38.9114 
2 2.6680 26.6803 65.5917 
3 1.4822 14.8219 80.4136 
The results of factor analysis for bargaining power have provided the Eigenvalues which 
represent the amount of variance in each factor. Each of the three extracted factors has 
an Eigenvalue greater than 1. The total cumulated percentage of variance is 80.41%. 
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In order to achieve a clearer factor structure, the Varimax method was used to rotate the 
initial factor solution. The Varimax rotated analysis factor loading matrix for bargaining 
power is presented in Table 6.2.3.3. 
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Table 6213 Rotated Comnonent Matrix of Factor Analysis of Rareaininn Prover 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1. Technology ability -0.9279 -0.2240 0.0665 
2. Innovative ability -0.9224 -0.2056 0.0347 
9. Knowledge of the local markets 0.9270 -0.0035 0.1019 
6. Management experience 0.8910 0.0174 -0.0680 
4. Investment amount 0.1806 0.8801 -0.2201 
5. Access to financial resources 0.1245 0.8680 " 0.0658 
10. The level of equity shares 0.0291 0.8241 -0.3488 
7. Access to sale distribution channel -0.0219 -0.0816 0.9174 
3. Access to export markets 0.0896 -0.1221 0.9047 
8. The influence of host government -), 0881 -0.1399 0.6441 
The rotated factor matrix provided a different factor loading for each variable as against 
each of the three extracted factors. The interpretation of the rotated factor matrix is 
calculated on the basis that a factor loading greater than ± 0.5 is considered as significant. 
All the factor loadings are greater than 0.6, which indicates that all the factor loadings 
are significant. 
However, we found that factor I has four significant loadings where two factor loadings 
with positive scores related to management knowledge and the other two factor loadings 
with negative scores related to technology. One factor includes two different and 
contradictory subjects. We exercised the second order factor analysis again in order to 
eliminate the intervention between variables. The Varimax rotated analysis factor 
loading matrix for these four variables is presented in Table 6.2.3.4. The results also 
indicate all the factor loadings are greater than f 0.5 and are considered as significant. 
Takle 6234 Rotated Comnonent Matrix of Four Variables for Rarvaininn Power 
Variables Factor I Factor 2 
2. Innovative ability 0.8924 -0.4226 
1. Technological ability 0.8679 -0.4606 
6. Management experience -0.3831 0.8919 
9. The knowledge of the local markets -0.5509 0.7562 
248 
Chapter 6 
In addition, in considering the significance of factor loadings, the reliability of each factor 
construct was also tested using the Cronbach coefficient alpha in order to measure the 
internal consistency of each factor. The results are shown in Table 6.2.3.5. These 
results represent very high Cronbach alpha scores for the factors of bargaining power. 
Thus, one concludes that the factor of bargaining power has very high reliability. 
Table 6.2.3.5 Factor Loadines and Reliability of Factors 
Factor Variables Fact Cronbach a 
F 
2. Innovation ability 0.8924 0 9689 actor 1 
1. Technological ability 0.8679 . 
6. Management experience 0.8919 0 8894 Factor 2 
9. Knowledge of the local markets 0.7562 . 
4. Investment amount 0.8801 
Factor 3 5. Access to financial resources 0.8680 0.8564 
10. The level of equity shares 0.8241 
7. Access to sale distribution channel 0.9174 
Factor 4 3. Access to export markets 0.9047 0.7045 
8. The influence of host government 0.6441 
After measuring each factor's reliability, we identified the label for each factor according 
to the meanings of the variables in each one. Each factor is elucidated in the following 
description. 
Factor 1: Technological Capability 
Factor 1 has two significant loadings and the variables mainly related to innovative ability 
and technological ability, with respective loadings of 0.8924 and 0.8679. All the 
significant variables have positive signs. This indicates that technology is a very 




Factor 2: Management Capability 
Factor 2 has two significant loadings, and the variables mainly related to management 
knowledge, which is management experience and the knowledge of the local markets, 
with respective loadings of 0.8919 and 0.7652. Therefore, factor 2 is labeled as 
"Management Capability". 
Factor 3: Financial Capability 
Factor 3 has three significant loadings, and the variables mainly related to financial ability. 
These variables are investment amount, access to financial resources and the level of 
equity shares, with respective loadings of 0.8801,0.8680 and 0.8241. All these variables 
have positive signs. Thus, this factor is labeled as "Financial Capability". 
Factor 4: Marketing Capability 
Factor 4 has three positively significant loadings, and the variables mainly related to 
marketing access which included access to sales distribution channel, access to export 
markets and the influence of host government, with respectively loadings of 0.9174, 
0.9047 and 0.6441. Therefore, this factor is labeled as "Marketing Capability". 
According to the above factor analysis, the 10 variables were summarized into four main 
dimensions which related to the bargaining power for international joint ventures in 
Taiwan. 
These results are not the same as Yan and Gray's (1994) results which classify the 
components of bargaining power into context based and resource based. However the 
results of this empirical survey echoed related research findings (Blodgett, 1991; Gomes- 
Cassores, 1990; Kobrin, 1987; Lecraw, 1984; Fagre and Wells, 1982). Bargaining 
power stems from critical resources, such as technology, marketing expertise, access to 
financial markets, access to export or local markets and investment amount. The 
important variables relating to bargaining power are analyzed and four factors of 
bargaining power are obtained. Next, we turn to analyze the relation between these 
factors and the sample characteristics. 
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6.2.3.2 Bargaining Power and Characteristics of Sample 
The main goals of this subsection are to analyze the variance between the sources of 
bargaining power and sample characteristics which include industry, size and age of host 
country parents. This analysis is conducted in two ways. Firstly, the rank order of 
bargaining power is examined over a number of characteristics of the sample. Secondly, 
the relationship between factors of bargaining power and the characteristics of the 
sample are examined. The relative statistical methods are used to test the relationships. 
6.2.3.2.1 Industry 
This subsection attempts to test whether there is any difference in bargaining power in 
different industry groups. The t test was employed and the result is shown in Table 
6.2.3.6. 
Table 6.2.3.6 t-Test of Variables of Bargaining Power and Industry Group of Host Country Parents 
Involved 
Service group Manufacturing group 





1. Technological ability 2.5517 1.3252 3.9176 1.4410 20.2078 0.0000* 
2. Innovative ability 2.2414 1.2437 3.3647 1.2803 16.8831 0.0001* 
3. Access to export markets 2.5172 0.7847 2.8000 0.8971 2.2822 0.1337 
4. Investment amount 4.5172 0.6336 4.1647 0.5311 8.6153 0.0040* 
5. Access to financial resources 3.6552 0.6695 3.4588 0.5681 2.3543 0.1278 
6. Management experience 3.8276 0.9662 3.0941 0.8539 14.9093 0.0002* 
7. Access to sale distribution 2 8276 0 8892 0824 3 0 9285 6623 1 0.2000 
channel . . . . . 
8 The influence of host . 1.7586 0.5766 1.9059 0.7007 1.0388 0.3103 
government 
9. The knowledge of the local 
market 
4.3103 0.9298 3.5059 0.8677 17.9210 0.0000 
10. The level of equity shares 4.5517 0.6317 4.3176 0.6018 3.1900 0.0768 
From the results shown in Table 6.2.3.6, we found that part of the results have a 
significant difference between the industry groups, while part of results are not 
significant. The significant variables included technological ability, innovative ability, 
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investment amount, management experience and the knowledge of the local markets. 
The manufacturing group has higher mean values than the service group in terms of 
technological ability, innovative ability and investment amount. On the other hand, the 
service group has higher mean values than the manufacturing group in management 
experience and the knowledge of the local markets. 
These results explained that the service group was involved with more invisible assets 
and focuses more on markets and management. However, the manufacturing group has 
involved more strongly on the technological issues and has invested large amounts on 
equipment and machines. 
Next, the analysis focuses on the factors of bargaining power. From the aspect of factor 
constructs, Table 6.2.3.7 shows that there are significant differences between industry 
groups in terms of technological capability, management capability and financial 
capability, but there is no significant difference in marketing capability. The 
manufacturing group shows technological capability as a higher influence on bargaining 
power with a mean of 3.64. For the service group, management capability and financial 
capability with means of 4.17 and 4.24, have a higher influence on obtaining bargaining 
power 
Table 6 2.3 7 i-Test of Rareainina Power Factnrc and the Industry Groan of Host Country Parents 









Technological capability 2.3966 1.2634 3.6412 1.3399 19.1898 0.0000* 
Management capability 4.0690 0.8937 3.3000 0.8099 18.4865 0.0000* 
Financial capability 4.2414 0.5835 3.9804 0.4916 5.5293 0.0204* 
Marketing capability 2.3678 0.5999 2.5961 0.7239 2.3325 0.1295 
On the basis of the above results, we found that different industries have different 
characteristics and core competitive advantages. Normally, the company which has more 
industry competitive advantages would have more negotiating power than its partners. 
Therefore, we conclude that the sources of bargaining power would be different in the 
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industry group. Bargaining power is more affected by technological capability in the 
manufacturing group; on the other hand, it is more affected by management capability 
and financial capability in the service group. 
6.2.3.2.2 Size of Host Country Parents 
This subsection looks at the relationship between sources of bargaining power and the 
size of the host country parents. The size of host country parents is discussed separately 
in relation to capital, sales volume and the number of employees. The ANOVA tests 
were performed. The results are shown in Table 6.2.3.8, Table 6.2.3.9 and Table 
6.2.3.10 and are indicated separately below. 
TahlP 7tR ANf1VA Tr t of Factnrc of Raroainino Pnwer and Canital of Nnst Country Parents 
Capital of host country parents 













Technological capability 2.92 3.12 4.09 3.43 2.5257 0.0613 
Management capability 3.78 3.49 3.19 3.50 1.2412 0.2983 
Financial capability 3.78 4.09 3.98 4.15 2.3509 0.0763 
Marketing capability 2.78 2.53 2.60 2.40 1.2690 0.2886 
As shown in Table 6.2.3.8, there are no significant differences between the factors of 
bargaining power and the capital of host country parents. However technological 
capability and financial capability had the lowest significant value at 0.06 and 0.07 
respectively. There was a trend that the company who had higher capital seemed to have 
a stronger relationship with financial capability. It is reasonable that the companies with 
more capital have more power when negotiating with their partners. 
Next, we turn to analyze the relationship between the factors of bargaining power and 
the sales volume of host country parents. The results are shown in Table 6.2.3.9. 
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Table 6.2.3.9 ANOVA Test of Factors of Bargaining Power and Sales Volumes of Host Country 
Parents 
Sales volumes of host country parents 
Factors less than NT$501- NT$5 001 - more than F Sig. NT$500 000 million 000 5 
NT$10,000 
million , , million million 
Technological 
bili 2.90 3.14 3.50 3.55 1.1482 0.3330 capa ty 
Management capability 3.83 3.53 3.50 3.36 1.0920 0.3557 
Financial capability 3.62 4.07 4.21 4.11 4.3518 0.0062* 
Marketing capability 2.69 2.56 2.52 2.48 0.3526 0.7873 
As the results in Table 6.2.3.9 show, there is only one significant difference between the 
financial capability and the sales volume of the host country parents. The companies 
who have higher sales volume seemed to have a higher relationship with financial 
capability power. This result is very similar to the relationship between the capital of the 
host country parents and the factors of bargaining power. 
Thirdly, the relation between the employee numbers of host country parents and the 
factors of bargaining power was tested. The result is shown in Table 6.2.3.10. 
Table 6.2.3.10 The ANOVA Test of Factors of Bargaining Power and Employee Numbers of Host 
Country Parents 
Employee numbers o f host country parents 
Factors less than 




Technological capability 2.74 3.27 3.56 3.49 1.6598 0.1799 
Management capability 3.64 3.57 3.54 3.37 0.5511 0.6485 
Financial capability 4.06 4.02 3.90 4.13 1.0023 0.3947 
Marketing capability 2.54 2.67 2.54 2.48 0.3689 0.7756 
From Table 6.2.3.10, the results reveal that there are no significant differences between 
the factors of bargaining power and the employee numbers of host country parents. 
In summary, the size of host country parents which relate to capital, sales volume and the 
number of employees do not have a significant relationship with sources of bargaining 
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power. There is only one exception, i. e., the financial capability and sales volume of host 
country parents had a significant association. Taiwanese companies who have higher 
sales volume seemed to have a stronger relationship with financial capability with regard 
to bargaining power. 
6.2.3.2.3 Age of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted the relationship analysis between the ages of the host country 
parents and factors of bargaining power. The results are shown in Table 6.2.3.11. 
Table 6.2.3.11 The ANOVA Test of Factors of BareaininLy Power and Aces of Host Country Parents 
Age of host count ry parents 
Factors 6-10 11-20 21-30 more than 30 F Sig. 1-5 years years years years years 
Technological 3 25 3 38 70 2 04 3 56 3 1.4478 0.2232 
capability . . . . . 
Management 75 2 3 75 70 3 3 67 40 3 1.0504 0.3848 
capability . . . . . 
Financial 83 2 4 00 4 24 3 99 06 4 3.5917 0.0086* 
capability . . . . . 
Marketing 2 33 2 67 2 47 2 54 2 55 0.1179 0.9759 
cap abili . . . . . 
As the results of Table 6.2.3.1 show, there is only one significant difference between the 
bargaining power of financial capability and the ages of the host country parents. The 
result is similar to the sales volume and the number of employees. The companies who 
are older have a stronger relationship with the bargaining power of financial capability. 
To review it as a whole, the results reveal that there are no associations between 
bargaining power and capital, and the Taiwanese parent's employee numbers, and the 
ages of host country parents. There are only a few exceptions namely the industry group 
and the age of the host country parents. A summary of the analysis results between 
bargaining power and the sample characteristics is provided in Table 6.2.3.12. 
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Table 6.23.12 Summary of the Relations between the Bargaining Power ani Samnle rharacterictinc 
Bargaining Power 
Sample Characteristics Technological Management inancial capability F 
Marketing 
capability capability capability 








Sales volume No association No association F=6.606 p=0.0004* No association 
Capital No association No association No association No association 
Number of employees No association No association No association No association 
Age 
Host country parents No association No association F=3.592 =0.0086* No association 
On the basis of the above results, there is little evidence in the study of any statistical 
variation in the sources of bargaining power across the characteristics of the sample. 
The major exception is the industries in which Taiwan parents are involved. Different 
industries have different core competitive advantages; therefore, companies focus on 
different characteristics and different resources. The results of this study show that the 
possible sources of bargaining power are different between industry groups. The 
bargaining power is more affected by technological capability in the manufacturing group, 
while it is more affected by management capability and financial capability in the service 
group. Apart from financial capability, however, there appears to be no other significant 
differences between the factors of bargaining power and the age of the host country 
parents. Next, we turned to analyze the dimension of resource contributions. 
6.2.4 Empirical Results of Resource Contributions 
In Chapter 5.4, several categorisations of resource types have been discussed in this 
study in relation to relevant literature. There is a wide range of resources that each 
parent might contribute to a joint venture and each type of resource potentially provides 
a different source of power and different scope of influence. This study gathers together 
the most common variables to measure the contributions of the host country parents and 
foreign parents. The resources contributed by parents are classified into five categories 
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viz, physical resources, invisible resources, financial resources, human resources, and 
organisation ability resources. 
This section considers the resource contributions from both parents. The relative 
importance of a set of resources is identified first. The relation between resource 
contribution by both parents and a number of characteristics of the sample are tested. 
The results of this empirical survey are described in the following subsections. 
6.2.4.1 Resource Contributions by Parents 
This subsection first demonstrates the resource contributions by host country parents and 
foreign parents. The rank order of resource contributions by parents is shown in Table 
6.2.4.1. 
Table 6.2.4.1 Rank Order of reccmrce contributions by Nnct Country Parents and Foreign Parents 
Taiwanese parent Foreign parent Variables 
Mean Std Rank Mean Std Rank 
1. Financial resource 3.51 1.01 6 3.81 0.87 1 
2. Key components and raw material 1.48 1.51 14 3.42 1.73 5 
3. Land, machinery, equipment 1.78 1.51 12 2.46 1.51 13 
4. Providing high-level expertise 3.15 1.06 8 3.05 1.08 9 
5. Marketing and operation ability 3.62 1.12 4 3.32 1.18 6 
6. Marketing channel 3.97 1.23 3 2.67 0.87 12 
7. Technological or R&D ability 1.75 1.44 13 2.97 1.44 10 
8. Access to external capital 3.51 0.83 5 3.25 0.82 7 
9. Expertise of employees 2.72 1.08 9 3.25 1.12 8 
10. Access to public relation with local government 4.35 0.53 1 1.63 0.52 14 
11. Access to environmental knowledge 4.11 0.96 2 2.91 0.82 11 
12. Sharing brands or patent 2.20 1.33 10 3.58 1.24 2 
13. Sharing know-how 1.87 1.29 11 3.43 1.20 4 
14. Sharing the knowledge of management 3.37 0.98 7 3.45 1.14 3 
16. In general, what degree is contributed by each 
partner? 
3.75 1.12 3.85 0.99 
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From the results in Table 6.2.4.1, for the host country parents, "Access to public relation 
with the local government" and "Access to environmental knowledge" are the most 
significant resources which contributed to the joint venture. One reason that 
international joint ventures are formed is because foreign companies want to expand into 
overseas markets. However, they might not be familiar with the local environment of the 
host country; therefore, they try to cooperate with a local company. Thus, local parents 
usually play an important role in access to local government and knowledge of the local 
environment. The results of this empirical survey are consistent with the results of 
UNCTC (1987) and Inkpen and Beamish (1997). The local partner's contributions are 
more on knowledge of the local environment and the access to government relation. 
In addition, the results show that the least resources contributed by host country parents 
are "Key components and raw material" and "Technological or R&D ability". Taiwan is 
a small island and doesn't have natural resources; therefore, most Taiwanese companies 
import raw material from other countries. For some industries, the key components are 
also controlled by other foreign companies; for example, Japanese companies control the 
key motor components of the motor industry. Most Taiwanese companies have very 
strong strengths in manufacturing, but have weaknesses in technology or R&D ability. 
Thus, they would cooperate with foreign companies to obtain or improve their 
technology or R&D ability. 
On the other hand, the first three resources contributed by foreign parents are "financial 
resources", "sharing brands or patent" and "sharing the knowledge of management". 
Foreign parents from the developed countries usually have a very strong financial 
capability, technological capability, and global brands. Technology, brands and patent, 
management knowledge are the most important resources for developing countries. 
Therefore, forming an international joint venture is a useful method to fit each other's 
demand and in turn to benefit from the complementarity. The results of this survey are 
consistent with the results of Wu (1994) and Chang (1986). Host country parents 
contribute more resources with regard to the local market and their main objectives are 
obtaining the foreign parent's technology and brands or patent. 
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The above discussion shows that the analysis of resource contribution is based on the 
rank order of each variable. The Paired-Samples test is used to test whether the resource 
contribution by each parent has a significant difference. The results are shown in Table 
6.2.4.2. 
Table 6.2.4.2 Paired-Samples Tests of Resource Contribution by Host Country Parents and Foreign 
Pnrrnic 
Paired Differences 
Si 2-t il d Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t g. ( a e ) 
1. Financial resource -0.30 1.50 -2.12 0.0365* 
2. Key components and raw material -1.94 2.17 -9.53 0.0000* 
3. Land, machinery, equipment -0.68 1.87 -3.86 0.0002* 
4. Providing high-level expertise 0.10 1.69 0.61 0.5441 
5. Marketing and operation ability 0.31 1.94 1.69 0.0942 
6. Marketing channel 1.31 1.54 9.09 0.0000* 
7. Technology or R&D ability -1.23 1.62 -8.10 
0.0000* 
8. Access to external capital 0.25 1.22 2.23 0.0277* 
9. Expertise of employees -0.53 1.73 -3.26 
0.0015* 
10. Access to public relation with local 
government 
2.72 0.76 38.28 0. ()()()()* 
11. Access to environmental knowledge 1.20 1.31 9.78 0.0000* 
12. Sharing brands or patent -1.38 1.96 -7.50 0.0000* 
13. Sharing Know-how -1.56 1.85 -9.02 0.0()00* 
14. Sharing the knowledge of management -0.08 1.73 -0.49 0.6261 
16. In general, what degree is contributed by 
each partner'? 
4l 11 1.71 -0.66 0.5113 
From Table 6.2.4.2, we could find that most of the variables are significant except 
"Providing high-level expertise", "Marketing and operating ability", "Sharing the 
knowledge of management" and "In general, what degree is contributed by each 
partner? " These results indicate that the host country parents and foreign parents 
contribute different degrees of resources into joint ventures. As to prior discussion, the 
host country parents concentrate on the relationship with local government and local 




On the other hand, there are no significant differences on human resources, marketing 
and operating ability, or management knowledge. However, both parents might focus on 
different issues. For example, foreign parents might contribute high-level managers or 
special experts to joint ventures, but the host country parents provide more resources on 
basic management or day-to-day management. Both contribute to human resources, but 
in different areas. To sum up, these results indicate that both parents contribute different 
resources to joint ventures from the complementary resource aspect. 
Next, the analysis was employed based on the factor of resources contributed by host 
country parents and foreign parents. The Paired-Sample test is used to test the 
difference between both parents. The results are shown in Table 6.2.4.3 and Table 
6.2.4.4. 
Table 6243 Faetnrc of Recnnrcec Cnnirihuted by Hnst Cnirnlrv Parents and Foreien Parents 
Host country parents Foreign parents 
Factors 
Mean Std Rank Mean Std Rank 
Physical resources 1.63 1.45 5 2.94 1.51 4 
Invisible resources 2.48 1.11 4 3.49 1.02 2 
Financial resources 3.51 0.88 2 3.53 0.77 1 
Human resources 2.93 1.04 3 3.15 1.07 3 
Organization resources 3.56 0.86 1 2.70 0.70 5 
Table 6.2.4.4 Paired-Sample Tests of Factors of Resource Contribution by Host Country Parents and 
Forcien Parents 
V i bl 
Paired Differences 
2 il d Si ar a es 
Mean Std. Dev. 
I -ta e ) g. ( 
Physical resources -0.30 1.50 -7.401 0. ()00* 
Invisible resources -1.94 2.17 -6.475 0.000* 
Financial resources -0.68 1.87 -0.179 0.858 
Human resources O. 10 1.69 -1.382 0.170 
Organization resources 0.31 1.94 7.831 0.000* 
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From the Table 6.2.4.3, it is clear that the host country parents contribute more on 
organization resources, and foreign parents make the least contribution. On the other 
hand, foreign parents contribute more in invisible resources, but host country parents 
have less contribution in this area. In general, foreign parents have a higher mean value 
on resource contribution, excepting the mean on organizational resources. 
Table 6.2.4.4 shows that there are significant differences in most factors of resources 
except financial resources and human resources. This might be because human resources 
and financial resources are basic resources that parents have to contribute to joint 
ventures. Therefore, there is no significant difference between parents in financial and 
human resources. 
In summary, these results reveal that both patents contribute different resources to joint 
ventures according to their expert resources. Host country parents contribute more on 
organizational resources, human resources, and local market knowledge. Foreign 
parents contribute more on the key components, brands or patents, and technologies. 
Both parents contribute complementary resources to joint ventures and benefit from the 
synergy of cooperation. Next, we tested the relationship between resource contributions 
and sample characteristics. 
6.2.4.2 Resource Contributions and Characteristics of Sample 
The main goals of this subsection are to analyze the variance between the resource 
contribution by parents and the sample characteristics including regions, industry, size 
and age of the host country parents. The analysis is conducted in two ways. Firstly, the 
factors of resource contribution are examined over a number of characteristics of the 
sample. Secondly, the relationship between the factors of resources and the 
characteristics of the sample are described. The relative statistical methods are used to 




This subsection attempted to test whether foreign parents from different origins would 
contribute different resources into joint ventures. The results are shown in Table 6.2.4.5. 
Table 6.2.4.5 ANOVA Test between Cnntrihutinn of Foreign Parents and Rehinns 








F_Physical resources 3.1364 2.8636 2.0333 3.5143 0.0331 
F Invisible resources 3.3939 3.7727 3.5333 1.1961 0.3062 
F Financial resources 3.4545 3.6591 3.7333 1.2128 0.3013 
F 
_Human 
resources 3.0649 3.2727 3.4000 0.8002 0.4518 
F_Organization 
resources 
2.7273 2.6727 2.6000 0.2257 0.7983 
The results reveal that there is only one significant difference between the resource factor 
contributed by foreign parents and the origin of foreign parents. From Table 6.2.4.5, we 
find that foreign parents from Asian countries had more contributions in physical 
resources than those from American or European countries. Although other factors have 
no significant differences in relation to the origins of foreign parents, the results showed 
that foreign parents from American countries had a higher contribution in invisible 
resources and parents from European countries had a higher contribution in financial 
resources. 
These results are consistent with the background of Taiwan, in that Taiwan has a closer 
relationship with America and has greater cooperative experience with American 
companies. Most American companies contributed more in brands or patent when they 
cooperated with Taiwanese companies. For parents who are from European countries, 
they contributed more in financial resources. The reasons as discussed before might be 




This subsection conducted an analysis of the relationship between industry groups and 
resource contribution by host country parents. The results are shown in Table 6.2.4.6. 




Manufacturing group Service group 
t g. 
Physical resources 1.9765 0.6207 22.6794 0.0000* 
Invisible resources 2.6078 2.1034 4.6498 0.0332* 
Financial resources 3.4529 3.6724 1.3416 0.2492 
Human resources 3.0000 2.7414 1.3520 0.2474 
Organization resources 3.6588 3.2759 4.3860 0.0385* 
There are significant differences between the industry groups and the physical resources, 
invisible resources and organizational resources that the host country parents contributed. 
In part of the results there is no significant difference in financial resources or human 
resources. 
The results reveal that host country parents who are in the manufacturing group, have 
higher resource contributions to the joint venture than parents from the service group. 
Thus, the manufacturing group has a higher resource contribution on all the resource 
factors excepting financial resources. They also have significant differences in physical 
resources, invisible resources and organizational resources. 
Although there is no difference in financial resources, the result shows that the service 
industry received a higher financial contribution than the manufacturing group. The 
reason might be because the service industry is not largely involved in productive 
equipments or visible assets, it is mainly involved in the investment of money. 
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6.2.4.2.3 Size of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted the relationship analysis between the size of the host country 
parents and their resource contributions to joint ventures. The size of the host country 
parents is discussed separately in relation to capital, sales volume and the number of 
employees. The ANOVA test was executed. The results are shown in Table 6.2.4.7, 
Table 6.2.4.8 and Table 6.2.4.9 and are discussed separately below. 
Table 6.2.4.7 ANOVA Test of Contribution Factors of Host Country Parents and the Capital of Host 
C'nnntnv Parente 
Capital of host country parents 












Physical resources 1.4444 1.3023 2.0313 1.9324 1.8260 0.1466 
Invisible resources 2.1481 2.2248 2.7083 2.8378 2.9742 0.0348* 
Financial resources 3.4444 3.3372 3.7813 3.6216 1.2939 0.2802 
Human resources 3.1389 2.6628 2.9063 3.1622 1.8610 0.1404 
Organization resources 3.3889 3.3860 3.6875 3.7946 1.8897 0.1355 
As shown in Table 6.2.4.7, there is only one significant difference between the invisible 
factor and the capital of the host country parents. Apart from invisible resources, 
however, there appears to be no other significant differences between the resource 
factors of contribution and the capital of the host country parents. 
When we compare the mean value among the capital groups of the host country parents, 
there is a significant difference between the capital in the "less than NT$5,000 million 
group and those in the more than NT$ 5,000 million group. The companies with higher 
capital contribute more on invisible resources. These results reveal that the companies 
who have higher capital contributed more on invisible resources. One possible reason 
might be because the brands or patents always are supported by the companies who have 
the ability and resources to develop these invisible assets. In the business world, the 
brands or patents always cost a lot of money to build. This result implies that the 
companies who have the ability to contribute these invisible resources are the big 
companies of high reputation in the world. 
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The results of the ANOVA test relating to the resource factors and sales volumes of host 
country parents are shown in Table 6.2.4.8. 
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Table 6.2.4.8 ANOVA Test of Contribution Factors of Host Country Parents and the Sales Volumes of 
Hnct ('nuntrv Parents 
Sales volumes of host country parents 












Physical resources 1.4333 1.1216 2.0000 1.9783 3.0111 0.0332 * 
Invisible resources 2.1333 2.0450 2.7083 2.8623 4.9313 0.0030 * 
Financial resources 3.3000 3.1757 4.0625 3.6522 5.0279 0.0026 * 
Human resources 3.0000 2.5405 3.1250 3.1630 2.8658 0.0399 * 
I Organization resources 3.2533 3.3027 3.7375 3.8087 3.4355 0.0195 * 
The results show that there are significant differences between all the resource factors 
and the sales volume of the host country parents. These results indicate that the 
companies who have higher sales volumes contributed more resources to joint ventures. 
The higher sales volumes of the host country parents, the higher ability and more 
resources they have, therefore, the big companies contribute more resources to a joint 
venture 
The results of the ANOVA tests relating to the resource factors and employee numbers 
of the host country parents are shown in Table 6.2.4.9. As shown in Table 6.2.4.9, part 
of the result is significant differences between the resources factors and the employee 
numbers of the host country parents. The significant factors are physical resources, 
invisible resources and organizational resources. There are no differences in financial 
resources and human resources. In general, no matter whether it is significant or not, the 
companies who have more employees contributed more resources into joint ventures. 
These results indicate that the bigger companies have greater ability to contribute 
resources to their joint ventures. 
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Table 6.2.4.9 ANOVA Test of Contribution Factors of Host Country Parents and the Employee 
Number of Host Country Parents 
Employee number of host country parents 
Factors less than 
200 




Physical resources 0.8095 1.2500 1.9167 2.0319 4.7120 0.0039 * 
Invisible resources 1.7302 2.1515 2.7500 2.8298 6.8341 0.0003 * 
Financial resources 3.3810 3.2500 3.4375 3.7234 1.7935 0.1526 
Human resources 2.6429 2.5909 3.0417 3.1702 2.3387 0.0774 
Organization resources 3.0762 3.2455 3.6583 3.8766 6.1191 0.0007* 
In summary, the size of host country parents relating to capital, sales volume and the 
number of employees, has a significant influence on the resource contribution, especially, 
the sales volume of parents. These results indicate that bigger companies with higher 
capability and resources seemed to have more abilities and resources to support their 
joint ventures. 
6.2.4.2.4 Ages of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted the relationship analysis between the ages of the host country 
parents and the resources contributions of host country parents. The results of the 
ANOVA tests are shown in Table 6.2.4.10. 
As Table 6.2.4.10, shows there is no significant difference between the resource 
contributions and the ages of the host country parents. Therefore, it was concluded that 
the resource contributions of the host country parents is not associated with ages of the 
host country parents 
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Table 6.2.4.10 ANOVA Test of Contribution Factors of Taiwanese Parent and Age of Host Country 
Parents 
Age of host country parents 
Factors 




Physical resources 3.5000 1.1250 1.0000 1.5833 1.7609 1.8758 0.1198 
Invisible resources 2.8333 3.0000 2.0000 2.3472 2.5894 1.2463 0.2957 
Financial resources 4.0000 3.5000 3.3667 3.2708 3.6087 0.9067 0.4628 
Human resources 4.2500 3.8750 2.6667 2.7708 2.9565 2.1197 0.0832 
Organization 
resources 
4.0000 4.0500 3.2400 3.4583 3.6261 1.1589 0.3330 
In sum, the age of the host country parents does not affect the resource contributions of 
host country parents to joint ventures. 
On the whole, the results of this empirical survey reveal that there are some associations 
between contribution factors, and some of the sample characteristics such as Taiwanese 
parent's size. A summary of analysis results is provided in Table 6.2.4.11. 
Table 6.2.4.11 Summary the Relations between the Contribution and Sample Characteristics 
Resource contribut ion Sample Characteristics 
Physical Invisible Finance Human Organization 
Regions of foreign 
partners F=3 514 No No No No Asian countries . p=0.0331* association association association association American countries 
European countries 
Industry groups 
Manufacturing t=22.6794 t=4.6498 No No t=4.3860 
group p=0.0000* p=0.0332* association association p=0.0385* 
Service group 
Size 
Sales volumes F=3.011 F=4.931 F=5.028 F=2.866 F=3.436 
p=0.0332* p=0.0030* p=0.0026* p=0.0399* p=0.0195* 
Capital No F=2.974 No No No 
association p=0.0348* association association association 
Number of employees F=4.712 F=6.834 No No F=6.120 
-0.0039* =0.0003* association association =0.0007* 
Age No No No No No 
Host ntry parents association association association association association 
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On the basis of the above results, there is some evidence of statistical variation with 
respect to the resource contribution factors and sample characteristics. The results 
reveal that foreign parents from Asian countries make more contribution on physical 
resources than those from American or European countries. The results also show that 
the host country parents in the manufacturing group had a higher resource contribution 
to the joint venture than the parents from the service group. 
The size of the host country parents relating to capital, sales volume, and the number of 
employees had a significant influence on the resource contribution, especially on the sales 
volume of the parents; and also the sales volumes of the host country parents. The 
higher sales volumes of the host country parents meant that they had higher ability the 
more resources they own, in this case, the big companies are willing to contribute more 
resources to joint ventures. Next, we turn to analyze the dimension of motivation for 
forming international joint ventures. 
6.2.5 Empirical Results of the Motivation for International Joint 
Venture Formation 
The main objectives of this section are to analyze the motives for the formation of an 
international joint venture. The relative importance of a set of motives is identified in 
chapter S. S. In this section, the relative importance of different motives as held by 
Taiwanese enterprises, is discussed first. Factor analysis of many motives for 
international joint venture formation is presented in the second subsection. The 
relationship between motivation and a number of characteristics of the sample is tested 
and indicated in relevant subsections. 
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6.2.5.1 The Relative Importance of Motivation for International Joint Venture 
Formation 
This subsection aims to indicate what motives for international joint venture formation 
assumed the greatest importance for Taiwanese enterprises. The rank order of motives 
for forming the international joint venture is shown in Table 6.2.5.1. 
Tahh f2S1 Rank (ln1r r of Mntivatinn of Tnternatinnnl Mint Ventures 
Variables Mean Std Rank 
6. Extending the range of products and service 3.89 0.87 1 
11. Facilitating diversified development 3.89 0.93 2 
5. Expanding the market and entering new markets 3.75 0.85 3 
21. Acquiring partner's brands or patents 3.75 1.20 4 
10. Maintaining or improving the competitive position 3.70 0.62 5 
20. Sharing partner's resource 3.68 0.63 6 
18. Acquiring low cost materials and components 3.59 1.44 7 
25. Technology transfer 3.13 1.62 8 
24. Acquiring technology 3.12 1.62 9 
8. Acquiring the economies of scale of production and sale 3.09 0.82 10 
14. Improving new product design ability from partner 3.05 0.81 11 
22. Acquiring partner's manufacturing equipment and technology 3.03 1.49 12 
19. Acquiring sufficient capital 3.01 0.68 13 
15. Learning management knowledge 2.96 1.05 14 
7. Reducing competition 2.91 0.69 15 
13. Learning marketing knowledge 2.82 1.06 16 
17. Learning partner's manufacturing technology 2.79 1.20 17 
23. Improving ability on developing new technology 2.77 1.44 18 
3. Reducing the risk caused by environment uncertainty 2.60 0.75 19 
2. Spreading the risk of finance 2.58 0.82 20 
12. Learning international business knowledge 2.58 0.85 21 
4. Sharing the risk of the business cycle 2.55 0.77 22 
9. Conforming to government policy 2.48 0.64 23 
1. Sharing a large sum of fixed costs 2.47 0.79 24 
26. Shortening the time from the product designment to market entry 2.36 1.21 25 
16. Learning partner's human resource management 2.18 0.67 26 
From the results shown in Table 6.2.5.1, the most important motives are "Extending the 
range of products and service", "Facilitating diversified development", "Expanding the 
market and entering new markets", and "Acquiring partner's brands or patents". The 
mean values are 3.89 and 3.75. These motives range between "important" and "fairly 
important". This indicates that market expansion and diversified development were 
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considered fairly important motives for Taiwanese enterprises to form an international 
joint venture. The results are consistent with those found in previous empirical studies 
(Lin, 1995; Beamish et al, 1994; Datta, 1988; Daniels et al., 1985). 
The least important variables are "Learning partner's human resource management" with 
the mean value of 2.18. These results indicate that human resource management is not 
an important variable for Taiwanese companies when they consider cooperating with 
foreign companies. The reason might be because the human resource management must 
fit the local situation and cannot be copied from other companies without any adjustment. 
Thus, the human resource management variable is not important to Taiwanese companies. 
All the motives are identified from the relevant studies; however, this shows too many 
variables on the motivation for international joint venture formation. From the review of 
the literature, we find that various authors use a broadly similar set of motivation 
variables. Consequently, these 26 motives represent a number of overlapping 
perspectives on the motivation for international joint venture formation. In order to have 
a clearer profile of motivation, factor analysis was employed to identify a smaller number 
of motives for this sample. The following subsection indicates the factor analysis of 
motivation. 
6.2.5.2 Factor Analysis of Motivations 
The potential conceptual and statistical overlapping factor analysis was launched to 
identify the structure underpinning the motivation for international joint venture 
formation. This subsection deals with the factor analysis of the motivation for 
international joint venture formation. This analysis summarizes the important 
information contained in the 26 variables into a smaller set of new factors with a 
minimum loss of information. Principal components analysis is used to extract a new set 
of core data. The rotated principal components analysis factor loading matrix for 





Table 6.2.5.2 The Eigenvalue after Rotation and Iteration of Motivation for International Joint 
Venture Fnrmatinn 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variable Cumulated 
1 6.02 23.15 23.15 
2 3.91 15.06 38.20 
3 3.32 12.76 50.97 
4 3.12 12.00 62.97 
5 2.85 10.95 73.92 
6 2.25 8.64 82.56 
The factor analysis results for motives of international joint venture formation indicated 
that the six extracted factors account for 82.56 % of the total variance for the motivation. 
Each factor of these six extracted factors has an Eigenvalue greater than 1. 
In order to achieve a clearer factor structure, the Varimax method is used to rotate the 
initial factor solution. The Varimax rotated analysis factor loading matrix for the 
motivation is presented in Table 6.2.5.3. Each of these six extracted factors has different 
factor loadings for each variable. A factor loading of greater than ±o. 5 is considered as 
significant. All the factor loadings are greater than 0.6. These results indicate that all the 
factor loadings are significant. 
After consideration of the significance of the factor loadings, the reliability of each factor 
construct was tested using the Cronbach coefficient alpha in order to measure the 
internal consistency of each factor. The results are shown in Table 6.2.5.4. The 
Cronbach alpha score for each factor of motivation for international joint venture 
formation is greater than 0.8. These results represent very high internal consistency in 
each factor. Thus, we conclude that the factor of motivation has very high reliability. 
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Table 6.2.5.3 Rotated Component Matrix of Factor Analysis of Motivation for International Joint 
Venture Formation 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
24. Acquiring technology 0.9528 -0.1337 -0.0181 0.0554 0.1577 -0.0975 
25. Technology transfer 0.9491 -0.1499 -0.0195 0.0644 0.1617 -0.1237 
23. Improving ability on developing 0.9491 -0.0397 -0.0126 0.1030 0.1492 -0.1120 new technology 
22. Acquiring partner's manufacturing 0 9315 -0.1294 -0.0418 0.0880 0.2216 -0.0826 equipment and technology . 
17.1-earning partner's manufacturing 0 9220 0.0016 -0.0349 0.1073 0.0102 0.0278 technology . 
26. Shortening the time from the 0.8958 -0.0141 0.0295 0.1343 0.1494 -0.1006 product design to market entry 
15. Learning management knowledge -0.1807 0.9098 0.0883 0.0309 -0.0331 0.0438 
13. Learning marketing knowledge -0.2105 0.9070 0.0677 0.0643 -0.1268 0.0886 
12. Learning international business 
-0.0879 0.8912 0.0232 0.0387 -0.1953 0.1264 knowledge 
16. Learning partner's human resource 0.0057 0.8546 0.1406 0.0747 0.0258 0.0631 
management 
14. Improving new product design 0 5481 0 6297 -0 0216 0.1522 0.0708 -0.0387 ability from partner . . . 
2. Spreading the risk of finance 0.0072 0.0686 0.9200 -0.0547 0.0074 0.1308 
1. Sharing a large sum of fixed costs 0.0780 0.0417 0.8866 0.0103 0.0562 0.1319 
4. Sharing the risk of business cycle -0.0498 0.0797 0.8836 0.0871 -0.0086 0.0154 
3. Reducing the risk caused by 
-0.1021 0.0952 0.8293 0.1427 -0.0729 -0.0131 environment uncertainty 
8. Acquiring the economies of scale of 0.1477 0.0007 0.0035 0.9015 0.1155 -0.0796 production and sale 
7. Reducing competition 0.1868 0.0268 -0.0068 0.8467 0.0237 0.1069 
9. Conforming to government policy 0.0635 0.2411 0.1295 0.7519 0.0597 0.2405 
10. Maintaining or improving the 0.1284 0.0378 0.0973 0.7255 -0.0628 0.3700 competitive position 
21. Acquiring partner's brands or 0.2046 -0.0853 -0.2063 0.0144 0.8553 0.0489 patents 
19. Acquiring sufficient capital 0.0243 0.1127 0.1333 -0.0032 0.7973 -0.0822 
20. Sharing partner's resource 0.2532 -0.1161 0.1410 0.0865 0.7819 0.0427 
18. Acquiring low cost materials and 0.3100 -0.3284 -0.1779 0.0393 0.7622 -0.0851 components 
5. Expanding market and entering to 
-0 0872 0.0784 0.0659 0.3989 -0.1290 0.8040 new market , 
6. Extending the range of product and 
-0.1441 0.0254 0.0706 0.4496 -0.1049 0.7939 service 
11. Facilitating diversified development -0.2758 0.2329 0.1784 -0.0840 0.1590 0.7861 
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24. Acquiring technology 0.9528 
25. Technology transfer 0.9491 
Factor 1 
23. Improving ability on developing new technology 




17. Learning partner's manufacturing technology 0.9220 
26. Shortening the time from the product design to market entry 0.8958 
15. Learning management knowledge 0.9098 
13. Learning marketing knowledge 0.9070 
Factor 2 12. Learning international business knowledge 0.8912 0.9005 
16. Learning partner's human resource management 0.8546 
14. Improving new product design ability from partner 0.6297 
2. Spreading the risk of finance 0.9200 
1. Sharing a large sum of fixed costs 0.8866 
0 9117 Factor 3 
4. Sharing the risk of business cycle 0.8836 . 
3. Reducing the risk caused by environment uncertainty 0.8293 
8. Acquiring the economies of scale of production and sale 0.9015 
7. Reducing competition 0.8467 
8641 0 Factor 4 
9. Conforming to government policy 0.7519 . 
10. Maintaining or improving the competitive position 0.7255 
21. Acquiring partner's brands or patents 0.8553 
Factor 5 
19. Acquiring sufficient capital 




18. Acquiring low cost materials and components 0.7622 
5. Expanding the market and entering a new market 0.8040 
Factor 6 6. Extending the range of product and service 0.7939 0.8380 
11. Facilitating diversified development 0.7861 
After the measurement of each factor's internal consistency, we constructed the label for 
each factor according to the meanings of the variables in each factor. Each factor of 




Factor 1: Technological Acquisition 
Factor 1 has six significant loadings and the variables are mainly related to the 
technological component. These variables are acquiring technology, exchanging the 
technology and transfer, improving the ability to develop new technology, acquiring 
partner's manufacturing equipment and technology, learning partner's manufacturing 
technology, and shortening the time from the product design to market entry. All these 
variables have positive signs and very high factor loading scores. This indicates the 
technological capability is a very important factor for the motivation for forming an 
international joint venture. Thus, this factor is labeled as "Technological Acquisition". 
Factor 2: Knowledge Learning 
Factor 2 has five high positively significant loadings and the variables are mainly related 
to knowledge learning which includes learning management knowledge, learning 
marketing knowledge, learning international business knowledge, learning partner's 
human resource management and improving new product design ability from partner. 
Thus, this factor is labeled as "Knowledge Learning". 
Factor 3: Risk Sharing 
Factor 3 has four significant loadings and the variables are mainly related to the risk 
sharing component. These variables are spreading the risk of finance, sharing a large 
sum of fixed costs, sharing the risk of the business cycle and reducing the risk caused by 
environment uncertainty. All these variables have positive signs. This factor is therefore 
labeled as "Risk Sharing". 
Factor 4: Competitive Strategic Consideration 
Factor 4 has four significant loadings and the variables are mainly related to competitive 
strategy consideration, which includes acquiring the economies of scale of production 
and sale, reducing competition, conforming to government policy and maintaining or 
improving the competitive position. All these variables have positive signs. Thus, this 
factor is labeled as "Competitive Strategic Consideration". 
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Factor 5: Resource Complementarity 
Factor 5 has four significant loadings and the variables are mainly related to resource 
acquisition. These variables are acquiring partner's brands or patents, acquiring sufficient 
capital, sharing partner's resource and acquiring low cost materials and components. All 
these variables have positive signs. This factor is therefore labeled as "Resource 
Complementarity". 
Factor 6: Market Expanding 
Factors 6 has three significant loadings and the variables are mainly related to market 
expansion which includes expanding the market and entering a new market, extending 
the range of products and services and facilitating diversified development. All these 
variables have positive signs. Thus, this factor is labeled as "Market Expanding". 
According to the above factor analysis, the 26 variables were summarized into six main 
factors, which relate to the motives for international joint venture formation in Taiwan. 
These are technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, competitive 
strategy consideration, resource complementarity and market expansion. These factors 
of motivation are obtained from the factor analysis and each factor is labeled. The 
relationship between the motivation factors and sample characteristics were tested and 
are described next. 
6.2.5.3 Motivations and Characteristics of Sample 
The main goals of this subsection are to analyze the variance between the motivation for 
international joint venture formation and the characteristics of the sample which includes 
regions, industry, size, and ages of the host country parents. The analysis was conducted 
in two ways. Firstly, the factors of motivation for forming IJVs are examined over a 
number of characteristics of the sample. Secondly, the relation between the motivation 
factors and the sample characteristics are tested and elucidated. The relevant statistical 




The relation between the motivation factors of the host country parents to form the 
international joint ventures and the regions of foreign partners were tested. The 
ANOVA test was employed and the results are shown in Table 6.2.5.5. 
Table 6.2.5.5 ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Motivation Factors and Regions of Foreign Partners 








Technological Acquisition 2.9675 3.2045 1.8556 5.3148 0.0062 
Knowledge Learning 2.6545 2.7636 2.9600 1.0653 0.3481 
Risk Sharing 2.4870 2.6250 2.7667 1.1782 0.3117 
Competitive strategic 
Consideration 3.0944 
3.0795 2.8000 1.5370 0.2196 
Resource Complementarity 3.5942 3.3182 3.3167 1.3459 0.2645 
Market Expanding 3.8268 3.8636 3.8889 0.0506 0.9507 
As shown in Table 6.2.5.5, the results reveal that there are no significant differences 
between the motivational factors of host country parents and the regions of foreign 
partners, except for the technological acquisition motivation factor. From the mean 
value, we find that at the time when international joint ventures were formed to acquire 
technologies, most of their foreign partners are from American countries, followed by 
Asian countries. American countries are viewed as the original place of initial and high 
technology in the world, and Taiwan has a very close relationship with them. Therefore, 
the results are consistent with Taiwan's historical background that some local companies 
cooperated with American enterprises to acquire technologies. For the Asian countries, 
especially Japan as described in Chapter 2, most Taiwanese companies also have a close 
relationship with Japanese companies. Thus, host country parents obtained technologies 
through cooperation with Japanese firms. These results are very consistent with the 




The relative importance of different cooperative motives may be connected with the 
background industry of Taiwanese parents. Therefore, this subsection attempts to test 
whether a different industry group has different motives for forming an international joint 
venture. The results are shown in Table 6.2.5.6. 
Tahle 6 ') 56t Test of Taiwanese Parent's Mntivatinn and Industry Groan they Involved 
Industry 
Si Factors 
Manufacturing group Service group 
t g. 
Technological Acquisition 3.17 1.98 4.3495 0.0000* 
Knowledge Learning 2.66 2.87 -1.2579 0.2111 
Risk Sharing 2.51 2.66 -1.0179 0.3109 
Competitive strategic 
Consideration 
3.12 2.82 2.4702 * 0.0150 
Resource Complcmentarity 3.58 3.28 1.6343 0.1050 
Market Expanding 3.75 4.11 -2.2502 0.0264* 
From the results of t- test shown in Table 6.2.5.6, we find that part of the results have a 
significant difference between the industry groups, but on the other hand, part of the 
results are not significant. The significant differences between industry groups and 
motivation factors are technological acquisition, competitive strategic consideration and 
market expanding. The manufacturing group has higher mean values than the service 
group in terms of technological acquisition and strategic consideration. On the other 
hand, the service group has higher mean values than the manufacturing group in market 
expansion. 
These results explain that the firms in the service group view the primary benefit of 
forming an international joint venture as being expanding the market. Normally, 
companies in the service industry would not invest significantly in fixed assets and they 
mostly conduct market expansion to achieve the firm's growth. As a result, firms in the 
service industry focus more on market expanding motives. On the other hand, 
technological acquisition is the most important issue for firms in manufacturing group. 
Most tacit technology could not be obtained from the market. It needs to be transferred 
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through cooperation with other companies. Thus, for manufacturing companies, there 
are incentives in technological acquisition and strategic consideration motives. 
6.2.5.3.3 Size of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted the analysis of whether the motives for forming an 
international joint venture would be different because of the Taiwanese parent's size. 
The size of the host country parents is discussed separately in relation to capital, sales 
volume, and the number of employees. The ANOVA test was performed to test their 
relationship. The results are shown in Table 6.2.5.7, Table 6.2.5.8, and Table 6.2.5.9 
and are indicated separately below. 
Table 6.2.5.7 ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Motivation and Capital 
Capital 












Technological Acquisition 2.53 2.73 3.75 2.81 2.8670 0.0399* 
Knowledge Learning 3.03 2.73 2.50 2.63 1.6572 0.1805 
Risk Sharing 2.61 2.44 2.47 2.68 0.9130 0.4372 
Competitive strategic 
Consideration 3.10 2.95 3.16 3.09 0.6951 0.5570 
Resource Complementaritv 3.22 3.64 3.72 3.39 1.6226 0.1883 
Market Expanding 4.37 3.64 3.75 3.86 4.1893 0.0075* 
As shown in Table 6.2.5.7, part of the results show a significant difference while part of 
the results show no significant difference between the motivational factors and the capital 
of the host country parents. There are significant differences on technological 
acquisition and market expansion. For the technological acquisition factor, it shows that 
the medium to biggest companies who have capital between NT$5,001 to NT$ 10,000 
million, have a higher mean value on technological acquisition motivation. Those 
companies who have capital of less than NT$ 5,000 million do not seem to have high 
motivation for acquiring technology when forming an international joint venture. 
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For the market expanding factor, the results show that the smallest companies who just 
have less than NT$ 500 million in capital have the highest mean on the market expanding 
factor. This indicates that market expanding is the most important motive to small size 
enterprises. The reason might be because small companies do not have enough resources 
and capability to expand their business to other areas or countries. Therefore, they seem 
to regard forming an international joint venture as an effective mode to expand their 
market. 
Next, the relation between the motivation factors and the sales volumes of the host 
country parents was examined. As shown in Table 6.2.5.8, there are no significant 
differences between the motivational factors of international joint venture formation and 
the sales volumes of host country parents. This indicates that the amount of sales 
volume of the host country parents did not affect their motives for forming international 
joint ventures. 
Table 6.2.5.8 ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Motivation and Sales Volumes 
Sales volume 
Factors less than NT$501 - NT$5,001 - more than F Sig. 
NT$500 5,000 10,000 NT$10,000 
million million million million 
Technological 
2 56 69 2 3 04 3.05 0.7990 0.4970 Acquisition . . . 
Knowledge Learning 3.05 2.78 2.61 2.59 1.6459 0.1830 
Risk Sharing 2.55 2.61 2.23 2.61 1.3297 0.2684 
Competitive strategic 3 13 2 90 17 3 09 3 1.2404 0.2986 Consideration . . . . 
Resource 
3 08 3 57 59 3 3 56 4521 1 0.2317 Com lementari . . . . . 
Market Expanding 4.27 3.75 3.73 3.82 1.8785 0.1374 
As shown in Table 6.2.5.9, the results of the ANOVA test show that there is only one 
significant difference between the motivational factors of international joint venture 
formation and the employee numbers of host country parents. The result is similar to the 
relationship between motivational factors and the capital of host country parents. Small 
size enterprises have more incentives for market expanding motivation. 
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Table 625.9 The ANOVA Test of Taiwanese Parent's Motivation and Number of Emulovecs 
Number of employees 
Factors less than 
200 




Technological Acquisition 2.54 2.84 2.78 3.07 0.7746 0.5106 
Knowledge Learning 3.01 2.88 2.60 2.57 2.2548 0.0860 
Risk Sharing 2.76 2.36 2.43 2.61 1.5556 0.2043 
Competitive strategic 
Consideration 
3.00 3.07 2.93 3.12 0.6065 0.6121 
Resource Complementarily 3.37 3.72 3.23 3.61 1.7488 0.1613 
1 Market Expanding 4.32 3.91 3.51 3.77 4.7676 0.0037* 
In summary, the size of host country parents related to capital, sales volume and the 
number of employees, has little significant difference on the motivational factors for 
international joint venture formation. However, the results reveal that small sized 
companies had a higher incentive motivation in the market expanding factor. The 
medium sized companies had more incentive on the technology acquisition. 
6.2.5.3.4 Age of Host Country Parents 
This subsection conducted analysis on whether the age of host country parents would 
affect the motives for international joint venture formation. The results of the ANOVA 
tests are shown in Table 6.2.5.10. 
As the results show in Table 6.2.5.10, there is no significant difference between the 
motivation factors and the ages of the host country parents. Therefore, we conclude that 
the motivation for forming an international joint venture is not associated with the age of 
host country parents 
Toh1A AIa In AUf1VA Tel nfTAi. vanpcr Pnrnnt'c Mntivntinn find Am,., of Hnsl Country Parents 
Ages of H ost country parents 
Factors 6-10 11-20 21-30 more than F Sig. 1-5 years 
years years years 30 years 
Technological Acquisition 3.67 2.13 2.37 2.49 3.13 2.0932 0.0866 
Knowledge Learning 2.40 2.95 2.67 2.73 2.72 0.1937 0.9412 
Risk Sharing 3.38 2.25 2.85 2.61 2.46 2.0266 0.0957 
Competitive strategic 3.88 3.19 2.88 2.92 3.09 1.8063 0.1328 
Consideration 
Resource 3.50 2.56 3.23 3.48 3.63 2.0697 0.0897 
Com lementari 
Market Expanding 4.50 3.92 4.18 3.85 3.74 1.3876 0.243O 
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Based on the above analyses, the results of this empirical survey reveal that there are 
some associations between motivation factors and a number of sample characteristics 
such as the Taiwanese parent's size. A summary of the analysis results is provided in 
Table 6.2.5.11. 
Table 62511 Summary the Relations between Motivations and Samnle Characteristics 
Sample Characteristics Motivation of forming international joint ventures 
Technological Knowledge Risk reduction Strategic Resource Market 
acquisition learning consideration complementarity expanding 
Regions of foreign 
partners F= 5.315 No 
Asian countries No association No association No association No association 




Manufacturing group t 4.349 No association No association 
t=2.470 No association 
t --2.250 
Service group p 0.0000* p=0.0150* p -0.0264* 
Size 
Sales volumes No association No association No association No association No association No 
association 
Capital F -2.867 No association F=2.974 No association No association F 4.189 
p 0.0399* p=0.0348* p 0.0075* 
Number of employees No association No association No association No association No association F 4.768 
p 0.0037* 
Age 
Host country parents No association No association No association No association No association 
No 
association 
On the whole, there is little evidence in the study of any statistical variation in the 
motivational factors across the various characteristics of the sample. The relevant results 
are outlined below. 
The results show that one of the important motivations for forming international joint 
ventures is technological acquisition. Most host country parents cooperated with foreign 
partners; especially American and Japan companies, in order to acquire technologies. 
One of the reasons for these results might be the influence of historical background. 
Another possible reason is that most pioneer technologies are developed by American 
and Japanese companies. Therefore, host country parents have more cooperation with 
both countries' firms in order to obtain high technologies. 
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The results showed that there are significant differences between industry groups and the 
motivational factors such as technological acquisition, strategic consideration and market 
expansion. The companies in the manufacturing group had more incentive for the 
technological acquisition and strategic consideration motivation. On the other hand, the 
companies in the service group had more incentive for market expansion. 
The results also reveal that the size of host country parents, related to capital, sales 
volume and the number of employees had a small significant difference on the 
motivational factors for forming an international joint venture. There were significant 
differences in technological acquisition and market expansion factors. The results show 
that small size companies have higher incentive motivation on market expansion. The 
medium sized companies had more incentive on the technological acquisition factor. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter examined the results of statistical analysis regarding core research 
dimensions and the relationship between the research dimensions and the sample 
characteristics. There are five core dimensions which were controlled namely, ownership, 
bargaining power, contribution and motivation in this study. Each was examined 
separately and the results have provided insight into the nature of each dimension. 
The extent of control is measured by the responsibility for decision-making and high- 
level manager appointment. The results reveal that host country parents perceive the 
decision-making responsibility in terms of capital expenditures and sales target activities. 
Foreign parents take more responsibility on the production design decisions. Most of the 
decisions relating to production scheduling, manufacturing process, quality standards, 
and cost budgeting are taken by the joint ventures themselves. To sum up, the parents 
concentrate on controlling specific activities instead of controlling all the activities of the 
joint venture and exercise effective control through the appointment of key executive 
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members of the joint venture. However, the results reveal that most joint ventures had 
high autonomy to manage the company. 
The results of equity shares held by the host country parents and foreign parents show 
that both parents have minority shareholding in the joint ventures, but the host country 
parents had slightly less equity than the foreign parents 
Bargaining power can stem from critical resources such as technology, marketing 
expertise, investment amount, and access to export markets. In this study, four 
constructs of bargaining power are identified which are technological capability, 
management capability, financial capability, and marketing capability. 
There is a wide range of resources that each parent might contribute to joint ventures. In 
this study, the results reveal that both patents contribute different resources to joint 
ventures according to their expert resources. The host country parents contribute more 
on organization resources, human resources, and local market knowledge. The foreign 
parents contribute more on the key components, brands or patents, and technologies. 
Both parents contribute complementarity resources to joint ventures and thus obtain the 
synthesis of cooperation. 
There are many possible explanations regarding the motivation for forming an 
international joint venture. This study identifies six factors of motivation from 26 
variables. These factors of motivation are technological acquisition, knowledge learning, 
risk sharing, competitive strategic consideration, resource complementarity and market 
expanding. The most important motivation for the host country parents were "Extending 
the range of products and services", "Facilitating diversified development", "Expanding 
the market and entering a new markets", and "Acquiring partner's brands or patents". 
The results indicate that the companies in the manufacturing group had more incentive 
for technological acquisition and strategic consideration motivation. On the other hand, 
the companies in the service group had more incentive for market expansion. 
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The relationship between each core research dimension and the characteristics of the 
sample was examined in the relevant sections. We only summarize the most significant 
results here. The size of the host country parents and the percentage of board members 
representing parents, had a strong effect on the control that they exercised over the joint 
venture. The percentage of board members also had a strong influence on the equity 
share of joint ventures held by parents. The size of host country parents had a significant 
influence on their resource contribution to a joint venture. The results indicate that the 
big companies can contribute more resources to their joint ventures. 
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1 The operating conditions investigation of overseas and foreign investment and the contribution to 
economic development of Taiwan-The Analysis Report, Investment Commission of the Ministry of 
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RESEARCHING FINDINGS: CORRELATION 
AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 has analyzed and discussed the descriptive analysis of core research 
dimensions. In this chapter, the relationships between control and the core dimensions of 
ownership, bargaining power, contribution, and motivation are analyzed and described. 
All the hypotheses posited by this study are tested. There are four sections organized in 
this chapter. Section 7.2 analyses the relationship between all the core research 
dimensions which encompass control, ownership, bargaining power, contribution, and 
motivation. The correlation analyses are exercised between each pair of dimensions. 
Section 7.3 draws a brief conclusion. 
7.2 Correlation Analysis and Regression Analysis 
In this section, we launch the correlation analysis and regression analysis. Relevant 
theories in terms of correlation and regression analysis are described in Chapter 5.3.10.3 
and Chapter 5.3.10.5. As discussed previously, before we employ the regression analysis, 
we have to assess whether there are high associations between variables or not. In other 
words, we have to assess the collinearity or multi-collinearity between independent 
variables. At a time when multi-collinearity occurs, it has substantial effects on the 
results of the regression analysis. It will limit the size of the coefficient of determination 
and increases the difficulty in assessing the contribution of each independent variable and 
distorts the results substantially. Thus, the researcher has to assess the effects of multi- 
collinearity when exercising the regression analysis. The simplest and most obvious 
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method of identifying collinearity or multi-collinearity is to examine of the correlation 
matrix for the independent variables (Hair et. al, 1998). Hair et al. (1998) provides a 
step-by-step procedure of regression analysis details of which are described in chapter 
5.3.10.5. In this section, this study applies his procedure when exercising the regression 
analysis. Therefore, correlation analysis is conducted through all the following sections. 
7.2.1 The Analysis of Relationship between Ownership and Control 
As discussed in Chapter 5.2, ownership is seen as a proxy for management control in 
joint ventures (Blodgett, 1991; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Stopford and Wells, 1972; ). 
From their research results in China, Child and Yan (1999) suggest that the company can 
increase strategic control and influence operational control over joint ventures through 
acquiring a larger equity share. In her study in the Taiwan context, Lin (1995) finds that 
the greater the ownership the parents have, the greater the control they exercise over the 
joint ventures. Thus, this study posits that ownership and control have a positive 
relationship and the hypotheses are tested. 
H 1: There is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of ownership 
and the extent of control 
H 1.1: The higher the proportion of equity ownership held by host country parents 
the stronger their control of the operational decision-making activities in a 
joint venture 
H 1.2: The higher proportion of equity ownership. held by host country parents the 
stronger their control of the appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture 
A Pearson correlation matrix is obtained and shown in Table 7.2.1. The correlations 
between host country parent's equity share, control of decision-making activities, and 
high-level manager's appointment in joint ventures are significant and positive. 
Therefore, one can conclude that ownership is significantly correlated to the level of 
control over the operational decision-making activities and the appointment of high-level 
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managers in joint ventures. The simple regression analysis is then conducted to test the 
hypotheses. 
Table 7.2.1 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Ownership and Control of Decision-Making 










Taiwanese Parent's Ownership 1.00 
Decision-Makin Activities 0.60** 1.00 
A intment of High-Level Managers 0.60** 0.74** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The hypotheses are tested by using simple regression analysis and the results are shown 
in Table 7.2.2 and Table 7.2.3. As shown in Table 7.2.2, the relationship between 
ownership and the control on decision-making activities shows a significant relationship 
with an R2 value of 0.360. The F-value of 62.97 is significant at the 0.05 level. This 
implies that hypothesis 1.1 is substantiated. In other words, the higher proportion of 
equity ownership held by host country parents, the stronger control they exercise in the 
operational decision-making activities over the joint ventures. The equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on DM = -0.043 + 0.008 TP_Equity 
Table 7.2.2 Regression Analysis of Taiwanese Parent's Ownership and the Control of Decision- 
M icing Artiviti'. c in a Tnint Vrntnrr 
Model Sum of Square Df Mean Square F Sig. RZ 
AdRu2ted 
Regression 2.07 1 2.07 
62 97 0 000* 360 0 0 354 
Residual 3.68 112 0.03 . . . . 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -0.043 0.045 -0.952 0.343 
TP Equity 0.008 0.001 0.600 7.935 0.000* 
Predictors: (Constant), TP Equity 
Dependent Variable: TP DM 
* Significant at p<0.05 
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The same procedure is again conducted based on the appointment of high-level managers. 
From Table 7.2.3, the relationship between ownership and control of the high-level 
manager appointment in joint ventures has a significant relationship with an R2 value of 
0.359. The F-value of 62.84 is significant at the 0.05 level. In other words, there is a 
significant relationship between ownership and control in a high-level manager 
appointment in joint ventures. Therefore, hypothesis HI-2 is also substantiated. The 
equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the HL manager appointment 
= -0.022 + 0.009 TP Equity 
Table 7.2.3 Regression Analysis of Taiwanese Parent's Ownership and the Appointment of High- 
i. evel M inaners in a Mint Venture 
Model Sum of Square Df Mean Square F Sig. R2 
Adjusted 
Regression 2.34 1 2.32 
84 6 000* 0 0 359 0 354 
Residual 4.14 112 0.04 
2. . . . 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -0.022 0.048 -0.463 0.644 
TP Equity 0.009 0.001 0.600 7.927 0.000* 
Predictors: (Constant), TP Equity 
Dependent Variable: TP_ iL 
* Significant at p<0.05 
Overall, there are significant and positive relationships between the Taiwanese parent's 
proportion of ownership and control of decision-making activities and also the 
appointment of high-level managers in joint ventures. This reveals that the higher the 
equity share of ownership held by host country parents, the more control on decision- 
making activities and high-level manager appointment they can exercise in joint ventures. 
These results are consistent with most researchers' studies (Child and Yan, 1999; Lin, 
1995; Blodgett, 1991; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Stopford and Wells, 1972). This indicates 
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that parents can gain more control through obtaining higher equity shares of joint 
ventures. 
7.2.2 The Analysis of Relationship between Bargaining Power and 
Control 
Previous literature demonstrates that bargaining power can be used to affect the outcome 
of the negotiation process (Lax and Sebinius 1986; Schelling 1956). Also it was 
reported that the bargaining power of partners is a critical variable in determining 
patterns of control in joint ventures (Blodgett, 1991; Harrigan and Newman, 1990; 
Lecraw, 1984). For example, Yan and Gray (1994) indicate that the proportions of 
bargaining power between parents will affect the control of IJV, including the percentage 
of board membership, nomination of general managers, structural control and perceived 
overall control. Moreover, Lecraw (1984) finds that bargaining power, which is 
influenced by technical leadership, advertising intensity and export capability of the 
multinational partner has a significant contribution to control. On the basis of the 
relevant literature, this study posits that there is relationship between bargaining power 
and the degree of control. Therefore, the hypothesis is presented as follow: 
H 2: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the extent of 
control 
In Chapter 6.2.3, we demonstrate relevant importance variables which will affect the 
ability of host country parents to gain power over its partners. Factor analysis was 
launched to extract a new set of bargaining power factors, such as technological 
capability, management capability, financial capability, and marketing capability. A 
correlation analysis between the factors of bargaining power and control was then 
conducted. The results are shown in Table 7.2.4. 
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Table 7.2.4 Correlations between Bargaining Power and the Control of Decision-Making Activities 
and Appointment of High-Level Managers in a Joint Venture 
DM TP HL TP B Fina B Mark B Tech B Mana 
Decision-Making 1.00 
Appointment of H-L 
Managers 0.74** 1.00 
Financial capability -0.18 -0.05 1.00 
Marketing capability 0.26** 0.29** 0.00 1.00 
Technological capability 0.18 0.10 -0.31** 0.05 1.00 
Management capability -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 0.03 0.00 1.00 
"` Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The correlations between bargaining power factors and control identified by the decision- 
making and high-level managers' appointment has a limited association. It shows that 
only the bargaining power of marketing capability has a positive relationship with control 
in terms of decision-making and high-level managers' appointment in a joint venture. 
The next step was to conduct a multiple regression (the Stepwise method is used) and 
the results are shown in Tables 7.2.5 and Table 7.2.6. From Table 7.2.5, the results 
indicate that only the bargaining power of marketing capability is included in the 
equation. The relationship between bargaining power and the extent of control in 
operational decision-making activities over joint ventures has a significant relationship 
with an R2 value of 0.069. The F-value of 8.26 is significant at the 0.05 level. The 
equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the N's DM activities= 0.290 + 0.059 B _Mark 
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Table 7.2.5 Multiple Regression Analysis of Bargaining Power and Control of Decision-Making 
Activities in q 7nint Venture 
Model Sum of Square Df Mean Square F Sig. R2 Adjusted RZ 
Regression 0.40 1 0.40 
* 
Residual 5.36 112 0.05 





Variable not in the equation 
Variables 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t value Sig. 
(Constant) 0.290 0.020 14.154 0.343 
B. Mark 0.059 0.021 0.262 2.873 0.000* 
B 
_Tech 
0.169 1.807 0.074 
B_Manage -0.077 -0.818 0.415 
B_Finan FZ, -1.971 0.051 
Predictors: (Constant), Bjvlark 
Dependent Variable: TP_DM 
* Significant at p<0.05 
The same procedure was conducted based on the high-level manager appointment. From 
Table 7.2.6, the results also indicate the bargaining power of marketing capability is 
included in the equation. The relationship between the bargaining power of marketing 
capability and the control on the JV's high-level manager appointment has a significant 
relationship with an R2 value of 0.087. The F-value of 10.672 is significant at the 0.05 
level. The equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the HL manager appointment 
= 0.331 + 0.071 B _Mark 
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Table 7.2.6 Multiple Regression Analysis of Bargaining Power and Control of High-Level Manager 
Annnintment nver 7nint Ventures 
Model Sum Df Mean Square F Sig. R2 Adjusted R2 
Regression 0.563 1 0.563 10 672 0 001* 08 0 0 
Residual 5.903 112 0.053 





Variable not in the equation 
Variables 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t value Sig. 
(Constant) 0.331 0.022 15.376 0.000* 
B_Mark 0.071 0.022 0.295 3.267 0.001* 
B 
_Tech 
0.091 0.962 0.338 
B 
_Manage 
(0.107) (1.138) 0.258 
B Finan (0.052) (0.544) 0.588 
Predictors: (Constant), B Mark 
Dependent Variable: T? 
-HL * Significant at p<0.05 
Although the RZ value is considerably low (0.069 and 0.087), indicating that the 
bargaining power of marketing capability explains very little of the control of decision- 
making activities and high-level manager appointment in the joint venture. Statistically, 
it is still a significant and positive predictor. Thus, an increase in the bargaining power of 
marketing capability may increase the extent of control over the joint venture. Other 
variables which are not included in the equation do not have any influence on the extent 
of control. Overall, the findings provide very little support for hypothesis H2. 
In summary, bargaining power and control are not closely associated. Only the 
bargaining power of marketing capability and control has a modest and positive 
relationship. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is only partially substantiated. These results are 
not consistent with some other researchers' results. One possible explanation is that 
bargaining power affects the outcome of the negotiation process, but it does not 
guarantee any direct influence on control. The parents exercising their control over joint 
ventures are normally affected by many possible factors such as their equity share and 
resources which they contribute to the joint venture. Equity share and resources are 
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more measurable items. However, bargaining power cannot be measured easily 
regarding the nature of its concepts, as it involves the process of negotiation procedure. 
Therefore, it might affect control but not directly. Therefore, most factors of bargaining 
power do not have a relationship with control. 
7.2.3 The Analysis of Relationship between Contribution and Control 
Resource-dependency theory suggests that the resources provided by the partners can 
increase a partner's control over the joint venture. From their empirical investigation, 
the contributions supplied by each partner significantly affect control over the venture 
(Child and Yan, 1999; Killing, 1983; Lin, 1995). Lin (1995) also finds that different 
resource contributions result in different scopes of control by each partner. 
Based on the relevant literature, this study posits that the degree of control and resource 
contributions supplied by the host country parents has a positive relationship and the 
hypotheses will be tested. This study classifies resource contribution into five main 
resource factors which are physical resources, invisible resources, financial resources, 
human resources, and organizational resources. Control is also identified by decision- 
making activities and high-level managers' appointment. Thus, the hypotheses are 
presented separately. 
H 4: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of host country 
parents and the extent of control they exercise in a joint venture 
H 4.1k: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 4-1b: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
H 42,: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
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H 42b: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
H 42,: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 42b: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
H 4-3a: Host country parents with higher financial resource contribution will have 
stronger control of decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 4-3b: Host country parents with higher financial resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
H ",: Host country parents with higher human resource contribution will have 
stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint venture 
H 4.4b: Host country parents with higher human resource contribution will have 
stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
H 45,: Host country parents with higher organizational resource contribution will 
have a stronger control of operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture 
H 45b: Host country parents with higher organizational resource contribution will 
have stronger control of the appointment of high-level management in a joint 
venture 
A Pearson correlation matrix is obtained as shown in Table 7.2.7. The correlations 
between the Taiwanese parent's resource contributions, control of decision-making 
activities and the appointment of high-level managers in joint ventures are strong and 
positive. The results indicate that all the factors of resource contribution and control 
have significant relationships. Therefore, one can conclude that resource contribution 
and control are significantly associated. 
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Table 7.2.7 Correlations between Resource Contribution and Control of Decision-Making Activities 
and the Appointment of High-Level Managers in a Joint Venture 
TP DM TP_HL Physical Invisible Finance Human Organiz 
TP DM 1.00 
TP HL 0.74** 1.00 
Physical 0.66** 0.65** 1.00 
Invisible 0.68** 0.66** 0.73** 1.00 
Finance 0.58** 0.57** 0.49** 0.63** 1.00 
Human 0.67** 0.66** 0.70** 0.85** 0.67** 1.00 
Organization 0.70** 0.63** 0.75** 0.89** 0.61** 0.87** 1.00 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
From Table 7.2.7, the results reveal that organizational resources are the strongest 
influence on the control of decision-making in joint ventures, followed by invisible 
resources and human resources. Control of the appointment of high-level managers, 
human resources and invisible resources are the strongest influences, followed by 
physical resources. In summary, all the contribution factors have a very strong and 
positive association with control of decision-making activities and high-level manager 
appointment. 
However, correlation matrix displays show that there are multi-collinearity problems 
between resource factors. One of the methods which could be used to solve the problem 
of multi-collinearity is to use the simple correlation between each independent and 
dependent variable. From that, we could understand the predictor-dependent variable 
relationships (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, simple regression analysis for these five resource 
factors was exercised, and hypotheses were tested separately. The regression analysis of 
the Taiwanese parent's resource contributions and control of decision-making in the 
venture are shown in Table 7.2.8. 
From Table 7.2.8, the overall F value and the p-value are statistically significant. The R 
square for these regressions is quite high and has relatively explanatory value with R2 
(most of them are over o. 4). These results show that relationships between contribution 
factors of physical, invisible, financial, human, and organizational ability resource and 
299 
Chapter 7 
control of decision-making activities over joint ventures are significant. In other words, 
the resource contributions supplied by host country parents do have an effect on control 
of decision-making activities in the venture. Therefore, H 41a, H 42a ,H 4-3a ,H 44, , and 
H $5a are substantiated. The equations are written as 
The control of host country parents on the N's DM = 0.123 + 0.103 TP Physical 
The control of host country parents on the JV's DM = -0.057 + 0.140 TP Invisible 
The control of host country parents on the N's DM = -0.227 + 0.147 TP Finance 
The control of host country parents on the N's DM = -0.140 + 0.147 TP Human 
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Overall, these results reveal that the more resource contributions supplied by host 
country parents into joint ventures, the more control on decision-making activities they 
exercise over joint ventures. These results are consistent with most researcher's studies 
(Child and Yan, 1999; Lin, 1995; Killing, 1983). 
The same procedures of regression analysis were performed on the relationship between 
resource contribution and the control of high-level manager appointment in the joint 
venture. The results are shown in Table 7.2.9. 
From Table 7.2.9, the overall F value and the p-value are statistically significant. The R 
squares for these regressions are quite high and have relatively explanatory value with R2 
(most of them are over o. 4). These results also show that relationships between 
contribution factors and control of high-level manager appointment in joint ventures are 
significant and positive. Therefore, one can conclude that resource contributions 
supplied by host country parents do have an effect on control of high-level manager 
appointment in the ventures. The H 41b, H 42b, H 43b, H 4-4b, and H 45b are substantiated. 
The equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the JV's HL = 0.155 + 0.108 TP Physical 
The control of host country parents on the JV's HL = -0.022 + 0.142 TP Invisible 
The control of host country parents on the JV's HL = -0.209 + 0.154 TP Finance 
The control of host country parents on the JV's HL = -0.114 + 0.152 TP Human 






















































Cý 00 "p 



























N V) -ý 
ýý 
N N tO ý 
. -i 
ö d 4 ý 4 ý 4 ö q ö 
ý w w w w 
Qy I": let M 'ýf M 























Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
^M" 
ö %0", 

























c c Ö 































cý ä ä 









Both results reveal strong and positive association of the relationships between 
contribution factors and control of decision-making activities and high-level manager 
appointment. Overall, the more resource contributions supplied by host country parents 
to the joint venture, the more control they excise over the venture. These results are 
consistent with most studies (Child and Yan, 1999; Lin, 1995; Killing 1983). The 
control of host country parents can be derived through the resource contribution, no 
matter what kind of resources they provide to the joint venture. 
7.2.4 The Analysis of Relationship between Motivation and Control 
Plenty of literature has investigated the objectives for the international joint venture's 
formation, and research results have revealed many possible explanations. These 
explanations are variants according to the four theoretical perspectives of transaction 
cost, strategic behaviour, resource dependency, and organizational learning (Lin, 1995; 
UNECE, 1988; Datta, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Porter and 
Fuller, 1986; Daniels, 1985; Harrigan, 1985; Beamish, 1984; Maniti and Smiley, 1983; 
Killing, 1983). 
However, very few studies have examined the relationship between motivation for 
forming international joint ventures and the control the parents exercise over joint 
ventures. From her study in the Taiwan context, Lin (1995) reports that different 
motivations have a different level of control over the ventures when forming international 
joint ventures. She indicates that the host country parents who have learning motivation 
have higher control in the joint ventures, in order to specifically learn knowledge from 
foreign partners. From her research results, we cannot explain the relationship between 
other motivations and control very well. Adopting her research results, this study 
intends to investigate the relationship between the motivation for international joint 
venture formation and control, using different analysis methods. This study posits that 
the motivation of the Taiwanese parent in forming international joint ventures and 
control has a positive relationship and the hypotheses will be tested. 
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H 7: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and the extent of control they exercise over a 
joint venture 
In Chapter 6.2.5, we elucidate the relatively important variables of motivation for 
international joint venture formation and launched factor analysis to extract a new set of 
motivational factors which are technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk 
sharing, competitive strategic consideration, resource complementarity and market 
expanding. The correlation analysis was carried out using those motivational factors and 
the results are shown in Table 7.2.10. 
Table 7.2.10 Correlations between Motivation Factors and Control of Decision-Making Activities and 
the Appointment of High-Level Managers in a Joint Venture 
Constructs TPDM TP_HL M Tech M Know M Risk M Strat M Reso M Mark 
TP_DM 1.00 
TP_HL 0.74** 1.00 
M Tech 0.10 0.02 1.00 
M Know -0.11 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
M Risk -0.12 -0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Strat 0.29** 0.33** 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Resou -0.20* -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Mark -0.29** -0.28** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
**Conelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Conelation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
The results are shown in Table 7.2.10. A limited number of significant correlations apply 
to the relationship between the motivation factors of host country parents, control of 
decision-making activities, and the appointment of high-level managers in joint ventures. 
Strategic consideration motivation has a modest positive relationship on the venture's 
decision-making activities and high-level manager's appointment, but market expanding 
motivation has a negative relationship to control. Resource complementarity only has a 
weak relationship to control of a joint venture's decision-making activities. Other factors 
such as the technological acquisition, knowledge learning, and risk sharing do not have 
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associations with control of decision-making and a high-level manager's appointment in a 
joint venture. 
In the next step, a multiple regression (the Stepwise method is used) was exercised and 
the results are shown in Table 7.2.11 and Table 7.2.12. From Table 7.2.11, the results 
indicate that the market expansion motive, strategic consideration motive, and resource 
complementarity motive are all included in the equation. The relationship between 
motive and the extent of control in the operational decision-making activities in joint 
ventures has a significant relationship with an R2 value of 0.203. The F-value of 9.355 is 
significant at the 0.05 level. The strategic consideration motive and the extent of control 
have a positive relationship; however, the relationships between the market expanding 
motive and resource complementarity motive and the extent of control have a negative 
relationship. The equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the N's DM activities 
= 0.461 - 0.123 TP MARK + 0.155 TP_STRAT - 0.049 TP_RESO 
Table 7.2.11 Multiple Regression Analysis of Motivation and Control of Decision-Making Activities 
inn mint Vrntnrr. 
Model Sum of Df Mean Square F Sig. R2 Adjusted R2 
Regression 1.170 3 0.390 
9 355 0.000* 0.203 0.182 






Coefficients t Sig. 
Variable not in the equation 
B Std. Error Beta P Partial 
ela 
t value Sig. 
(Constant) 0.461 0.144 3.192 0.002* 
TP_MARK (0.123) 0.028 (0.419) (4.440) 0.000* 
TP STRAT 0.155 0.036 0.403 4.280 0.000* 
TP_RESO (0.049) 0.023 (0.183) (2.109) 0.037* 
TP_TECH (0.008) -0.085 0.932 
TP KNOW (0.130) -1.364 0.175 
TP_RISK (0.130) -1.372 0.173 
Predictors: (Constant), TP MARK, TP_STRAT, TP_RESO 
Dependent Variable: T? 
-DM * Significant at p<0.05 
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From Table 7.2.12, the results indicate that the motives for market expansion and 
strategic consideration are included in the equation. The relationship between motivation 
and control on the high-level manage appointment over joint ventures has a significant 
relationship with an R2 value of 0.168. The F-value of 11.246 is significant at the 0.05 
level. The motive of strategic consideration and the extent of control have a positive 
relationship; however, the motive for market expansion and control has a negative 
relationship. The equation is written as 
The control of host country parents on the JV's HL manager appointment 
= 0.254 + 0.162 TP STRAT - 0.109 TP MARK 
Table 7.2.12 Multiple Regression Analysis of Motivation and Control of High-Level Manager 
Annnintment in a Mint Venture 
Model Sum of Df Mean Square F Sig. RZ Adjusted RZ 
Regression 1.089 2 0.545 11 246 000* 0 0.168 0.154 






Coefficients t Sig. 
Variable not in the equation 
B Std. Error Beta P 
on elati 
t value Sig. 
(Constant) 0.254 0.128 1.989 0.049* 
TP STRAT 0.162 0.039 0.398 4.208 0.000* 
TP_MARK (0.109) 0.029 (0.350) (3.701) 0.000* 
TP_TECH (0.147) (1.557) 0.122 
T? 
-KNOW 
0.017 0.180 0.858 
TP RISK (0.152) (1.611) 0.110 
TP RESO (0.127) (1.338) 0.184 
Predictors: (Constant), TP_MARK, TP_STRAT 
Dependent Variable: T? 
-DM * Significant at p<0.05 
Consistent with the correlation results, the multiple regression analyses reveal a limited 
number of significant correlations between the motives of host country parents and the 
control of decision-making activities, as well as the appointment of high-level managers 
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in joint ventures. The motive of strategic consideration does have a modest positive 
relationship on the venture's decision-making activities and high-level manager's 
appointment. However, the motive for market expansion has a negative relationship to 
control. The resource complementarity motive has only a weak negative relationship 
with the extent of control of a joint venture's decision-making activities. Therefore, the 
findings only provide partial support for hypothesis H7. 
One possible explanation is the strategic consideration which seems to be the main 
concern when Taiwanese companies form a joint venture with foreign partners. 
Taiwanese companies seem not to pursue tight control over their joint ventures in order 
to attain their objectives. For example, from the joint venture case of Talee-Isetan 
department store described in Appendix I-A, this Taiwanese parent adopts the "with the 
safe to make safe" strategy to achieve its objective and it does not get very involved in 
the management of its subsidiary. Another example which might be able to be explained 
the market expansion motivation is the COSTCO joint venture formed by the American 
COSTCO Corporation and the President Department Group (see Appendix I-B). For 
the host parent, it has its own warehouse stores, but it adopts the mode of joint venture 
to expand its business field. It also does not intervene in the management of the child 
and let its foreign partner take over all the management activity. 
Of course, these two examples cannot represent all cases, but they can provide some 
information about the relationship between motivation and control. The reader should 
bear in mind that the objectives for the formation of international joint ventures have 
many possible explanations with respect to four theoretical perspectives, namely, 
transaction cost, strategic behaviour, resource dependency, and organizational learning. 




7.2.5 The Analysis of the Relationship between Bargaining Power and 
Ownership 
Lecraw (1984) finds that the bargaining power of multinational firms and the host of 
LDCs has a strong influence on the percentage of equity ownership. When the host 
country has the country-specific advantages, the local investors (host parents) have the 
greater bargaining power and higher ownership. Fagre and Wells (1982) use a 
bargaining power framework to explain the relationship between the multinational firm's 
characteristics and equity ownership. Theoretically, when the partners have higher 
bargaining power, they can have higher opportunity and capability to obtain greater 
equity shares. Thus, this study posits the hypothesis as follows: 
H 3: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the proportion of 
ownership 
The correlations analysis between these bargaining power factors and the ownership 
were conducted. The results of the correlation are shown in Table 7.2.13. 
Table 7.2.13 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Bargaining Power and Equity Share of Host 
rniintrv Parente Nell inn Mint Venture 
Financial Marketing Technological Management 
Host country 
Parent 
capability capability capability capability Ownership 
Financial capability 1.00 
Marketing capability 0.00 1.00 
Technological capability -0.31** 0.05 1.00 
Management capability -0.16 0.03 0.00 1.00 
Host country Parent 03 -0 0.23** 0.11 -0.04 1.00 Ownershi . 
**Conelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The results are shown in Table 7.2.13. The relationship between the factors of 
bargaining power and equity shares of joint ventures held by host country parents reveal 
only one significant correlation. The marketing capability factor has a modest 
relationship with ownership. But overall, the results show very weak correlations 
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between bargaining power factors and the equity shares in joint ventures held by host 
country parents. 
Next, a multiple regression was conducted to measure the relationship between 
ownership and bargaining power. The results are shown in Table 7.2.14. From Table 
7.2.14, the results indicate that only the bargaining power of marketing capability is 
included in the equation. The relationship between bargaining power and the proportion 
of equity shares held by host country parents has a significant relationship with an R2 
value of 0.054. The F-value of 6.372 is significant at the 0.05 level. The equation is 
written as 
The equity shares held by the of host country parents = 41.148 + 3.880 B Mark 
Tai-1P 7' 1d Mnltin1P P PCCinn Annlvcic of Rarvainina Pnwer and the ProDo Lion of Ownersh1D 
Model Sum of Df Mean Square F Sig. RZ Adjusted W 
Regression 1701.367 1 1701.367 6 372 0.013* 0.054 0.045 






Variable not in the equation 
Variables 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t value Sig. 
(Constant) 41.148 1.530 26.888 0.000* 
B_Mark 3.880 1.537 0.232 2.524 0.013* 
B 
_Tech 
0.097 1.024 0.308 
B 
_Manage 
(0.051) (0.541) 0.590 
B_Finan (0.035) (0.367) 0.715 
Predictors: (Constant), B_Mark 
Dependent Variable: T? 
-DM * Significant at p<0.05 
As mentioned in the previous section, although the R2 value is considerably low (0.054), 
which indicates the the bargaining power of marketing capability explains very little in 
terms of the proportion of equity shares held by host country parents. Statistically, it is 
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still a significant and positive predictor. Thus, the bargaining power of marketing 
capability and ownership has a significant and positive relationship which is consistent 
with the correlation results, but other variables which are not included in the equation do 
not have any influence on ownership. Overall, the findings provide very little support for 
hypothesis H3. 
In summary, bargaining power and ownership are not closely associated. A higher 
bargaining power variable is expected to have greater influence on equity shares. 
However, the findings have provided very little support for hypothesis H3. We can only 
conclude that bargaining power cannot be used to predict the degree of ownership of 
parents. From the previous section, one possible reason is because bargaining power will 
affect the outcome of the negotiation process, but does not guarantee direct influence on 
ownership. Bargaining power has a lot of involvement in processes throughout the 
negotiation procedure and the outcome of negotiation is not always represented by 
ownership. It may be represented on the non-capital contractual resources. Thus, only a 
small part of the relationship between bargaining power and ownership could be 
explained. There might be other variables that can be used to better explain their 
relationships. 
7.2.6 The Analysis of the Relationship between Contribution and 
Ownership 
Based on the existing literature, some researchers deem that resource contributions to 
joint ventures will affect the amount of equity shares (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Harrigan, 
1985; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Blodgett, 1991; Lin, 1995; Pan, 1996). When parents 
contribute resources to joint ventures, they can acquire certain equity shares of joint 
ventures. Theoretically, the more resources provided by the parent, the more power they 
can acquire from a greater number of equity shares. Therefore, this study posits that the 
contribution supplied by host country parents and the equity shares they hold in joint 
ventures have a positive relationship and the following hypotheses were tested. 
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H 3.1: Host country parents with higher physical resource contribution will have a higher 
proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5.2: Host country parents with higher invisible resource contribution will have a higher 
proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H 5_3: Host country parents with higher financial contribution will have a higher 
proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H s. 4: Host country parents with higher human resources contribution will have a higher 
proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
H s_s: Host country parents with higher organizational resource contribution will have a 
higher proportion of equity shares in a joint venture 
The correlations analysis between these contribution factors and ownership were carried 
out. The results of correlation analysis are shown in Table 7.2.15 which shows that the 
correlations between the Taiwanese parent's resource contribution and the proportion of 
equity shares are strong and positive. Therefore, one can conclude that resource 
contributions provided by host country parents and ownership in joint ventures are 
closely associated. 
Table 7.2.15 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Resource Contributions and the Proportion of 
Eauity Shares in a Joint Venture 
Taiwanese Parent's 






CPhs 0.50** 1.00 
C Invi 0.61** 0.73 1.00 
C Fin 0.90** 0.49 0.63 1.00 
C Hum 0.63** 0.70 0.85 0.67 1.00 
C Org 0.57** 0.75 0.89 0.61 0.87 1.00 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
In Table 7.2.15, the results indicate that financial resources have a nearly perfect 
correlation with the ownership. It is clear that financial resources are always related to 
equity shares. Additionally, human resources, invisible resources, organisational 
resources and physical resources also have strong relations with ownership. 
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Again, because of the high multi-collinearity among resources factors the relationships 
apply between resource factors and ownership as explained in section 7.2.3, simple 
regression analyses was carried out separately and hypotheses were tested. The results 
of Taiwanese parent's resource contribution and the proportion of equity shares are 
shown in Table 7.2.16. 
From Table 7.2.16, the overall F value and the p-value are statistically significant. The R 
square for these regressions is quite high and has relative explanatory value with R2. 
These results show that the relationships between contribution factors supplied by 
Taiwanese and ownership of joint ventures are significant and positive. Therefore, H 
H s-z, H s-s, H s. a, and H s. s are all substantiated. The equations is written as 
The equity shares held by host country parents = 31.75 + 5.76 TP Physical 
The equity shares held by host country parents = 18.12 + 9.29 TP_Invisible 
The equity shares held by host country parents = -18.74 + 17.07 TP_Finance 
The equity shares held by host country parents = 11.40 + 10.14 TP Human 
The equity shares held by host country parents = 1.8 + 11.05 TP Organ 
The results reveal that resource contributions supplied by host country parents have an 
effect on the ownership of joint ventures. The results are consistent with most 
researcher studies (Pan, 1996; Lin, 1995; Blodgett, 1991; Gomes-Casseres 1990; 
Harrigan, 1985; Fagre and Wells, 1982). The more resources contributed by host 
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7.2.7 The Analysis of the Relationship between Motivation and 
Ownership 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) elucidates that the motivation for cooperation will result in a 
different ownership structure for foreign subsidiaries. From her empirical investigation, 
Lin (1995) finds that a different motivation for international joint venture formation will 
affect the proportion of ownership held by host country parents. She also finds that 
Taiwanese companies with learning driven motivation have a higher proportion of 
ownership than for other kinds of motives. Thus, this study posits a hypothesis as follow. 
H g: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and their ownership in a joint venture 
The results of correlation analysis are shown in Table 7.2.17. It reveals no significant 
associations at all about the relationship between Taiwanese parent's motives for forming 
international joint ventures and the proportion of equity ownership. Therefore, 
hypothesis 8 is not substantiated. In other words, there is no relationship between 
motivation for a joint venture's formation and the proportion of ownership. 
Table 7.2.17 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Motivations for Forming Joint Ventures and 
the Prnnnrtinn of Ownerchin 
M Tech M Know M Risk M Stra M Reso M Mark TP Own 
M Tech 1.00 
M Know 0.00 1.00 
M Risk 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Stra 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Reso 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M Mark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Taiwanese Parent's 
, Ownership 
0.10 -0.07 -0.15 0.13 0.00 -0.16 1.00 
One possible reason is that the motivation of joint venture formation has very 'wide and 
varied explanations, depending on the objectives of the parents. On the other hand, 
when host country parents and foreign partners have an agreement to form an 
international joint venture, ownership is a basic and initial resource which they have to 
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invest in joint ventures. Therefore, no matter what kind of motivation the parents have, 
they all have to put capital into joint ventures and the rights of equity shares. The 
findings can give us a different way to think about the cooperation between the partners 
based on the objectives of parents. 
7.2.8 The Analysis of the Relationship between Contribution and 
Bargaining Power 
The issue of the determinants of bargaining power have been presented by some studies 
and research results indicate that the bargaining power of parents can be increased when 
parents contributed resources to joint ventures (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and 
Gray, 1994; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kobrin, 1987; Lecraw, 1984; Fagre and Wells, 
1982). Yet what kind of resource contribution has a strong influence on bargaining 
power, the results vary. For example, Fagre and Wells (1982) find that the bargaining 
power of the multinational firm is an increasing function of five elements which are the 
multinational's technological level, the product differentiation, the access provided to 
export markets, the invested sum, and the diversity of the firm's production line. In his 
study, Lecraw (1984) stresses that firm-specific advantages, which include proprietary 
products or technology, access to relatively inexpensive capital, access to export markets, 
and management expertise, may give the multinational bargaining power over the host 
country and competing firms. Kobrin (1987) has used several variables to represent the 
NINE bargaining power sources, such as technology, parent size, subsidiary size, 
employment, and export potential. 
Gomes-Casseres (1990) suggests that the bargaining process is affected by several 
factors, such as R&D intensity, marketing intensity, and intra-system sales and the 
outcome of ownership negotiations seems to be affected by the market attractiveness and 
the type of subsidiary. Harrigan and Newman (1990) show that the bargaining power of 
potential joint venture partners is determined primarily by what each partner brings into 
the venture. Blodgett (1991) identifies five resources which are government suasion, 
technology, knowledge of the local environment and/or marketing expertise, control of 
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intra-system transfers, and financial capital that can give a firm bargaining power in a 
joint venture. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) state knowledge of the local environment is 
not only a key resource of local partners, but it is also a key source of bargaining power. 
Yan and Gray (1994) indicate that the components of resources-based bargaining power 
encompass two context-based and seven resource-based components of bargaining 
power. 
In general, according to the pioneering work of researchers, bargaining power can be 
affected by the parent's resource contributions. On the basis of the alternative literature, 
this study posits that resource contributions supplied by parents and bargaining power 
has a positive relationship and the hypothesis will be tested. 
H 6: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of host country 
parents and bargaining power. 
The correlation matrix provides the answer to the hypotheses. The results of correlation 
analysis are shown in Table 7.2.18. 
Table 7.2.18 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Resource Contributions and Bargaining Power 
B Fin B Mark B Tech B Mana 
C Ph s -0.20* 0.30** 0.33 ** -0.24* 
C Invi -0.25** 0.39 ** 0.35 ** 0.06 
C Fin 0.00 0.27** 0.15 0.03 
C Hum -0.22* 0.35** 0.28 ** 0.07 
C Org -0.13 0.31** 0.30** 0.00 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Part of the significant associations to the correlations between resources contributions 
supplied by host country parents and bargaining power are shown in Table 7.2.13. The 
results reveal that of all resource contributions which have strong and positive 
relationships with the bargaining power of marketing capability and also have positive 
relationships with the bargaining power of technological capability, the exception is 
financial resources. Physical resource contributions have a modest but negative 
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relationship with the bargaining power of management capability. However, physical 
resources, invisible resources, and human resource contributions have modest but 
negative relationships with the bargaining power of financial capability. 
The results confirm that the resources contributed by host country parents are correlated 
with bargaining power, but not all resources have the same direct relationships with 
bargaining power. Different resources will have different influences on bargaining power. 
For example, the result reveals that all the resource factors have a positive correlation 
with the bargaining power of marketing capability. That is, the greater the resources 
contributed by the host country parents, the more these resources influence bargaining 
power in terms of marketing-capability. 
However, there are negative correlations between the resources and bargaining power of 
finance capability. This indication is shown when host country parents contribute more 
non-financial resources to joint ventures which might result in less influence on financial- 
based bargaining power. It is reasonably to say that parents supplying non-financial 
resources such as technological know-how, management skills, and brands or patents, 
can complement the weakness of few equity shares held in joint ventures. 
In sum, these results can confirm that the resource contributions and bargaining power 
are associated. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is partially substantiated. 
7.2.9 The Analysis of Relationship between Motivation and 
Contribution 
In chapter 5.5 the alternative theories for forming international joint ventures are 
reviewed. The principal theories relating to the motives for forming an international joint 
venture are (a) resource dependency theory, (b) transaction cost theory, (c) strategic 
contingency theory, (d) organizational learning theory. 
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From the aspect of resource dependency theory, international joint ventures are 
motivated by the belief that the parent of the international joint venture can better obtain 
the target's resources through cooperation. Harrigan (1985) suggests that joint ventures 
can be resource-aggregating and resource-sharing mechanisms, which allow investing 
companies to concentrate resources in those areas where they possess the greatest 
respective strengths. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) state dependence can be a source of 
power to control key resources, because each firm can increase or withhold resources 
which are attractive to its partner (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). 
Transaction cost theory is concerned with the cost-effectiveness of organizing 
international economic activities and is seen as a means to decide whether a joint venture 
is the best option according to the sum of production costs and transaction costs. Teece 
(1986) finds that a joint venture is the best option when firms possess high specific 
resources (Hennart 1991; Kogut 1988). 
Strategic behaviour theory emphases how strategic behaviour influences the competitive 
position of a firm. Kogut (1988) indicates that the purpose of forming joint ventures is 
to prevent the entry of rivals or to enervate the competitive position of rivals. 
Organizational learning theory views a joint venture as a mode by which firms learn (or 
seek) to retain their capabilities. Firms will cooperate in forming joint ventures when 
they can benefit from another partner's knowledge or advantages (Hamel, 1991; 
Badaracco, 1991; Ciborra, 1991, Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1984; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; ). Based on alternative literature, many previous research point out 
that one of the motivations for forming a joint venture is resource dependence (Inkpen 
and Beamish, 1997; Harrigan, 1985; Beamish, 1985; Killing, 1983; Pfeffer and Salabcik, 
1978; Zald, 1970; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Tompson, 1967; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
Selznick, 1949). On the basis of the relative literature's results, this study posits that 
there is a significant relationship between the motivation for forming an international 
joint venture and the resource contribution of the host country parents. Thus, the 
hypothesis is represented below: 
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H 9: There is a significant relationship between the motivations of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and their resource contribution to a joint 
venture 
A Pearson correlation matrix shown in Table 7.2.19 is obtained for the motivational 
factors and contribution factors. The results show there are partial positive and negative 
relationships between motivation and contribution factors. 
Table 7.2.19 Correlations between Taiwanese Parent's Motivation for Forming Joint Ventures and 
Resource Contributions 
M Tech M Know M Risk M Strat M Resou M Mark 
C Phys 0.31** -0.20* -0.07 0.48** -0.06 -0.30** 
C Invi 0.23* -0.01 -0.12 0.47** -0.14 -0.29** 
C Fina 0.15 0.00 -0.18 0.16 0.03 -0.08 
C Huma 0.21* 0.10 -0.11 0.41** -0.24* -0.25** 
C Ora 0.24* -0.02 -0.15 0.47** -0.13 -0.34** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
The results reveal that motivational factors do not have any relationships to financial 
resource contribution. This is because financial resources encompass equity investments 
which are basic resources involved in forming international joint ventures. Therefore, no 
matter what kind of motivation the parents have, partners still have to contribute the 
financial resources for joint ventures. 
Beside financial resources, most resource contribution factors have positive and strong 
relationships with motivational factors such as strategic consideration motive, and 
technological acquisition motive. On the other hand, there are negative relationships 
between market expansion motivation and most resource contribution factors. Resource 
complementarity motivation has only a weak and negative relationship with physical 
resources contribution, and knowledge learning motivation also has a weak and negative 
relationship with physical resources contribution. 
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Why is there a positive relationship between strategic consideration motivation and 
resource contributions? This study infers that host country parents use joint ventures to 
improve their competitive positioning within the market, and see the joint venture as a 
mode to prevent the entry of rivals. From the analysis of sample characteristics, we find 
that most joint venture's parents are big companies. They use their resource strengths to 
cooperate with foreign companies to enervate the competitive position of their rivals and 
increase the value of their company's assets. Therefore, they will contribute more 
resources into joint ventures in order to achieve their strategic aspiration. These results 
are consistent with most researcher studies (Lin, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Contractor and 
Lorange, 1986; Vickers, 1985; Vernon, 1983; Pennings, 1981). 
Technological acquisition motivation and resource contribution also have positive 
relationships. Harrigan (1985) classifies the various uses of joint venture into three 
categories which are internal uses, competitive uses and strategic uses. One strategy 
which has been used is technology or other skills transfer. Hung (1992) identifies twenty 
two motives for strategic alliances based on Canadian and Pacific Asia companies. One 
of the motives is the acquisition of foreign technology. From her empirical study in the 
Taiwan context, Lin (1995) finds that one motivation for forming international joint 
ventures is acquiring technology. 
From relative research results, we find that Asian companies engaging in international 
joint ventures are generally concerned with obtaining foreign resources, especially 
acquiring foreign technology. The results of this study also find that host country 
parents who have a motivation for technology acquisition will contribute more resources 
to joint ventures. These results are also consistent with some research results (Lin, 1995; 
Hung, 1992; Harrigan, 1985). 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between the market expansion motive 
and resource contributions, excepting financial resources. This study infers that when 
host country parents engage in an international joint venture for market expansion, they 
might be considering entering a new market or a new industry. Based on the Taiwan 
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empirical situation, Taiwanese companies like to cooperate with foreign companies in 
order to use the foreign company's expertise to enter a new industry or a new market. 
Thus, they normally put more money into joint ventures and contribute less in other 
resources. In other words, they only invest the money and do not intervene in other 
activities in joint ventures. 
For example, one of the interviews cases the Taiwanese company-President group and 
American COSTCO enterprise form an international joint venture in Taiwan. The 
President enterprise group only invests money into the venture, it does not contribute 
other resources and does not intervene in the joint venture's operating activities. The 
objective of President enterprise group in engaging in the joint venture, is to expand its 
market through cooperation with a foreign company. Therefore, one can infer that 
companies with motivation for market expansion will have less resource contribution into 
joint ventures. Other motivations and resource contribution have weak relationships, 
thus, it is not discussed here. 
In summary, with regard to the relationship between control, ownership, bargaining 
power, contribution, and motivation derived from this empirical survey, all the results are 
represented in Table 7.2.20. 
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Table 7.2.20 Summary of the Results of the Research Hvnotheses 
Research Hypotheses Results 
Dimension 
HI: There is a significantly positive relationship between the 
proportion of ownership and the extent of control. 
H 1.1: The higher the proportion of equity ownership held Substantiated + 
by host country parents the stronger their control of 
Ownership operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture. 
H 1.2: The higher the proportion of equity ownership held Substantiated + 
by host country parents the stronger their control of 
the appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between bargaining 
Bargaining power and the extent of control. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between bargaining 
power and the proportion of ownership. 




H. 4: There is a significant relationship between resource 
contribution of host country parents and the extent of 
control they exercise in a joint venture. 
H , -I.: Host country parents with higher physical resource Substantiated + 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activities in a joint venture. 
H 4. Ib: Host country parents with higher physical resource Substantiated + 
contribution will have stronger control of the 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture. Substantiated + 
H 4.2.: Host country parents with higher invisible resource 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activity in a joint venture. Substantiated + 
H 4-2b: Host country parents with higher invisible resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint Substantiated + 
venture. 
H 4.3.: Host country parents with higher financial resource 
Contribution contribution will have stronger control of operational Substantiated + 
decision-making activity in a joint venture. 
H 4-3b: Host country parents with higher financial resource 
contribution will have stronger control of the Substantiated + 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture. 
H ": Host country parents with higher human resources Substantiated + 
contribution will have stronger control of operational 
decision-making activity in a joint venture. 
H 44b: Host country parents with higher human resources Substantiated + 
contribution will have stronger control of the 
appointment of high-level managers in a joint 
venture. 
H 4.5.: Host country parents with higher organizational Substantiated + 
resources contribution will have stronger control of 
operational decision-making activities in a joint 
venture. 
H 4-5b: Host country parents with higher organizational 
resources contribution will have stronger control of 






Table 7.2.20 Summary of the Results of the Research Hypotheses (continue) 
Research Hypotheses Results 
Dimension 
H5: There is a significant relationship between the resource Substantiated 
contribution of host country parents and their proportion of 
ownership in a joint venture. 
H s. 1: Host country parents with higher physical resources Substantiated 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity 
shares in a joint venture 
H s_Z: Host country parents with a higher invisible resources Substantiated 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity 
shares in a joint venture 
Contribution H 5-3: Host country parents with a higher financial resources Substantiated 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity 
shares in a joint venture 
H 5.4: Host country parents with a higher human resources Substantiated 
contribution will have a higher proportion of equity 
shares in a joint venture 
H -. 5: Host country parents with a higher organizational Substantiated 
resource contribution will have a higher proportion of 
equity shares in a joint venture 
H 6: There is a significant relationship between resource Partially 
contribution of host country parents and bargaining power Substantiated +/ - 
H 7: There is a significant relationship between the motivation Partially 
of host country parents forming international joint ventures Substantiated +/ - 
and their control over a joint venture. 
H 8: There is a significant relationship between the motivation Not 
Motivation of host country parents forming international joint ventures Substantiated 
and their ownership in a joint venture. 
H 9: There is a significant relationship between the motivation Partially +/ - 
of host country parents forming international joint ventures Substantiated 




The chapter analyzed the relationships between control, ownership, bargaining power, 
contributions, and motivations. All the hypotheses have been tested and examined. 
Hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 are built to test the relationship between ownership and control 
in operational decision-making activities and high-level managers' appointments in joint 
ventures. The results reveal that the ownership is significantly and positively correlated 
to control over operational decision-making activities and the appointment of high-level 
managers in joint ventures. The higher the proportion of IV's equity shares held by host 
country parents, the stronger control they exercise in joint ventures. Therefore, H1.1 and 
Hl_2 are substantiated. 
Hypothesis H2 is built to understand the relationship between the bargaining power of a 
firm and its control of operational decision-making activities and the high-level 
manager's appointment in joint ventures. There are four factors, namely, technological 
capability, management capability, financial capability, and marketing capability. The 
results reveal that the relationship between bargaining power and control are not closely 
associated. Only the bargaining power of marketing capability and control has a modest 
and positive relationship. The findings provide a very little support for Hz. Therefore, 
H2 is only partially substantiated. 
Hypothesis H3 is built to test the relationship between a firm's bargaining power and 
ownership. The results of this study provide very little support for H3. Only the 
bargaining power of marketing capability has a modest and positive relationship with 
ownership. Therefore, H3 is only partially substantiated. 
Hypothesis 114 is posited to examine the relationship between the resource contribution 
supplied by host country parents and the extent of control. The results show that 
relationships between contribution factors which are physical, invisible, financial, human, 
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and organizational ability resource and control, are significant and positive. The more 
resource contributions supplied by host country parents to joint ventures, the more 
control on decision-making activities and high-level manager appointment they exercise 
in joint ventures. Therefore, H 41,, and F 14-1b, H 42,, and H 4_2b, H 4-3a and H4-3b, H 
and H 44b, F 14-s. and H4-5b, are all substantiated. 
Hypothesis H5 is posited to examine the relationship between the contribution of host 
country parents and the proportion of ownership. The results reveal that relationships 
between resource contributions of host country parents and the proportion of ownership 
are significant and positive. The more resources contributed by host country parents, the 
higher the proportion of JV's equity shares they possess. Therefore, H 5.1, H 5-2, H s. s, H 
5.4, and H s. s are all substantiated. 
Hypothesis Hb is posited to examine the relationship between the contribution of host 
country parents and bargaining power. The results reveal that most resources 
contributed by host country parents are correlated with bargaining power. However, not 
all resources have the same direction of relationship with bargaining power. All resource 
contribution factors have a strong and positive relationship with the bargaining power of 
marketing capability, and also have positive relationships with the bargaining power of 
technological capability except for the financial resources contribution. The greater the 
resource contributed by host country parents, the more these resources influence 
bargaining power with regard to marketing-capability. On the other hand, physical 
resources contribution has a modest but negative relationship with the bargaining power 
of management capability. Therefore, for the most part, H6 is substantiated. 
Hypothesis H7 is posited to understand the relationship between the motivation for 
forming international joint ventures and the extent of control. There are six motivational 
factors as follows, technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, 
competitive strategy consideration, resource complementarity, and market expanding. 
The results reveal that there are a limited number of significant correlations between 
motivational factors and the extent of control. Strategic consideration motivation has a 
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modest positive relationship to control. However market expansion resource motivation 
has a negative relationship to control. Resource complementarity motive has a weak 
relationship with control of a joint venture's decision-making activities. Therefore, the 
findings provide a partial support for hypothesis H7. 
Hypothesis H8 is posited to understand the relationship between the motivation for 
forming international joint ventures and the proportion of ownership. The results reveal 
there are no significant associations between Taiwanese parent's motivations for forming 
international joint ventures and the proportion of equity shares. Therefore, hypothesis 
H$ is not substantiated. 
Hypothesis H9 is posited to understand the relationship between the motivation for 
forming international joint ventures and the level of contribution. The results show there 
are partial positive and negative relationships between motivational factors and 
contribution factors. Beside financial resources, most resource contribution factors have 
positive and strong relationships with motivational factors such as strategic consideration 
motivation and resource contribution motivation. However, there are negative 
relationships between the market expansion motive and all resource contribution factors 
except financial resources contribution factor. Resource complementarity motivation 
and the knowledge learning motive have only a weak and negative relationship with 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 have conducted the description analysis and inferential analysis 
of the data. The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results derived from 
this empirical survey. The organization of this chapter is divided into five sections. A 
summary of the main findings of this study is presented in section 8.2. Followed by 
section 8.3, which is a discussion of the limitations of this study. Section 8.4 provides 
some suggestions for future research. A brief conclusion is provided in section 8.5. 
8.2 Summary of Main Findings 
The main findings derived from this empirical survey are examined briefly in this section. 
There are the general characteristics of Taiwanese enterprises, the core research 
dimensions in terms of control, ownership, bargaining power, contributions, and 
motivation, the results of hypothesis testing. Each factor is described separately. 
8.2.1 The General Characteristics of Taiwanese Enterprises 
The general characteristics of Taiwanese enterprises forming international joint ventures 
includes the industry, the nationality /regions of foreign parents, size of host country 
parents, ages of both host country parents and joint ventures, the number of board 
members, and the nationality of general managers. The findings of each characteristic 




The major industries of host country parents are Electronics, Plastics, Trade/General 
Merchandise, Machinery Equipment, Electrical Equipment/Cable, and Banking & 
Insurance industry. These results indicate that most international joint venture 
formations in Taiwan occur in the manufacturing group. This probably reflects that 
economic development under the Government's influence in Taiwan has been more 
focused on the manufacturing industry since 1960. The manufacturing sector needed to 
develop new technologies, improve production processes, increase market power, and 
improve their managerial efficiency in order to meet the demands of international market 
competition. Therefore, most international joint ventures occur in the manufacturing 
sector. Nevertheless, the government of Taiwan implemented an open policy on the 
service industry in 1990, which results in an increasing ratio of IN in the service sector. 
These results indicate that the Taiwan government plays a vital role in economic 
development and enterprises can improve their competitiveness through assistance from 
and cooperation with the government's policy. 
2. Nationality / Regions of foreign partners 
The major nationality of foreign partners is Japanese, followed by American partners. 
These results indicate that Japan and other Asian companies are heavily involved in 
international joint ventures in Taiwan. Because of location, historical background and 
culture, Japan and other Asian countries have a higher percentage of foreign investment. 
Especially Japan, as most key production components have been controlled by them, and 
some Taiwanese companies have relied on them to obtain technology or import 
machinery or components. American partners represent the second highest proportion of 
foreign investment. The US and Taiwan have had a special political relation since the 
government of Taiwan withdrew from Mainland China. Under a military and economic 
agreement, the US provided economic aid to Taiwan which gave the government of 
Taiwan the impetus to develop the economy and trade. Although the US ended 
economic aid in 1957, a close relationship was built between the government and 
enterprises. These relations brought great influence on foreign investment in Taiwan. 
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America becomes the main and fastest growth area on the amount of inbound foreign 
investment in Taiwan. Taiwanese enterprises obtain high technologies and advance skills 
from their American partners, and greatly improve their competitive abilities through 
such cooperation. These results indicate that Japan and America have great influence on 
the development of Taiwan enterprises and the economy of Taiwan. 
3. Size of host country parents 
The size of host country parents is measured by capital, sales volume and the number of 
employees. No matter whether based on the company's capital, or the company's sales 
volume, or the numbers of employees, the results indicate that most international joint 
ventures occur within large companies in Taiwan. With regard to capital, sales volume 
and the number of employees, these results indicate that most host country parents 
involved in international joint ventures are very successful companies and have a high 
reputation in Taiwan and this may be the reason why foreign companies choose them as 
partners. 
4. Ages of host country parents and the joint ventures 
From the empirical results, the average age of host country parents is 32.9 years. Over 
half (60.5%) of the host country parents have been established more than 30 years. Only 
5.3% of host country parents were established less than 10 years. These results imply 
that the older the company, the more experience and abilities it has, and in turn, more 
opportunities to cooperate with foreign investors. 
From the age of joint ventures, the average age of a joint venture is 14.2 years. Over 
half (56.1%) of the joint ventures were established more than 10 years. Especially, 14 
cases of ventures have been formed for more than 30 years. These results imply that 
host country parents have very good relationships with foreign parents and these good 
relationships will affect opportunities for future cooperation. 
5. The number of board members 
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The board directors serve as a communication and information processing channel 
between the parents and the child (or joint venture). It is also the method that parents 
use to exercise control over the joint venture. The mean score of the number of JV's 
board members represented by the host country parents is 4.2 and 3.9 for foreign parents. 
When counted as a percentage, the host country parents have 57% and foreign parents 
have 43%. These findings reveal that host country parents have more seats on the board 
of directors of joint ventures than foreign parents. Prior research results suggest that 
partners could use participation in the joint venture's board of directors to exert effective 
control over its activities (Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang, 2001; Kumar and Seth, 1998; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Schaan, 1983). Therefore, this study infers that the host 
country parents might have more control over the joint venture than the foreign parents. 
6. The nationality of the general manager 
Prior research suggests that occupation of key executive positions can ensure the 
parent's objectives are observed (Yan and Child, 2004; Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang, 
2001; Child and Yan, 1999; Schaan, 1983). The general managers are commonly 
regarded as a tool for control by the parents (Yan and Gray, 1994; Geringer and Hebert, 
1989). The results indicate that most general managers of joint ventures are Taiwanese 
(70% of total samples). This result implies that the host country parents might have 
greater control than their partners by having more general managers. 
8.2.2 The Control of International Joint Ventures 
This section examined the results of statistical analysis regarding the core research 
dimensions and the relationship between research dimensions and sample characteristics. 
In this study the five core dimensions are control, ownership, bargaining power, 
contribution and motivation. Each one has been examined separately and the results 
have provided insight into the nature of each dimension. 
From the relevant literature, three constructs have been identified to describe the control 
of international joint venture (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). They are the mechanism of 
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control, the extent of control and the focus of control. The focus and extent of control 
are measured by responsibility for decision-making and the appointment of high-level 
managers. 
Regarding the focus of control, the results indicate that most of the decisions relating to 
production scheduling, manufacturing process, quality standards, and cost budgeting are 
taken by joint ventures; however, on the other hand, they have the least power in capital 
expenditure decisions. This might be because these activities are highly related to a joint 
venture's environment and have to acknowledge the joint venture's daily operating 
strategies. Foreign parents actively participate in exercising control in product design 
decisions. This might be because most foreign parents see product design as their area of 
expertise and competitive advantage. Host country parents exercise more control in 
sales targets and capital expenditures decisions. This may be because these two 
decisions largely involve the financial investment and performance of joint ventures. 
The results are consistent with those found in previous empirical studies (Glaister, 1994; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer, 1986; Schaan, 1983). They suggest that parents 
tend to seek control over particular activities rather than over the whole range of the 
joint venture's operations. This study also suggests that that the joint venture's parents 
concentrate on controlling specific activities instead of controlling all the operations of 
the joint ventures. 
For the mechanism of control, most general managers are appointed by either both 
parents or one parent. The purpose of this is to ensure that the policies of the joint 
ventures are followed up and fully observed by the subsidiary company. Except for the 
general managers, host country parents command stronger control over the appointment 
of vice general managers, and financial managers. This result is consistent with the 
findings of IN's decision-making activities where it reveals that Taiwan headquarters 
also have stronger power on the decision of capital expenditures. The results indicate 
that host country parents have high intervention in capital expenditure decisions and the 
appointment of financial directors in their invested company. Normally, Taiwanese 
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companies like to use financial results to estimate the performances of their subsidiaries 
and they also use it to decide on resource allocation. Therefore, they would have higher 
intervention on that issue. On the other hand, foreign parents are the most active in the 
appointment of R&D managers and also have stronger control in the decision-making on 
product design as already explained. The results indicate that foreign parents have better 
professional skills and superiority in completion of production design and research. 
Therefore, they possess stronger control in R&D. Joint venture companies have more 
autonomy in terms of production, marketing and personnel managers as well as head 
engineers. Again, these results are consistent with most existing research findings that 
effective control should emphasize selective control over some important dimensions 
rather than attempting to control the entire range of the joint venture's activities (Glaister, 
1994; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer, 1986; Schaan, 1983). 
For the extent of control, the empirical results reveal that most joint ventures have higher 
autonomy to manage the company. The parents seek to control particular activities 
which they perceive as critical dimensions and which work in synergy. These results are 
not consistent with some prior studies and some other studies have different arguments 
on this issue (Glaister, 1994; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer, 1986; Schaan, 1983). 
The results are puzzling. There are some possible explanations. Firstly, it might be the 
different research context that results in a different management culture in the way the 
subsidiaries are managed. Secondly, it might be caused by the measurement of control. 
Killing (1983) deems the importance of each decision is equal, but Chang (1996) argues 
that control is not a dichotomous context, there is a different degree of importance for 
decisions. Each decision or activity should be weighted by its importance. This study 
uses a different method to measure the extent of control by modifying Killing's method 
and considering the weighting of each activity in which parents and the joint ventures are 
involved at the same time. Thus, the method of measurement of control is more 
comprehensive. Therefore it creates different results. Thirdly, a joint venture is an 
independent organization, it has its own objectives and management structures, even 
though the parents are involved in some important decisions. Joint ventures still have to 
be responsible for the results of its activities. Thus, it would have higher autonomy in 
335 
Chapter 8 
operating the company. Fourthly, most of the joint ventures have been established more 
than 10 years and they have run the business successfully, this might let their parents 
have trust and respect for them and let them have more autonomy. 
With regard to the relation between the sample characteristics and the type of control, 
most of the results are not significant except for the sales volume of the host country 
parents and the percentage of board members. The higher sales volume of host country 
parents allows them to have stronger control over their joint ventures. Host country 
parents who have sales volumes normally mean they have more resources and abilities to 
successfully manage businesses by themselves. When they form international joint 
ventures with foreign partners, they have their special strategic motives. Therefore, this 
study infers that host country parents might have special objectives for forming 
international joint ventures; and therefore require greater control over their joint ventures 
to ensure their strategic objectives are adhered to and achieved. In addition, the higher 
the percentages of board members from host country parents, the more "independent 
control" they exercise over a joint venture. The phenomenon could be explained by the 
host country parents letting their joint venture have more autonomy but at the same time, 
they use the representatives on the joint venture's board to exert control over the joint 
venture. 
8.2.3 The Ownership of International Joint Ventures 
The results of equity shares held by the host country parents and foreign parents show 
that both parents have minority shareholding in the joint ventures. The mean equity 
shareholding of host country parents is 41.15% and the mean equity shareholding of the 
foreign parent is 46.64%. The relationship between the Taiwanese parent's ownership 
and the sample characteristics reveal that there are associations between the Taiwanese 
parent's equity shareholding, the sales volume of the host country parents, and the 
percentage of parent's board members in joint ventures. The higher the sales volume of 
the host country parents, the higher their equity shareholding in a joint venture. The 
study infers that when the parents are bigger, they will have more financial ability to 
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invest capital in a joint venture. Therefore they hold higher equity shares in a joint 
venture. 
The results also reveal that a higher ownership by the parents in joint ventures indicates 
that they have a higher percentage of board members. Leksell and Lindgren (1982) 
indicate that the equity ownership of joint ventures affects the number of members on a 
joint venture's board of directors. Basically, the representation of board members and 
the equity share represent voting rights on important decisions relating to joint ventures. 
Therefore, the parents who have a larger ownership would have more power in terms of 
board member representation. The results of this study echo Leksell and Lindgren's 
(1982) results. 
8.2.4 Bargaining Power of International Joint Ventures 
Bargaining power stems from critical resources such as technology, marketing expertise, 
investment sum, and access to export channels or markets. The results of this study 
show that the most important variable affecting bargaining power is ownership. When 
two, or more than two companies want to cooperate and establish another new 
subsidiary, ownership is a basic and critical resource. The amount of equity shares held 
affects the bargaining power of partners; thus, the most effective method of gaining 
bargaining power is to gain more equity shares. Two other important variables are 
"access to export markets" and "the knowledge of the local markets". The results 
indicate that market is a fairly important variable for bargaining power. "Technological 
ability" and "Innovative ability" are ranged between "fairly important" and "important". 
These results indicate that technology is an important variable for a company to obtain 
more bargaining power and implies that technology could enhance the control available 
to the partners. 
The least important variable is "the influence of host government". Taiwan is a 
democratic country and the government encourages and assists enterprises in 
cooperating with foreign companies. Taiwan is unlike other developing countries where 
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the government is involved in cooperative activities between local business and 
transactional companies and has a strong effect on bargaining power. In the Taiwan 
context, the government has minimal influence on bargaining power. 
In this study, four factors of bargaining power are identified using factor analysis, namely: 
technological capability, management capability, financial capability, and marketing 
capability. The relationship between bargaining power factors and the sample 
characteristics reveal that the only industry variable in which host country parents are 
involved has an association with the bargaining power factors. It seems that different 
industries have different characteristics and core competitive advantages. Normally, the 
company who possesses more industry competitive advantages would have more 
negotiating power than its partners. Therefore, one could conclude that the sources of 
bargaining power would be different in each industry group. Bargaining power will be 
affected more by technological capability in the manufacturing group; on the other hand, 
it would be affected more by management capability and financial capability in the service 
group. 
8.2.5 The Parent's Contribution 
There is a wide range of resources that each parent might contribute to joint ventures. In 
this study, the results reveal that both parents contribute different resources to a joint 
venture according to their expert resources. For the host country parents, "access to a 
public relation with the local government" and "access to environmental knowledge" are 
the most significant resources they contributed to a joint venture. When foreign 
companies expand their market overseas through cooperation with host country 
companies, the local partners usually play an important role in access to local 
government and knowledge of the local environment. The results of this empirical 
survey are consistent with the results of UNCTC (1987) and Inkpen and Beamish (1997). 
The local partner's contributions are more on knowledge of the local environment and 
access to a relationship with the government. On the other hand, the least significant 
resources contributed by host country parents are "key components and raw material" 
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and "technological or R&D ability". Most Taiwanese companies have very strong 
strengths in manufacturing, but have weaknesses on technology or R&D ability. Thus, 
they would cooperate with foreign companies to obtain or improve their technological or 
R&D ability. 
Foreign parents mostly contribute inputs in terms of the following: "financial resource", 
"sharing brands or patent" and "sharing the knowledge of management". Foreign 
parents who are from developed countries usually have a very strong financial capability, 
technology capability, and global brands. Technology, brands and patent, management 
knowledge are most important resources for developing countries. Therefore, forming 
an international joint venture is a useful method to satisfy each other's requirements. 
The results are also consistent with the results of Lin (1986), Chang (1986), Wu (1994) 
and Lin (1995). Host country parents contribute more resources with regard to the local 
market and their main objectives are to obtain the foreign parent's technology and brands 
or patent. These results indicate that both parents contribute different resources to joint 
ventures with respect to resource complementarity. 
There is some evidence of the statistical variation in relation to resource contribution 
factors and sample characteristics. The results reveal that foreign parents who come 
from Asian countries have a greater contribution in physical resources than those from 
American countries or European countries. The results also show that host country 
parents who are in the manufacturing group have a higher resource contribution to a 
joint venture than parents from the service group. The big companies contribute more 
resources into their joint ventures. The larger the host country parents are, the higher 
ability and more resources they own. In this case, the big companies are willing to 
contribute more resources to a joint venture. 
8.2.6 The Motivation for Formation of an International Joint Venture 
There are many possible explanations with regard to the motivation for international joint 
venture formation. The most important motives for Taiwanese parent to form the IN 
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are "Extending the range of product and service", "Facilitating diversified development", 
"Expanding the market and entering new markets", and "Acquiring partner's brands or 
patents". From the results, it shows that "market expansion" and "considering 
diversified development" are fairly important motives for Taiwanese enterprises. The 
results are consistent with those found in previous empirical studies (Lin, 1995; Beamish 
et al, 1994; Datta, 1988; Daniels et al., 1985). On the other hand, the least important 
motivation is "Learning partner's human resource management". The reason might be 
because human resource management must be adapted to the local situation and cannot 
simply be copied from other companies without any adjustment. Thus, the motivation of 
learning foreign partner's human resource management does not have very high effect to 
Taiwanese companies comparing with other variables. 
There are too many variables in terms of the motives for forming an IN. Therefore, 
factor analysis was used to identify a smaller range of motives. Six motivation factors 
are identified from 26 variables. They are namely, technological acquisition, knowledge 
learning, risk sharing, competitive strategic consideration, resource complementarity and 
market expanding. 
The relationship between resource contribution factors and sample characteristics shows 
that there are some associations. The results reveal that the technological acquisition 
motive and the origins of foreign partners are associated. When international joint 
ventures are formed to acquire technologies, the majority of foreign partners are from 
American countries, followed by Asian countries. American countries are viewed as the 
original creators of high technology in the world. As Taiwan has a very close 
relationship with them, therefore, most local companies cooperate with American 
enterprises to acquire technologies. For Asian countries, especially Japan, most 
Taiwanese companies also have close relationships with Japanese companies and 
cooperate with Japanese firms to obtain technology. The results reveal that there is great 
consistency with the background of Taiwan's economic growth. In addition, there is an 
association between resource contribution factors and the industry of the host country 
parents. The results indicate that companies in the manufacturing group have more 
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incentive in technological acquisition and strategic consideration motives. On the other 
hand, companies in the service group have more incentive for market expansion. Firms 
in the service group view the primary benefit of forming an international joint venture as 
being market expansion. As a result, service companies focus more on market expansion 
motives. For firms in the manufacturing group, technological acquisition is the most 
important issue. Most tacit technology could not be obtained from the market. It needs 
to be transferred through cooperation with other companies. Thus, the companies in 
manufacturing have a high incentive for technological acquisition and strategic 
consideration motives. 
The relationship between each core research dimension and the characteristics of the 
sample has been examined in the relevant sections. We only summarize the most 
significant results here. The size of host country parents and the percentage of board 
member represented by parents, has a powerful effect on the control they exercise in a 
joint venture. The percentage of board members also has a strong influence on the 
equity share of joint ventures held by the parents. The size of host country parents has a 
significant influence on their resource contribution to a joint venture. The results 
illustrate that big companies have the ability and willingness to contribute more resources 
to their joint venture. 
8.2.7 The Results of Hypotheses Testing 
The results of each hypothesis posited by this study are summarised and described briefly. 
Hypothesis Hl: There is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of 
ownership and the extent of control 
This study expects that the proportion of equity shares would have an impact on control 
in terms of mechanisms, focus and the extent of control. It successfully shows that 
ownership is significantly correlated with control. The results reveal that ownership is 
significantly and positively correlated with the control of a N's operational decision- 
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making activities and the appointment of the high-level manager. These findings are 
consistent with most research studies (Child and Yan, 1999; Lin, 1995; Blodgett, 1991; 
Fagre and Wells, 1982; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Parents can gain more control of 
their joint venture through obtaining higher equity shares in such ventures. 
Hypotheses H2: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the 
extent of control 
While an attempt is made to relate the firm's bargaining power to control of operational 
decision-making activities and the high-level manager's appointment in a joint venture. 
The results reveal that the relationship between bargaining power and control is not 
closely associated. Only the bargaining power of marketing capability and control has a 
modest and positive relationship. The findings provide very little support for Hypotheses 
Hi, Bargaining power is normally involved in the process of the negotiation procedure 
which in turn affects the outcome of the negotiation process, but it is not a guarantee to 
direct influence on control. In addition, bargaining power cannot be measured easily 
regarding its nature. It might indirectly affect control. Therefore, from the results, most 
factors of bargaining power do not have a relationship with control. 
Hypotheses H3: There is a significant relationship between bargaining power and the 
proportion of ownership. 
The investigation of the relationship between bargaining power and ownership reveals 
that the findings of this study provide very little support. A higher bargaining power 
variable is expected to have greater influence on equity shares. However, only 
bargaining power of marketing capability has a modest and positive relationship with 
ownership. Bargaining power has a lot of involvement in the process throughout the 
negotiation procedure, and the outcome of a negotiation is not always contingent on 
ownership. It might be represented in non-capital contractual resources. Thus, other 
variables might be used to better explain their relationship. 
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Hypotheses H4: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of host 
country parents and the extent of control they exercise in a joint venture 
The investigation of the relationships between resource contributions in terms of physical, 
invisible, financial, human, and organizational ability of host country parents and their 
control has indicated that there are significant and positive associations. The findings of 
this study are consistent with most prior research studies (Yan and Child, 2004; Chalos 
and O'Connor, 2004; Child and Yan, 1999; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Child, Yan and 
Ku, 1997; Lin, 1995; Killing, 1983). The greater the resource contribution of host 
country parents to joint ventures, the greater their control in decision-making activities 
and the appointment of high-level managers. 
Hypotheses H5: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of host 
country parents and their proportion of ownership in a joint venture 
The findings of this study with respect to the relationship between the resource 
contributions and the ownership reveal that there appears to be a significant and positive 
association. The findings are consistent with most other research studies (Pan, 1996; Lin, 
1995; Blodgett, 1991; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Harrigan, 1985; Fagre and Wells, 1982). 
The greater the resources contributed by host country parents, the larger their proportion 
of a N's equity shares. 
Hypotheses H6: There is a significant relationship between resource contribution of host 
country parents and bargaining power 
This study attempts to test the relationship if any, between resource contributions which 
are predicted to be associated with a firm's bargaining power. The findings confirm that 
resources contributed by host country parents do correlate with bargaining power. 
These findings are consistent with prior studies (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and 
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Gray, 1994; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kobrin, 1987; Lecraw, 1984; Fagre and Wells, 
1982; ). Not all resources have the same direction of relationship with bargaining power. 
All the resource contribution factors have a strong and positive relationship with the 
bargaining power of marketing capability and also have a positive relationship with the 
bargaining power of technological capability, excepting financial resource contribution 
factor. On the other hand, there are also negative correlations between resource 
contributions and bargaining power of financial capability. The findings show that when 
host country parents contribute more non-financial resources to a joint venture, this 
might result in less influence in financially-based bargaining power. This study infers that 
parents supplying non-financial resources such as technological know-how, management 
skills, and brands or patents can complement the weakness of holding less equity shares 
in joint ventures. Especially, when these non-financial resources could not be obtained 
from the market and are important to cooperating firms, the suppliers of these non- 
financial resources will have more power even though they own less equity shares. 
Therefore, resource contributions have negative associations to the bargaining power of 
financial capability. However, these findings overall confirm that resource contributions 
and bargaining power are associated. 
Hypotheses H7: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country 
parents forming international joint ventures and their control over a joint 
venture 
The investigation of the relationships between the motives for forming an IN, in terms 
of technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, competitive strategy 
consideration, resource complementarity, market expansion, and control, indicate that 
there are a limited number of significant correlations between motivational factors and 
control. The strategic consideration motive does have a modest positive relationship to 
control. However, the motive for market expansion has a negative relationship to 
control. Resource complementarity has only a weak relationship with control of a joint 
venture's decision-making activities. These findings reveal that the motives for forming 
an international joint venture have many possible explanations with respect to different 
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theoretical perspectives. Therefore, it is difficult to find direct associations between 
motives and control. 
Hypotheses Hg: There is a significant relationship between the motives of host country 
parents forming international joint ventures and their ownership in a 
joint venture 
The investigation of the relationships between the motives of host country parents 
forming international joint ventures and their ownership, indicates that there are no 
significant associations. From the prior research, the motives for forming a joint venture 
have diverse explanations and they depend upon the various objectives of the parents. 
On the other hand, ownership is the fundamental and primary resource under 
consideration when partners negotiate to form an international joint venture. This study 
infers that the all parents have to put capital into the joint venture and so have rights to 
equity shares, no matter their motives. Therefore, the findings of this study reveal that 
there is no relationship between motivation and ownership. 
Hypotheses H9: There is a significant relationship between the motivation of host country 
parents forming international joint ventures and their resource 
contribution to a joint venture 
The investigation of the relationship between the motivation for forming international 
joint ventures and the contribution, reveals that there are partial positive and negative 
relationships between motivation factors and contribution factors. The motives for 
forming international joint ventures and the financial resource contribution do not have 
any relationship. This study infers that financial resources which encompass equity 
investments are the basic resource to a new venture. Therefore, no matter the motives of 
the parents, all partners still have to contribute financial resources to a joint venture. 
Beside the financial resource factor, strategic consideration and technological acquisition 
motives have positive and strong relationships with resource contribution factors. This 
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study infers that host country parents use joint ventures to improve their competitive 
position within the market, and see the joint venture as a mode to prevent the entry of 
rivals. In addition, the motives for technological acquisition and resource contributions 
also have positive relationships. The findings also reveal that host country parents who 
have the motive to acquire technology will contribute more resources to a joint venture. 
These results are consistent with most researcher studies (Lin, 1995; Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988, Vickers, 1985; Vernon, 1983; Pennings, 1981). 
On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between the motive for market 
expansion and resource contribution factors. Based on the Taiwanese empirical situation, 
this study infers that when host country parents engage in an international joint venture 
for market expansion, they like to cooperate with foreign companies in order to use the 
foreign company's expertise to enter a new industry or a new market. Thus, they only 
invest capital and do not intervene in any of the other activities of a joint venture. 
Overall, the motives of host country parents in forming international joint ventures and 
their level of resource contribution are associated. The resources contributed by host 
country parents depend on their objectives. These findings provide evidence that 
different motives for forming an international joint venture affect the level of resource 
contributions to a joint venture. 
8.3 The Limitations of this Study 
There are a number of limitations which must be borne in mind when interpreting these 
results. 
The first limitation of the current study is data resources. It is very difficult to collect 
examples of international joint ventures from any source other than the government. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5.3.7, no list of international joint venture organizations is 
available. It is also very difficult to successfully request access to the government 
database. Although the researcher has made every effort to identify all international joint 
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venture companies, there might still be other enterprises left unidentified. The most 
efficient method is to obtain permission to enter the Taiwan government's database. In 
that way the researcher can more accurately identify examples directly, which is crucial 
to the success of the research; in addition, it can also save much time and expense. 
The second limitation is the sample size. For a quantitative study, the size of the sample 
is very important as this can affect the statistical results. Basically, the larger the sample 
size, the better this is for data analysis. There are few examples of international joint 
ventures in Taiwan, and one phenomenon exists in which one business group invests in 
numerous international joint venture companies. The unit of analysis in this study is the 
Taiwanese parent company; therefore, the duplicate Taiwanese parent company must be 
eliminated. This means that the total sample size was reduced which in turn affects the 
results of this empirical study. 
The third limitation is the data collection method. Primary data was collected by the 
method of mail questionnaires dispatched to a single respondent in each of the Taiwanese 
parent companies. This single respondent of each parent was assumed to be competent 
across a range of dimensions of their international joint venture's activity. While the 
researcher made telephone contacts in order to identify the individual and his/her position 
as the most appropriate president or senior manager in the parent organization with 
intimate knowledge of the international joint ventures. However, this did not guarantee 
that the selected respondents had intimate familiarity with all the dimensions of the 
international joint venture's activity. Also, this study relies only on a single respondent 
from the Taiwanese parent. This type of research could be conducted by investigating 
both the foreign parent's perspectives and the joint venture's perspectives to develop a 
fuller understanding of all the actives of international joint ventures. 
The fourth limitation is the cross-sectional design employed by this study. Cross- 
sectional studies are designed to obtain information simultaneously on a variable in 
different contexts. They are commonly used in social research due to constraints of time 
or resources. However, it cannot explain why a correlation between variables exists. On 
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the other hand, the longitudinal study is recognized as producing more fundamental 
insights than the cross-sectional study. It allows the researcher to examine processes of 
change within a social context. Therefore, it should be possible to suggest likely 
explanations from an examination of the process of change and the patterns which 
emerge (Hussey, 1997). As a result of the characteristics of longitudinal research, it 
helps to identify the "cause and effect" relationships between variables. The creation of 
an international joint venture is the outcome of both parents' negotiations of an 
agreement to cooperate. This involves many negotiation processes and takes a long time 
to accomplish. Therefore, a well-planned longitudinal study could be conducted in 
future research in order to improve the applicability and validity of the findings which are 
obtained from this cross-sectional study. 
8.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
A number of suggestions for future research are offered from this study. 
Firstly, if the research difficulty could be overcome, the researcher should investigate the 
relationship between control and its antecedents from both parent's perspectives 
simultaneously, not only from the Taiwanese parent's perspective. For example, the 
degree of resource contribution from foreign partners was answered by the host country 
parents. If the foreign parents could answer these questions directly, this would increase 
confidence in the results. Therefore, it would be valuable to conduct an investigation 
from the perspectives of both parents and compare the findings. 
Secondly, an international joint venture includes at least the host country parents, the 
foreign parents and the joint venture (child). These three organizations often play an 
extremely different role but have very close relationships. Therefore, there are at least 
three permutations between the organizational relationships; (1) foreign parents and host 
country parents, (2) foreign parents and the joint ventures, and (3) host country parents 
and the joint ventures. The inter-dynamic relationships between foreign parents and their 
joint ventures, or host country parents and their joint ventures might affect the control 
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that parent's could exercise. Therefore, the issues in terms of future research of 
international joint ventures could not only be discussed from parent's viewpoint, but also 
from the perspectives of the joint venture itself. 
Thirdly, when we discuss the relationship between control and the nationality or region 
of the foreign parents, we find that the nationalities of foreign parents do have influence 
on the degree of control that they exercise in a joint venture. According to the definition 
of an international joint venture, it is clear that the international joint venture is 
established by the parents of different nationalities. Parkhe (1993) deems that the 
differences in culture between the participating firms in a joint venture mean that they 
have different perspectives on the issue of control, which in turn results in a different 
outcome for the research. Therefore, how the culture influences management control of 
the international joint venture, could be the subject of comparative research in the future. 
Fourthly, from this empirical survey, we find the phenomenon that host country parents 
and foreign parents normally have good interaction which affects their cooperation in the 
future. These good relationships are built on long term relationships which are a benefit 
from the past, and in turn have influence on trust and credibility. Trust tends to have 
influence on control in a joint venture. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to consider 
placing the factor of trust into the antecedent variables which would affect the issue of 
control in the future research. 
Fifthly, this study only considers joint ventures set up in Taiwan. It could be expanded 
to other areas such as mainland China. Through cooperation with Taiwanese enterprises, 
advances into mainland China have continuously increased, therefore it would be an 
interesting subject to examine how host country parents and foreign parents exercise 
control over the joint venture which they have set up in mainland China. Are there any 
differences with respect to control because of the joint venture's location? What factors 
would have more influence on control? Therefore, the research context could be 




The above chapter presents the conclusions of this study. The main findings derived 
from this empirical survey are briefly described which include the sample characteristics 
of Taiwanese enterprises, the core research dimensions in terms of control, ownership, 
bargaining power, contribution, and motivation, and the results of testing hypotheses. 
The limitations of this study are examined and attention should be paid when interpreting 
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THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of the final chapter is to draw out the recommendations and research 
implications of this study. This chapter is divided into three sections. The theoretical 
implications are presented in section 9.2. Section 9.3 presents the managerial 
implications of this study. 
9.2 Theoretical Implications 
Drawing on theoretical rationales for international joint ventures, this study engages in 
empirical research into Taiwanese enterprises. It attempts to further our understanding 
of international joint ventures based on the Newly Industrialized Country context. This 
study makes the following contributions to the theoretical debate and also offers some 
suggestions for all the enterprises. 
1. Providing an integrative framework of control and its antecedent factors in 
international joint ventures 
Parkhe (1993) argues that the dimensions of joint ventures ( motives for joint venture 
formation, partner selection/characteristics, control/conflict, and stability /performance) 
have previously been investigated, and cannot be viewed as separate phenomena, but 
need to be re-conceptualized into an integrative framework. Therefore, this study has 
attempted to follow his suggestion to integrate the relative dimensions of international 
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joint ventures into a framework in order to have a more lucid picture of IJVs. One of 
this study `s contributions is to provide a structure to discuss the correlations between 
the most important dimensions with regard to the international joint venture and offers 
associations between these dimensions. 
Control vs Ownership 
There is substantial research literature to describe the relationship between ownership 
and control; however, some research results are conflicting. Some research indicates 
that equity share is a predictor of the overall control held by IN partners, and of their 
control over strategic decisions in particular (Child, 2002; Child and Yan; 1999; Child et 
al., 1997; Yan and Gray; 1996; Lin, 1995; Meier, Perez, and Woetzel, 1995; Harrigan , 
1986; Lecraw, 1984; Killing, 1983 Youseff, 1975). However, other researchers argue 
that equity structure is not equivalent to management control (Mjoen and Tallman , 
1997; 
Yan and Gray, 1994; Lecraw, 1984). 
The results of this study reveal that ownership is significantly and positively correlated 
with the control of a N's operational decision-making activities and the appointment of 
the high-level manager. These findings are consistent with most research studies (Child, 
2002; Child and Yan; 1999; Child et al., 1997; Yan and Gray; 1996; Lin, 1995; Meier, 
Perez, and Woetzel, 1995; Harrigan, 1986; Lecraw, 1984; Killing, 1983; Youseff, 1975). 
Parents can gain more control of their joint venture through obtaining higher equity 
shares in such ventures. 
Control vs Bargaining power 
Previous researchers suggest that the bargaining power of partners is a critical variable in 
determining patterns of control in joint ventures (Blodgett, 1991; Harrigan and Newman, 
1990; Lecraw, 1984). The results of this study reveal that the relationship between 
bargaining power and control is not closely associated. Only the bargaining power of 
marketing capability and control has a modest and positive relationship. 
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Bargaining power vs Ownership 
Based on his research results, Lecraw (1984) deems that the greater the country-specific 
advantages of the host country, the greater its bargaining power and the higher the level 
of local ownership it may gain for local investors. By following the bargaining approach, 
Lee (2004) indicates that the multinational corporations will hold an equity share of IN 
that is larger than its relative bargaining power, because the MNC has a cost advantage 
and superior technology over its local partner. 
The result of this study reveals that the relationship between bargaining power and 
ownership has a very weak relationship. A higher bargaining power variable is expected 
to have greater influence on equity shares. However, only bargaining power of 
marketing capability has a modest and positive relationship with ownership. Bargaining 
power has a lot of involvement in the process throughout the negotiation procedure, and 
the outcome of a negotiation is not always contingent on ownership. It might be 
represented in non-capital contractual resources. Thus, other variables might be used to 
better explain their relationship. 
Control vs Resource Contributions 
Resource-dependence theory suggests that the extent of the stakeholders control 
depends on their ability to provide the resources needed for the international joint 
venture to succeed. Some researcher suggest that the parents supply the necessary 
resources and the most critical resources to the joint venture will gain more control over 
the international joint venture entity (Chalos and O'Connor, 2004; Child and Yan, 1999; 
Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Lin, 1995). Yan and Child (2004) also claimed that the ability 
of one party to provide better resources than its partners and/or control resources will 
give that party power over the IN. 
The result of this study reveals that the relationship between control and resource 
contributions has significant and positive association. The findings of this study are 
consistent with most prior research studies (Yan and Child, 2004; Chalos and O'Connor, 
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2004; Child and Yan, 1999; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Child, Yan and Ku, 1997; Lin, 
1995; Killing, 1983). The greater the resource contributions of host country parents 
contribute to joint ventures, the greater control they have. 
Resource Contributions vs Ownership 
Blodgett (1991) indicates that the type of expertise that a company contributes to a joint 
venture may affect the amount of equity it holds. Pan (1996) indicates that the foreign 
partner who is capable of contributing more to the initial capital sum acquires stronger 
bargaining power for a higher equity share (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Harrigan, 1985; 
Fagre and Wells, 1982). Lin (1995) demonstrates that the level of contribution supplied 
by each stakeholder will affect their proportion of ownership in the joint venture. 
The results of this study reveal that relationships between resource contributions of host 
country parents and the proportion of ownership are significant and positive. The more 
resources contributed by host country parents, the higher the proportion of N's equity 
shares they possess. 
Resource Contributions vs Bargaining Power 
Some researchers assert that the parents can gain the bargaining power from their 
commitment of various resources (Blodgett, 1991; Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Gomes- 
Casseres, 1987b; Robinson, 1969). Lecraw (1984) indicates that possession of a 
proprietary product or technology may increase the bargaining position of a multinational 
over the host country. Kobrin (1987) indicates that the sources of MNE bargaining 
power can be derived from the firm-specific advantages or assets. 
The results of this study reveal that most resources contributed by host country parents 
are correlated with bargaining power. All resource contribution factors have a strong 
and positive relationship with the bargaining power of marketing capability, and also 
have positive relationships with the bargaining power of technological capability except 
for the financial resources contribution. The greater the resource contributed by host 
country parents, the more these resources influence bargaining power with regard to 
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marketing-capability. However, not all resources have the same direction of relationship 
with bargaining power. The physical resources contribution has a modest but negative 
relationship with the bargaining power of management capability. 
Control vs Motivation 
Chalos and O'Connor (2004) describe partner differences in their perceptions of control 
mechanisms as determined largely by their respective motives. They found knowledge 
dependency and asset specific transaction costs to be the determinants of controls to 
varying degrees for each partner. Lin (1995) indicates that a different motivation for 
joint venture formation has a different extent of control. In her study, she found that the 
partner who has the learning motivation would have higher control in order to learn 
specific knowledge from a partner. 
The results of this study reveal that there are a limited number of significant correlations 
between motivational factors and the extent of control. Strategic consideration 
motivation has a modest positive relationship to control. However market expansion 
resource motivation has a negative relationship to control. Resource complementarity 
motive has a weak relationship with control of a joint venture's decision-making 
activities. 
Motivation vs Ownership 
The parents of a joint venture usually have different backgrounds and different business 
operating strategies which affects the choice of ownership structure (Harrigan, 1985; 
Killing, 1983; ). Gomes-Casseres (1989) address the motivation for cooperation as the 
result of a different ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries. Lin (1995) also reported 
that different motivation for creating a joint venture will affect the proportion of 
ownership in such venture. 
The results of this study reveal there are no significant associations between Taiwanese 




Motivation vs Resource Contributions 
For a joint venture, the needed resources are derived from different parent entities. 
Therefore, firms will cooperate in forming joint ventures when they can benefit from 
another partner's knowledge or advantages (Hamel, 1991; Badaracco, 1991; Ciborra, 
1991; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Much existing research 
points out that one of the motivations for forming a joint venture is resource dependence 
(Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Harrigan, 1985; Beamish, 1985; Killing, 1983; Pfeffer and 
Salabcik, 1978; Zald, 1970; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967; Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1962; Selznick, 1948). 
The results of this study show there are partial positive and negative relationships 
between motivational factors and contribution factors. Beside the financial resource 
factor, strategic consideration and technological acquisition motives have positive and 
strong relationships with resource contribution factors. However, there are negative 
relationships between the market expansion motive and all resource contribution factors 
except financial resources contribution factor. The findings also reveal that host country 
parents who have the motive to acquire technology will contribute more resources to a 
joint venture. These results are consistent with most researcher studies (Lin, 1995; 
Kogut, 1988, Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Vickers, 1985; Vernon, 1983; Pennings, 
1981). 
Overall, the motives of host country parents in forming international joint ventures and 
their level of resource contribution are associated. The resources contributed by host 
country parents depend on their objectives. These findings provide evidence that 
different motives for forming an international joint venture affect the level of resource 
contributions to a joint venture. 
In sum, this study's theoretical contribution is that these empirical findings derived from 
this study could provide some insightful understandings of the relationship between the 
most important dimensions of international joint ventures. 
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2. Providing an empirical results of international joint ventures in Newly Industrialized 
Countries context 
Most existing research has focused on developed countries and developing countries; 
however, there are few studies examining Newly Industrialized Countries. This study 
provides some empirical findings based on the Newly Industrialized Countries context. 
From this empirical survey, we could find the Western theories might not be applicable 
to these Newly Industrialized Countries. Especially, when China has such great potential 
in the marketplace and has attracted such large numbers of foreign investors. However, 
many difficulties have been encountered and high failure rates have occurred among the 
legions of foreign investors in China. Since Taiwan plays a vital and intermediate role 
between Western countries and China, the empirical findings of this study could help to 
explain why international joint ventures operate successfully. The findings of this study 
are important in relation to providing useful insights into established and viable 
international joint ventures in a Newly Industrialized Country context. 
3. Providing the categorization of bargaining power 
There is scant research highlighting bargaining power in terms of international joint 
ventures. The investigation of the relationship between bargaining power and control are 
difficult to compare from the results of prior research because in these studies bargaining 
power has been quantified using different variables. This study has drawn together the 
appropriate variables from the relevant literature and conducted factor analysis to 
identify the structure underpinning bargaining power for international joint ventures. 
The empirical survey of this study identifies the source of bargaining power into four 
basic capabilities which are technological capability, management capability, financial 
capability, and marketing capability. The relationships between bargaining power, 
control and ownership are not totally supported by this study; however, there are partial 
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correlations. The findings could help to create insights into the relationship between 
bargaining power, ownership and control and also provide an empirical base for further 
exploration on this issue. 
4. Providing the more comprehensive relationships between resource contribution, 
ownership and control. 
This study has offered a more comprehensive understanding of the relationships between 
resource contribution, ownership and control. The findings of this study provide some 
theoretical and empirical support for the different determinants of ownership and control. 
Previous research examined the relationship between these factors by measuring the 
individual resource supplied by parents. This study classifies the resource into five 
categories and the results support the hypothesis that resource contributions have a high 
correlation with control and ownership. Based on resource dependency theory, resource 
contributions not only have an important influence on the equity share held by parents 
but also the focus and the extent of control of the parents in their joint ventures. 
9.3 Managerial Implications 
The findings of this study have important implications for all types of business enterprises. 
A brief review of managerial recommendations derived from this study is provided. 
1. The mechanism, the focus, and the extent of the control 
This study uses the appointment of high-level managers as the mechanism of control and 
the responsibility for nine types of decisions is used to measure the focus of control. The 
extent of control is classified into four types namely; dominant host country parent 




With regard to the mechanism of control, the results of this study reveal that Taiwanese 
parents have the strongest control over the appointment of general managers, vice 
general managers and financial managers. However, joint venture companies have more 
autonomy in the appointment of managers in production, marketing, personnel and 
engineering sections. These results are consistent with most research findings (Child and 
Yan, 1999; Chang, 1996; Wu, 1994; Child, 1984; Schaan, 1983, Killing, 1983; Gullander, 
1976; Rafii, 1978). 
With regard to the focus of control, the results of this study reveal that most of the 
operating decisions are taken by the joint venture management excepting the decisions 
on capital expenditure. These results are also consistent with several other research 
findings which state that effective control emphasises selective control over the joint 
venture's activities (Jaussaud, Schaaper and Zhang, 2001; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; 
Geringer, 1986; Dunning and Cantwell, 1984; Schaan, 1983). 
With regard to the extent of control, these empirical results reveal that most joint 
ventures in Taiwan have a high degree of autonomy to manage their business. These 
results are inconsistent with some prior studies (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983). 
In sum, given the above findings of this study, the N's parents seem to employ control 
over particular areas rather than over the whole range of the N's activities. For example, 
most decisions concerning production scheduling, manufacturing processes, cost budgets, 
pricing policies, and quality standards are taken by the joint venture management as are 
most appointments of production managers, marketing managers, personnel managers, 
and head engineers. These findings indicate that when decisions are closely connected to 
local and day-to-day operations, these decisions are normally made by the joint venture 
management. As the N's managers have to respond to local customers and cultures, it 
follows that they have more appropriate information and capabilities to deal with these 
types of decisions. Therefore, these decisions should not be centralized in the parent 
companies. When parent companies exercise control over their joint ventures, they must 
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consider the relative weighting of various factors and choose the most important 
activities in which to exert control, in order to achieve their objectives. 
On the other side, for the IN's managers, if they wish to have more autonomous 
authority over operational decision-making activities and the appointment of high-level 
managers, they should improve their resources and abilities relating to these areas. When 
a joint venture has stronger capabilities and more resources than its parents, or it 
supports its capabilities and resource independently, the greater the authority that is 
gained from the parent companies. In other words, a joint venture will have high 
autonomy only when it has strong capabilities to manage the company, which in turn 
gives the parent companies the confidence to delegate responsibilities to it. 
In addition, this study finds the mean age of a joint venture in Taiwan is 14.2 years and 
over half (56.1%) of the joint ventures are more than 10 years old (see chapter 5.4.4). 
These findings indicate that in Taiwan, joint ventures have long and healthy relationships 
with their parent companies. Therefore, this study implies that the relationship between 
the N's managers and their parent companies can influence the extent of control of 
parent companies over the joint venture. A close relationship between the N's 
managers and their parent companies can maximise trust between each partner, which in 
turn increases the opportunities for greater autonomy. Therefore, the N's managers 
should actively build a close and trusting relationship with their parent companies. 
2. Control and its antecedents 
As noted in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, existing research demonstrates that the degree of 
control is an important function in an international joint venture, which is affected by 
various factors in terms of parent's contributions, ownership, bargaining power and the 
motives for forming the 11V. The findings indicate that among the four antecedent 
dimensions, ownership and resource contributions demonstrate significant strong and 




As we discussed in Chapter 7.2.1 and 7.2.3, resource dependency theory asserts that the 
extent of control is affected by the resource contribution which is needed for the 
international joint venture to succeed (Chalos and O'Connor, 2004; Child and Yan, 1999; 
Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Lin, 1995; Killing, 1983). The higher the proportion of equity 
shares held by the parent companies and the larger and more significant their resource 
contribution, the greater the degree of control they exercise over the joint venture. 
Based on both the resource dependency perspective and the findings of this study, we 
suggest that the parent companies can increase their control in their joint venture through 
the acquisition of a higher proportion of the N's equity shares or by contributing large 
and/or significant resources to their joint venture. Moreover, the parent companies can 
also protect their investment (equity shares and resource contributions) by exercising 
strict control over the joint venture. 
However, the two other antecedents, bargaining power and the motives for forming an 
IN have only tenuous relationships with the degree of control (see the results of 
hypothesis H2 and hypothesis H7). This study found that only the bargaining power of 
marketing capability has a modest and positive relationship with the extent of control. 
Even so, the adjusted RZ was too small to be viewed as having any practical impact on 
control (see the analysis in Chapter 7.2.2). Thus, bargaining power might not have a 
linear relationship with control; therefore, it cannot be used to predict influence on the 
extent of control, although it does have a modest and positive relationship with control. 
As we discussed in Chapter 7.2.2, because of the nature of the concept, bargaining 
power cannot be measured easily and directly, and it also has a significant influence on 
the process of negotiation procedures. Previous research also suggests that partners use 
the power of cooperation to influence the outcome of a negotiation process (Brouthers 
and Bamossy, 1997; Schelling, 1956; ), which in turn affects the degree of control 
(Lecraw, 1984). Therefore, we suggest that parent companies increase their opportunity 
to control the joint venture through the process of negotiation. To assure the outcome 
of negotiation, the parent companies can increase directly or indirectly their influence and 
power over the joint venture. 
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Moreover, this study found that there are a limited number of significant relationships 
between the degree of control and the motives for forming an IJV. The strategic 
consideration motive has a modest and positive relationship with control; however, the 
motive for market expansion has a negative relationship with the extent of control. 
Resource complementarity motivation only has a weak connection with control. 
For the motive of strategic consideration, this study found that it is the main concern 
when Taiwanese companies form a joint venture with foreign partners. This result is 
inconsistent with Lin's (1995) and Lin's (1986) investigations in Taiwan. They found 
that the main motive of Taiwanese parents in forming a joint venture with foreign 
partners is to learn or acquire technological knowledge. However, the findings of this 
study might reflect more the economic development of Taiwan and add a new 
explanation for the motivation of IJV formation. As noted in Chapter 2, Taiwanese 
companies acquired their foreign partner's technologies to improve their competitive 
abilities between 1984 and 1994. As a result of the effort of the past forty years, Taiwan 
has risen rapidly to the status of a "Newly Industrialized Country" and becomes an 
integral link in the global high technology industry supply chain. Therefore, the 
motivation for forming an IJV will be allocated to strategic considerations since 
Taiwanese companies acquire high-level technologies and the desire to expand their 
global markets. According to this finding, the international joint venture is an effective 
mode to achieve a parent company's objectives. We suggest that Taiwanese enterprises 
can create IJVs to achieve their strategic objectives. 
In addition, the motives for forming an international joint venture have many possible 
explanations with respect to the following four theoretical perspectives; transaction cost, 
strategic behaviour, resource dependency, and organizational learning. Most prior 
studies discuss the motivation of IN formation by using a single theoretical perspective. 
However, this study found that these four theoretical perspectives all play an important 
role in forming the IN. For host country companies, the motives for forming an IN 
might be to acquire critical resources in order to overcome a transaction difficulty 
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(transaction cost perspective and resource dependency perspective), or to achieve a 
specific strategic objective (strategic behaviour perspective), or to benefit from 
knowledge learning (organizational learning perspective), or include all these motives at 
the same time. Different motives will result in a different influence on the extent of 
control. Therefore, we suggest that the parent companies can employ various degrees of 
control over their joint ventures according to their main motives. 
In sum, the international joint venture offers multinational companies the ability to use 
their partner's capabilities in achieving their objectives. Given this fact, the degree of 
control is regarded as the most important factor of any business organization when they 
cooperate with other partners. Therefore, by identifying the principal factors affecting 
the extent of control that parents exercise over their ventures, parent companies can have 
a better understanding of the importance of each individual factor and the way in which it 
influences the degree of control. Moreover, parent companies can adjust their 
operational strategies and reconstruct the mechanism of control. Redesign of the control 
mechanism, can improve both partners' resource commitments on the one hand and on 
the other, can advance the successful achievement of both partners' objectives. 
The government of Taiwan continues to demonstrate its effort to encourage foreign 
companies to cooperate with Taiwanese enterprises. In fact, Taiwanese enterprises gain 
significant benefits from cooperation in international joint ventures. For example, 
Taiwanese companies are increasing their competitiveness, advancing their technological 
skill and knowledge management through such cooperation. They should continue 
investing in international joint ventures and employ appropriate procedures in managing 
their joint ventures. At the outset, the parent companies should set a clear and definite 
motive when they consider forming an international joint venture, since this can affect 
some important issues, such as the kind of resource contribution to the joint venture, 
how many equity shares will be allocated to each partner, what areas will be under the 
control of the parents, and what extent of control the parents will exercise in their joint 
venture. Through successful cooperation, all partners can reach a win-win outcome. 
Companies which understand these relationships can apply this knowledge to effectively 
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enhance their company's specific advantage(s). The better the understanding of the 
operation of international joint ventures, the more success and achievement will be 
gained. 
Today, there are numerous challenges facing international joint ventures both in their 
day-to-day operations and their strategic management. All the findings of this study 
provide numerous useful suggestions and insights for companies which are operating in 
today's highly competitive marketplace, especially, for Taiwanese enterprises to improve 
their competitive capabilities in the global market. 
365 
Appendix 
Appendix I-A: President Department Store 
1. History of President Department Store 
President Department Store established in Kaohsiung in 1975, was the largest 
department store of Southeast Asia at that time. Its founder had already established the 
first large-scale domestic department store-Dashin Department Store in 1958. After 
President Department Store was established, the founder of this group set up the 
President Supermarket chain. In 1984, it set up Talee Department Store. In addition, it 
entered into the warehouse market in 1991, and established President Department Store- 
Hooping Branch in 1999. All these developments show the ambition and strength of the 
President Enterprise Group in the past 30 years. President Enterprise Group has gained 
the favorable terrains in Kaohsiung, it has been the leader of the south general 
merchandise industry of Taiwan all the time. 
2. Develop the Motive and Methods of the International Joint-Venture 
Originally, President Enterprise Group planned to set the Talee Department Store 
holding a high price market, which in order to make the clear distinction between the 
President Department Store and the Talee Department Store. However, a few years 
later, the achievement of Talee Department Store was not outstanding. In addition, 
because there are many other general merchandise industry companies settling on the 
potentiality of the high consumer market in Kaohsiung area, they decided to expand the 
market in Kaohsiung and set up one branch after another. Among two or three of them 
are the Japanese general merchandise industry companies also attending the battle of 
Kaohsiung. Under the impact of international competition, the achievement of the Talee 
Department Store still does not reach the original expectation of the President Enterprise 
Group. The group has the reputation of being conservative and the leader of the group 
is determined to adopt "a safe" strategy. In 1991, the group decided to cooperate with 
the Japanese Isetan Department Store. 
_ 
The original Talee Department Store changed its 
title to the Talee-Isetan Department Store. President Enterprise Group occupies 51% of 
the equity shares; Japanese side has 49% of the stock shares. Japanese Isetan is famous 
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for its fashion in Japan, and has a long term relationship with the President Department 
Store. The private relations with the executives on the senior level of both sides are 
quite good which makes the Japanese Isetan beat back another cooperative- Japan 
SOGO Company. 
3. Management and Administration 
The President of President Department Store is also the president of Talee-Isetan 
Department Store. On one hand, President Department Store hopes to depend on 
Isetan's management knowledge; on the other hand, to understand the Talee-Isetan 
Department Store's daily operation activity by taking the topographical advantages. 
Hence, the Japanese Isetan is in charge of the major operations of the Talee-Isetan 
Department Store. The President has a meeting with the general manager of Talee- 
Isetan Department Store regularly every two weeks. 
Since the Japanese Isetain takes over the management of the department store, it has 
greatly advanced in its achievements. The achievement grows up continuously that 
shows the original tactics works so as to meet the group's expectation at first. 
The table shows the brief explanation of the Talee-Isetan Department Store. 
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Name ofjoint-venture's Talee-Isetan Department Store 
subsidiary 
Items of business of the Department store subsidiary 
The subsidiary establishes 1991 time 
General manager of the Japan 
subsidiary nationality 
Name of the parent President Department Store Japanese Isetan 
company 
Characteristic of the parent 
The leader of general Large department store 
merchandise group in in Japan company Kaohsiung 
1. The performance of the Expand the Southeast 
Department does not meet Asian market 
Joint-venture's motive of 
the Group's expectation. 
parent company 
2. Face the new competitor 
The Group adopts "with the 
safe to make safe" strategy. 
Main contribution to joint- Equipment and building Management know-how 
venture's subsidiary of Knowledge of the local Marketing knowledge 
parent company market 
Hold the proportion in stock 51 49 
right of parent company 
The management to joint- 
President not intervene The general manager is 
venture's s subsidiary of subsidiary's 
daily operation appointed by the Isetan 
parent company is activity, 
but has a meeting company and he is in 
' 
controlled with 
the general manager charge of Talee-Isetan s 
regularly every two weeks. main operation. 
The parent companies of 
both sides take subsidiary 4 3 
directors' percentage 
Performance Stand greatly in his tendency after taking over 
managing, an achievement grows up continuously. 
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Appendix I-B: COSTCO Wholesale Corporation 
1. History of COSTCO 
PRICE Club which is established in Santiago of California in 1976, is one of the 
COSTCO Company predecessors. It is the first warehouse club for business shoppers in 
the world. In 1984, PRICE Club became the greatest warehouse seller in America. 
Another predecessor of COSTCO Company is the one which was established as the 
COSTCO member system wholesaling firm in Seattle of Washington in 1983. PRICE 
Club is located in the Holy Land (the end of California), and COSTCO is in Seattle, 
Washington (relatively close to Canada), the two locations are in the west coast of the 
U. S, and enjoy good operating conditions. 
In order to pursue better achievements, the Western companies adopted merges and 
acquisition strategies in 1980s. In October 1983, PriceCostco is formed by merging 
PRICE Club and COSTCO. It officially changed its name from PriceCostco to Costco 
Companies, Inc. afterwards, in 1998. Due to the merger of these two companies, the 
number of locations increased and the operation was even bigger than before. 
Furthermore, the company started to open markets in Florida and gradually moved 
towards the East of the U. S. and the International markets. By December 2004, there 
were 449 locations, over 110,300 full and part-time employees worldwide, with over 43 
million cardholders in 8 countries of the world and the average annual revenues reached 
$47.15 billion. Costco Companies, Inc. presents one of the largest international chains of 
membership warehouses. Table 1 shows its worldwide distributions 
Table 1 Worldwide Distributions of Costco Company 
Worldwide Countries Number of Warehouses 
U. S. & Puerto Rico 333 
Canada 63 







Source : Costco Wholesale Corporation (2005) (on-line) Available- http: //202.43.196.230 
2. Motivation for entering Taiwan Market 
Costco has been in the American market about 30 years, and has a solid foundation in 
the market. However, due to the warehouse gradually tending towards maturity in the 
North America market, and in order to pursue the persistent development of the 
enterprise, it has increasingly penetrated the overseas market. 
When the company decides to get into the overseas market, Asia is also the target 
market to be taken into consideration, besides developing the middle South America and 
European market. Hence, after opening locations in the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Mexico in succession, it starts to plan getting into Asia in the 1990s. 
After a series of political and economical assessments in south-east Asia countries, the 
Taiwanese political and economical environment is more stable comparison to the other 
south-east Asia countries. Therefore, the company decides to open the first Costco 
branch in Taiwan. 
3. Methods of entering Taiwan Market 
The Taiwan government has allowed foreign investors to operate retail businesses since 
1985. There are many foreign joint-venture hypermarkets in operation in Taiwan in a 
short period of time, for instance, Makro, Carrefour and so forth. Costco and Talee 
Investment Ltd. which is one of the companies of the President Enterprise Group started 
a joint-venture in Taiwan. The proportion of equity share of the parent company is 55% 
and 45%. Costco is in charge of operating the business and management. The first 
Taiwan Costco opens in Kaohsiung on January 18th in 1997. Nei-Hu Costco in the 
North of Taiwan is established in July 1999. Shih-chih Costco in the North of Taiwan 
starts in January 2000. In addition, the fourth locations in Jhong-He was scheduled to 
open in the beginning of the year 2005. 
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4. Human Resources Management 
In the first stage of organizing and operating the business, American Costco dispatches 
employees to Taiwan and teaches the operational knowledge, experience, techniques and 
the methods of food production. These employees leave after Taiwan Costco employees 
learn all the techniques. Since the first Taiwan Costco in Kaohsiung had been opened for 
more than 10 years, the employees who were sent by American Costco had gone home. 
Currently there is three high levels of administrators working in Taiwan, which occupies, 
small amount of staff ratio in Taiwan. According to the above, Costco adopts a local 
policy, but it still tends to send higher level of management from the Costco Home 
Company. 
Name of joint-venture's COSTCO Wholesale Corporation Subsidiary 
Subsidiary Selling Items wholesale 
The subsidiary established time 1995 
Nationality of the general United States 
manager of the subsidiary 
Name of the parent company Talee Investment Ltd. American COSTCO Wholesale 
Corporation 
Characteristic of the parent The largest department store A big American wholesale 
company hsiung company 
Joint-venture's motive of Expand business field Expand Asia market parent company 
Main contribution to the joint- 
' Capital Management know-how venture s subsidiary of parent Local marketing knowledge Marketing knowledge company 
Hole the proportion in stock 45 55 
right of parent company 
The management to the joint- The investor does not intervene The general manager is sent by 
venture's subsidiary of parent the subsidiary's daily operation the home company and he is in 
company is controlled activity, but have a meeting charge of Costco's main 
with the general manager operation. 
regularly 
The parent companies of both 
sides take subsidiary directors' 5 5 
percentage 
Achievement Since enters in Taiwan, the achievement grows up continuously 
and expands locations continually 
371 
Appendix 
Appendix 11-A: English Questionnaire A 
Bargaining Power, Ownership and Control 
of International Joint Venture in Taiwan 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
I am a doctoral research student in the Department of Management Studies at 
University of Glasgow in U. K. and a lecturer at the Department of Business 
Administration - National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences in Taiwan as 
well. For my research I am undertaking a study on the following topic:, `Bargaining 
Power, Ownership and Control of International Joint Ventures in Taiwan'. 
According to the Directory of Foreigner Investing in Taiwan it appears your company 
is an institute invested by foreign enterprises. This objective of this questionnaire is 
to identify the firm of joint venture and the Taiwanese parent of the joint venture. 
Responses will be used strictly for the purpose of academic research and not be for 
the public domain. All information is strictly confidential. You may return your 
completed questionnaire in the prepaid envelope provided. Thank you for taking time 
out of your busy schedule to assist is this. 
Yours Sincerely, 
The University of Glasgow 
Department of Management studies 
Supervisor: Doctor Michael Mayer 
Professor Luiz Moutinho 
Postgraduate student : Miss Min-Li Yang 
Contact telephone: (07) 3814526 ext 7305 
Fax number : (07) 3961245 
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A. On what basis was the company formed? Please tick one. 
Q 1. Sole trader 
Q 2. Wholly owned subsidiary 
Q 3. Overseas branch 
Q 4. Joint venture with other non Taiwanese partners 
Q 5. Joint venture with Taiwanese partners 
If you tick Boxes `1-4', please do not continue this questionnaire. Thank you very 
much for your cooperation, there is no need to return this form. 
If you tick Box `5' , please continue. 
B. Please list the domestic parent company's name, address and telephone number. 










Please return your completed questionnaire in the prepaid envelope provided 
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation 
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Appendix 11-B: English Questionnaire B 
Bargaining Power, Ownership and Control 
of International Joint Ventures in Taiwan 
Dear Director General, 
I am a doctoral research student in the Department of Management Studies at the 
University of Glasgow in the U. K. and also a lecturer in the Department of Business 
Administration - National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences in Taiwan. For 
my research I am undertaking a study on the following topic: `Bargaining Power, 
Ownership and Control of International Joint Venture in Taiwan'. Hopefully, with 
your assistance, this study could provide insights into the local joint venture relation 
affect bargaining power, ownership and control when Taiwanese companies create 
joint ventures with foreign firms, and the results could provide reference for the 
companies. 
Our data sources show that your company is the Taiwanese parent of an international 
joint venture and has high a profile in the industry. Your opinions will have a crucial 
influence on this study. It is requested that the senior manager who has a good 
knowledge of the background of the joint venture complete this questionnaire. This 
questionnaire is for the purpose of academic research only. Responses will be used 
strictly for entire analysis and will not be made public. All information is strictly 
confidential. Please return your completed questionnaire in the prepaid envelope 
provided. Thank you for taking time to assist in this study. 
Yours Sincerely, 
The University of Glasgow 
Department of Management studies 
Supervisor: Doctor Michael Mayer 
Professor Luiz Moutinho 
Postgraduate student : Miss Min-Li Yang 
Contact telephone: (07) 3814526 ext 7305 




1. For an international joint venture, we describe the partners involved as: 
Taiwanese Parent 
Taiwanese investment firms 
as `Your Company' 
(for example: President Group. ) 
Foreign Parent 
Foreign investment firms 
as `Foreign Parent' 
(for example: French's 
Carrefour Co. ) 
New firm invested by both o 
parent as `joint venture' 
(for example: Taiwan 
Carrefour Co. ) 
Child (Joint venture) 
2. If foreign investment firms are comprised of more than two companies, Please choose 
the foreign partner who has the highest percentage shareholding as reference. 
3. If there are more than two cases of international joint venture, please base your 
comments on the case is the most important and which you have deep knowledge. 
4. The senior managers include the general manager and other managers who have 
sound knowledge of the background of the joint venture. 
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Section A: The motivation for International Joint Venture Formation 
As far as your company is concerned, how important are the following motives for 
forming the Joint Venture? On a scale between 1 to 5, please tick the appropriate number 
according to their importance. 
Extremely Not at all 
important important 
54321 
Extremely Not at all 
important important 
54321 
1. Sharing a large sum of fixed costs 
2. Spreading the financial risk 
3. Reducing the risk caused by environment uncertainty 
4. Sharing the risk of business cycle l1 
5. Expanding the market and entering new markets 
6. Extending the range of products and services 
7. Reducing competition 
8. Acquiring the economies of scale of production and sale 
9. Conforming to Government policy I 
10. Maintaining or improving the competitive position 
11. Facilitating diversified development I1 
12. Learning international business knowledge 
13. Learning marketing knowledge 
14. Improving new product design ability from partner 
15. Learning management knowledge It 
16. Learning partner's human resource management 
17. Learning partner's manufacturing technology 
18. Acquiring low cost materials and components Il 
19. Acquiring sufficient capital 
20. Sharing partner's resource 
21. Acquiring partner's brands or patents 
22. Acquiring partner's manufacturing equipment and technology 
23. Improving ability on developing new technology 
24. Acquiring technology 
25. Technology transfer iiii 
26. Shortening the time from the product development to market entry it 
27. other, please specify iiii 
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Section B: The degree of contribution by each partner to the Joint 
Venture 
What degree of resource has been contributed by each partner to the joint ventures? 
Please tick one according to the degree of contribution. Please indicate on a scale of one 
to five your assessment of the resource contribution of each partner. 
Extremely high High Average Low Very low None 
543210 
Your company Foreign partner 
Extremely Very Nie 
Extremely Very 
high low high 
543210543210 
1. Financial resources 
2. Key components and raw material 
3. Land, machinery, equipment 
4. Providing high-level expertise 
5. Marketing and operation ability 
6. Marketing channel 
7. Technology or R&D resources 
8. Access to external capital 
9. Expertise of employees 
10. Access to public relation with 
local government 
11. Access to environmental knowledge 
12. Sharing brands or patent 
13. Sharing Know-how 
14. Sharing the knowledge of management 
15. Other, please specify 




Section C: Factors affecting the Bargaining Power 
To what degree do the following factors affect the bargaining power? Please tick each 
one according to their degree of influence. 
Extremely 




1. Technology ability 
2. Innovative ability 
3. Access to export markets 
4. Investment amount 
5. Access to financial resources 
6. Management experience 
7. Access to sale distribution channel 
8. The influence of host government 
9. Knowledge of the local markets 
10. The level of equity shares 








Section D: Operational Decision Making for the Joint Venture 
The following decisions with regard to the N are taken by whom? Please tick the 
partner/s taking the major responsibility for these decisions. 
* N( joint venture) means the new firm invested by your company and foreign partner. 
Your Foreign JV Your Co. Your Foreign Your Co. Not 
company Partner alone & foreign company. Partner & foreign applicable 
alone alone partner & JV & iv partner & 
iv 
1. Product design 
2. Pricing policy 
3. Production scheduling 
4. Manufacturing process 
5. Quality standards 
6. Cost budgeting 
7. Sales targets 
_ 8. Capital expenditures 
_ 9. Other, please specify 
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Section E: High level management Appointment 
Who appoints the management in the following areas for the Joint Venture? Please tick 
the partner/s responsible for the appointment of the following positions. 
* JV(joint venture) means the new firm invested by your company and foreign partner. 
Your Foreign N Your Co. Your Foreign Your Co. Not 
company Partner alone & foreign company. Partner & foreign applicable 
alone alone partner &N&N partner & 
N 
1. General manager 
2. Vice general manager 
3. Production manager 
4. Marketing manager 
5. Financial manager 
6. Personnel manager 
7. R&D manager 
8. Head engineer 
9. Other, please specify 
Section F: Company's Background 
1. When was your company founded? Year 
2. The number of employee: 
3. Current investment capital: NT$ million 
4. The average business volume last three years: NT$ million 
5. Country of incorporation of your foreign partner 
(1) Japan (2) America (3) United Kingdom 
(4) Germany (5) France (6) Canada 
(7) South Korea (8) Hong Kong (9) Others, please specify 
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7. The number of the N's board members represented by your company? 
(1) The total number of board member in the joint venture: 
(2) The number of seats on the board occupied by your company: 
8. What is the nationality of N's general manager? 
9. What is the major business activity of your company? 
(1) Mining (2) Food 
(3) Plastics (4) Textiles 
(5) Machinery / Equipment (6) Electrical Equipment/Cable 
(7) Chemicals (8) Glass/Ceramics 
(9) Paper Product & Printing (10) Steel 
(11) Rubber Products (12) Automobiles 
(13) Banking & Insurance (14) Trade/General Merchandise 
(15) Electronic (16) Construction 
(17) Transportation (18) Tourism 
(19) Others, 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
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Appendix 111-A: Chinese Questionnaire A 
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Appendix III-B: Chinese Questionnaire B 
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